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
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EXCHANGE



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1908

The Religious Teachers of Greece

GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED AT ABERDEEN
UNIVERSITY, 1904-06

By

James Adam, Litt.D.

Fellow and Senior Tutor of Emmanuel College, Cambridge

Edited, with a Memoir,
by his Wife

Adela Marion Adam



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*οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.*

XENOPHANES.

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PREFACE

THIS book represents the substance of the Gifford Lectures delivered in Aberdeen in December 1904, June and December 1905, and June 1906. The Lectures were revised by the author, and proofs were read and corrected by him down to the end of Lecture XVII. The MS. of the remaining Lectures was sent to the press about a fortnight before his death, and no proofs of this portion were seen by him, nor had he finally passed the sheets of any part of the book. He intended to go through the whole again carefully, verifying references where he had not already done so. This duty and the correction of Lectures XVIII-XXII have devolved upon me, and, as I have verified the references throughout, the responsibility for any errors that may be found in the text or footnotes, rests with me. A small part of the index had been made, and I have endeavoured to complete it on the same lines.

The author, when he thought that he might not live to finish his task himself, bade me make known his misgiving as to the merits of his work. He was acutely conscious of the difficulties of his subject, more particularly in dealing with Plato's metaphysics, but it may be said that he set down nothing, without taking

the most earnest pains to weigh conflicting views, and to form his own judgment by a careful study of all materials that he could collect. One of his last acts was to choose the motto from Xenophanes prefixed to the Lectures.

I wish to acknowledge, with the deepest gratitude, the help given to me, in the correction of the proofs or the preparation of the Memoir, by the Master of Emmanuel, Mr. P. Giles, Mr. L. Whibley, and Mr. T. R. Glover. Mr. Giles was good enough, in addition, to verify references in books to which I had not access. Most sincere thanks are also due to those friends who have entrusted me with letters, or sent notes concerning my husband's life and work.

A. M. A.

CAMBRIDGE, *March* 1908.

CONTENTS



LECTURE I

THE PLACE OF POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

	PAGE
Introduction—The feud between Greek philosophy and Greek poetry —Its causes to be sought in differences about religion—Evidence in support of this statement—Philosophy seldom just to her rival—Homer along with Hesiod represents the “orthodox” Greek conception of the divine nature—In what sense these two poets are the “makers” of the Greek theogony—The poet as a teacher in ancient Greece—Use of poetry in Greek educa- tion—Homer sometimes regarded as an encyclopædia of human knowledge—Allegorical interpretation of Homer—Later history of this method—Practical effect of the poetical theology on Greek life—Two main streams of development in Greek reli- gious thought, the poetical and the philosophical—Plan and scope of the inquiry	1-20

LECTURES II AND III

HOMER

Religion and theology of Homer—“All men have need of Gods”—
The divine omnipresence—Homeric polytheism—Fate in
Homer—The position of Zeus—Homer’s anthropomorphism—
Inherent dualism of the Homeric theology shown first in the
physical, secondly in the mental, and thirdly in the moral
attributes of the Gods—Tendency to spiritualise Zeus—Are the
Homeric Gods omnipotent and omniscient?—Homer’s incon-
sistency on this subject—Moral qualities of the Homeric Gods
—Here the vein of idealism is much less prominent—God in
Homer the cause of evil to men—Envy of the Gods—*Quem deus
vult perdere, prius dementat*—The Gods deceive mankind—Yet

are the givers of good and the guardians of justice—Was Homer conscious of the antagonistic elements in his theology?—The Homeric view of sacrifice and prayer—The conception of sin in Homer—Infatuation—Influence of circumstances on character—Responsibility for sin—Punishment of sin—Atonement—Homer's psychology—What does Homer mean by "self"?—He means the body rather than the soul—Death the separation of the soul from the body—The disembodied soul a phantom of the living man—Homer's view of immortality and the future world—Islands of the blest—Pathos of the Homeric view of life—Nobility of the Homeric man	21-67
---	-------

LECTURE IV

FROM HESIOD TO BACCHYLIDES

The Hesiodic poems—Progress in the <i>Theogony</i> from anarchy to law—Successive dynasties of Gods—Traces of a still higher Power—The Gods hardly as yet conceived as moral beings—The <i>Works and Days</i> —Attributes of Zeus—The divine justice—The Hesiodic doctrine of <i>daemons</i> —Justice, in Hesiod, rewards virtue, and is not merely the punisher of sin—Sacrifice and prayer—The moral law—Requite evil for evil, good for good—The five ages of the world—Hints of a golden age hereafter—Pessimism of Hesiod—The origin of evil—Immortality in Hesiod—The duty and dignity of labour—Remarks on the Homeric Hymns—Hope of immortality through initiation in the mysteries—Lyric and elegiac poetry—The inferior Gods more and more overshadowed by Zeus—Fate generally identified with the ordinance of Zeus—Religious interpretation of Destiny—Man's dependence on the Gods—Can man by searching find out God?—Righteousness of Zeus—Sins of the fathers visited upon the children—Hebrew parallels to the perplexity of Theognis about this and similar difficulties—Anticipations in gnomic poetry of the moral and religious doctrine of Greek drama—The morality of the Gods higher than in Homer—Other noteworthy features—Greek melancholy—The future life	68-91
--	-------

LECTURE V

ORPHIC RELIGIOUS IDEAS

The Orphic religious revival in the sixth century—Centres of Orphic teaching—Organisation of the brotherhoods—Authorities for early Orphism—Pantheistic character of Orphic theology—The	
--	--

	PAGE
body as the soul's prison-house or grave—Celestial origin of the soul—Fall of the soul through sin—The "wheel" or "circle of generation"—Transmigration—"Purity" and "purification" in Orphism—Purity to be attained by a particular way of life, and by religious rites and ceremonies—The "Orphic life"—Rules of abstinence—Ritual of Orphism—Plato's condemnation of Orphic religious practices—Orphic eschatology—The intermediate state—Reincarnation—No absorption of the individual—Orphic pictures of heaven—The "restoration of all things"—Contrast between Orphism and the Homeric religion in regard to their doctrines of immortality, sin, and the relation of the human to the divine—Deification in Orphism—Intellectualisation of Orphism by Plato	92-114

LECTURE VI

PINDAR

<p>Essentially religious character of Pindar's poetry—Connexion between Pindar and Apollo—His theology is anthropomorphic, but he endeavours to purge the legends of their grosser features—Passages illustrating the lofty idealism of his conception of the Godhead—No conflict between Zeus and Fate—Deification of the Fates—The goddess "Fortune" in Pindar—Various attributes of the Gods—Their omnipotence and omniscience—The divine justice rewards virtue as well as punishes vice—Providence—God is faithful and true—To Pindar, though frankly polytheistic, there is but one divine will determining the course of events, and that is the will of Zeus—The Greek doctrine of the "Envy of the Gods"—Pindar's treatment of the doctrine—Conception of sin in Pindar—Ever-recurrent warnings against insolence and pride—For the most part Pindar makes the transgressor himself responsible—Punishment of sin—The innocent suffer with the guilty—The "melancholy" of Pindar never sinks to pessimism—A characteristic feature of his poetry is the emphasis which he lays on aspiration and hope—Orphic and Pythagorean features in his anthropology—Immortality in Pindar—He bases the belief on the Orphic doctrine of the soul's divinity—Discussion of the eschatological passages and fragments—Metempsychosis—Reward and punishment in the future state—Pindar's interpretation of the <i>fortunatorum insulæ</i>—His debt to Orphism—Pindar and Plato—Conclusion</p>	115-137
--	---------

LECTURE VII

AESCHYLUS ✓

PAGE

Connexion of Greek tragedy with religion—Aeschylus pre-eminently a religious poet—The Promethean trilogy illustrates the substitution of harmony and justice for discord and violence in the divine government of the world—Zeus and Fate—Attributes of Zeus—Aeschylus is not a monotheist, although he believes in a single all-controlling will—The divine justice a cardinal feature of Aeschylean drama—Sin in Aeschylus—Are the gods authors of infatuation?—Doctrine of inherited guilt—The <i>Alastor</i> or family curse—Responsibility for sin—Tragic conflict of duties—The <i>lex talionis</i> —Punishment regarded as a discipline—How Aeschylus corrects the popular interpretation the “Envy of the Gods”—Attitude of the poet on the question of the divine truthfulness and purity—Immortality—Alleged Orphic and Pythagorean features—Influence of Homer—Judgment and punishment hereafter—No Elysium in the underworld of Aeschylus—The leading characteristic of his teaching is the stress which he lays on the punitive aspect of the divine justice—Contrast with Sophocles	138-162
---	---------

LECTURE VIII

SOPHOCLES ✓

The serenity of Sophocles as compared with Aeschylus and Euripides—Piety in Sophocles the foundation of virtue—Sophocles does not deliberately break with traditional theology—His doctrine of an eternal and immutable morality, or prior obligation to merely human law, illustrated from the <i>Antigone</i> —Religious significance of this doctrine—Sophocles' view of suffering—Though frequently the result of sin, suffering is yet compatible with moral innocence—Can undeserved suffering be reconciled with the divine justice?—The discipline of pain—Hope of recompense hereafter—Individual suffering may subserve the larger purposes of Providence and contribute to the universal harmony—Resemblance to Heraclitus—Is Sophocles a monotheist?—True religion, in Sophocles, means purity of heart—His sympathy for human weakness— <i>Imitatio Dei</i> —The “sense of tears” in Sophocles—Faith in Zeus forbids despair—The future life in Sophocles—Consideration of the relevant passages—Conclusion	163-183
--	---------

LECTURE IX

FROM THALES TO XENOPHANES

	PAGE
The saying of Thales that "all things are full of Gods" contains, perhaps, the germ of the later doctrine of the World-soul—Anaximander and his concept of the Infinite—Justice as a cosmic power—Anaximenes—How the cosmological teaching of these three thinkers points the way to monotheism—Pythagoras and his brotherhood—A half-religious, half-scientific foundation—Relation to Orphism—The Pythagorean doctrine of the soul—The pursuit of knowledge in early Pythagoreanism subordinate and auxiliary to moral salvation—Pythagorean dualism—Opposition of Limit and the Unlimited—Limit is apparently the active or formative, the Unlimited the passive principle—Later writers identify these with God and Matter—Pythagoras the first to make philosophy a way of life—Adoration of Pythagoras by his followers—Xenophanes of Colophon—Was he influenced by the Orphic movement?—His theological fragments—Dispute as to his monotheism—Evidence for and against the traditional view—Suggested solution—The God of Xenophanes is uncreated—Virtue and truthfulness of God—Conception of the Godhead as a moral ideal for humanity—the "one God" of Xenophanes is the World—Question of personality—In effect, Xenophanes deifies Nature	184-211

LECTURES X AND XI

HERACLITUS

Heraclitus of Ephesus—Life and temperament—He denounces alike the *vulgus*, the poets, and the philosophers—His famous book—Character and style of the surviving fragments—Proverbial obscurity of Heraclitus—Heraclitus first and foremost a prophet or seer—Regards himself as the vehicle of a new revelation to mankind—The Heraclitean doctrine of *Logos*—*Logos* not simply the discourse or treatise of Heraclitus—Fragments in which the *Logos* is described—The *Logos* eternal—a cosmic principle operating also in man—Is it only objective reason or law?—Indications showing that it is actively intelligent and thinks—It is apparently the divine reason immanent in Nature and in man—Arguments against this view considered—The *Logos* a unity, omnipresent, rational, and divine—Not, however, an immaterial essence—Identified with Fire—Fragments establish-

ing this identification—Rationality of Fire—Evidence of later authorities—Theological fragments of Heraclitus—Unity of God—No distinction between God and Logos—Occasional use of polytheistic terms—Deification of Fire—Part played by Fire in Heracliteanism—Fire the ever-changing reality of things—Ceaseless transmutation of the elements—Is the world, in Heraclitus, eternal?—Discussion of this question—Warfare of opposites throughout the world—Perpetual flux—Underlying harmony of opposites—The unity in which all opposites are reconciled is the Logos or God—Pantheism of Heraclitus not irreconcilable with Polytheism—Ethical doctrine of Heraclitus—Follow the Universal—Obedience to law—Evil is inseparable from good and contributes to the universal harmony—Individualism and self-seeking to be eradicated—Eschatology of Heraclitus—The relevant fragments betray the influence of Orphism—His great contribution is the doctrine of the Logos—Subsequent history of that doctrine in Plato, Stoicism, Philo, and St. John. 212-240

LECTURE XII

FROM PARMENIDES TO ANAXAGORAS

Parmenides of Elea—Distinction between the Philosophy of Truth and the Philosophy of Opinion—The Parmenidean concept of Being—Attributes of Being—Its materiality—Antagonism between the Heraclitean and Parmenidean points of view—Attempts at reconciliation—Empedocles of Agrigentum—His theory of the elements or roots of things—Introduction of the "movent cause"—Love and Hate—Love combines and Hate separates—Recurrent cycles in the life of the world—Theology of Empedocles—Denial of anthropomorphism—The sphere-God—Spiritualisation of Apollo—Created Gods—Deification of the elements—Love and Hate are also Gods—No real teleology in Empedocles—The corporeal and spiritual not really distinguished by Him—Universal diffusion of intelligence in things—Karsten's attribution of pantheism to Empedocles—Empedocles' theology not a harmonious whole—His ethical and religious teaching mainly Orphic—Anaxagoras of Clazomenae—His theory of *panspermia*—The primeval mixture—The world-forming *Nous*—Fragments in which it is described—Is the Anaxagorean *Nous* a corporeal substance?—Reasons for believing it to be incorporeal—Omniscience of *Nous*—*Nous* is omnipotent and supreme—Creative function of *Nous*—What led *Nous* to

	PAGE
create the world?—Difficulty about the action of Mind on Matter not touched on by Anaxagoras—the teleology of Anaxagoras—Strictures by Plato and Aristotle—Did Anaxagoras identify <i>Nous</i> with the Deity?—He is the founder of philosophic Theism in the Western World—His views on immortality—Conclusion	241-264

LECTURE XIII

THE AGE OF THE SOPHISTS

Foreshadowing of humanism in the *Nous* of Anaxagoras—Diogenes of Apollonia materialises *Nous* in the element of Air, combining Anaxagoreanism with the theory of Anaximenes—His pantheism and teleology—Views on immortality—Democritus, the high-priest of materialism—His physical theory does not require the assumption of a creative Mind—Allegorism in Democritus—Origin of the belief in Gods—Daemonology—Criticism of the belief in immortality—Spread of rationalism in Athens—The so-called Sophists—What is their place in the moral and religious development of Greece?—Not a philosophical school, but a profession of mutually independent teachers—Protagoras—The tendency of his instruction was to subvert the political and religious principles of the city-state, for “Man the Measure” means individualism in Ethics, and in Theology he was an agnostic—Gorgias—The rationalism of Prodicus and Critias a form of atheism—Prevalent distrust of oracles and divination—Denial of immortality—Hippias of Elis—The antithesis of nature and law operated destructively on the established order, but at the same time encouraged the development of humanism and cosmopolitanism—The negative and positive consequences of this antithesis illustrated from the literature of the time—General effect of the Sophistic movement was to overthrow but not to rebuild—Conclusion

265-285

LECTURES XIV AND XV

EURIPIDES ✓

Euripides as the poetical exponent of the Age of Enlightenment—His iconoclasm illustrated from the *Hippolytus*, the *Madness of Heracles*, and other plays—Exceptions to this attitude—In denying the Gods of Greece, does he intend to deny the ex-

instance of Gods altogether?—Sentiments suggestive of atheism or agnosticism—Positive contributions towards a purer theology contained in the poet's criticisms of the Olympian religion—Goodness essential to the Godhead—the Gods as moral ideals for mankind—A hint of monotheism—Self-sufficiency of the divine nature—Philosophical theology in Euripides—The "strange prayer" of Hecuba—Parallel from Wordsworth—Nestle's theory that Euripides was a follower of Heraclitus—In reality, Euripides has no uniform or consistent point of view—The humanism of Euripides—Views of death and immortality throughout his poems—Re-absorption in the divine element of aether—The prevailing pessimism of Euripides—Is the <i>Bacchae</i> intended as a palinode?—The leading motive of the play is to exalt enthusiasm above reason—In this consists the religious significance of the <i>Bacchae</i> , but the earlier rationalism is not yet extinct—Influence of Euripides on Greek religious thought	286-319
---	---------

LECTURES XVI AND XVII

SOCRATES

A new chapter in Greek thought begins with Socrates—Union of rationalism and transcendentalism in his temperament—The "supernatural sign"—He regards himself as a divinely-appointed minister to Athens—Religious significance of his devotion to Apollo—Socrates as a "physician of the soul"—His identification of vice with ignorance, virtue with knowledge—Discussion of this theory and its implications—The Socratic method, considered first on its destructive or cathartic, and second on its positive or constructive side—Substance of the Socratic teaching—"Know thyself"—He preaches the Gospel of Noocracy both for the individual and for the State—Rule of conduct as between man and man—His views on immortality—Theology of Socrates—God as the Reason who directs the world—Socrates' teleology is essentially anthropocentric, and its motive is religious rather than philosophical—Practical religion in Socrates—"Worship God according to the law of the State"—Lessons conveyed by this precept—The Socratic conception of sacrifice and prayer—Causes which led to the condemnation of Socrates—The historical significance of his trial and death	320-355
---	---------

LECTURE XVIII

PLATO.—THE COSMOLOGICAL DOCTRINE

PAGE

Plato's relation to Socrates—The simile of the Cave—The main lesson which it teaches is the reality of the invisible and eternal—Parallels from the New Testament—What are the chains that bind the soul?—The <i>Timaeus</i> of Plato—Platonic dualism—Plato's account of the creation of the body of the world—Principles underlying that account—The world as the expression in time and space of mathematical law—To what extent Necessity yields to the Good—The Soul of the World in the <i>Timaeus</i> —Why Plato endows the Universe with soul—Constituents of the World-soul—Its attributes of motion and intelligence—The world a "perceivable God," the "image of its Maker"—Comparison of the World-soul with the Logos of Heraclitus and of Philo—The World-soul a link between the infinite and the finite—What Plato means by the generation of the World-soul—The <i>Timaeus</i> a "hymn of the universe"—Influence of the dialogue on later religious thought .	356-374
---	---------

LECTURE XIX

PLATO (*continued*).—ELEMENTS OF ASCETICISM AND OF MYSTICISM

The "created Gods" of the <i>Timaeus</i> —Creation of the rational part of the human soul by the supreme God—Man's reason is divine, and this divine possession makes him specifically human—Creation of the body and the "mortal part" of soul by the subordinate Gods—Man a compound of mortality and immortality—The chains by which the prisoner in the cave is bound symbolise man's lower nature—During life Reason may either regain supremacy or still further lose it—Plato's anthropology compared with that of St. Paul—Different ways in which Plato describes the soul's deliverance—The <i>meditatio mortis</i> of the <i>Phaedo</i> —Comparison and contrast with St. Paul's doctrine of <i>necrosis</i> —In the <i>Symposium</i> the deliverance is effected by love of beauty and goodness—The earlier portion of the dialogue—The speech of Diotima—By means of love the soul rises to the contemplation of the invisible and eternal Beauty—Some points of contact between Platonic and Christian mysticism—Union of intellectual and religious enthusiasm in Plato .	375-397
--	---------

LECTURE XX

PLATO (*continued*).—THEORY OF EDUCATION

	PAGE
Value attached by Plato to education—Education in the <i>Republic</i> —The preliminary discipline—Plato's canons for a reformed theology—His own ideal of Poetry and Art—Comparison with Milton—The higher or philosophical curriculum—Relation of the two schemes to one another—The philosophical discipline confined to a select class—Natural qualifications of the philo- sopher-king—The ascent into the realm of Being—Education in Plato presupposes the presence in every man of a divine element, which it endeavours to turn from darkness to light— Parallels from the New Testament—The different studies in the Platonic curriculum—Plato the founder of University education —Mathematical science in Plato a revelation of the Godhead, but the soul's deliverance is not complete till it has risen beyond mathematics to the immediate contemplation of the supreme Idea of Good	398-421

LECTURES XXI AND XXII

PLATO (*concluded*).—THE THEORY OF IDEAS

The Theory of Ideas—Aristotle's account of the genesis of the Theory
—The Ideas, in Plato, stand for the *real*—At once transcendent
and immanent—The transcendence of the Ideas—Their various
attributes, unity, changelessness, and perfection—The Idea is
the hypostasised type, standard, or ideal in manufactured
objects, in the creations of nature, above all, in the domain of
art and morality—Why the Idea is of necessity transcendent—
Plato's religion the uplifting of the soul towards this realm of
perfection—Virtual deification of the Ideas—The Ideal World
described in the language of the mysteries—Immanence of the
Ideas—"Communion," "participation," "presence"—The
transcendent immanence of the Idea comparable to the Christian
doctrine of the transcendent immanence of God—Intellectual
difficulties involved in this conception—Parallel from St.
Augustine—The "presence" of the Idea denotes the re-
semblance of the particular to its Idea—Paradigmatic conception
of the Ideas—Christian parallels to Plato's way of representing
the relation of Ideas to particulars—The Idea of Good, as
described in the *Republic*—The Good transcends both Know-

CONTENTS

xix

PAGE

ledge and Reality, and is the cause of both—Is the Idea of Good to be identified with God?—Arguments in favour of the identification—The Good in Plato not a mere inanimate abstraction—In its creative aspect inseparable from soul or life—Identical with the “true and divine mind”—Parallel from Dante—Inferences to be drawn from the sovereignty of the Good—Nature a revelation of God—Teleology in Plato—Is evil nothing but negation?—Dualism not eliminated—The Good as the final cause—Man as co-worker with God against the forces of evil—Does Plato believe in the ultimate triumph of Good?—In the soul, perhaps, but hardly in the material universe—How we may attain to knowledge of the Ideas—The science of Dialectic—Hierarchy of Ideas—Comparison with the Christian doctrine of celestial hierarchies—The universe of knowables an organic whole—Contrast between the mathematical and dialectical methods—Dialectic proceeds through hypotheses to the un-hypothetical first principle, which is the Good—Permanent value of this method—Plato’s dialectic an ideal—Immortality in Plato—Conclusion 422-460

MEMOIR



JAMES ADAM was descended on each side from a typical stock of rural Aberdeenshire. His father, who was also named James Adam, worked for some time as a farm-servant, but had ambitions beyond this calling. He used to study Latin while following the plough, and had thoughts of becoming a missionary, though he took no steps in this direction beyond practising lay-preaching in his neighbourhood. At about the age of twenty-six he went into Aberdeen to learn the trade of a merchant, or general village shopkeeper; and then returning to his own part of the country he took a small shop at Kinmuck, a hamlet consisting of not more than a dozen scattered houses, on high ground some three and a half miles south-east of Inverurie, in the valley of the Don. To the north and east the country is very bare and featureless: nothing is to be seen but an expanse of rolling hillside, divided with pitiless regularity by "dykes" (stone walls) into fields of grass, oats, or "neeps" (turnips). White rough-cast or "harled" homesteads are planted every few hundred yards; but for miles around there is an absence of any collection of houses compact enough to be called a village. To the south the land slopes down to the river Don, and at a short distance uphill, along the road to Inverurie, the chief glory of the neighbourhood comes into view, the noble hill of Benachie,¹ dearly-

¹ The *ch* as in the German *Fach*.

beloved of the inhabitants of the countryside for its form and rich colour. Trees are scarce, except for straggling lines of firs along the roadside; but in summer there is an abundance of yellow broom and wild pansies, whose purple seems here more intense than in less northerly regions.

James Adam's venture in shopkeeping prospered. He presently married Barbara Anderson, who came from a race of small crofters living at the "hill-foot," about fifteen or twenty miles away, on the western borders of Aberdeenshire. Of her early days Mrs. Adam writes: "I was the youngest of ten; we were all brought up on a small farm in the parish of Clatt. The boys were sent to school, but they thought in those days that, if girls could read and write, it was all that was needful for them. As soon as we were able to work, we were sent away to earn our own living, as my parents were very poor."

Seven children were born from this marriage: first a daughter, next, on April 7th, 1860, a son, James, and then five other daughters, of whom one died in infancy. Soon after the birth of James the family moved to new and larger premises close by, consisting of a good-sized shop for general trade, with dwelling-house and large garden, and a smaller house next door containing a tailor's workshop. The old thatched house, where James Adam the son was born, has now disappeared, and a new farmhouse has been built in its place.

The great ambition of James Adam the father was to give all his children the best education possible. His eldest daughter well remembers hearing him speak of this desire, though she was not more than ten years old when he died. A few farmers round about combined with him to build a small schoolhouse at Kinmuck, and he helped to maintain the schoolmistress by receiving her as a boarder at the low rate of five shillings a week.

He also bought several expensive maps for the school, as he was distressed that the children should learn geography only out of books. In every way he seems to have been a leading man in his neighbourhood, ready to help in all cases of distress, and also active in the intellectual as well as the commercial and religious life of the district. Essays are still in existence, written by him for local societies. His piety was fervent, so much so that every morning he would retire to spend a quarter of an hour alone in private prayer. All his life he attended the Congregational Church at Inverurie founded by his father, which had begun by meeting in the Town Hall, but by this time had a building of its own. His children used to drive over with him every Sunday morning.

When his boy Jamie (pronounced in Aberdeenshire Jeemie) was about seven years old, Professor Black came to inspect the little school at Kinmuck, and picked out the lad as showing special promise. "That boy will come to something yet," he remarked, as he patted him on the head; and the father went home with pride to tell the mother. Alas! the father was not to see how amply the prophecy was fulfilled, for about a year later, at the early age of forty-three, he fell a victim to a local epidemic, and died of pleurisy following typhoid fever. His memory is still cherished in the countryside. Both the eldest daughter and Jamie also suffered from the fever; but, though Jamie was a delicate boy, neither of them seems to have been permanently injured by the serious illness. After this tragedy Mrs. Adam, with splendid determination, carried on the business of the shop, and by her ceaseless efforts brought up and started in life her six children. Long after they were all grown up she continued the work, with the sole assistance at last of one daughter, besides the tailor who was employed on the premises, and it was not till Sep-

tember 1906 that she could be prevailed upon to retire to a house in Inverurie, built by her son-in-law.

Shortly before the death of his father the little Jamie Adam won a prize at Kinmuck school—I copy from the inscription in the actual volume—"Awarded by the votes of his schoolfellows for good conduct." That night, however, he was sorely distressed, for, while playing at horses during the day, he had acted the part of a ploughboy driver with too great realism, and had made use of an unparliamentary expression. His conscience pricked him, and he thought the prize had not been justly earned. The school building is still there, but the school no longer exists.

At ten years old he begged his mother to send him to the parish school of Keithhall, about a mile away. While he was there, according to his elder sister, he never prepared a single lesson, and learnt next to nothing. The master, Mr. Brown, wished him to begin Latin, but the first night's preparation caused such weeping over the declensions, that his mother said he might give it up. He used to march off in the morning, dressed in a suit with a pair of striped fancy moleskin trousers, and armed with a flask of milk and a "bread and syrup piece." He would sometimes speak in his later years of his troubles with the big rough boys at the school. On one occasion at least he was made to fight before the assembled school, and returned home after the ordeal bearing the marks of the fray.

After two years at Keithhall school, Jamie, aged twelve, and his elder sister were sent to live with an aunt, Mrs. Ewing, and her husband, in Aberdeen. There he attended the Free South Church school under Mr. Ramage. This school had considerable fame at the time, and here Jamie Adam seems to have been fired with a desire to excel. He worked very hard, and at the end of the year carried off all the first prizes—an achievement

the more remarkable because of the meagreness of his earlier education. According to his sister's recollection, it was at this school that his enthusiasm for work began. But the following year, 1873, he returned home and told his mother that he was not going back to school, but was going into the shop. His mother's opinion was that he would be the better for another year at school, but he would not hear of going back, and (I quote Mrs. Adam's own words) "he began selling; but whenever the customer went out, he had his book on the desk, and he went off to it at once. After a short time he got tired of the shop, and said to me that he would stay if I wanted him to do so, but that he would never be happy at the back of the counter." His mother wisely saw that it would be for the happiness of neither of them, if he were to be kept at an uncongenial occupation, so she told him that she would manage the shop, and he might "go back to the learning." There does not seem, on this occasion, to have been any question of going back to school in Aberdeen, and he returned to his old school at Keithhall, where there was now a new master, Mr. George Kemp, M.A., of Edinburgh University. To Mr. Kemp Adam owed a very great debt, for there is no doubt that he played an exceedingly large part in fostering the love of learning that had begun to spring up, during the previous year, in Aberdeen. His mother says of this time: "He used to sit with his lesson-book before him, and learn his lessons, and play the flute at the same time. He was a tender-hearted and most affectionate boy, and most persevering: everything had to be well done." Mr. Kemp, who still (1908) holds the post of master of Keithhall school, writes as follows: "Dr. Adam entered with me on the 14th October 1873. . . . He took very kindly to the work, and made rapid progress. He began the study of Latin *de novo*. In about a week he had got the length of the third de-

clension, when Professor Christie, examiner for the Milne Bequest Trust, visited the school. The Professor, after testing his proficiency thus far, remarked: 'Aye, aye! laddie, ye're daein' fine, but you're a lang wye frae the first bursary.' On hearing this, from what I had seen of the *laddie*, my thought was 'he may take the first bursary, if he goes on as he is doing.' In a few weeks he began Greek. I am not particularly fond of Greek . . . but was rather pleased to have a Greek pupil. In the report on the inspection of the school on 11th February 1875 by Dr. Kerr, the following remark is made regarding the *laddie*, 'The most advanced pupil showed unusually sound drill in Latin, Greek, and mathematics.' Although I have some claim to having led him to acquire a taste for classics, I must say that I tried to get him to specialise in mathematics. He, however, chose the right path, and Professor Geddes led him gloriously on."

Adam used often to speak of the extraordinary attraction Greek had for him from the first—"The letters looked so nice," he would say, and he would describe how he used to walk up and down the garden at Kinmuck, devouring the Greek grammar. He remained at Keithhall school till July 1875. During his holidays he often spent several weeks at his mother's old home at Clatt, with her sister, Mrs. Cook, and her brother, Mr. Anderson. There he would get up at 5.30, breakfast off porridge and milk (and nothing else), go off to the heather with his books, and come back again at twelve for a dinner perhaps of cabbage or kail or milk broth.

His cousin, the Rev. W. Anderson, who was his constant companion during these holiday visits, writes an account of the two boys' long tramps over the hills to fish in the Gadie and other seldom fished streams, where they could be sure of getting a bite. When they came home, Jamie Adam would tell highly glorified

accounts of the day's adventures, for the benefit of the family circle. His extreme fondness for his mother and sisters is especially well remembered by Mr. Anderson, whose father, now aged eighty-eight, recollects how Adam used to "accompany him to the field to work, and discussed farm problems with all the keenness and discrimination of an experienced hand."

By this time he had fully resolved to go to college, and was spurred on by the inspector above mentioned, Dr. Kerr,¹ who told him that he ought to go. Besides his school work, he, of his own accord, procured and worked through a great many Latin and Greek "versions" (*Anglicæ*, prose composition exercises), correcting them by means of keys. He was wanted at home to give help in the Kinmuck shop during the latter part of 1875, but in all spare moments he was busy with his books, working by himself. One or two of the friends in the neighbourhood remonstrated with his mother for letting her boy attempt a University career. They thought it was his duty to stay and use his powers for the benefit of the locality. Mrs. Adam, however, was unshaken, seeing clearly the stuff that was in her son.

The next step was to go for a few months to the Old Grammar School in Old Aberdeen, in order to supplement Mr. Kemp's valuable training by the instruction of Dr. Dey, whose name was one to conjure with among the would-be holders of bursaries or entrance scholarships to the University of Aberdeen. The competition for these bursaries was extremely keen, and perhaps a good deal of the blame for overworking her best sons, which is laid to the charge of the University, should be put down to the pressure endured before entering her gates. Soon after Adam had gone to this school a Greek exercise was prescribed. His work was publicly commended, somewhat to

¹ In Dr. Kerr's *Memories Grave and Gay* he refers to this without giving the name.

the surprise of his companions ; and his pride was raised high when Dr. Dey further remarked of the new boy's performance, "and what is more, he has put on all the accents." That word of praise gave him lifelong pleasure. The Bursary Competition was held in October 1876, and he came out third out of some two or three hundred candidates.

The life of an Aberdeen student of those days was an over-strenuous one. Living in lodgings, with no supervision, and no care but that of a landlady who might or might not be competent, the students vied with one another in the race for prizes and medals to an abnormal degree. The love of knowledge for its own sake was strong, but the spirit of competition ran unduly high, and was not checked, but rather fostered by the several professors. In after life Adam used frequently to say—and the original dictum is attributed to the late Professor Bain—"All distinguished Aberdonians die before they are fifty." Unhappily there is but too much truth in the statement, as far as academic distinction is concerned. On October 17, 1907, the *Cambridge Review* contained obituary notices of two of these graduates, Professor Strachan of Manchester and James Adam himself, aged respectively forty-five and forty-seven ; and the list includes the names of Robertson Smith, Croom Robertson, Minto, R. A. Neil, and others. Mr. Neil in *Aurora Borealis Academica*, p. 30, mentions "that disregard of simple rules of health and work which has had much to do with those gaps in the class lists of twenty or thirty years ago, that make them like army lists in time of war." It is pathetic to reflect that, two years after this passage was published, Mr. Neil's death made one of the largest of these gaps.

At Aberdeen Adam received, as he himself says in the opening sentence of his Gifford Lectures, "the greatest intellectual impulse of his life." Of all his teachers none

exercised an influence over him comparable to that of Professor Geddes, who then held the Greek chair, and afterwards became Sir William Geddes, Principal of the University. For him Adam had an enthusiastic admiration and an almost filial affection, which was engendered by the very unusual interest which the Professor took in his eager pupil. To his kindness Adam practically owed his subsequent career; and he was never tired of referring to the stimulus he had received not only in the Greek class, but also by his intercourse with Professor Geddes at other times. In later years, whenever he came to Aberdeen, he, and in due course his wife also, were most warmly welcomed by Sir William and Lady Geddes; and Lady Geddes still likes to say that her husband looked upon Adam more as a son than as a pupil. Greek was the subject in which Adam, though he did well in all parts of his degree course, outstripped everyone. For his degree he had to pass at one time or another, according to the system of that day, in Latin and Greek, English, mathematics, zoology, geology, physics, logic, and metaphysics. In the opinion of Mr. Giles, of Aberdeen and Emmanuel College, Cambridge, the defects of this training, of which he thinks highly, "were that there was so little supervision, that the examinations being largely upon work done in the various classes led to cram, and that the professors were too ready to spur the willing horse, with the result that it came to be thought almost a virtue to sit up working to all hours of the night or morning."

There is no doubt that the work, whatever its merits may have been, was too heavy; and besides this formidable list of pass subjects, the better candidates prepared themselves for Honours in classics, mathematics, or philosophy. Even the examinations were conducted under extra high pressure. Instead of a *maximum* of three hours for a paper to which English schools and

universities are accustomed, Aberdeen students had sometimes to endure papers of four hours' length. No wonder that breaking-down was a common occurrence, or that the effects of the strain were felt severely in after life. During part of his course, Adam's letters show that he had thoughts of taking Honours in philosophy as well as in classics, but in the end he gave up the philosophy. He speaks also of studying Sanskrit and German, apparently solely for his satisfaction; but there are also signs of weariness. In 1879 he writes to his sister: "With my weighty head burdened with care and anxiety as to what I am to do when I leave College, and wretched discomfort and corroding disgust and general debility and what not, I'm afraid I'm going to sink."

The following week he writes, "Wouldn't it have been nice if we could always have remained wee little creatures, running about with no thought save of pleasure, nothing to vex ourselves about, and nothing to grind? Speaking of grinding, I confess I feel in a queer sort of humour with regard to that, and have done so for some time. I think it is all very good to boast about the pleasures and nobilities of knowledge and all that, but where is the practical use of it all? What is the use of filling our minds with all sorts of miscellaneous knowledge, most of which will doubtless never do us any immediate service, and very little indirect good?" It is only fair, however, to say that, in this letter, his rebellious mood seems to have been roused by someone who is "thumping away at something which pretends to be a piano," in a way which is "perfectly maddening to one who has a taste for music like me."

In general, however, his spirits were buoyant. He had a genius for making friends, and one and all speak of his power of affection, which was perhaps even more markedly shown in his dealings with his pupils, when he became a College lecturer and tutor at Cambridge. His

class-fellow, the Rev. G. Pittendrigh, writes : " We went walking tours together. We tramped through Ross-shire and Skye one year ; another year we went down the Clyde. . . . He used to pour forth his soul in talk, not about men or things, but about ideas. Even then Plato was becoming his teacher and inspiration, and speculation on the great facts of life and death was his constant theme ; but always in a more or less playful mood. Through even the most serious of our talks there ran a ripple of fun. He delighted in the intellectual interest which they afforded. That, I think, was to him their main charm. In those days he hardly felt them to be practical problems of life. Of the usual young men's sports we had none. We did not think of them : we never missed them. Nothing but walks, with the never-ending stream of fresh talk. During the terms we saw much less of each other. These were months of strenuous labour, and we buried ourselves perhaps over much in our books."

In this description of his conversation we may trace the qualities that made his College lectures a source of delight to hearers from all the Colleges in Cambridge. The outpouring of ideas, the enthusiasm for Plato, the speculation on the great facts of life, the never-absent playfulness, and, above all, the sympathy with his audience, these were the constant features of his discourses ; and even when at other times of the day he would be troubled with serious mental depression, in the lecture-room his vitality was always overflowing.

Mr. Giles, who entered the University two years after him, and followed him first to Caius and then to Emmanuel at Cambridge, has a vivid recollection of seeing him for the first time in front of the chapel at King's College, Aberdeen. Adam was pointed out as " the great Greek scholar of the Tertian year." Mr. Giles was greatly astonished to see a boyish figure, with a fresh

pink and white complexion, and fair, almost flaxen, hair, looking not more than fourteen, though in reality he was nearly nineteen.

There was no class for Honours men in Greek, but among the subjects of examination were prose and verse composition. Professor Geddes, taking a wider view of his duties than did some of his colleagues, helped his students by looking over such verses as they might write spontaneously. One day Adam presented a translation of the passage from Macbeth, "Is this a dagger which I see before me?" beginning:


ὦ θεοί, τί λεύσω; μῶν ἐναντίον ξίφος
κώπην προτείνον τῆδε δεξιᾷ χερί;

Professor Geddes was struck by the copy (which he published in course of time in the collection of verses by Aberdeen students called *Flosculi Graeci Boreales*), and he told me, many years afterwards, that it was this version that made him believe in the possibility of his students competing successfully, in this branch of scholarship, with English public school boys. The verses were generously praised; and Adam's soul was uplifted, as it always was, when he met with commendation. He went out, and marched up and down the seashore at Old Aberdeen, repeating the lines in ecstasy, especially the *μῶν ἐναντίον ξίφος*, which struck his own fancy particularly.

Professor Geddes' schemes presently began to take a practical shape. Hitherto such Aberdeen classical students as had gone on to an English University had, as a rule, chosen Oxford, always excepting Mr. R. A. Neil, who took his degree at Cambridge in 1876. It is highly probable that Mr. Neil was consulted by Professor Geddes, and advised that more men should be sent up to Cambridge, more especially if they should be good at Latin and Greek composition. Anyhow, Professor Geddes

recommended Adam to go South and try for a scholarship at Gonville and Caius College. At the end of May 1879 Adam was attending a summer class held by Mr. Ramsay, now Sir W. M. Ramsay, the distinguished Latin professor at Aberdeen, who was then assistant to Professor Geddes. Mr. Ramsay was also of opinion that Adam should try to transfer himself to Cambridge, as is shown by the following letter, dated May 30, 1879. "Last night I was across dining with Ramsay, and he advises me to go up to Cambridge and compete on 16th March. This I intend to do, if by any means I can be back in time for my own examinations here; and I think it is quite possible. . . . If I go up to Cambridge at the time I was speaking of, I shall not go up with any great hopes of success, the more so that the number of scholarships to be competed for is almost infinitesimally small. But never venture, never win, as Ramsay says, who thinks I stand a very good chance."

The idea once mooted held its ground, and was carried out. In the interval Adam must have been more busily employed than ever. In addition to his heavy work for the Aberdeen classical Honours, he took a pupil for a few months in 1879, being recommended by Mr. Ramsay. On June 10th he writes: "I am in a tremendous hurry either to get outside or else to stop in and study something disgustingly stiff, *i.e.* the *Republic* of Plato—only I hope that I shall be able to conquer the allurements of the weather and prevail on myself to stop in and grind." This uncomplimentary allusion is the first surviving mention of the work which was to be the main study of his life. It does not appear that he had as yet any distinct notions as to his future career. A college lad from the country might naturally be expected to "wag his pow in a poopit" eventually, but the following extract from a letter in June is not to be taken too



seriously. "You will see the marriage of Harvey Adam's sister in the papers. I see it is a J. Adam, M.A., that married her. When will another Rev. J. Adam, M.A., be performing a wedding ceremony for one of his sisters?" Later on, he used to wish to be a Bishop—what would his grandfather, the founder of the Inverurie Congregational Church, have said?—and in 1906, while occupying a Dorsetshire Rectory during the Long Vacation, he wrote to one of his colleagues, expressing his fervent longing to be a country parson, more, I am afraid, on account of the peace and beauty of the scenery, than from a desire to benefit his parishioners.

The winter of 1879–1880 passed in the usual round of steady work, and in March 1880 came the great venture into "the arena of the south" (a favourite phrase of Professor Geddes). He went to Cambridge, was successful in obtaining a scholarship at Gonville and Caius College, and returned to undergo his degree examinations immediately afterwards. He thus describes his experiences:

"With exams. without end on one's mind, how can one attain the degree of composure necessary to write a long sensible letter? Well, now I am through with *all* my examinations. And on the whole I have done exceedingly well; I think I am dead certain of the Greek prize and the Latin medal.

"You wish me to give you an account of everything. Well, I will, though it should take me the whole afternoon, and reduce me to bankruptcy, through wasting of ink and paper. On Saturday, March 20, Smith and I left Aberdeen station at 4.5 p.m. amid a group of affectionate friends, consisting of some classfellows who had congregated to bid us God-speed. . . . Reached Edinburgh about ten, and had to wait some minutes, during which I walked up and down the station. . . .

Back to the train and out with Geddes' huge mantle¹ (may all the good divinities bless him for it!), and wrapped myself up in it, and tried to sleep. No go. . . . Oh! I did feel seedy and shivering as the night wore on, and still more so when the first streaks of light fell on the fields that appeared out at the window, and showed a tremendous coating of hoar-frost covering the grass: a sight that made me shiver again and again. At length after groaning in the spirit and the flesh incessantly for a long time we reached Hitchin. There we waited two miserable hours. . . . Cambridge reached about eleven o'clock, so I hired a cab and drove to Caius College. Found the porter, and was taken by him to the tutor, who took me to my rooms in College. Felt very squeamish at the idea of being so far from home, and was very much inclined to do a weep; in fact, I did drop a tear or two over a letter I wrote to mother telling her that I had got safely housed. Luncheon on cold bacon or something equally execrable. . . . Dinner in Hall at half-past five was the event of the day. I went down looking very green . . . and sat down amid the assembly with face unabashed. In fact I was hungry. . . . I went to bed about ten. Slept beautifully till I heard the bedmaker (oh! how ugly all these bedmakers are! I am informed that the College authorities get them ugly on purpose) knocking at my door and informing me that chapel was at eight. Slowly and with deliberation I arose, but I didn't go to chapel. Monday's experiences were like Sunday's, except that I got on rather better at dinner. . . . Oh! but on Monday I called on Neil, Fellow of Pembroke College, an Aberdeen man to whom Geddes gave me a letter of introduction. He was awfully kind, and I went out a walk with him; he was going to the river to have a row. . . .

¹ He never ceased to retain a grateful recollection of Professor Geddes' kindness in coming to the station with a big wrap to keep off the cold from his favourite pupil.

"Then on Tuesday morning Gardiner¹ (that was the other successful candidate) and I breakfasted with Reid,² a Fellow of Caius, and then came the examinations: as to which I need not tell you that I thought I had done horribly, and had not the ghost of a chance. . . .

"On Wednesday . . . I dined with R. Neil, M.A., Fellow of Pembroke College. He is a splendid fellow is Neil; he was second classic at Cambridge and Craven Scholar, and it was with reference to him as the only one holder of that Scholarship who has come from Aberdeen that Geddes said he had just one other ambition to gratify before he died, namely, to get another Craven Scholarship to³ the University of Aberdeen: meaning my humble self. Reached Aberdeen 'weary and sad at heart' (quotation from my paper on Keats) at one o'clock on Thursday. . . .

"I intended to go over to Geddes that afternoon. So I did, and he was very fatherly; hoped I was not awfully tired and wouldn't catch cold, made me stop tea and have a long chat with Mrs. Geddes and Miss Geddes. Mrs. Geddes said, 'Oh! you do look so tired, it almost makes me sleepy to look at you!'

"Next day I was a hero in the class, though I had not heard the result: the fellows clustered round me, welcoming me back to Aberdeen, and asking all about Cambridge. Whereupon I told them that Aberdeen was a musty old hole, and that the only place worth living at was Cambridge. This, of course, produced an immense impression. . . .

"I do not know how to thank you for the letters you have sent me during the winter. I have been working hard on the whole; and many a time I have been far

¹ *Sic.* It should be Gardner. Mr. E. A. Gardner became the most intimate friend of his undergraduate days.

² Dr. Reid, now Professor of Ancient History at Cambridge.

³ *Anglicæ* "for."

gone in the doldrums, and your letters have cheered me up immensely. I am getting more and more sensible the longer I live of all the good that my sisters have done me. I do not know how I would do without you all. God grant that I may one day be able to repay you in some measure. . . .

“Remember you must be very particular in putting M.A. to¹ the back of my letters . . . on and after Saturday, except when I am at Cambridge, and then I am simply

JAMES ADAM, Esq.,

Scholar of Gonville and Caius College,
Cambridge.

“(Excuse my writing it out in full, I like to look at it.)

“I heard from the Senior Tutor the other day: he tells me that I was second in the Examination, but that I acquitted myself remarkably well, as was indeed shown (he adds) by the amount of my Scholarship.² He further states that if Gardiner and I go on as well as we have begun, he has no doubt that our year will be the best Classical Year that the College has ever had. Think of that! By and by, I hope, if I do well, to have a good income; and then, though it has been long delayed, I shall be able to do something for you all.

“Did I ever write such a long letter? Never, I believe. Our Class Supper is on Thursday night (Bursary Night), and Graduation the day after.”

These exciting days, which decided his future career, and started the two chief friendships of his life—those with the late Mr. R. A. Neil, and Mr. Ernest Gardner, now Professor of Archaeology at University College, London,—were followed by further cause for elation; the result of the Aberdeen examination gave him first class classical Honours, together with the Simpson Greek Prize and the

¹ *Anglice* “on.”

² £70.

Seafeld Latin Medal. It will be remembered that he thought himself "dead certain" of both these distinctions.

But there was to be no holiday, or very little, that summer. If he was to go to Cambridge more funds must be forthcoming, and, according to his own saying, he never worked so hard as during the summer of 1880 (at his home at Kinmuck), in the hope of winning the Ferguson Scholarship, open to all the four Scottish Universities. He was again successful, and he also won the Fullerton Scholarship at Aberdeen. With these three scholarships he had enough to pay his expenses at Cambridge, whither he proceeded in October, taking up something like £90 in cash, in his pocket, on the journey. His letters are scathing in his criticism of undergraduate slang, but highly complimentary to the food supplied in Hall. "At desert" (*sic*) [spelling was occasionally something of a stumbling-block] "we have among other ineffably good things, apple tart, stewed pears, all sorts of puddings, and many other kinds of tarts: varied with an occasional plum-pudding or compound of all the kitchen-scum at which we turn up our noses in a row and say, 'Blowed! but that is beastly,' or 'Hanged! but that looks bad.'" He thinks a Cambridge egg "a shabby thing, of which any Aberdeenshire hen would be thoroughly ashamed." By November he considers that "that dignity of presence, that loftiness of aspect, and that refinement of pronunciation, spiced with a little judicious slang, which characterise a Cambridge man," are now beginning to adorn him, and "to harmonise excellently well" with his "Cambridge moustachio." He is rapturous over the buildings, but does not like the climate. "A stranger would think it fairyland; but if he had to attend morning-chapel in these freezing mornings he would very soon change his opinion. The frost last night was [savage—'perfectly awful': this low-lying place—not a hill is visible all round—hardly

so much as a mole-hillock—seems very congenial to frost. So it is to rain when it comes: occasionally a 'great plague of immoderate rain and waters' (the phrase is from the English Prayer-Book) floods all the vicinity of Cambridge, and substitutes navigation for pedestrianism. But this is rare."

His life at Cambridge as an undergraduate went on as before in an unbroken course of work; and, though he no doubt was one of the hardest readers in his College, his letters show that he thought it a much easier form of existence than at Aberdeen; in fact he sometimes grumbles at its laziness. From notebooks we may see the very large amount of reading he got through. The Classical Tripos had been remodelled just before he came up, and in his second year he went in for Part I, when the examination under the new scheme was held for the second time. Two months before the Tripos he writes: "In the College Exams. I have been bracketed equal with Gardner. If I do as well in the Tripos, I ought to get into the second division of the first class." When the time came, he was placed in the first division of the first class. In Part II, he gained a first class with distinction in Scholarship, Philosophy and Philology. The First Chancellor's Medal for Classics also fell to him; and the only time he met with disappointment was when the Craven Scholarship was wrested from him by a candidate in the year below him.

Mr. Ernest Gardner says of Adam's undergraduate work: "During the earliest part of his Cambridge career he was sometimes beaten in the competition for scholarships or prizes by others whose scholarship was not so wide and thorough as his own, merely because he had not gone through the particular form of drill in these matters which English public schools devote to the end of obtaining these distinctions. But it was evident to all who knew him and his work that he was

gaining ground upon his competitors every day ; and it was no surprise when he ended his undergraduate career as clearly the best classical scholar of his year." The late Dr. B. H. Kennedy wrote, after Adam had taken his degree : " During the eighteen years in which I have examined as Greek Professor I have known no instance in which mental and scholarly growth, during the four years of study at our University, has been so manifest and so signal."

At Caius his friendly nature had freer play than at Aberdeen. He writes in an undated letter : " I have had Wiseman and Gardner to breakfast to-day, and we consumed a cold chicken. I am getting to like both more and more ; they are certainly far the finest spirits I have ever known. We form a little transcendental circle here in Caius, and we try to look beyond the shells to the real essence of religion, and we there see sights which it is not lawful to utter. Gardner uses the Key of Art to open the door of Heaven, Wiseman that of the Higher Music, I that of philosophy ; and we call our religion variously by the names of Platonism, the Higher Life, and the Higher Pantheism, or even the Higher Christianity, for we believe them all to be identical. We worship God in Nature, and in the sayings and deeds of the best men : we cherish a healthy contempt for theologians, falsely so called, who mistake the earth for the pure Gold, the letter for the spirit : and we believe it is nearly time for a new Gospel to be preached, that those who have been robbed by the Church of the priceless pearl of their faith may find it again, purified and glorified, and so be even happier than before. Such is our faith."

Mr. Wiseman's recollection confirms the impression given by this letter of Adam's rhapsodising tendencies at this time. He says : " In his early undergraduate days he was quite an enthusiastic Platonist, and his literary

sympathies were largely determined by the Platonic tendency of an author's mind: for instance, one of the favourite poems was Wordsworth's 'Ode on Immortality,' and I believe he read a paper on it at the Science and Art Society.¹ What attracted him in the poem was the Platonic theory of pre-existence, and he imagined it was suggested to Wordsworth by the Simile of the Cave:—one particular passage he admired was 'Our birth is but a sleep.' Rossetti's Sonnets attracted him for the same reason, and so did Shorthouse's 'John Inglesant.' His enthusiasm for philosophy was remarkable—I have never seen anything like it—and what is more remarkable, this enthusiasm seems to have been sustained for a whole lifetime. When I last saw him at Cambridge in 1904, in your beautiful house at Emmanuel, it really seemed as though he had changed very little." Mr. Giles also says: "He used to propound very high-flown mystical theories in the Science and Art Society at Caius, and some of the rest of us used to pick them to pieces." Adam himself writes concerning that paper on Wordsworth: "I think in all essential points Wordsworth is right, except in this, that we ought not to lose the light as we go on, but get it more and more. I am sure that Love will keep it alive, and so ought Religion, though, alas! it often crushes it out."

The influence of Rossetti is clearly shown in the verses which he used to write often about this time and for a few years before and after. In a letter he says: "I have been breakfasting with three poets, myself the fourth." Some of his sonnets have much beauty in them, and they are generally couched in a strain of Platonic mysticism. A few of his poems were published in the *Cambridge Review*. The poetry of Dante appealed to him strongly, as might be expected from his temperament; and though he never read Italian

¹ This paper was printed in the *Cambridge Review* in 1885.

easily (or for the matter of that French either), he absorbed a great deal of Dante's spirit about the time he took his Cambridge degree. He returned to Dante with fresh ardour, some twenty years afterwards, when he was preparing his Gifford Lectures. With Shakespeare he had much less sympathy, though he writes once of Shakespeare in a letter, that he is "glad to find an English author who is unfathomable": I think he found him too human, and not mystical enough; but for Milton, in his soaring vein, he had the greatest admiration; and Goethe also appealed to him, though he read very little German poetry, at any rate after the year 1890.

From his tutor, the Rev. E. S. Roberts (now Master of the College), and Dr. Reid, then classical lecturer, he met with the utmost kindness. Mr. Roberts at one time took him away to Cromer before an examination, and in Dr. Reid's household he was looked on as one of the family. Miss Reid, who was then a little girl, says that the children took to calling him "Uncle," as he constantly came to the house with their real uncle, Mr. Ernest Gardner. In his intercourse with Dr. Reid's family we see for the first time his great love of children. Miss Reid recollects that he nearly always came to play on Sunday afternoons, and nearly always once a week besides. His pleasure in the company of children served him in good stead in his work as a teacher, for to his own youthfulness and his sympathy with the youthfulness of others was largely due his power of arousing and maintaining interest. He liked to stir up children to a high pitch of excitement, and would then suddenly decamp to his work, demanding absolute quiet, which it was not always easy for others to enforce at a moment's notice. In summer vacations of later years, when most of his literary work was done, a system of "danger signals" was devised to secure his peace. One hand-

kerchief was hung out from the window, and another outside the door : while these were visible (usually about eight hours a day), no sound must be heard ; but when he emerged, he took the lead in the riotous reaction that followed.

In his vacations while at Caius, Adam used to go home to Scotland ; but twice he went to Germany, once to Göttingen to read on his own account, and again in 1884 to conduct a reading party to Heidelberg. Towards the end of his time he made two more intimate friends, Mr. Arthur Platt, now Professor of Greek at University College, London, and Mr H. McLeod Innes, now Senior Bursar of Trinity College. Both were Trinity men, and both students of ancient philosophy along with him. In the autumn of 1884 his mind was not, for once, wholly given to work. He attended with great interest Professor Colvin's lectures on Michael Angelo, and then first learnt that the artist was a Platonist. He also writes : "I have taken three private lessons in waltzing, and can waltz pretty fairly now" ; but he afterwards used to say that he turned tail, and fled from the remainder of his course. In an actual ballroom I think he never attempted anything more complicated than a polka.

Very soon after his degree came the next decisive step of his life. Emmanuel College, from being a very small institution, was beginning to rise in numbers. A new classical lecturer was wanted, and the Master, Dr. S. G. Phear, and the tutor, Mr. W. Chawner, now Master of the College, had their attention turned to the young man who had just taken (in 1884) a brilliant degree from Gonville and Caius College. The present Master writes as follows as to his introduction to Emmanuel College :

"I had a good deal to do with the negotiations which led to his appointment as lecturer, and ultimately to his

election as a Junior Fellow on Dec. 12, 1884; but all I remember clearly is that he was very strongly recommended to us by Dr. Reid. As tutor, I was commissioned by the College to have an interview with him, before any invitation was sent, and I went to see him in his rooms at Caius. I remember the rooms, and the impression made on me by the owner. A slight figure very simply (almost poorly) dressed. A thorough Scot in appearance and manner, and also in accent. Probably I did most of the talking, as was natural under the circumstances. On his side there was great reserve and caution, but he practically signified that he would be willing to accept a Fellowship, if offered. I do not remember that he made any conditions. The reserve of which I speak (which seems to be a universal characteristic of Scotsmen in presence of an English stranger) made it difficult for me to form as definite a judgment as I should have liked, but I saw that he was a youth of force and character, and my report was favourable."

He was taking several private pupils during the autumn of 1884, and writes thus with regard to his new plans: "Next term, as you know, I am to lecture to Emmanuel on the Ethics of Aristotle, and in the summer term on the Greek Lyric Poets. The last will be a delightful task. I will not take many private pupils next term, so as to have more time for work: this term I am hardly doing anything at all for myself." The course on the Lyric Poets was frequently repeated, and was always successful. I remember an undergraduate of Christ's College telling me in 1885 or 1886 of his pleasure in those lectures, when as yet I had scarcely seen my future husband. Aristotle's Ethics also reappeared at intervals, and of other subjects, various books of Plato, Cicero's *De Finibus*, Pindar, and post-Aristotelian philosophers formed the usual list. In the last sixteen or seventeen years of his life he did

not often, if ever, add an entirely new subject to his stock, but there was never any lack of freshness. He was constantly at work on his own account, and every scrap of material that he gathered in was utilised to give new life to a familiar theme. It often happens that the man who has written a book on any subject is thereby spoiled for *viva voce* treatment of that topic. It was not so with him. After his edition of the *Republic* came out, he lectured on the book with greater zest and brilliancy than ever, to audiences of nearly two hundred undergraduates and students from the women's colleges. A pupil has told me that some of his friends went twice over to a course of lectures on the *Phaedo* of Plato, for the pleasure of hearing them again.

The secret of his success lay in his power of enthusiasm and affection. He carried his hearers along with him, making them feel (in the words of an old pupil, the Rev. C. Creighton, son of the late Bishop of London) that he did not aim at imparting the stores of his own learning, but invited them to join with him in a voyage of exploration. "In his lectures on Plato he seemed to say to us, 'Don't you see what fun it all is; come along with me, and let us find out what it all means.' There seemed to be in his mind the same adventurous joy in discovery that we felt in our own." It was just as in his early days, when he poured out his soul to his student friends at Aberdeen; as when his exuberance ran riot in the Science and Art Society at Caius; and, finally, as when, in his capacity as Gifford Lecturer, he held fast the interest of a critical audience of his own compatriots. Since his death, such expressions as "he seemed the embodiment of vitality" have recurred again and again in letters from sorrowing friends and pupils, and that "vitality was the keynote of his teaching"¹ will be agreed by all who have sat in his lecture-room. Though he loved

¹ Rev. C. Creighton.

to scale the heavens in his discourses, he would not miss an opportunity for a merry hit. "The dog is a philosophic animal," were the words with which a canine intruder on an exalted *Phaedo* lecture was politely escorted to the door.

Another Emmanuel man, Mr. Bernard H. Dobson, I.C.S., son of Mr. Austin Dobson, writes: "I believe he despised the purely utilitarian aspect of lectures as aids to examinations; though from personal experience in the India Civil Service examination I think no one was better able to forecast the lie of the examiners' minds; and he knew well, too, that most of his pupils were not rich enough to be able to regard the classics merely as *literae humaniores*, and had to think of them for the time being as an *ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα* rather than as a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*. I remember the contempt he used to pour upon that sinister society, the Civil Service Commissioners; it almost matched that which he reserved for pedantic verbal critics, too ready to alter the text. It is hardly necessary to say that he possessed all the arts of the lecturer *in excelsis*: the anecdotes were carefully sandwiched in to enable the men to write down the more pithy morsels which preceded and followed; but they were generally so good as completely to distract the attention of the audience till their effect had subsided. Like all the best humorists, he was most completely in his element when the audience was appreciative. By his enthusiasm for the subject, 'in his hands the thing became a trumpet whence he blew Soul-animating strains, alas! too few.'

"This is not too high praise. Such lecturers are the burning need of the Cambridge of our day. *ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι*¹: Dr. Adam was a Bacchant of the Bacchants. I freely admit that my notebooks were no sort of index of the real

¹ Plato, *Phaed.* 69 C.

value of his lectures to me, but there were passages, like the closing scenes of the *Phaedo* or the educational system of the *Republic* or the critique of Sappho—whose name was always written in large capitals on the black-board—which can never fade from the memory. Even now the philosophy which I learnt from him is part of the mental apparatus which keeps me jogging on day by day.”

The Master says that he made his mark as a teacher at Emmanuel immediately, both in teaching composition, and in formal lectures, and that “from the first moment of his arrival he thoroughly identified himself with Emmanuel.” At that time Professor (afterwards Bishop) Creighton was a prominent figure at Emmanuel, and the Combination Room listened to floods of paradoxical talk both from the Professor and from the Junior Fellow.

He was at once on friendly terms with his pupils, and “stimulated them to the foundation of the Classical Society, of which he was the life and soul, as well as the formal President. The reading of papers and their subsequent discussion was a valuable supplement to the regular teaching. It was of great direct educational value, and indirectly brought him into frequent and close personal contact with his pupils.”¹

It must have been about the time of his first coming to Emmanuel that his friendship with Mr. Neil of Pembroke, whose kindness to the unformed newcomer from Aberdeen we have seen, blossomed to its full development. Writing to me very shortly before our marriage, he says: “Whatsoever (or one-third of what) is good in me, put down to Neil, one-sixth to —, and the rest to Plato.” Not that he forgot what he owed to others, but there is no doubt that Mr. Neil exercised over him no common influence. He would sometimes groan over his friend’s omnivorous appetite for all kinds of knowledge, which was very different from his own temperament: when his mind

¹ From the Master of Emmanuel.

was full of one subject, no other seemed attractive, and he grew restive, when Mr. Neil pointed out to him the duty of being interested in art, in science, in French novels, in modern minor poetry, and what not. But between the two men there was a very deep and strong bond of sympathy. One was mercurial, the other like a rock of defence, and both were absolutely loyal. The custom grew up that they took luncheon in one another's company every Sunday. This practice, uninterrupted by Adam's marriage, which only brought in his wife as an additional member of the party, went on until the first day of Mr. Neil's last illness in 1901 constrained him to break his engagement. That parting was perhaps the most sore trial of Adam's life. The dedication of his *Republic* of Plato to the memory of Robert Alexander Neil, with the beautiful motto, *εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὐθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωμεν λόγοις*, shows the depth of the affection inspired by the departed friend. Little did we think, as we grieved over the untimely loss, that Adam himself must so soon follow, with his own span of life shorter by two years.

It was probably through Mr. Neil's encouragement that Adam embarked on the preparation of his first book, an edition of Plato's *Apology* for the Pitt Press Series. This was published in 1887, and very favourably received. The *Crito* was then undertaken as another volume of the same series, and published in 1888. About this time the depression of spirits, of which we have seen signs in his Aberdeen career, came on him with a new intensity. He was especially liable to such troubles if he had any literary work on hand, though only his most intimate associates were aware of them. After publication, or indeed after the printing of the first sheets, he would recover all his gaiety. The last year and a half of the preparation of the *Republic*, and first the writing, and then again the revision for the press of the Gifford

Lectures, were times of much storm and stress. It seemed as if his capacity for enjoyment must have a counterbalancing power of suffering.

To his sister he writes in a letter not dated, but from an allusion to his "booklet," which is to be ready for the press in a few days, and from other internal evidence to be placed in 1887 or 1888: "Are you in the doldrums? Because *I* am, fearfully, horribly. I am in a sort of waking nightmare! And without any real assignable cause, except homesickness, and, above all, the depressing consciousness of my own stupidity, ignorance, forgetfulness, and falling off! This oppresses me frightfully at times, but I must endure! I always feel it particularly at the beginning of term,¹ and I can only hope that in the hurry and bustle of work I shall escape from myself. Oh! for a lodge in some quiet country village, with £100 a year and nothing to do! Isn't it melancholy to hear a young man speak in this way? I ought to be full of the ardour of knowledge and the enthusiasm of humanity, but I am a feeble body, so I'm not."

Again: "I wrote one letter already, but it was so horribly dismal that I tore it up and threw it into the wastepaper basket. Now I feel rather better, having worked off the mood. . . . I am determined to bear up and do my best. I shall have to work hard, only I don't feel quite equal to any intellectual labour, that's what makes me miserable. However, after this term it won't be so bad, I hope; because I shall be quit of private pupils."

Once more: "I am rather in the dumps again to-day, and most horribly homesick . . . with the ever-present consciousness of my own inefficiency!

"What a bad world it is, that we cannot always be with those we love. Here I have not a soul who cares

¹ A trying time to him always, even when in the best of health.

for me really, or who would stick to me if I came a cropper. My work worries me a great deal more than it is all worth. Some day I shall resign it all, and become a clerk, or something of that sort. I was never meant to be a student or teacher: for I have no interest in literature at all, as is proved by the fact that I never read anything but what I am forced to read. I expect there is a dreary future in store for me. . . .

"In the Long Vacation, if all is well, I shall either go to Germany and try to read hard, or else read hard up here. It is my intense and crass ignorance, not only of ordinary topics, but above all of my own subject, that distresses me. Now that I am an M.A. I shall be found out, what an ignoramus I am, for I shall be liable to be appointed examiner, in frightfully hard subjects, too. You see, since I took my degree I have learnt practically nothing—I began taking pupils at once. The only result I can show for it is £1000 and my own discontent. Let us hope for happier days; but I for my part never hope to be what I was: I have to do the duties of a man, and I am the merest boy.

"Heigh-ho! if the worst comes to the worst, I will resign and try something entirely different—I dislike teaching more and more, the longer I am at it. If we only had a little money, I think we should all emigrate—but we cannot starve."

It is hard to realise, without a very close knowledge of Adam's character, that at the time when he was writing these letters he was the life of the Emmanuel Parlour (as the Combination Room, where the Fellows sit after dinner, is called), and making for himself a name as a lecturer of unusual *verve*. His quick changes of mood were a marked feature in him. So early as 1885, when just coming to Emmanuel, he speaks of himself as "horribly miserable"; but his vivacity immediately made itself felt both at the high table, and among the under-

graduates. The difficulty with him was that, owing largely, I think, to his too exacting work at Aberdeen, he could not, when he was overdone, turn easily to mental recreation. If he was not fit for hard work, he was unable to substitute other occupations, and the more jaded he felt, the more difficult it was to put away his task. Cycling, first on a tricycle and then on a bicycle, lawn-tennis, and for a while real tennis he enjoyed, and later on he played golf with keenness; but physical exercise did not help him much in seasons of depression. The only resource then was to get the exhausting piece of work behind him as soon as possible. Though he writes that he dislikes teaching, it was the teaching and the routine work of the term that kept him from breaking down. Work he must, always, through temperament and ingrained habit; but that part of his work took far less out of him than the self-imposed labours of vacations. A peculiarity of his nature was that when he felt cast down, he accused himself of incompetence in the very things wherein he excelled, and knew that he excelled, such as examining, or teaching, or power of absorbing literature; but for all that he never neglected any duty, whatever might be the cost to himself of carrying it through.

In 1885 and 1886 Adam was a candidate first for the Greek and then for the Latin Professorship at Aberdeen, to which Professor Harrower and Sir W. M. Ramsay respectively were appointed.

In the same term as that in which he started his life at Emmanuel, he began to teach at Girton College; and with one or two short interruptions he continued up to the last to take a little work there each year, being very much interested in the College. He also served for several years on the Executive Committee of the College. On January 17, 1885, he writes: "I begin work with the Girton young ladies on Wednesday at three, and I go

thereafter twice a week, in all three and a half hours. It is a formidable task, but I'll soon get steeled to it, I daresay." It did not take him long to "get steeled," for on February 1 he says: "My Girton work is getting on very nicely. They are very industrious students even when they are not clever; and one or two of them are distinctly good. I no longer feel afraid of them. I am going to a dance there on Tuesday—I believe it is almost big enough to be called a ball, but I will not trip the toe, because I dread a catastrophe."

Among his pupils there, between 1885 and 1889, were Miss A. F. Ramsay, now Mrs. Montagu Butler, wife of the Master of Trinity, and Miss A. M. Kensington; who was to become Adam's wife. Adela Marion was the youngest daughter of the late Arthur Kensington, who was for several years Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford.

The following letter was written after a Tripos examination in 1889:

"MY DEAR MISS KENSINGTON,—Any words of congratulation will seem cold and inadequate: I can only say that I am most delighted with your place. I used to say to you *φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μουσική*: I say so still, only I construe it thus: *μουσική* sc. *ἡ* = the musical lady sc. *ἔστι* is (for copula omitted, see my notes *passim*), *μεγίστη* greatest, *i. q.* first, *φιλοσοφία* = in philosophy. The sense would be improved by reading *φιλοσοφίας*, but I do not think there is any necessity for any change. . . .

"The only item of personal news I have that will amuse you is that I am a candidate for Jebb's chair in Glasgow. I don't very much expect or desire to get it—though having once reached a *ικανόν τι* in the shape of the *λόγος* *ὅτι δεῖ καταβαίνειν εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα*, I refuse

ἀποδειλιᾶν or εἰκῆ φέρειν the original λόγος and its results.¹

“ Hoping that you will with the star of your philosophy calm the raging billows of Irish discontent—I am, yours ever sincerely,
J. ADAM.”

To the same, January 12, 1890: “ As I write there is a duck in Chapman’s garden making the most unearthly noise, so if there are any Pindaric leaps in my letter, put them down to her. . . . I am glad you are going in for the *Laws*. I still believe that the *Republic* is the greatest book in the world—i.e. *my* world (Protagorean school, you see), and that φιλοσοφία is the μεγίστη μουσική—only now I take φιλοσοφία in a very wide sense. . . . I am getting out the *Euthyphro*, and I will send you a copy when it comes out, I hope about the end of the term. I have got a lot of interesting things in it, I think, but (with the modest editorial bow) you shall judge. I hope your expedition to Greece will come off. Perhaps I may turn up at Athens during Easter too; but it is doubtful.”

To the same, March 1, 1890: “ Why did you not tell me that you are going to lecture at Girton? I protest, it is too monstrous to leave me to hear that from Mr. Dale. I am very glad of it, though. Mr. Rose mentioned the fact after you had gone, but he was not sure whether it was Girton or Newnham you were to prelect at. . . . *Tandem vero serio* (something must be allowed to the unfortunate lecturer on Tully’s ends—so Innes denotes the *De Finibus*), I am hoping to reach Greece about next Wednesday or Thursday fortnight. Probably we shall stay at the Grand Hotel. Anyhow, if it please the gods that we come, I shall hope to come to see you, should you be in another ποῦ than τὸ μεγάλο ξενοδοχεῖο(ν). Innes has been in this evening: he has

¹ Mr. G. G. A. Murray was appointed.

ideas on *Rep. X*, and I am waiting to see if you agree, before I adopt them. As you said that if ever I had any puny (the adjective is *mine*) work on, you would be glad to help me in your humble (the adjective is *yours*) way, if ever I get as far as the *Republic*, I am sure you could help me in many ways, and chiefly by scathing criticism of my remarks, which, if you should ever care to see them, I will submit to you in proof. If you have any influence with ——¹ *bribe him*.—Yours ever sincerely,

J. ADAM.

εἰς παλινοψίαν!"

A plan of editing the *Republic* had by this time been formed, and a notice had recently been issued of the scheme as "in preparation." Adam came to Athens with his friends, Mr. J. Sutherland Black of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and Mr. A. E. Shipley of Christ's College. The party invited Miss Kensington's sister, Mrs. Mylne, and herself to join them in a journey through the Peloponnesus and to Delphi and Thebes. When the whole company reached the middle of Arcadia, James Adam became engaged to Adela Marion Kensington.

From A. M. K.'s journal in Greece, 1890:—"Mar. 21. Great expedition up Pentelicus in company with the Grand Hotel party. We started four inside the carriage and Mr. Adam on the box, to air his Modern Greek to the driver, who appeared, however, to have but small intelligence. . . . On the top we ate oranges, read Herodotus, and surveyed Marathon.

"Mar. 23.—At the Academy we sat down under an olive tree, while Mr. Adam read aloud the simile of the cave, and we fell to talking of our favourite topics, the Platonic theory of education and the *Timaeus*.

"Mar. 24. To Sunium. . . . From Laurion we proceeded in two carriages. My companions were Mr. Black, Mr. ——,² and Mr. Adam. Mr. —— took the

¹ A formidable critic.

² A visitor from the hotel.

opportunity to tell the story of his friend who tumbled down a hole in the Acropolis; and that lasted all the way. Mr. Black listened with admirable politeness, covering the sins of the other two.

"*Mar. 25.* . . . Thence to the βουλή,¹ which amused us extremely. We gathered that the debate was on a σιδηρόδρομος,² a subject which orators on the opposition seemed to find very emotional. The trio³ came in while we were there, bringing seaweed from the tomb of Themistocles. I have stuck a piece in my Thucydides, thereby giving the work a very ancient and fishlike smell.

"*Apr. 2.* Megalopolis to Andritsaena, eight hours' riding. . . . By this time I had discovered that my horse would go ahead, and I trotted in front most of the afternoon. Mr. Black and Mr. Adam followed closely, then after a long interval the rest of the company.

"*Apr. 8.* To Arachova *via* Delphi. J. and I quarrelled over Pindar.

"*Apr. 9.* The chief event of the afternoon ride was a halt at the field of Chaeronea, where a stirring oration in fluent Greek was made⁴ to the agogiates, prophesying that if Tricoupi were not re-elected, Greece might be once more enlaved on that self-same spot. The arguments were weak, but rhetoric made up for that."

We were married in London in the following July. A great sorrow befell Adam just before our marriage, in the death of a much-loved sister. We went straight to his home at Kinmuck after the wedding. Adam's best man was, of course, Mr. Neil, and our eldest child was named Neil Kensington. Owing to the scarcity of houses in Cambridge at that time, we took for a year a furnished house, 18, Brookside, belonging to Mrs. Henry Fawcett, widow of Professor Fawcett. Next we

¹ Greek Parliament.

² Messrs. Black, Shipley, Adam.

³ Railway.

⁴ By J. A.

established ourselves in St. Giles' House, Chesterton Lane. There our three children were born. In 1900 changes in College called us to take up residence in Emmanuel House, in the precincts of the College. We were reluctant to go, for my husband feared that he would find himself too much in the midst of his work; but when once there, he became devotedly attached to the beautiful house, and its still more beautiful outlook, and he enjoyed the increased power, that living on the spot gave him, of free and easy intercourse with colleagues and undergraduates. He liked to wander out at night, and gaze at the beauty of the College paddock by moonlight or starlight, taking especial delight in the contrast between the broad white surface of the pond under the moon's rays and the yellower lights from the College windows, and also in the dark outline, as seen against the sky, of the great horse-chestnut tree which grew in front of the house, and overhung the pond.

At the end of the May term, 1890, Mr. Chawner, who had been tutor of Emmanuel for fifteen years, resigned his office. During his tutorship the College had been steadily growing in numbers. This process has gone on continuously to so great an extent that in 1907, the year of Adam's death, the entry of freshmen was equal to the total number of undergraduates in residence at the time of his coming to Emmanuel. The College decided to appoint two tutors, in consideration of the increased numbers, and chose Mr. W. N. Shaw (now Director of the Meteorological Office) and Adam to fill the posts.

To A. M. K., June 6, 1890: "To-day Shaw and I have been appointed tutors. . . . Every one is very amiable; and if we two are successful as tutors (*i.e.* you and me), and make ourselves indispensable, they will treat us sensibly and well. I shall try hard to get up the educational system of the University in the Long

Vacation. So shall you. I think seriously that it is a great opportunity; a tutor has far more influence in the college than anyone else, and we may be able to justify our existence."

The Master (Mr. Chawner) says of the tutors: "Shaw was essentially a reformer, with a love of change and of framing new schemes. Adam, in everything that concerned the College and the University, was a strong conservative at heart, though he never would admit the imputation, and sometimes repudiated it with some warmth. In other respects the two men were very unlike, one scientific, the other literary and emotional, and the two tutors were in the strictest sense complementary to one another. Adam rated very highly the importance of classical studies as compared with mathematics or natural science. In pressing the claims of his own side he was avowedly a partisan.

"The joint tutorship only lasted three years. It was replaced by a new scheme, which came into operation at Michaelmas, 1893. The principle of the scheme was that as far as possible the tutor should be also a teacher of the subjects which his pupils were studying. It involved an increase of the number of tutors to four. The change was in the first instance suggested by Shaw, but at a very early stage he took me into his confidence and we worked out the details together. I think experience has shown that the plan works well. Adam did not openly oppose, but criticised details, and it was clear to me at the time that he would have preferred not to make the change. I attribute this mainly to his naturally conservative temperament."

It is perfectly true that Adam's temperament was conservative, and in this connexion it is amusing to see his fervour for the Liberal Party in his Aberdeen days. He writes thus: "I daresay you have found it impossible to visit Edinburgh and hear Gladstone's eloquent and

powerful orations, than which nothing has been delivered of recent years more calculated to rouse electors to the gravity of this unprecedented crisis, and make them consult at once the dignity and the interests of this gigantic empire by returning the Liberals to Parliament (Excuse the statesman-like tone of this letter; I fancied that I was Mr. Gladstone writing a post-card)." And again in another letter (both are undated, but written before coming to Cambridge), he describes a debate: "If you had only heard how I 'wired into' Tory rule, and evoked the bursts of Liberal applause, you would have stood aghast. But enough of this; methinks the Government will tremble in their shoes." As he grew older he disliked restlessness: he thought, as a rule, that not all is made, that might be made, out of things as they are, and that plans of reform are apt to consume energy which could be better applied. The one great change in the University that he wished for was the admission of women to degrees.

His advocacy of his own studies did not arise from a wish to slight other branches of learning, but his eagerness always inclined him to overstate his case. His own men were so meritorious that they *must* be rewarded, and if there was not enough to go round—well, it was a pity, but it could not be helped. This trait came from his affectionate disposition, which was at the root of his nature.

In dealing with undergraduates as tutor he was eminently happy. It was his instinct generally to say "no" when privileges were asked for; but he contrived to soften the disappointment by a merry word; and I do not think resentment was often felt. If he thought any disorder was likely to arise, he would send for leading men beforehand and try to enlist their sympathy in maintaining discipline; and the result was that, especially towards the end of his time, there was

very little disciplinary work for the tutor to do. He was very quick to see where any trivial relaxation might lead to more serious consequences, and would stop apparently harmless practices, wherein might lie a dangerous germ. His warm-hearted pleasure in the well-doing of his pupils met with its own reward; the Emmanuel man who wrote from India after his death, "I feel as if a bright light had suddenly been removed from my eyes," only expressed the feeling of hundreds of others. The Rev. C. Creighton says: "As tutor, to one who was idly wasting his time, his attitude would be one of humorous remonstrance calculated to make him feel what a source of interest he was missing through neglect of his studies, rather than of perfunctory indignation, which only arouses opposition. And if the sarcasm of his remarks was sometimes a little more biting than our youthful arrogance was prepared to accept with equanimity, this was never resented, when once we had found out, as it did not take us long to do, that it arose from the fact that he took a real personal interest in each one of us, and was disappointed rather than indignant at our falling short of what he expected of us."

Another old pupil writes: "Dr. Adam was no sympathiser with arm-chair students of his favourite authors. Hard and consistent labour was to be the groundwork of all prospective success. *ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν δνειδος, ἀεργείη δέ τ' δνειδος*, he once wrote to me in my early and most unregenerate days. I remember he lectured as usual on the morning after Queen Victoria's death, as being 'an act in keeping with the character of that great lady,' but still more, I suspect, with his own."

His criticisms could be stinging; as when a copy of Greek verses, which had cost the writer much labour, was greeted with the words *βαίᾳ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ῥόδα*. A piece of composition was thus appraised: "Very good of its class"; the pupil was elated. Then he added

"Third class," and pride had a fall. He was sometimes unmerciful to others besides pupils. In a friend's diary there is the following entry: "12 Feb. 1905. Met Adam very hot on Greek question,¹ and very peppery, with intervals of geniality. I suggested perhaps in view of all² I should go to Canada, and he said 'yes,' concluding by saying if my head were equal to my heart I should be a great man." Next day he repented and sent a post-card saying, "Don't go to Canada — *Pax vobiscum*, J. ADAM." He was always ready to make the *amende honorable*. He writes to the same friend thus: "Dec. 10, 1905. . . . I believe St. James somewhere says something about the *γλώσσα* as setting on fire the *τροχός* of *γένεσις*, and being altogether a sort of disreputable member. It occurred to me yesterday that in the exuberance of the end of term I spoke rather wildly, and behaved altogether in a rude and unwarrantable fashion, not undeserving of the rebuke which you administered to me; and I am writing to you in order to relieve my conscience by saying *peccavi*.³ . . . Let me beseech you as a brother to shut your eyes to Stoic 'self-sufficiency' and 'apathy' and all the rest (though even that is sometimes great: 'Paete, non dolet'—I hope you don't think that is affectation; if you realise the situation you won't), and contemplate the *ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν* and all that it involves.

I suppose I should apologise for this rambling incoherence too. Good-bye (*εὖ πράττειν*) from your anything but apathetic friend,
J. ADAM."

His interest in the after-career of his pupils was lasting. To one who was about to become a schoolmaster he wrote:

¹ As to whether Greek should remain compulsory in the Previous Examination.

² His friend declined to take Adam's view of the controversy.

³ The cause of dispute was a difference of opinion about the Stoics.

“I cannot refrain from a word of advice, for it is not easy all at once *exuere tutorem*. (1) Try to make your boys like to learn—make learning *pleasant* to them—so that they may become *φιλόσοφοι* (*ὡς ἀληθῶς*, you know, lovers of knowledge). There is no doubt that English schools don't set half enough value on the love of knowledge. ‘The power of the love of truth, regarded only as an instrument of enlarging and deepening the faculties, has never been sufficiently regarded, either in ancient or modern education.’ So said Jowett. And the love of knowledge, which every boy has naturally, though his teachers often crush it out of him, is the love of Truth. A boy's *character* even is not the best possible unless he like to learn.

“(2) Keep reading yourself as far as you can. Don't read *drivelling* books about education. Read and re-read especially R. L. Nettleship's essay, ‘On the theory of education in Plato's *Republic*,’ if you can get it. It gives the best ideal I know of after which a schoolmaster or teacher should strive, and is admirable in what it says of the strength and weakness of public schools. You won't have much time for reading, and should not waste it in reading third-rate novels. You will find good literature vastly more refreshing in the end than the sort of trash which people devour nowadays, and familiarity with the best authors will make you a stronger man all round, and help you to forge ahead in your profession.

“This is a longer sermon than I meant to write, but you must make allowances for me. I am writing notes on the *Republic*, and words come very easily.”

In 1895 Dr. Phear resigned the Mastership of Emmanuel, and Mr. Chawner was appointed in his stead. Adam's work was not changed thereby, except that the continual growth of the College increased the pressure in all departments. At the end of 1899 Mr. Shaw, the

Senior Tutor, went away, whereupon Adam was made Senior Tutor, and held the office to the last. During all this time, besides his full College work and outside examining (of which he did a great deal in early days, but little after 1895, except when it fell to him to examine for the Classical Tripos), Adam had always some work for publication on hand. The Pitt Press edition of the *Euthyphro* was published in 1890. In 1891 preliminary studies for the *Republic* led him to write his treatise on *The Nuptial Number of Plato*. The University Press then requested him to bring out an edition of the *Protagoras*. This was published in 1893. Meanwhile materials were being collected for the *Republic*, and vast numbers of German pamphlets digested. In 1894, on September 1, he writes: "To-morrow I mean to finish my Ferguson papers and begin the *Republic*." On September 4 he says: "The *Republic* does not progress much. I am gradually coming to the conclusion that, although I could produce a creditable school edition, a really big work is beyond my leisure (thanks chiefly to golf) and powers. Never mind." September 7: "The *Republic* creeps slowly on, but I have got nothing interesting as yet." December 17 (after the appearance of Jowett and Campbell's edition): "I don't think it is much good my going on to make another edition: it would not sell, and they deserve success. . . . Its conservatism in the matter of the text rather takes the wind out of my sails. I shall probably consult Jackson or somebody on the advisability of my dropping my little game."

He decided to continue the work, and by the end of 1895 had finished notes on the first two books. The time when most of the work was done was the Long Vacation in each year. It was the custom for a large family party of his wife's relations to collect at some country house for about two months in the summer.

The house was always chosen by a sister-in-law, with a special eye to a study for him and a nursery for his children. Several large boxes of books used to be despatched in advance, and the books, when unpacked, were ranged on the top of the empty boxes and on the floor. In the room thus prepared he sat like Marius on the ruins of Carthage, usually wearing a straw hat or a cloth cap all day, "to keep the brains in"—a very odd engine for the purpose.¹ Sometimes, but not nearly often enough, he would be induced to come for whole day excursions; but, whether he could be decoyed out or no, he was happy in the feeling that he was free to do exactly as he pleased in a congenial company.

In 1896 he was very vigorous, and enjoying the work. He writes: "I am developing a great talent for table-talk of the witty-buffoonery type, and generally send the children into fits over their meals. . . . I am working hard nearly all day long from 7 o'clock on. To-day and yesterday I have done a chapter. It is most invigorating, and I get fresh points continually, some very pretty. You will see I am much content. I have picked the right books pretty well and am seldom brought to a standstill from want of literature. . . . I call this a real good letter to be written *currente calamo* after eight hours' work or more." A few days later he says: "Six more chapters, and I shall have ended Book III so that I hope to finish IV before the year is out. It is much better doing this than examining schools; and unless I feel the pinch of poverty too much, I will do no more schools until I have begun to print at least. I still get lots of pretty points, which the editors mostly miss." Again: "I have finished Book III and hope to finish IV also, or nearly so, before I go

¹ The friend's diary, already quoted, speaks of finding him "with straw hat turned down all round, sitting on the sofa, busy with his Gifford Lectures."

back, if I am here a month still. I am getting plenty of interesting points. There are still a host of German pamphlets that I must get hold of. I have not been for a single bicycle ride—I stick so to my books. I am perfectly well in spite of it.”

In 1897 he was busy preparing a text of the *Republic* which the University Press wished to publish separately. It is interesting to compare this text with the large edition published five years later, and to note his increasing dislike of emendations, some of his own not excepted. The commentary advanced at the rate of about two books a year during 1897 and 1898. Unfortunately, by 1899 the strain was beginning to tell upon him, and until the autumn of 1900, when he finished the notes, it was uphill work. It could not be helped. Nothing could make him put aside a task, more especially when it was becoming irksome, and the only thing to be done was to try to make the conditions of work as easy as might be. The following extracts show the change of tone: “I am making nothing of my book: I hope I shall get a little ‘go’ when I am in Yorkshire.” “It’s dull here, and I am not making any *προκοπή*, but the indolence is making me fat.” He was very much oppressed and out of health, and no remedies of travel or rest or medical treatment seemed to do much good. His fear was that his mental powers were giving way; but it was astonishing to see the change in his spirits, when the first printed sheets began to arrive, towards the end of 1900. There was no more talk of collapse after that, for some years. It should be remembered that all this time his vivacity as a teacher was unchanged, and very few people were aware of the struggles of mind through which he was passing.

When the book came out in the autumn of 1902 it had an excellent reception. Shortly before its publication he wrote to Professor Cook Wilson of Oxford: “Through-

out my whole book I have made it my aim to rest everything on the language, and tried not to force it so as to make Plato consistent with himself." And again, "Finally, no one has ever helped me so much in my difficulties as you have done, although I was a complete stranger to you—I hope I am no longer; and I hope to show my gratitude to you by coming again for criticism and help, when I get into bewilderment on other subjects. Ever yours gratefully and sincerely, J. ADAM." To the same correspondent he writes after the appearance of the book: "I thank you for your most kind and generous letter. Such expressions of sympathy and congratulation are, I confess, very pleasing to me: I hunger after them to a quite abnormal degree." Among others who helped him in the work should be specially mentioned his former teacher, Dr. Henry Jackson of Trinity College, now Regius Professor of Greek. Dr. Jackson not only found time to read all the proofs, but was always ready to discuss doubtful points, showing that interest in the work of a younger man which has stirred the lively gratitude of a long train of pupils and friends.

In the original scheme, Adam had intended to write an introductory volume of essays and a translation; but after he had finished the commentary, he became less and less inclined to attack this remaining part of the work. He became interested in other subjects, particularly in the connexion of the Stoics with Christianity, and he felt that he had said nearly all he had to say about the *Republic* in the notes and Appendixes. It is quite likely, however, that he would have changed his mind again later on. He was always gathering fresh material, which is stored in numerous notebooks and large sheets of paper about three times the size of foolscap, and the day might very well have come, when he would have wished to make use of it.

In 1898 he had the pleasure of receiving an Honorary

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Degree from his old University of Aberdeen, and in 1903 he took the degree of Litt.D. at Cambridge. He presented his edition of the *Republic* as his thesis.

No sooner was the *Republic* out than a fresh piece of work was undertaken. At Christmas 1902 he was appointed Gifford Lecturer to the University of Aberdeen. According to Lord Gifford's will, twenty lectures must be given by every Gifford Lecturer in the course of two years, ten lectures in each year, on some subject connected with Natural Religion. It is usual to make the appointments two years beforehand, so as to allow time for preparing the lectures.

Adam lost no time in setting to work on his subject, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*; but it is unfortunate that this new labour did not come a year or two later. He needed time to lie fallow after the eight years' strain of the *Republic*, but he did not have a single vacation's rest before beginning again. His depression attacked him once more, almost immediately. In March 1903 he writes: "I am making no progress at all, and am in a state approaching abject despair. My brain won't work, and I am seedy otherwise this morning. I begin to regret that I had anything to do with this business at all. I have written to Macmillan and Bowes to order Hastings' Dictionary to be sent to me at once, to see if it will give me any hints. I can't even think of words, much less of ideas, though I am sitting at the table about ten hours a day. I seriously think I shall have to chuck it." Next day he is better, but he says, "privately I think the whole thing will have to be tremendously rewritten before it is fit to publish." A few days later he writes: "The Giffords don't progress much, but still they creep on. No doubt in time they will get into shape. It is the combination of writing and accumulating material that is so hard." In September 1903 he writes to his friend, Professor Davidson of Aberdeen: "The subject is very vast and very laborious,

but I am not discontented with the progress I have made, though I am beginning to doubt whether I shall manage to make them [the lectures] as interesting as I had hoped to do." A month later he writes, also to Professor Davidson: "There is little time for Giffordizing—though a page gets added now and then. I pass through the usual throes of despair, which always afflict me when I have a big job of the kind on, but I must be content, and so, I am afraid, must you, if I do the best ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, as Aristotle says. . . . I cannot deny myself the pleasure of sending you the latest advertisement of my *Republic*, because I know you will like the gratifying reviews." In the same month, writing to Professor Cook Wilson, he says: "I wrote some lectures on the religious and theological ideas of the pre-Sophistic Greek philosophers this summer, and worked my brain quite dry. In consequence, I am rather run down, but better than I was. If I get safely through the job I now have on, I think I shall shut up shop, as far as writing is concerned, and devote myself to second-rate golf for the rest of my life. When one is cumbered with tutorial work, it is very hard to think consecutively."

The preparation of the Lectures was not, however, all weariness. It was the start that was difficult in this case, not the finish as with the *Republic*. From Holme-next-the-Sea, in Norfolk, he writes to Mr. T. R. Glover, in August 1904:

"It is lovely here—no intruders—nothing but peace, except for my turbulent offspring. I have finished Socrates and am now deep in Plato. Of course he knocks all the others into cocked hats: there is no one like him, none. It is tremendous how he searches the depths of one's whole nature. You really must devote a year or two to the exclusive study of his works, if you mean to do anything useful for the interpretation of religious thought.

Occasionally I read Matthew Arnold too, and he is particularly good over Paul. If only Paul had been a little more Hellenic! *quem te, Paule, reddidissem!*

“But enough of this. Goodbye, from your friend and admirer,
J. ADAM.

“Bell sounds for dinner—two young ducklings—O the pleasures of the *σάργξ*—the *ἐπίγειον σκῆνος*, etc. etc.”

The postscript may be contrasted with the following, written in 1893: “Neil gave me a very good lunch—only DUCK! Like the *De Finibus*, that animal dogs my footsteps everywhere.”

When it came to the delivery of the Gifford Lectures, Adam was at his very best. The four visits that he made to Aberdeen for the purpose of lecturing were among the happiest days of his life. Thanks to the kindness of our hosts, Professor and Miss Davidson, and to the wonderful hospitality and friendliness of the Aberdeen world, every moment was a pleasure. The interest shown in the lectures was very great, and many of the audience came from considerable distances outside the town to hear them. All this delighted him.

His punctuality and despatch in matters of business were remarkable. He had the enviable quality of always getting through a piece of work more quickly than he expected. This was particularly marked when he was examining. Most men find it an effort to finish looking over the papers of the Classical Tripos, Part I, in the time allotted: Adam, whenever he examined for the Tripos, in spite of his protestations at the beginning that he could not possibly be ready in time, had about a week to spare, during which he used to exult over his still toiling colleagues. Mr. Leonard Whibley, an intimate friend of Adam's later years, remembers in this connexion “how quick he was, and how sound his judgment, and also how his humour relieved the inevitable pedantry

of Examiners' meetings." Adam himself thoroughly enjoyed examining for Part I. He did it six times in all, and he liked seeing the work of classical men all over the University. The meetings gave him the opportunity for much friendly banter, of which I believe he especially availed himself in the year 1904, when he acted as Chairman of the Examiners.

"In conversation," says Mr. Whibley, "he was admirable. In general company he often let some time pass before he took an active part; but when he had once started, he pursued the topic of the moment with a half-serious, half-humorous logical method. I used to think he was consciously or unconsciously adopting the Socratic irony; and there was, without any pedantry or pretence, a suggestion of the Platonic dialogue. He liked to sustain a thesis, by arguments consistent, even if absurd. In intimate conversation he was always sympathetic: interesting and interested—and ready to advise."

When in a cheerful vein, he was apt to visit everything and everybody with his gibes, not excepting his beloved native land. If we travelled to Scotland together by night, he invariably woke up at Edinburgh, and began to pour forth a torrent of Aberdeenshire speech, in which always occurred the words: "It's a queer country." One day he writes: "Truly it is a great country, and England is not worthy to hold a candle to it. When I washed myself in the waiting-room at Aberdeen, I put on my hat without combing my hair, whereupon the man in attendance said, 'Arenn ye gaun tae redd yer hairs?' No Englishman could possibly have said anything so illuminating." Next day, however, he says, "It's a very queer country, so odd that it is difficult not to laugh." Travelling to Scotland once by sea he begins a letter: "It is very nice on the sea: such thoughts of infinity swarm in one's brain! Sometimes the vessel

(*δύχημα*) rocks a little too much ——." Alas! by the end of the letter the steamer is apostrophised as "this shaking, groaning, internal-economy-menacing dam(pf)-boat." His most hilarious moods were often displayed, when he went to Royston to play golf with Dr. J. R. Tanner, another of the close friends of his later years. On one occasion Dr. Tanner said: "If you and I had taken Holy Orders, we should undoubtedly have attained the highest positions in the Church." "Yes," he replied, without a moment's hesitation: "*You* would have been Archbishop of *York*." A delicate situation at a College or Syndicate Meeting was often, it is said, brought to a happy ending by some humorous quip on Adam's part.

"One characteristic," writes Mr. Whibley, "which always struck me was, that while he was very slow to take part in a contest, when he was once involved he fought with the utmost keenness, resource, and determination. At first he realised the strength of the opposing forces, was prepared to compromise or even to give way; but when he saw that there would be a fight, he seemed to lose his doubts; and when he warmed to the conflict, he became eager and often sanguine about the result. In the campaign he was quick and resourceful—and in the strength of his convictions fought hard, but always with good temper and without bitterness. He was quick to see the weak points in the adversary's arguments: he found the right retort, and expressed it with admirable effect and humour.

"These characteristics of slowness to engage and keenness in the engagement appeared in the controversy about the reform of the Classical Tripos and in the long struggles over compulsory Greek.¹

"On the question of the Tripos he was at first carried away by the strength of the support given to the scheme originally proposed, and gave it a (no doubt) reluctant

¹ In the Previous Examination.

assent;¹ but when the issue was joined, he became convinced that the proposals were wrong (I now believe he was right), and he fought them hard."

The scheme was rejected. Amended proposals were then brought forward and carried in 1900. These Adam heartily supported, and it is generally agreed that they have worked well.

"On the Greek question," continues Mr. Whibley, "he had hesitations and doubts—and did not join in the first movements of the opposition—but he soon was in the thick of the fray; and no one worked harder or did better service in defeating the proposals."

A good fight seemed to put new life into him, though he professed to yearn for peace and quiet. An opponent has said of him that he made no enemies, though he was such a hard fighter: his good-humoured sallies did him here, as elsewhere, excellent service.

To some Emmanuel undergraduates who wrote to congratulate him on the success of his side in the controversy in 1905, he answered:

"MY DEAR DOBSON and other φιλέλληνες,—It was a kind thought that prompted your most acceptable letter. For the present the torch still burns: next time, it will be *your* business to keep it alive.

"Meantime, in the words of St Paul—

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τῆς εἰρήνης διώκωμεν."

In January 1906, Adam was a candidate for the Regius Professorship of Greek, vacant by the death of Sir Richard Jebb.² He came forward, more in response to the suggestion of his friends than because he had any strong wish to be elected. He certainly had no expecta-

¹ He signed the Report recommending the scheme, but afterwards repented.

² Dr. Henry Jackson was appointed.

tion of being chosen. It is the custom at Cambridge that candidates for this post should give a prelection or public lecture before the electors and the University at large. This ordeal Adam welcomed with alacrity. It gave him the chance of mounting a pulpit, and holding forth in an impassioned strain on the soul and immortality to large numbers of his friends. A member of the audience remarked that the Vice-Chancellor should have rung a bell, and reminded the candidate that the vacant chair was not one of theology. Before the election he wrote thus to a friend: "Thank you also for your good wishes for myself. Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπάλεξε (cf. Pl. *Alc.* ii. 142 E). So say I, for my friends as well as myself."

He was not much given to religious observances, and did not often go to church in vacation, when the College chapel was closed. But his interest in the great questions of life and also in the relationship between Hellenism and Christianity was constant. He first began to study the affinity of St. Paul to Plato a few weeks before his marriage, and continued to do so with immense vigour during his honeymoon. When he came to write the Gifford Lectures, the storehouse of material that he then gathered was re-opened, and it was a subject he would have liked to pursue still further by and by. In July 1906 he gave three lectures on "The Hymn of Cleanthes" to some two hundred Presbyterian ministers who had come to Cambridge for a Summer School of Theology. These lectures were very successful. It has been said that many theological students, unknown to him, have derived inspiration from hearing him discourse at one time or another. A comment, overheard and reported to the lecturer, delighted him: "There's matter in that lecture for four sermons." His earnestness is shown by the underlying and often-quoted text of nearly

of his public and College lectures, which was that man is a *φυσὸν οὐκ ἔργειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον*.

During the summer of 1906 he was beginning to revise his Gifford Lectures for the press. This year saw the last of the family parties that he loved so well. Except that his spirits began once more to flag under the pressure of work, it was a particularly happy time. As the autumn and winter went on it was obvious that his College work was more burdensome to him than usual, and the lectures weighed heavily on his mind. A year before he had written: "I am under no illusions as to their scientific value, but I hope to improve them perhaps a little before publishing." When he began the revision, he found less to alter than he had expected; but this fact, which would, if he had been in vigorous health, have appeared to him a sign of merit in them, he could only look upon as an indication of lessening mental power. He was induced to seek medical aid soon after Christmas; and as the symptoms were apparently just the same as those which had troubled him many times before during the last twenty years, it was hoped that, as soon as the book should be out of hand, he would recover his elasticity. His chief pleasure during the winter was to hear his little daughter read aloud favourite passages of the Bible on Sunday evenings. As the spring went on he began to be troubled by sleeplessness, which, after a while, assumed a more obstinate form than he had ever suffered from before. Still there was nothing to rouse suspicion of serious mischief, and he consulted doctors, who gave him a reassuring report. His work went on, though at increasing cost to himself, and those about him were very anxious, as there did not seem to be sufficient cause, in the actual amount of work, to account for the failure of his energy.

He went to Winchester towards the end of July 1907 to examine for the Goddard Scholarship, the school's chief

classical distinction. He had a special interest in the school, as by this time his elder boy had been there two years as a Scholar, and a week or two before his visit his younger boy had been placed Senior (or first) on the Roll of Scholars to enter in the following September. Though he was evidently very far from well, he enjoyed the work, and was glad to realise, more fully than he had done before, the charm of the school and all belonging to it. His last game of golf was played with our most kind host, the Headmaster, on July 27.

He returned to Cambridge to give his last lecture, on July 29, at Newnham College, to an audience consisting of Vacation Biblical Students. The title of the lecture, "Ancient Greek Views of Suffering and Evil," was, in the light of after events, pathetically appropriate. Many who heard it wrote afterwards, describing the impression of vitality that he made on them as they listened to his words. He had dreaded the effort beforehand, but as soon as the lecture was over he said, "I should like to give another to-morrow."

The next day he started for his mother's house at Inverurie, intending to finish preparing the Gifford Lectures for the press, and then to join his family in North Wales, for the rest of the holidays. We all hoped that, as soon as the book was published, he would take a long rest, and do nothing but routine work perhaps for several years. He did send the last batch of his MS. to the printers, as usual in a shorter time than he expected, and was on the point of coming to Wales, when he was led to consult a surgeon in Aberdeen about what he thought to be a slight local complaint, not connected with his sleeplessness and other troubles. An incurable malady in an advanced state was discovered, as his wife learnt on arriving in Aberdeen on August 21 to join him, though he himself did not know till several days later. There was a chance that an operation might prolong his life,

and it was decided to take the risk. The operation was performed on the morning of August 30, 1907. Four hours afterwards he passed peacefully away.

Those last nine days in Aberdeen were a time of blessed calm. By the admirable arrangement of the nursing home where he was installed, I was allowed to be with him all day. His work was done, he was suffering very little, and he was free at last to rest. He liked to listen to reading aloud, or rather to lie in a half-dream while my voice went on. Boswell's *Tour to the Hebrides* and the Bible were what he chiefly desired to hear. Every evening I read St. John xiv before leaving him for the night, sometimes in English, sometimes in Greek. Our friend, Professor Davidson, came each day for a short visit, for my husband said it gave him courage to see him enter the room. Three sisters, and two other friends came, each once: beyond that the time was all our own. When he knew that he was to undergo the operation, he wrote and dictated several letters to his friends. In one of these he quoted from Theognis: ὅτι δὲ μοῖρα παθεῖν, οὔτι δέδοικα παθεῖν.

He was buried at Brookwood Cemetery, Woking, on September 3rd. The memorial services held in Cambridge and Aberdeen on October 19, when both Universities had reassembled, showed how deep and widespread was the grief felt for his departure; but the best tribute to his nature is the fragrant memory he has left in the hearts of all who knew him. *Amans, amabilis, amatus* he was throughout his life of forty-seven years: ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀτενής was his motto for himself. I have tried to show how faithfully he served his generation, and may rest content in the sure hope *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι.*

THE RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF GREECE



LECTURE I

THE PLACE OF POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

WHEN I accepted the invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures at the University to which I owe the greatest intellectual impulse of my life, I was fully sensible of my inability to rival some of my distinguished predecessors in their own particular field. The studies which circumstances as well as inclination have led me to pursue are concerned with the past rather than with the present; and I cannot pretend either to criticise any existing system of philosophy, or to construct a new one in its place. But it seemed to me that there was room for a series of lectures which should attempt, however imperfectly, to reproduce, as far as may be without prejudice or passion, the kind of answers which the religious teachers of ancient Greece—that is to say, the poets and philosophers—were able to supply to those spiritual problems which are not of to-day or yesterday, but for all time. There is a profound truth in the ancient saying, *neminem vere vivere diem praesentem, nisi dierum praeteritorum memorem*. In its special application to the history of religious thought, it is

difficult to exaggerate the significance of this remark. I do not think merely of the historical fact that the science of Natural Theology—to quote the words of Professor Case—“in its foundation and main principles, is a development of Greek metaphysics.” That in itself would seem to be ample justification for discussing the philosophers of Greece in a course of Gifford Lectures; but the particular suggestion which I desire to make is that the religious ideas of Greek philosophy are of peculiar importance for the student of early Christian literature in general, and more especially for the student of St. Paul’s Epistles and the Fourth Gospel. “Neque sine Graecis Christianae, neque sine Christianis Graecae litterae recte aut intellegi aut aestimari possunt.” The early Fathers of the Church were conscious of the spiritual connexion between Greek philosophy and Christianity when they spoke of philosophy as the preparation or propaedeutic—*προπαιδευτική* or *προπαιδεία*—for the Christian faith; and it is from this point of view, as well as on account of the bearing of the subject upon Natural Theology and Theism, that I invite you to consider the development of religious ideas in Greek philosophy and poetry from Homer down to Plato.

Let us begin by endeavouring to form a general idea of the relative position of poetry and philosophy in Greek religious development. In a well-known passage of the *Republic*,¹ it is said by Plato that between philosophy and poetry there was an ancient and hereditary feud. By way of illustrating and enforcing his assertion, Plato cites a number of poetical fragments in which Philosophy and her votaries are satirised by the followers of the Muses. Philosophy, one of the poets says, is but “a clamorous hound, baying at her master”; the philosopher, says another, is “great” only “in the vain

¹ x. 607 B.

babblements of fools"; a third speaks of the "rabble-out of wisecracs"; while another ridicules the poverty and destitution of "these threadbare thinkers." This deep-seated antagonism, which continually meets us in Greek literature, is not sufficiently explained by a reference to the familiar antithesis between the philosophic and the artistic temperaments; for whether that antithesis is true or false in modern life, it is subject to essential qualifications before we can apply it to Greek antiquity, in which the provinces of the poet and philosopher continually overlap. Nearly all the greatest Greek philosophy is coloured by poetical imagery and ideas: and, conversely, there are few of the great Greek poets in whom we do not meet with reflections indicative of a decidedly philosophical habit of mind. It is enough at present to mention Heraclitus among philosophers, and Aeschylus and Euripides among poets. And, as we shall afterwards see, it is precisely in Plato, who more than any other Greek author unites the poet and the philosopher, that this hostility to Greek poetry is most marked.

What, then, are we to suppose to have been the originating cause of the antagonism? From a passage in the *Laws*,¹ it appears that the first of the four quotations selected by Plato to exemplify the feud between poetry and philosophy has reference to the atheistical views of Anaxagoras and his disciples on the subject of the heavenly bodies. The ordinary Greek believed the sun and moon to be Gods: Anaxagoras robbed them of their divinity, and maintained that the sun was nothing but a red-hot mass of stone; while the moon, according to him, contained hills and ravines, and was inhabited like the planet on which we live.² In thus rebelling against the national religion and its deities, philosophy resembles a dog barking at its master. This is the meaning and

¹ 967 C, D.

² Diog. Laert. ii. 8.

application of the first of the passages cited by Plato; and as the others refer to more accidental and superficial occasions of dislike, we are led to conjecture that the quarrel between poetry and philosophy originated in differences about theology and religion. The conjecture becomes a certainty as soon as we study the other side of the picture. It will be observed that the quotations which Plato gives serve only to illustrate the attitude of Greek poetry to Greek philosophy. If we are fully to understand the meaning of the quarrel, and appreciate its true significance in the history of religion and religious development, we must also consider some of the attacks of early Greek philosophy on the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. By so doing we shall be enabled once for all to conclude that the most potent cause of strife was the antagonism between poetry and philosophy on the subject of the attributes of the Godhead and his relations with mankind.

Among the pre-Socratic philosophers who appear to have expressly protested against the Homeric and Hesiodic theology, three names stand out above all others—Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus. There are traces of similar protests also in Empedocles,¹ although Homer and Hesiod are not mentioned in his surviving fragments; and we may infer from the general tone and attitude of other pre-Socratic writers on philosophy that they did not sympathise with the Homeric representations of the divine nature, although they may not have given public expression to their dislike. In one of those apocalypses or “descents into Hades” of which we find traces in early Pythagorean legends,² it seems to have been related of Pythagoras that in his sojourn in the lower world “he saw the soul of Hesiod, bound to a brazen pillar and crying out, together with the soul of Homer, suspended from a tree, and surrounded by snakes, in

¹ Diels, *poet. phil. frag.* p. 160 f.

² Dieterich, *Nekyia* p. 129.

return for what they said about the Gods.”¹ The story is in keeping with the pervading spirit of Pythagorean theology and ethics, and may well preserve an echo of some of Pythagoras’ own sayings. In the fragments of Heraclitus, there is a contemptuous allusion to poets in general,² as the leaders and guides of the populace, along with severe animadversions upon Homer and Hesiod in particular,³ the former of whom, he says, “is worthy to be cast out of the arena and scourged, ay, and Archilochus along with him.” But we have to look to Xenophanes, himself a poet as well as a theologian and philosopher, for the strongest and most emphatic protest in Greek literature against the Homeric conception of the divine nature, at all events until we reach the time of Plato. Xenophanes proclaims his dissent from the anthropomorphism of the Olympian theology in the famous lines preserved for us by Clement. “There is one God, greatest both among Gods and men, resembling mortals neither in form nor in thought.” “But mortals think that Gods are born, and have dress and voice and form like their own.” “But if oxen or lions had hands, or could draw with their hands and make works of art like men, horses would draw figures of Gods like horses, oxen figures of Gods like oxen, giving them bodies like the form which they themselves possessed.” “The Ethiopians say their Gods are black and flat-nosed; the Thracians make theirs fair-eyed and with red hair.”⁴ The satirist Timon, author of the famous *σάλλοι* or satirical verses on Greek philosophers, describes Xenophanes as “the reprover of Homer’s lies,”⁵ and in other fragments of Xenophanes’ writings we meet with strictures on both Homer and Hesiod for falsely attributing immorality to the Gods. “Homer and Hesiod”—these are his words—“ascribed to the Gods every-

¹ Diog. Laert. viii. 21.

² fr. 111 Bywater.

³ fr. 35, 43: cf. Diog. Laert.

ix. 1.

⁴ Diels, *frag. d. Vorsokratiker*² i.

p. 49 ff.

⁵ fr. 60 Diels.

thing which is a disgrace and shame among men, theft, adultery, and mutual deception.”¹ The old legends imputing discord and strife to the divine nature, such as the stories about theomachies, and battles between Gods and giants, are summarily dismissed as “figments of the ancients.”²

These and similar invectives, which in reality foreshadow from afar the early patristic diatribes against Paganism, make it sufficiently clear that the feud between philosophy and poetry, of which Plato speaks, was mainly inspired by the *odium theologicum*. On the one hand we have poetry, as a German writer has well said, “immortalising in imperishable creations the traditional faith,” and on the other hand philosophy, “just on account of that faith, condemning those creations,”³ and at the same time—we may add—providing materials for a purer and more elevated conception of the divine nature. What is the historical significance of this conflict between philosophy and poetry? What is its bearing on the religious history of the world? It will be one of the objects of these lectures to furnish some indirect contributions to the solution of this question by expounding, with occasional references to later religious thought, some of the principal conceptions entertained by Greek philosophers and poets about God and Man and Nature. Our review of the religious teaching of Greek poetry will show, of course, that the philosophers are seldom altogether just to their rival: they fix their attention too exclusively on the naturalistic features of the poetical theology, and tend to ignore the elements of spirituality and idealism which are inherent in it from the very first, and become more and more active as time goes on. But at present we are concerned only with the nature of the quarrel, and its cause; and in order that we may the better understand the circumstances by which the

¹ *fr.* 11, 12.

² *fr.* 1. 22.

³ Krohn, *der Plat. Staat* p. 262.

antagonism was produced, it is necessary at this stage to consider the character and extent of the authority and influence exercised by the poetical religion and theology upon the life and thought of ancient Greece. And when I say the poetical theology, I mean first and foremost the theology of Homer and Hesiod, the two great protagonists on behalf of poetry in the feud of which I have spoken.

To speak of anything like dogmatic orthodoxy or heterodoxy in connexion with ancient Greek religion is, of course, to use words somewhat freely and inaccurately; for there was comparatively little persecution for religious beliefs in Greek antiquity. Religious institutions and ceremonies were carefully guarded; but in respect of dogma the limits of toleration were very wide. We may infer from a remark of the Platonic Socrates that the Athenians in general cared little what a man believed, so long as he did not attempt to proselytise.¹ It is nevertheless true to say that certain views of the Deity, and certain versions of the legends about the Gods and heroes, enjoyed an exceptional authority such as may justify us in designating them as orthodox, in a certain qualified sense of the term; and in this restricted meaning of the word, it is Homer and Hesiod who are the representatives of Greek orthodoxy. As such, we shall see, they were almost universally regarded by the Greeks themselves, by those who dissented from their teaching, as well as by those who, like Euthyphro in the dialogue of Plato, accepted it without reserve.

The ordinary well-educated Greek looked upon Homer and Hesiod as the founders of the national, that is, the Panhellenic or Olympian, theology. We are expressly told by Herodotus that it was Hesiod and Homer who "made the Greek theogony, assigned to the Gods their appellations, distinguished their provinces and arts, and

¹ *Euthyphro* 3 C.

indicated their various forms.”¹ The Olympian theology did not, of course, spring self-created from the imagination of Homer and Hesiod, like Athena from the head of Zeus; nor does Herodotus imagine anything of the kind. The idea of absolute genesis or creation out of nothing is always foreign to Greek thought, and the poet, who is universally regarded by the Greeks as a maker, may be said to “make a theogony” when he reduces theological discord and chaos into harmony and order, just as the Creator himself, according to Plato, created or made the universe by imprinting definite mathematical forms on indeterminate and shapeless matter. In this sense of the term, Herodotus is not improbably right when he asserts that Homer and Hesiod “made” the Greek theogony; for although the elements of the Homeric pantheon are pre-Homeric, in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* perhaps for the first time they are combined into a more or less coherent and organic whole. We may well suppose that it is the genius of the poet which has to a large extent brought order out of the chaos of pre-existing legends and belief—that it is the universalising instinct of poetry which has apprehended and transfigured the universal element in the particular cults, creating out of local and provincial deities the awe-inspiring figures of a single Zeus, a single Apollo, a single Poseidon, and so on, and thus establishing what may truly be called a national or Panhellenic theology. But in any case, the important point for us to grasp is that Herodotus attributes to Homer and Hesiod something of the authority which the adherents of a religious system ascribe to the founders of their faith. That Homer was regarded in antiquity as primarily responsible for the Hellenic theology is apparent from many other indications in Greek literature, and especially from the fact that it is Homer whom Plato chiefly quotes to illustrate

¹ ii. 53.

the false and unworthy notions of the divine nature against which he protests in the *Republic*.

We may therefore regard the poems of Homer and Hesiod as the chief literary monuments of Greek orthodoxy, according to the conception of orthodoxy that prevailed in the most flourishing period of Greek intellectual life. As Professor Butcher has remarked, "the Greeks, like the Jews, had their sacred volume. Already in the seventh century B.C., at the Delian festival and in many other parts of the Hellenic world, they assembled to hear their minstrels recite the Homeric poems. At Athens, from the sixth century onward, a public recitation of Homer was held every fourth year at the Panathenaic festival. It was analogous to the Jewish provision that once in every seven years the law was to be read at the Feast of Tabernacles in the hearing of all Israel."¹ The modern reader is so accustomed to look on Homer as a poet and nothing more, that it is difficult for him to realise that Homer was also a great religious teacher, whose representations of the Godhead and his attributes had a practical influence on the lives and conduct of the Greeks. But if we transport ourselves into the atmosphere of ancient Greek life, we shall see that it was not only natural but inevitable that Homer should exercise an authority of this kind. For one thing, the Greeks almost invariably conceived of the poet as a teacher. "Poets," says Plato in the *Lysis*, "are as it were our intellectual fathers and guides."² Aristophanes' ideal of the poet was essentially the same, although his practice fell short of his profession. In the *Frogs* he passes the following judgment on certain features of ancient realism which frequently meet us in what we may perhaps call the problem-plays of Euripides: "No doubt the story of Phaedra and Hippolytus is true; but it is not a fit

¹ *Harvard Lectures* p. 105.

² 214 A.

subject for dramatic treatment. It is the duty of the poet to suppress what is evil, and not exhibit it upon the stage. For just as children have a schoolmaster to direct them, so poets are the schoolmasters of grown men."¹ There is an echo of Aristophanes' sentiment in the second book of Plato's *Republic*, where the philosopher insists that little children must be taught by their teachers only those fables and legends which are morally pure and wholesome, and that poetry must be required to make tales of a similar character for them as they grow older.² It is the conception of the poet as a moral and religious teacher that explains in some degree the lofty prophetic tone of writers like Pindar and Aeschylus. Nor should we omit to notice that the underlying presumption of the whole of Plato's attack upon Greek poetry is that poetry was the universally recognised teacher of Greece. The head and front of his indictment is not that poetry does not teach, but that her doctrines—so Plato at least believed—are too often demoralising and degrading.

We have seen that Aristophanes and Plato speak of poets as the teachers or schoolmasters of adult Greece; but in another and more literal sense they were also the teachers of the young. "As soon as children have learnt how to read," says the Platonic Protagoras, "and are likely to understand what is written, their teachers set before them the good poets to read as they sit upon the benches, and compel them to commit the poems to memory; for these poems contain many exhortations, many descriptive passages, many eulogies and encomia of the heroes of old. The object of this is to kindle a spirit of emulation and induce the boy to imitate these heroes and aspire to become like them."³ The orator Aeschines declares that "we study the maxims of the poets in our youth in order that we may use them

¹ 1052 ff.; cf. 1032 ff.

² 378 C, D.

³ *Prot.* 325 E.

when we have grown to manhood.”¹ We learn from another passage of Plato that poetic anthologies were sometimes made with the object of instilling the wisdom of the poets into the youthful mind ;² and it is to a later anthology of this kind, the anthology of Stobaeus, that we owe many of the finest fragments of the Greek dramatists. The poets who played the chief rôle in the education of the young were Homer, Hesiod, and the so-called gnomic poets, particularly Theognis. How thoroughly they were assimilated may be seen from the frequency with which these poets, and especially Homer, are quoted and alluded to throughout the whole history of Greek literature. “Most men who had an opinion to defend,” says Grote, “rejoiced to be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or ill-explained—just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times.”³

With regard to Homer in particular, we have a considerable body of evidence showing that the most extravagant claims were advanced on his behalf about the time of Plato by those votaries of Homer who were called “Homeridae.” Not content with describing him in general terms as the educator of Greece, they sometimes went so far as to maintain that all the lessons of statesmanship, war, religion, and morality were to be found in Homer, and that the sole and indispensable requisite for living well was to know this poet thoroughly.⁴ The contention in fact was that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* contained the sum of human knowledge, and were a kind of inspired revelation of the whole duty of man, in every department of human life. Just as Tertullian suggests that the Christian revelation in the New Testament satisfies all legitimate curiosity, and supersedes the necessity of further inquiry, so also, in the view of these enthusiasts, if we may trust the description of them

¹ *In Ctesiph.* 135.

² *Laws* 811 A.

³ *Plato* i. p. 455.

⁴ *Plato, Rep.* x. 606 E.

which Plato gives, whatever is not in Homer, is either superfluous or untrue. The exposition of the ethical and religious doctrine of the Homeric poems occupied the energies of many writers in the time of Plato. In those cases where the plain and literal meaning of Homer's text appeared to convey an undesirable lesson, recourse was had to the hypothesis of a hidden or cryptic meaning (*ὑπόνοια*), in order to save the character of Homer as a teacher of religion and morality; for "assuredly," as Heraclides afterwards said,¹ "Homer was an impious person, or else he spoke in allegories." This allegorical method of interpretation was, however, by no means confined to passages in which a literal exegesis would have imputed falsehood and immorality to the Gods; and in course of time it became the instrument for reading into Homer whatever ethical, political, religious, and even metaphysical doctrines were believed by his expositors. "At one moment," says Seneca, "they make Homer a Stoic, at another an Epicurean, at another a Peripatetic, at another an Academician."²

The habit of interpreting Homer allegorically is an interesting testimony to the half-sacred character of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; for sooner or later there is nearly always a tendency to allegorism in the exposition of writings to which a peculiar sanctity is attached. The method began very early in Greek literary criticism. It was practised in the end of the sixth century B.C. by Theagenes of Rhegium, who is said to have been the first to write a book on Homer.³ In the fifth century, Anaxagoras, we are told, asserted that the subject of Homer's poetry is in reality virtue or righteousness;⁴ and the same method underwent a new development in the hands of his pupil Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who

¹ *Alleg. Hom.* ad init.

² *Epist.* 88. 5 (quoted by Grote, *Plato* i. p. 455).

³ Diels, *frag. d. Vorsokratiker*, p. 510.

⁴ *Diog. Laert.* ii. 11.

anticipated the Stoics by interpreting the Homeric Hera, Athene, and Zeus as physical principles, and seems to have conceived of the different Homeric heroes as purely symbolical representations of physical and other ideas.¹ Agamemnon, he said, means the æther, Achilles the sun, Helen the earth, Alexander the air, and Hector the moon. The Goddess Demeter is an allegorical representation of the liver, while the spleen and the bile are symbolised by Dionysus and Apollo.² Democritus also wrote a book called *Τριτογένεια*, in which the Homeric Pallas was identified with wisdom, because she is the mother of the three component elements on which all the prosperity of mankind depends—good reasoning, good style, and right action.³ Other pre-Socratic writers and teachers of less importance were addicted to the same method; and even so rationalistic a thinker as Socrates himself occasionally employs this weapon of interpretation, though only in a vein of mingled playfulness and earnest.⁴

Among the immediate pupils of Socrates, Antisthenes, the founder of Cynicism, wrote a series of works upon Homer in which he seems to have given an allegorical interpretation to various episodes of the *Odyssey*, as for example those of Circe and the Cyclops.⁵ In the *Second Alcibiades* of Plato we have an excellent description of the allegorical theory of poetry. "Let me tell you, my good sir," says the Platonic Socrates, not without a touch of his usual irony, "Homer is in the habit of speaking in riddles, and not only Homer, but nearly all the other poets too. For the whole of the poetic art is enigmatic from its very nature, and it isn't possible for the man in the street to understand the meaning of a poet; moreover, in addition to the naturally enigmatic character of poetry, it sometimes happens that

¹ See Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* i. p. 1019.

² Diels² i. p. 326, § 4.

³ Zeller, *l.c.* p. 930 n. 4.

⁴ Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 7; cf. *Symp.* 3. 6.

⁵ Diog. Laert. vi. 17 f.

the Muse lays hold of a man who is of a grudging disposition, and anxious to conceal his wisdom as far as possible instead of revealing it to us, and then it is found to be a task of quite portentous difficulty to make out the idea in the poet's mind." ¹ It is clear that we are dealing with a theory of literary criticism which requires us to suppose, not only that Homer is inspired, but that a measure of inspiration is necessary also to his interpreters, if they are to fathom his true meaning: and here again we are struck by the remarkable analogy presented by the history of Christianity and Christian dogma. Such a theory of inspiration is actually outlined by Plato in the *Ion*.² It is suggested in that dialogue that Homer, his interpreter, and the audience are as it were a chain of magnetic rings, the first of which is the poet, the second the rhapsodist, and the third the listener. By means of these rings, says Plato, "the God draws men's souls wherever he lists, communicating his power from link to link of the chain. One poet is attached to one Muse, another to another; and we call the phenomenon *possession* or *inspiration*."

The later history of the allegorical method of criticism forms an instructive chapter in the history of human thought. A great impetus was communicated to it by the Stoics, who made an attempt to show that the Homeric deities and legends were only symbolical expressions of the truths of ethics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. In the hands of the Jewish Hellenists, and especially of Philo the Jew, the same method is applied to the interpretation of the Old Testament, much of which Philo construes as a cryptic or esoteric presentation of Platonism, or rather of that eclectic fusion of Plato with Stoicism which had so great an influence on the development of early Christian doctrine. Allegorical expositions of the Old Testament are found also in the Epistles of St. Paul,

¹ 147 B ff.

² 533 D ff.

as for example in the Epistle to the Galatians.¹ The allegorical method afterwards became a favourite weapon among the early apologists of Christianity, by whom it is constantly used in the elucidation of sacred as well as profane literature. It was to a large extent by means of this arbitrary and elastic principle of interpretation that they endeavoured to establish their favourite thesis that Plato is only *Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων*—"Moses speaking in Attic Greek." The Neoplatonists, too, for their part, are never weary of seeking allegories in the works not only of Homer, but also of Plato; both in the myths, where we expect to encounter a veil of symbolism, and even more eagerly and indefatigably in the sterner abstractions of his dialectical dialogues, such as the *Parmenides*. With the single exception of the Pentateuch, it may be doubted whether any body of literature has suffered so severely at the hands of the professional allegoriser as the dialogues of Plato, in spite of the fact that Plato himself rarely alludes to this mode of criticism without some degree of irony, and has actually furnished us in the *Protagoras* with a long and elaborate satire on the violent and arbitrary canons of interpretation employed by writers of this school.²

But it is time to return to Homer. The evidence which I have adduced will enable us to form some idea of the moral and religious influence of poetical literature in ancient Greece, and especially of the Homeric poems; but in order to realise the practical effect of the writings of Homer and Hesiod on the lives of men, it may be well to consider some of those passages in Greek literature in which the teaching of these poets is appealed to in recommendation or defence of some particular line of conduct. In the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, after Apollo

¹ iv. 21-31.

² 339 A ff. Cf. *Phaedrus* 229 C ff. For an interesting account of the allegorical method of interpreta-

tion in antiquity, the reader may be referred to Stewart's *Myths of Plato* pp. 230-258.

has urged that Orestes had slain his mother in obedience to the commands of Zeus, the Furies reply: "According to thy words, Zeus hath regard to a father's doom; howbeit he put in chains his own aged father, Cronus."¹ The murder of Orestes' father is excused or palliated by the example of Zeus himself. In like manner, the Athenian Euthyphro, who is represented by Plato as the impersonation of consistent and self-satisfied orthodoxy, defends his own unfilial conduct to his father by citing the treatment of Cronus by Zeus. A more instructive illustration is furnished by the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. One of the scenes of that drama represents a contest between the Just and Unjust Arguments, which are brought upon the stage and hold a debate on the rival claims of Righteousness and Unrighteousness to the allegiance of mankind. "Where is Justice?" asks the Unrighteous Argument. "Her seat is in heaven," is the reply. "How comes it then, if Justice exists, that Zeus has not been put to death for imprisoning his father?"² And in a later passage of the same play the Unjust Argument formulates this rule of life: "Follow the impulses of nature; be frolicsome and laugh; consider nothing shameful: for if you are caught in adultery, you can plead that you have committed no sin; you can appeal to the example of Zeus, and point out that he too is the slave of love and woman; and how can you, that are but a mortal, be stronger than a God?"³ This is just the motive to which the Nurse in Euripides' *Hippolytus* appeals when she encourages her mistress to sin; and, indeed, Euripides is always insisting on the incentive to immorality which is furnished by the example of the Gods. It may be desirable to quote a single illustration, perhaps the most vigorous of all the many vigorous attacks upon the Gods contained in the writings of the most iconoclastic of Greek poets. The

¹ 643 ff.² 903 ff.³ 1078 ff.

youthful Ion in the play which bears his name thus expostulates with Apollo :

“Yet must I plead

With Phoebus—what ails him? He ravisheth
 Maids, and forsakes : begetteth babes by stealth
 And heeds not, though they die. Do thou not so!
 Being strong, be righteous. For what man soe'er
 Transgresseth, the Gods visit this on him.
 How were it just then that ye should enact
 For men laws, and yourselves work lawlessness?
 For if—it could not be, yet put it so—
 Ye should pay mulct to men for lawless lust,
 Thou, the Sea-king, and Zeus the lord of heaven,
 Paying for wrongs should make your temples void.
 For, following pleasure past all wisdom's bounds,
 Ye work unrighteousness. Unjust it were
 To call men vile, if we but imitate
 The sins of Gods :—they are vile which teach us this.”¹

More than any other Greek poet Euripides reflects the modes of thought and feeling current in his generation ; and it is therefore reasonable to suppose that there were many of the Greeks who argued in this way. The strictly orthodox view, indeed, as we shall afterwards see, required the Gods to teach by precept only, and not also by example ; and hence it is the Unjust Argument which in the play of Aristophanes appeals to the conduct of the Gods as an excuse for immorality ; but as soon as men began to reflect on the ethical significance of their theology, we may be sure that it began to influence their lives. If such legends had been purely otiose and inoperative, Euripides and Plato would never have attacked them with so much vehemence. In point of fact, it is precisely on the ground that the Homeric theology exercised a corrupting and degrading influence upon character that Plato falls foul of it in the *Republic* and elsewhere. Plato declares that there is no possible

¹ 436 ff, tr. Way.

alternative except to reject such stories altogether. "It is not true," he says, "that Uranus committed the actions attributed to him by Hesiod; it is not true that Cronus thus avenged himself upon his father; and as for the deeds of Cronus and his sufferings at the hands of his son, I would not have them told in this light-hearted way to the young and foolish even if they were true. . . . We must not tell a youthful listener that if he commits the greatest crimes he will be doing nothing new or strange, . . . but only what the first and greatest of the Gods has done before him."¹ In the same way Plato proscribes the Homeric and Hesiodic stories of feuds and battles between the Gods, lest they should encourage the citizens of his Republic to think lightly of quarrelling with one another. The theory of a deeper or hidden meaning will not help us here; for even if Homer spoke in parables, children, says Plato, cannot distinguish between fact and allegory. They inevitably take the symbol for the truth.² According to Plato himself, the object of all true religion is "assimilation to God, so far as it is possible for man."³ It is therefore an essential part of his conception of the divine nature that it should furnish an ethical ideal for mankind. The theology of Homer, in his opinion, provided no such ideal, and must therefore be discarded.

After what has now been said, it will readily be conceded that the feud between philosophy on the one hand, and the old Homeric and Hesiodic religious ideas on the other hand, is one of the most striking features in Greek religious development. Regarded from this point of view, the evolution of theological and religious thought in Greece, as it is embodied for us in the works of Greek literature, may be regarded as the result of the action and interaction of the two rival principles of orthodoxy and dissent. We must beware,

¹ *Rep.* ii. 377 E ff.² 378 D.³ *Theact.* 176 B.

however, of supposing that the poetical theology itself remained stationary. The truth is rather that there are two main streams of development, the poetical and the philosophical, which for the most part pursue a separate and independent course until the time of Euripides. On the one hand the poets, especially Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, without abandoning the old Homeric anthropomorphism, gradually purified and spiritualised the elements of religious idealism already contained in the Homeric poems, at the same time allowing the grosser features of the Homeric and Hesiodic theologies to recede into the background, without, however, entirely vanishing from view. It is Sophocles who represents the climax of this movement on the part of Greek poetry: more than any other Greek poet he seems to lay hold of whatever there is of divine and imperishable in the traditional faith of Greece, and consecrates it for all time in those incomparable dramas, which are the most perfect embodiment of the Hellenic genius at its best. On the other hand, the pre-Socratic philosophers were more and more led by their physical speculations towards a view of the universe in which no room was left for the Homeric Gods, and began to express their dissent at a very early period of Greek thought. As the poetical development culminates in Sophocles, so the philosophical—I speak at present only of pre-Socratic philosophy—culminates in Anaxagoras, whose doctrine of a world-forming *Nous* contained the promise of a teleological interpretation of Nature, such as Plato and Aristotle afterwards developed. In Euripides, whom the ancients were fond of calling “the philosopher upon the stage,” the two concurrent streams converge and meet: there is hardly a single idea of first-rate importance in pre-Euripidean theology and ethics, whether popular, poetical, or philosophical, which is not re-echoed some-

where in the writings of that extraordinary man. But the effect of the Euripidean drama upon traditional beliefs was in the main destructive; and in a survey of Greek religious development he should be considered in connexion with the so-called epoch of Illumination, whose poetical interpreter he was. With Socrates a new era begins, and from this point onwards the advancement of religious thought in Greece is effected by philosophy alone.

Such, in brief outline, is the course which our inquiry will pursue. We shall first consider the poetical development from Homer to Sophocles, and afterwards the philosophical from Thales to Anaxagoras. The teaching of the Sophists and of Euripides will claim our attention next; and the remainder of the lectures will be devoted to Socrates and Plato.

LECTURES II AND III

HOMER

IN accordance with the plan proposed at the end of the preceding lecture, we have now to consider the chief features of the Homeric religion. Recent archaeological investigation has shown, of course, that Homer, instead of standing at the commencement of Greek history, belongs to a comparatively late period; but as it is the evolution of religion within the limits of Greek literature with which these lectures are to deal, I will not attempt to penetrate beyond the epoch represented for us by the Homeric poems.

The three main questions which we shall attempt to answer are these: First, what is the Homeric representation of the divine nature? Secondly, what is Homer's conception of man's duty to the Gods? And thirdly, how does Homer conceive of the future life? God, man's obligations to God, and immortality—these are the three great corner-stones of religious belief, and I will consider them in this order.

All men, says Homer, have need of Gods: πάντες δὲ θεῶν χυτέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.¹ In this profound and memorable sentence, on which Melanchthon among others loved to dwell,—he used to say it was the most beautiful verse in Homer,—the poet gives expression not only to the universality of the religious instinct, but also to the foundation on which religion everywhere rests, man's consciousness of dependence on a personality or person-

¹ *Od.* 8. 48.

alities higher than his own. For the religion of Homer in particular, this saying should be regarded as an authoritative text or motto; for by far the most striking and characteristic feature in his faith is the extent to which both man and nature are conceived as dependent on the heavenly powers. Turn where he may, man, in Homer, finds himself in contact with the Godhead, for the Gods are everywhere; *πάντα πλήρη θεῶν*,—"all things are full of Gods,"—as Thales said;¹ and nothing appears to Homer more reasonable and obvious than that he should ascribe all the activities of human life and history, and all the phenomena of external nature, to the direct and immediate agency of the divine. "The period," says C. O. Müller, "from which we have inherited the popular religions of antiquity, together with the poetry which grew upon the soil which they provided, a period into which we can transport ourselves only by a sudden leap of the imagination, is distinguished from the age in which we live by one conspicuous feature. It regarded every form of intellectual life, nay, life itself in all its forms, as the unintermittent operation not of individual forces and causes, but of higher supernatural powers, and viewed man for the most part as only the focus in which these active powers meet and reveal themselves to mankind."

We may perhaps illustrate the difference between Homer's attitude and our own by comparing the effect produced upon the Homeric and the modern mind by the contemplation of the sea in storm and calm. Except in moments of deep religious feeling, prompted by gratitude for deliverance from imminent peril, or by a sense of the weakness of man in the face of the mighty forces of nature, we do not ordinarily hear the voice of God in the tempest, or see his hand in the stilling of the wave; we think of secondary and subsidiary causes; and even when

¹ Arist. *de An.* i. 5. 411^a 8.

the religious consciousness rises from nature to nature's God, the Deity still remains apart, rousing and assuaging the waves by his almighty will, but 'not, except by a poetical figure, present in his own person amid the tumult which he sways. In the view of Homer, on the other hand, the atmospheric conditions are not in any true sense the cause of storm; secondary and subsidiary causes he scarcely recognises: the one and only cause is the personal action of the deity whom winds and waves obey. "Now the lord, the shaker of the earth . . . saw Odysseus as he sailed over the deep; and he was yet more angered in spirit, and shaking his head he communed with his own heart . . . 'Methinks, that even yet I will drive him far enough in the path of suffering.' With that he gathered the clouds and troubled the waters of the deep, grasping his trident in his hands; and he roused all storms of all manner of winds, and shrouded in clouds the land and sea: and down sped night from heaven."¹ When the Christian poet sings

"He plants his footsteps in the sea
And rides upon the storm,"

or, to take another instance,

"His chariots of wrath the deep thunderclouds form!
And dark is his path on the wings of the storm,"

the language is felt to be metaphorical, not only by the reader, but even by the poet; or at all events, it is much more nearly metaphorical than any such language would be in Homer. To Homer, such a description would be true in a literal and not merely in a poetical and figurative sense; for in Homer, truth is poetry and poetry is truth. Thus Poseidon has "his famous palace in the deeps of the mere, his glistening golden mansions builded, imperishable for ever"; he is the immanent, indwelling

¹ *Od.* 5. 282 ff, tr. Butcher and Lang.

monarch of the sea; and when he mounted his chariot, and rode upon the waves, "the sea-beasts frolicked beneath him, for well they knew their lord."¹ And what we have said of the sea is equally true of earth and air and sky. The entire framework of the universe is penetrated and quickened throughout all its parts by the multitudinous presence of the divine, revealing itself not only in the uniform and regular sequence of natural phenomena, but also from time to time in those exceptional and arbitrary suspensions of natural law which later ages pronounce to be miraculous. In a certain sense we may say that in Homer the age of miracles, so far from being past, is hardly even begun; for the distinction of natural and supernatural, which the conception of miracles appears to presuppose, is scarcely existent in a world where every natural phenomenon is a theophany. On this account the greatest miracles of Homer seem even to the modern reader altogether natural and right. When the horse of Achilles bows his head and addresses his master, we are satisfied, because it is the white-armed goddess Hera who gave him speech,² and *θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται*: nor does the delaying of the dawn by Athene³ fill us with more amazement: it is felt to be in perfect harmony with the Homeric point of view. We are much more sensible of the miraculous, when we read in the Old Testament that Jehovah "hearkened unto the voice of a man," "and the sun stayed in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day."⁴


The truth is that the ubiquity and nearness of the Godhead are hardly less conspicuous in Homer than in the Psalms of the Old Testament. As far as appertains to this doctrine, the Homeric Greek might have said, with the author of the hundred and thirty-ninth psalm,

¹ *I.* 13. 21 ff. Lang.

² *I.* 19. 404 ff.

³ *Od.* 23. 243 ff.

⁴ *Josh.* x. 13, 14.



"If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Sheol, behold, thou art there." But Homer's conception of the divine omnipresence assumes a totally different and far less spiritual character by reason of his polytheism. Instead of a single all-embracing Deity, whom "even the heaven of heavens cannot contain," we find a multitude of separate personalities, each with his peculiar province, attributes and rights, and each pursuing aims and objects of his own. There is, as we shall see, a certain unity or identity of nature in these several deities; but the Homeric polytheism is otherwise frank and unrestrained.

It is true, of course, that the will of a particular God is sometimes thwarted by the inexorable decrees of Destiny or Fate, to which even Zeus himself must yield. "Ah woe is me," cries Zeus, "for that it is fated that Sarpedon, the best-beloved of men to me, shall be subdued under Patroklos son of Menoitios!" And when he bows to the inevitable, "he shed bloody raindrops on the earth, honouring his dear son, that Patroklos was about to slay in the deep-soiled land of Troia, far off from his own country."² But the conception of Fate is so far from clear in Homer, that in other places he does not separate it from the dispensation of Zeus himself;³ and even where Destiny is a power above the Gods, it remains an implacable ordinance or law, with none of the divine attributes except omnipotence.

It is therefore inadmissible to attribute a monotheistic value to the notion of Fate in Homer. The most that we can say is that the Homeric conception of Destiny, regarded as a power to which Gods and men alike must bow, is a kind of unconscious tribute to that instinct for unification which often asserts itself in

¹ *Il.* 16. 438 f. Lang.
² *Il.* 16. 459 ff. Lang.

³ *Διδί αἶσα, Διδί μοῖρα, etc.*

polytheistic religions. After Homer, we meet with the theistic interpretation of Destiny now and then in poetry, but it is not at all common in Greek thought before the Stoics. There is more to be said in favour of the view which finds an approximation to monotheism in the position occupied by the Homeric Zeus. The celestial kingdom is no anarchy, but a well-ordered commonwealth or state, in which, as in the terrestrial commonwealths on whose model it was framed, the king is himself supreme. The king of Heaven, like his earthly prototype, takes counsel with his peers, but is in no way bound by their opinion: the final decision is entirely his own, and the other Gods, whether they like it or not—and frequently they do not—must acquiesce. “Surely,” says Hermes, “it is in no wise possible for another god to go beyond or to make void the purpose of Zeus, lord of the aegis.”¹ And even Poseidon, who claims to be equal to Zeus in honour, “left the host of the Achaians, and passed to the sea, and sank,”² when Zeus commanded him “to cease from the battle and war, and go among the tribes of the gods, or into the bright sea.”³ It is obvious that in the sovereignty of the Homeric Zeus, based though it is in the last resort on might and not on right, we have already the germ which is capable of developing into a species of monotheism; for the conception of an organised world of Gods under a single ruler is in all religions a kind of “station on the way from polytheism to monotheism.”⁴ In point of fact, the Homeric conception of the “father of Gods and men” is gradually purified and elevated by poetry and philosophy until the thought of Zeus, the “most glorious of immortals, called by many names, for aye omnipotent, maker and lord of Nature, ruling all things by law,” calls forth from the

¹ *Od.* 5. 108 ff. B. and L.

² *I.* 15. 218 f. Lang.

³ *I.* 15. 160 f. Lang.

⁴ Höfding, *Philos. of Religion*
p. 156.

lips of Cleanthes the Stoic what is perhaps the noblest tribute of religious adoration in the whole range of ancient literature. The influence of religious art tended in the same direction. It is impossible to estimate the effect of the famous statue of Zeus at Olympia—the supreme embodiment of divine beauty, benignity, and calm—in purifying the religious sentiment of ancient Greece. “He who is heavy-laden in soul,” writes Dio Chrysostom, “who has experienced many misfortunes and sorrows in his life, and from whom sweet sleep has fled, even he, I think, if he stood before this image, would forget all the calamities and troubles that befall in human life.”¹ But in Homer, Zeus, although he is king of Gods and men, rarely interferes with the jurisdiction of the lesser Gods, and even within Olympus his authority is not unchallenged; so that the most which can with propriety be affirmed is that the Homeric Zeus provides a nucleus out of which something analogous to monotheism was afterwards evolved in the religious consciousness of later Greek thinkers.

We should accordingly conceive of the Homeric world as peopled with a multitude of deities, who are not merely, as the Stoics in a later age contended, different aspects or manifestations of the one divine essence, but individuals in the fullest sense of the word, free and independent, except in so far as their liberty is circumscribed by Zeus and Fate. Let us now proceed to consider the question, “What is Homer’s idea of the divine nature, regarded in itself? What does he understand by the name of ‘God’?” No better answer can be given than in the words which Lucian puts into the mouth of Heraclitus: “What are men? Mortal Gods. What are Gods? Immortal men.”² It is a trite, but true saying, that just as man, in the Old Testament, is made in the image of God, so God, in Homer, is made in the

¹ Or. xii. 51 (von Arnim).

² *Vitarum auctio* 14.

image of man. The Homeric polytheism is pre-eminently humanistic.¹ We have already seen that the political organisation of Olympus is the divine and heavenly counterpart of the human commonwealth on earth; and that which is true of the totality of Gods, is even more conspicuously true of the individual deity. The Gods are indeed immortal, with all that immortality implies of eternal youth and beauty, of ideal majesty and power; but even this immortality, from the standpoint of later thought, is open to question; for they are created in time, and it is almost an axiom of Greek philosophy from Xenophanes onwards that time will at last destroy what it creates. And in other respects the anthropomorphism of the Homeric Gods is unusually naïve and literal. When the Old Testament "speaks of the hand, arm, mouth, lips, and eyes of God; when He makes bare His holy arm, lifts up a signal to the nations, is seen at the head of the Medes mustering His hosts, and His military shout is heard, all this," according to Professor A. B. Davidson, "is but vivid conception of His being, His intelligence, His activity and universal power over the nations whom He directs. . . . The language only testifies to the warmth and intensity of the religious feelings of the writers."² Whatever may be true of Hebrew representations of the Deity, we are not at liberty to interpret the anthropomorphism of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as only a fashion of speech dictated by religious or poetical enthusiasm. Even in a later age, after a more spiritual conception of the Godhead had long been taught by philosophers and poets, it was the prevailing habit to assign corporeal shape and form to God. Speaking of the popular notion of a divine being, Plato observes in the *Phaedrus*, "although we have

¹ See on this subject E. Caird, *The Evolution of Religion* i. p. 264 ff.

² Article "God" in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* ii. p. 198.

neither seen him with our eyes, nor adequately conceived him with our minds, we imagine a God as an immortal animal, possessed of soul, and possessed of body, combined into an indissoluble union of these two elements throughout all time."¹ And to Homer, in particular, the anthropomorphic view of God was inevitable, owing to his peculiar conception of personality, in which, as will afterwards be seen, body played a hardly less important part than soul. The alternative—to sacrifice the personality of God—would have seemed to Homer, as it has seemed to others, only atheism.

But although there is hardly any limit to the degree in which the attributes of human nature are reproduced in the Homeric Gods, we shall do less than justice to Homer if we fail to remark that the grosser tendencies of anthropomorphism are frequently counterbalanced and counteracted throughout the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by a powerful current of moral and religious idealism. It is the presence of this struggle between the ideal and the actual, the religious consciousness for ever striving to escape from the bondage of materialism into a freer and more spiritual atmosphere, which has occasioned the remark that "Homer's men think better of the Gods than they deserve." There is a sense in which this saying is profoundly true: only we must beware of supposing that the higher and purer conception of the Deity to which the human heart in every age aspires, is not itself reflected in the Homeric poems, as well as the lower conception, to which it is opposed. The Zeus who sends the lying dream to Agamemnon² was certainly not the God to whom the Homeric heroes prayed for deliverance in times of distress and danger; but along with such malevolent impersonations of the Deity, Homer sets before us the diviner figure of the son of Cronus, strong to save, who "stretches out his hand to shield in battle."³

¹ 246 C.² *Il.* 2. 1 ff.³ *Od.* 14. 184.

The interaction of these two opposing currents of naturalism and idealism, materialism and spiritualism, may be traced in the physical, the mental, and in a lesser, perhaps, but still, I think, appreciable degree, the moral characteristics of the Homeric Gods. We ought not, of course, to ascribe to Homer any conscious discrimination between these three kinds of attributes: even in the Socratic age the moral and intellectual constituents of personality were scarcely distinguished: but for the sake of clearness and convenience of exposition it is necessary for us to study the different attributes in isolation, even at the risk of obtruding a later and more critical standpoint upon Homer. With this proviso, I will review in order, as briefly as may be possible, the principal characteristics of the divine nature, physical, intellectual, and moral, as they are portrayed in the poems of Homer, distinguishing the grosser features of his theology from those loftier and purer elements which also find a place in the Homeric conception of God.

According to the less spiritual aspect of the Homeric Gods, we have to conceive of them as resembling humanity not only in outward form and features, but also in respect of those physical necessities and limitations which are inseparable from corporeal existence. Like men, they require material nourishment and sleep, and rejoice in the light of the sun, as he leaves the "lovely mere, speeding to the brazen heaven, to give light to the immortals and to mortal men on the earth."¹ Like men, too, though in a less degree, they are subject to the exigencies of space, and have a local habitation, residing in Olympus, or in the case of those deities who, like Poseidon, rule an allotted portion of the universe, dwelling in the actual element which they control. At other times they visit their temples, or meet together in solemn conclave at Olympus, the capital of the celestial

¹ *Od.* 3. 1 ff. B. and L.

commonwealth, where they have each "his fair mansion," "his palace built with cunning device by renowned Hephaestus" in the folds of the mountain.¹ In respect of authority and power, they are far superior to mortals; but Homer does not, as a rule, make them omnipotent, and they suffer at times discomfiture and pain.

On the other hand, there is an element of superhuman grandeur and sublimity—what Wordsworth calls "the presence and the power of greatness"—about the Homeric Gods, which is calculated to inspire religious veneration, and even perhaps diffuse a sense of tranquillity and peace, making us for the moment almost forget the grosser and more material parts of the conception; and sometimes the physical attributes of the Godhead retire into the background, and we are conscious only of the spiritual side of Zeus. It is not only that the invisibility of the Gods would seem to imply that their bodies are made of finer stuff, reminding us of the *perlucidi perflabiles dei* of Epicurean theology: it is not only that ichor and not blood flows in their veins, that they live on nectar and ambrosia, that they excel mankind in beauty and stature and strength, and are sometimes said to be omnipotent—*θεοὶ δὲ τε πάντα δύνανται*.² Nor is it merely that the city in which they dwell, like the *intermundia* of Lucretius, who copies the Homeric picture of Olympus, is a centre of serenity and calm, the thought of which might serve to soothe and tranquillise the heart in moments of anxiety and pain.

"So spake, and forth to Olympus Grey-eyed Athene passed,
Where men say is the House of the Godfolk for ever firm and fast;
And by no wind is it shaken, nor wet by the rainy drift,
Nor the snow comes ever anigh it; but the utter cloudless lift
Is spread o'er all, and white splendour runs through it everywhere;
And therein the Gods, the Happy, all days in gladness wear."³

¹ *Il.* 11. 76 f., 1. 607.

² *Od.* 10. 306; cf. 4. 287 and 14. 445.

³ *Od.* 6. 41–46 Morris.

"To the Homeric Greek," says Höffding, "Olympus stood amid the pains and struggles of this life in eternal clarity, unmoving and unmoved. . . . In this brilliant picture the Greeks saw the expression of the eternal reality of the valuable, and in its splendour they forgot the shadow of their own life; or they accepted in sadness and resignation the contrast between the Olympian and the terrestrial as something that had to be."¹ We have here the same kind of opposition as appears in Plato between the "supra-celestial region" of Ideas and the world of generation and decay; and essentially the same religious need—the desire for an "abiding city"—finds satisfaction in both cases. It should also be remarked that if a particular God can only be in one place at a time, both space and time are almost annihilated by the rapidity of his movements. Hera lashes her horses, and "they nothing loth flew on between earth and starry heaven. As far as a man seeth with his eyes into the haze of distance as he sitteth on a place of outlook and gazeth over the wine-dark sea, so far leap the loudly neighing horses of the gods."² These and other passages of a similar nature are in themselves a testimony to the idealism which tends to neutralise the grosser elements of the Olympian theology, but they do not attempt to spiritualise the Deity; and in view of later theological developments in Greece, it is more important to observe that there are places in which the mind or purpose of Zeus operates at a distance without employing any corporeal instrument or vehicle whatever. The Zeus who strikes the bow from the hands of Teucer is not merely unseen, but far away;³ and in two other instances, where the God himself is equally remote, it is the "mind of aegis-bearing Zeus,"

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* p. 230.

² *Il.* 5. 768 ff. Leaf; cf. 15. 80 ff.
³ *Il.* 15. 461 ff.

which alone produces the effect.¹ In this involuntary tendency to spiritualise the conception of Zeus—for it is only the king of Gods and men who is thus depicted—we may already detect the beginnings of that loftier view of the almighty Father with which we meet in Aeschylus. “Secure it falls, not prostrate on its back, whate’er is decreed to fulfilment by the nod of Zeus. Through thicket and through shade lead the pathways of his mind: no thought can spy them out. From their high-towering hopes he hurls men to destruction, but uses no armed violence. God knows not toil: seated above upon his holy throne he worketh his will from thence by ways unknown.”²

We find a similar antagonism between the lower and higher representations of the Deity if we pass from the physical to the intellectual sphere. The attribute of omniscience is that which primarily concerns us in this connexion. Ideally, as we have seen, the Gods in Homer are all-powerful; but the poet is unable to maintain his theology at so high a level, and their omnipotence is belied by many of the incidents which he narrates. In like manner, from the ideal point of view, the Godhead is omniscient: *θεοὶ δὲ τε πάντα ἴσασι*.³ Not only past and present, but the future falls within his ken: he “knoweth utterly All things that are doomed and undoomed for men on earth that die,”⁴ and sometimes forewarns mankind of coming fate.⁵ As Nägelsbach acutely observes, the prophetic faculty which Homer ascribes to the seer, bears witness to the power of the Gods to see into the future: for, according to the Homeric view, afterwards more fully developed by later Greek thinkers, and especially by the Stoics, the seer is an *ἐνθεος ἀνὴρ*, a living oracle of God, who derives

¹ *Il.* 15. 242; *Od.* 24. 164.

² *Suppl.* 95–109.

³ *Od.* 4. 379, 468.

⁴ *Od.* 20. 75 f. Morris,

⁵ *Od.* 1. 37 ff.

his prescience from no other source than the indwelling Deity. We may be sure, I think, that it was this all-powerful and all-knowing God, and none of the maimed and deformed embodiments of the divine nature, that awakened the deepest religious feelings of the Homeric Greek; but it is none the less true that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* abound in episodes which cannot be reconciled with the omniscience of the Godhead; and no small part of the energy of the immortals is in fact devoted to outwitting Zeus. The episode of the beguiling of Zeus by Hera, which Plato cites to illustrate the licentiousness of the Homeric Gods, tells equally against their omniscience;¹ and it must certainly be allowed that the prevailing conception of the divine intelligence in Homer falls far below the level to which it afterwards attained in Pindar, when he thus sang of Apollo: "Thou that knowest the appointed end of all things, and all the paths thereto: all the leaves that Earth puts forth in spring, and the number of grains of sand in sea and rivers, tossed to and fro by waves and blasts of wind, and discernest well the future, and whence it shall come to be."²

The preceding observations may serve perhaps to illustrate in some degree the antithetical elements in Homer's religion, as far as concerns the physical and intellectual attributes of his Gods; and we have now to witness a similar antagonism of lower and higher views in connexion with those qualities which belong to the sphere of divine morality or ethics. In this department of our subject, as I have already hinted, the vein of idealism is much less apparent.

If we have regard in the first instance to the more degrading vices connected with the lower appetites of human nature, we must confess that the Homeric poems

¹ *Iliad*. 14. 294 ff., and Plato, *Rep.* iii. 390 B. ² *Pyth.* 9. 43 ff.

are justly exposed to the censure of those who, like Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and many other critics of Olympian theology in the early Christian era, demanded that the conception of God should be such as to furnish a moral standard to mankind. It is worthy of notice that Homer hardly ever betrays any consciousness of the paradigmatic aspect of the Deity. There is, I think, only one passage, to be quoted hereafter, in which a particular course of conduct is recommended because it is exemplified by the Gods. It was apparently Xenophanes who first laid stress on this idea in Greek thought. The kind of criticism to which Homer exposes himself on this account may be illustrated from Tertullian's violent attack on Pagan theology. "It is Homer, I imagine, who has represented the divine majesty as subject to the conditions of human nature, attributing to Gods the misfortunes and passions of humanity: they take sides according to their several sympathies, and he pits them against one another like gladiators in the arena: Venus he wounds with an arrow from the hand of a mortal: Mars he keeps in chains for thirteen months, with the fear of death before his eyes: Jupiter he parades as having all but suffered the same indignity from the celestial proletariat, or draws tears from his eyes at Sarpedon's fate; or he represents him in shameful dalliance with Juno after advocating his passion by an enumeration of his mistresses." "Is it a case for laughter or indignation," asks Tertullian, "*tales deos credi, quales homines esse non debeant?*"¹ The fact is that the lower as well as the higher instincts of humanity not only reappear in the Gods of Homer, but actually seem to be intensified and strengthened before they are transferred to the divine nature; nor is there apparently any trace in Homer of those attributes of holiness and purity which are features so prominent in the Hebrew conception of

¹ *Ad Nationes* i. 10, ii. 7.

God. In respect of their lower as well as of their higher qualities, the Homeric Gods are magnified men.

✓ A scarcely less inadequate apprehension of the divine character sometimes reveals itself in Homer's account of the dealings of God with man. Can God be good, and nevertheless the cause of physical suffering and evil to mankind? The question is for the first time explicitly raised by Plato,¹ whose treatment of the origin of evil will be touched upon in a later lecture. In the meantime, accepting the Platonic axiom that nothing which is altogether good can be the cause of that which is in itself and absolutely evil, we must allow that, tried by this standard, the Homeric Gods fall short of ideal goodness and beneficence: for the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* abound in episodes where misfortune and calamity are due to the immediate agency of Gods, without, so far as we can see, any moral justification or any prospect of redress either now or in the world to come. "Father Zeus," says Philoetius in the *Odyssey*, "none other god is more baneful than thou: thou hast no compassion on men, that are of thine own begetting, but makest them to have fellowship with evil and with bitter pains."² In Homer's view, Zeus is the "steward of things evil as well as of things good":³ for "two urns stand upon the floor of Zeus filled with his evil gifts, and one with blessings. To whomsoever Zeus whose joy is in the lightning dealeth a mingled lot, that man chanceth now upon ill and now again on good, but to whom he giveth but of the bad kind him he bringeth to scorn, and evil famine chaseth him over the goodly earth, and he is a wanderer honoured of neither gods nor men."⁴ The ordinary solutions by which philosophers and theologians, both in Greece and in Christendom, have attempted to reconcile the existence of pain and sorrow in the world with the moral goodness and omnipotence of God, are

¹ *Rep.* ii. 379 B ff.

² 20. 201 ff. B. and L.

³ ap. Plato, *Rep.* ii. 379 E.

⁴ *Il.* 24. 527-532 Myers.

alien to the simple realism of the Homeric age; and on the whole it may fairly be said that in their dealings both with one another and with mankind the Olympian Gods are true to the golden rule of Paganism, "Love your friends, and hate your enemies."

The lower ingredients in Homer's conception of God, so far as his activity affects the happiness and virtue of human beings, may be illustrated from two sister doctrines which begin with Homer, although their full development belongs to a later period of Greek literature. I refer in the first place to the widely-spread belief in "the envy of the Gods," a belief which is characteristic of a certain stratum of religious development, and still survives in some popular interpretations even of Christianity itself; and, secondly, to the idea expressed by Aeschylus when he wrote, "God engenders guilt in mortal men, when he is minded utterly to destroy their house."¹ A parallel to the former belief may perhaps be found in the story of the Tower of Babel, and in the punishment inflicted on the unoffending Israelites when David was moved by Satan, or according to the other account, by God himself, to number the hosts of Israel.² It is obvious that neither of these two doctrines, at least in their crudest and most primitive form, can easily be harmonised with the belief in a supremely good and beneficent God; and on this account, as we shall afterwards see, they were finally rejected by Plato along with other "poetic lies." In Homer the "envy of the Gods" is apt to be aroused by anything which tends to disturb the balance of power between Gods and men, such as the alliance between a Goddess and a mortal, or when a man enjoys a long and unbroken course of prosperity; and how is the balance restored? Simply by casting down the mighty from their seats, without any suggestion, such as we afterwards meet with in Aeschylus, that the

¹ ap. Plato, *Rep.* ii. 380 A.

² 1 Chron. xxi. 1 ff.; 2 Sam. xxiv. 1.

victim is punished for his sins, and not for his success. "Hard are ye gods and jealous exceeding," says Calypso, "who ever grudge goddesses openly to mate with men. . . . Even so when rosy-fingered Dawn took Orion for her lover, ye Gods that live at ease were jealous thereof, till chaste Artemis, of the golden throne, slew him in Ortygia with the visitation of her gentle shafts."¹ When Bellerophon incurred the hatred of the Gods, and was driven to wander "alone in the Aleian plain, devouring his soul, and avoiding the pathways of men,"² there is no implication that he had sinned, unless prosperity itself be sinful; and the reason why Poseidon is jealous of the Phaeacians is because they invariably "give safe escort to all men"—*οὐνεκα πομποὶ ἀπήμονές εἰμεν ἀπάντων*.³

In later Greek literature, more especially the drama, the doctrine of the "envy of the Gods" is sometimes brought into connexion with the still more tragic idea that the sins of erring mortals are directly due to the inspiration of the Gods—*quem deus vult perdere prius dementat*; and the germs of this idea, as I have already stated, are also to be found in Homer. It is true that in one remarkable passage the Homeric Zeus protests against so injurious an imputation. "Lo you now," says Zeus, revolving in his mind the fate of Aegisthus, "how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained."⁴ But there are many instances in which the responsibility for sin is laid at the door of the Gods, and one of Homer's regular formulae for that principle of Atê or Infatuation from which, according to Greek tragedy, sin takes its rise, is *φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς*: "blinded was I, and Zeus deprived me of my wits."⁵

¹ *Od.* 5. 118 ff. B. and L.

² *Il.* 6. 200 ff.

³ *Od.* 8. 566; cf. also 23. 209 ff.

⁴ *Od.* 1. 32 ff. B. and L.

⁵ e.g. *Il.* 19. 137.

“What could I do?” cries Agamemnon, when he is at last made conscious of his criminal folly; “it is God who accomplisheth all. Eldest daughter of Zeus is Atê who blindeth all, a power of bane: delicate are her feet, for not upon earth she goeth, but walketh over the heads of men, making men to fall; and entangleth this one or that.”¹ We are not at liberty to regard such passages as merely a dramatic expression of the innate tendency of man to blame the Gods or Fate for sins of his own choosing, in spite of the language which Homer puts into the mouth of Zeus; for the violation of the treaty between Trojans and Greeks in the fourth book of the *Iliad* is ascribed by the poet himself to the immediate instigation of the almighty Father. “Forthwith he spake to Athene winged words: ‘Betake thee with all speed to the host, to the midst of Trojans and Achaians, and essay that the Trojans may first take upon them to do violence to the Achaians in their triumph, despite the oaths.’”² We should remember that man, in Homer, is only a παύγιον θεῶν—a plaything or puppet in the hands of the Gods; “he dwells but in their sight, and works but what their will is.” On this account it is, and must be, the Gods who are in the last analysis responsible for the sins as well as for the sufferings of mankind. In other words, we may say that the moral dualism of the Homeric Gods is a necessary and inevitable consequence of their all but unlimited control of human character and fate. In Homer there is no devil to bear the blame.

It remains to say something of another and not less unfavourable feature in Homer's conception of the Deity, I mean the way in which he represents the Gods as beguiling mankind by false appearances and lies. As with the doctrine of the “envy of the Gods,” so also here, we can find numerous parallels in other early races

¹ *I.* 19. 90 ff. Myers.

² *I.* 4. 69 ff. Leaf.

whose ideas of God have not as yet been transformed and spiritualised by a nobler and profounder estimate of man: and it is easy to detect survivals of this crude belief in theologies of a purer and more elevated type, such as, for example, the "lying spirit" which Jehovah put in the mouth of the prophets who prophesied to Ahab.¹ But in Homer the instances in which the Deity deceives men to their hurt are not, as in the Old Testament, sporadic and exceptional; nor will the Homeric critic be disposed to borrow the weapons of some modern theologians and vainly try to reconcile such passages with those in which the more developed religious consciousness of Greece, as it is exemplified in Pindar, for example, and in Plato, attributes perfect truthfulness to God. The classic example of malevolent falsehood on the part of the Homeric Gods is the lying dream which Zeus despatches to Agamemnon;² but there are other not less diabolical episodes, where by their unlimited power of self-transformation the Gods mislead men to their doom. Perhaps the most pathetic instance is where Athene, in the crisis of Hector's fate, takes her stand by the side of the hero, in the guise of his brother Deiphobus, in order to lure him by the hope of fraternal succour to destruction, and vanishes as soon as he is at the mercy of his foe. "Then Hector knew the truth in his heart, and spake and said: 'Ay me, now verily the gods have summoned me to death. I deemed the warrior Deiphobos was by my side, but he is within the wall, and it was Athene who played me false.'"³ We make a grave mistake if we regard these and similar delineations of the divine nature in the Homeric poems as having only a poetic or dramatic value. It is part of the tragedy of Homeric life that they were believed to be true. Homer's theology in this respect lags far behind the teaching of Plato, to whom, as to St. James,

¹ 1 Kings xxii. 22 ff.

² *Il.* 2. 1 ff.

³ *Il.* 22. 296 ff. Myers.

God is the "Father of lights, with whom is no variation, neither shadow of turning."

We must admit, I think, that Tertullian's unqualified condemnation of Homer's theology would be justified, if we had no other passages to rely upon except those which I have just quoted. But here, as elsewhere in Homer, there are not wanting traces of higher and purer conceptions of the Godhead, and these should also be regarded in any impartial appreciation of Homer's religious standpoint. If the Homeric Gods are givers of evil, they are also givers of good. "It is Olympian Zeus himself that dispenses happiness to men, to the good and to the evil, to each according to his will."¹ Everything that makes life desirable is in Homer's way of thinking a revelation of the divine beneficence: it is the Gods to whom we owe not only the goods of body and external goods, beauty and health, prosperity and fame and wealth, but also the goods of soul, courage and wisdom and righteousness; there is, in short, no blessing of which they are not the cause. If they violate the moral law themselves, and sometimes lead mortals into sin, Homer nevertheless regards them as the appointed guardians of morality in general and of justice in particular: "ill deeds do not prosper"; for the Gods "honour justice and the righteous acts of men."² From this point of view the entire *Odyssey* may be regarded as one great drama by the first of tragic poets³ intended "to justify the ways of God to man" by showing how Justice is in the end triumphant over Sin—

δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει
εἰς τέλος ἐξελευσάσα παθῶν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω.⁴

That Homer himself was not insensible of the profoundly moral aspect of the final catastrophe in the *Odyssey* is

¹ *Od.* 6. 188 f.

² *Od.* 8. 329, 14. 84.

³ Plato, *Rep.* x. 607 A.

⁴ Hesiod, *O. D.* 217 f.

clearly shown by the words of Odysseus as he stands among the bodies of the dead, stained with blood and soil of battle: "These hath the destiny of the gods overcome, and their own cruel deeds, for they honoured none of earthly men, neither the good nor yet the bad, that came among them. *Wherefore they have met a shameful death through their own infatuate deeds.*"¹ In these lines of Homer the keynote of Aeschylean drama is already sounded; "the doer must suffer: so speaks the immemorial tale."²

We have now finished our necessarily rapid and imperfect survey of Homer's representation of the Deity and his attributes. In his conception of the divine nature the two conspicuous features are polytheism and anthropomorphism; and in connexion with the divine attributes, that which is chiefly deserving of notice is the extraordinary union of naturalism and idealism, revealing itself not only in the physical, but also in the moral and intellectual qualities attributed by Homer to his Gods. In whatever way this dualism should be explained, whether an originally purer conception of the divine nature has become contaminated by later accretions, or whether, as is more generally believed, the higher view has been engrafted on a stock of primeval superstition, Homer leaves the two opposing factors side by side, without any attempt to reconcile them.

That Homer was wholly unconscious of a contradiction which obtrudes itself upon the most casual and unintelligent reader of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is an assertion which no one will make who has adequately realised the intellectual as well as the poetical endowments necessary to the composition of so great masterpieces; and here and there positive indications show that he was not altogether unaware of the antagonism. Like Euripides,

¹ *Od.* 22. 413 ff. B. and L.

² *Choeph.* 312f.

and other writers of a more reflective age, the Homeric heroes frequently upbraid the father of Gods and men for cruelty, treachery, and deceit; and in one passage of the *Iliad*, Menelaus indignantly points the contrast between the ideal conception of Zeus as the all-wise ruler, and his actual administration of human affairs. "O father Zeus, verily they say that thou dost excel in wisdom all others, both gods and men, and all these things are from thee. How wondrously dost thou rejoice in men of violence, even the Trojans, whose might is ever iniquitous, nor can they have their fill of the din of equal war."¹ The attitude adopted by later Greek poets and thinkers in view of this inherent dualism of Homeric theology, will claim our attention in due course; but at present we must turn to the second division of our subject, and endeavour to explain, as briefly as may be possible, what is Homer's view of the duty of man to the higher powers by which he is on every side encompassed.

It may be said, in general terms, that the duty which man, in Homer, owes to God, is that he should recognise and acknowledge his dependence on the divine authority in every circumstance of life. This recognition is expressed chiefly in two ways, by means of religious observances or cult, and by adherence to certain divinely-appointed principles of conduct. The religious observances by which the Homeric heroes testify to their dependence on the Gods are chiefly sacrifice and prayer; and in this connexion it is worthy of note that the Platonic Euthyphro, who is represented by Plato as the incarnation of Homeric orthodoxy, defines piety itself as the knowledge of how to sacrifice and how to pray.²

In Homer it is the sign of a God-fearing spirit to offer many hecatombs to Zeus.³ From the standpoint of the Gods, the Homeric sacrifice is a kind of tribute

¹ *Ii.* 13. 631 ff. Lang.

² *Euth.* 14 B ff.

³ *Od.* 19. 365 f.

which the givers of all good demand as their right: τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς: ¹ and any intermission of the payment is severely visited. "Artemis of the golden throne had brought a plague upon them, in wrath that Oineus offered her not the harvest first-fruits on the fat of his garden land; for all the other gods had their feast of hecatombs, and only to the daughter of great Zeus offered he not, whether he forgot or marked it not; and therein sinned he sore in his heart."² From the standpoint of humanity, sacrifice is intended to express not so much a sentiment of gratitude for past favours, as the hope of favours to come; and hence it is a common formula in Homeric prayers to remind the God of former gifts and oblations. Thus Chryses prays to Apollo: "Hearken to me, Lord of the silver bow; . . . if ever I built a temple acceptable unto thee, or if ever I burnt to thee fat flesh of thighs of bulls or goats, do thou accomplish this my desire."³ The Homeric view of sacrifice and similar oblations is deeply engrained in Greek thought; "gifts," says Hesiod, "prevail over Gods and reverend kings,"⁴ and there was an ancient proverb to the same effect—*πείθει δῶρα καὶ θεούς*.⁵ Plato unreservedly condemns the doctrine, holding that it reduces worship to a sort of *ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη* or art of merchandise between Gods and men, and emphatically protesting that God cannot be "seduced by presents like a villainous money-lender."⁶ He will have nothing to do with the man "who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them. As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks."⁷ But Homer's conception of sacrifice is susceptible of a somewhat higher interpretation than

¹ *Il.* 4. 49 *al.*

² *Il.* 9. 538 ff. Leaf.

³ *Il.* 1. 37 ff.

⁴ *fr.* 180 Goettling.

⁵ Cf. *Eur. Med.* 964.

⁶ *Euth.* 14 E; *Alc.* ii. 149 E.

⁷ *Laws* 906 D Jowett.

this, and ought not to be at once dismissed as irreligious. It rests upon the familiar Greek idea that Gods and men form a single organised society, with mutual rights and obligations; there must be *pietas* in heaven if there is to be *pietas* on earth. We must admit, however, that there is little or no hint of the importance of true devotion on the part of the worshipper, such as Socrates afterwards inculcates; still less does Homer rise to the higher religious level, from which it is seen that "to do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice."¹

Homer's conception of prayer, although in some respects more spiritual and refined than his view of sacrifice, involves a somewhat similar theory of the relation between Gods and men. The suppliant does not bow the knee or veil the head, but stands erect, raising his hands frankly and fearlessly to heaven. Unconscious of unworthiness and sin, he claims an answer, not so much as an act of grace, but as a return for services which he has rendered or will hereafter render to the God. "And lifting their hands to all the gods did each man pray vehemently, and chiefly prayed Gerenian Nestor, the Warden of the Achaians, stretching his hand towards the starry heaven: 'O father Zeus, if ever any one of us in wheat-bearing Argos did burn to thee fat thighs of bull or sheep, and prayed that he might return, and thou didst promise and assent thereto, of these things be thou mindful, and avert, Olympian, the pitiless day, nor suffer the Trojans thus to overcome the Achaians.'"² This is the usual type of a Homeric prayer; but there are not wanting instances in which a higher note is struck, and God is appealed to not as the recipient, but as the giver of benefits and blessings in the past. "Hearken to me, god of the silver bow . . . even as erst thou heardest

¹ Prov. xxi. 3.

² Il. 15. 368 ff. Lang.

*bargaining
bid.*

my prayer, and didst me honour . . . even so now fulfil me this my desire."¹ Sometimes the basis of the appeal is

"God of our Fathers, be the God
Of their succeeding race."

"Hear me," cries Diomedes, "hear me, daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, unwearied maiden! If ever in kindly mood thou stoodest by my father in the heat of battle, even so now be thou likewise kind to me, Athene."² And there is at least one passage in which it is suggested that obedience to the will of God ensures the readiest answer to prayer: "whosoever obeyeth the Gods, to him they gladly hearken."³ "To obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams." For the rest, Nägelsbach⁴ has observed that prayers, in Homer, seldom express the language of praise or thanksgiving: they are nearly always petitions rising to the lips spontaneously at seasons of stress and danger, "for it is good to uplift the hands to Zeus, if so be he may have pity."⁵ We are told by Plato that at the commencement of every undertaking, "be it small or great, all who participate in virtue, to the least degree, invariably invoke a God."⁶ This statement is conspicuously true of the Homeric heroes, with whom prayer is a necessary prelude to successful endeavour, as we may see from the remark of Antilochus on his defeated rival, "He ought to have prayed to the immortals, and then he would not have come in last in the race."⁷ At a later stage of Greek religious development, the object prayed for by the worshipper was sometimes a particular attitude of mind or state of soul — resignation, let us say, or virtue. Thus

¹ *Il.* 1. 451 ff. Leaf.

² *Il.* 5. 115 ff. Leaf.

³ *Il.* 1. 218.

⁴ *Homerische Theologie*, p. 212 f.

⁵ *Il.* 24. 301.

⁶ *Tim.* 27 C.

⁷ *Il.* 23. 546.

Xenophanes, for example, bids men "pray for power to do that which is right,"¹ and the whole Socratic ideal of life and conduct is comprised in the prayer with which Plato ends the *Phaedrus*:² "O beloved Pan and other gods here present, grant me to become fair within. Let my outward possessions be such as are favourable to my inward life. May I think the wise man rich. Give me so much gold as only the temperate man can bear or carry." It is hardly necessary to say that for parallels to such a prayer as this we should look to the New Testament and not to Homer. The objects for which a Homeric suppliant entreats the Gods are generally such as we should expect in the society of the Homeric age, the pleasures of revenge and victory, or deliverance from toil and danger, not yet purity of heart and life.

We may conclude this part of our subject by quoting the famous allegory, unique in Homer, where in spite of an implicit attribution of men's sinfulness to the agency of Zeus, the poet sets before us a more truly religious view of prayer than in any other passage of his poems. "Prayers of penitence are daughters of great Zeus, halting and wrinkled and of eyes askance, that have their task withal to go in the steps of Sin" (*Atê*). "For Sin is strong and fleet of foot, wherefore she far outrunneth all prayers, and goeth before them over all the earth making men fall, and Prayers follow behind to heal the harm. Now whosoever reverenceth Zeus' daughters when they draw near, him they greatly bless and hear his petitions; but when one denieth them and stiffly refuseth, then depart they and make prayer unto Zeus the son of Kronos that sin may come upon such an one, that he may fall and pay the price."³ Here, no doubt, the reference primarily is to the supplications addressed by one man to another;

¹ *fr.* 1. 15 f.² 279 B.³ *Il.* 9. 502 ff. Leaf.

but if we read the allegory in connexion with what precedes,¹ we are equally at liberty to understand it of prayers made to the Gods.

So much, then, by way of explaining the spirit which seems to animate all those religious observances through which, in Homer, man expresses his sense of dependence on the Gods. From what I have said you will see that piety, at this period of Greek religious development, is chiefly, though not perhaps exclusively, concerned with externals. In spite of the fatherhood of Zeus, on which Homer dwells so frequently and fondly—"Father Zeus, thou that rulest from Ida, most glorious and most great"²—there is little suggestion in the Homeric poems of any spiritual relationship between God and man, such as finds expression in Lactantius' definition of true piety: *pietas nihil aliud est quam Dei parentis agnitio*.³

We have already seen that the Homeric Gods are the official guardians of justice, and in their *ex cathedra* capacity take cognisance of good and evil deeds among mankind. In a famous passage of the *Odyssey* we are told that "the gods, in the likeness of strangers from far countries, put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men."⁴ It is therefore necessary for man to express his recognition of the divine authority and government, not merely by the services of sacrifice and prayer, but through his life and conduct. Perhaps we shall most readily comprehend this aspect of man's duty towards the Gods, if we approach the question on its negative side, and endeavour to understand the Homeric view of sin. At first sight it may seem, perhaps, an anachronism to use the term "sin" in connexion with Greek literature. We are frequently

¹ 499-50L.

² *Il.* 24. 308.

³ *Div. Inst.* iii. 9 ad fin.

⁴ *Od.* 17. 485 B. and L.

told that "sin" is a peculiarly Christian, or Jewish and Christian idea; and it is an oft-repeated statement that the notion was altogether foreign to the ancient Greek world. But when such an assertion is made, the unprejudiced inquirer will pause and discriminate. The conception of sin, he will say, appears to have two aspects, a subjective and an objective. On its subjective side, our idea of sin involves an element of self-consciousness, a haunting sense of moral imperfection and alienation from God; on its objective side, it consists in a breach of morality or law, or in the state of mind from which such transgression takes its rise. It may be admitted that what we call the sense of sin is comparatively seldom found in Greek literature, although something analogous to it may be detected in the dramas of Aeschylus, and also, perhaps, in the moral and religious doctrine of the *Phaedo* of Plato. To the half-exotic religious fraternities of the Orphic and Pythagorean type the consciousness of sin was probably familiar enough; and Stoicism, at least in some of its later developments, was no stranger to the feeling. But neither the reflections nor the actions of the Homeric heroes warrant us in attributing to them any such affection as may fairly be called by this name: they all belong to the class of souls which Professor James has christened "healthy-minded" or "once-born." If we have regard, however, to the objective usage of the word, we are quite at liberty to speak of sin as having a place in the moral universe of Homer; and a brief examination of its origin and nature will throw light on the poet's attitude to some of the greatest questions of human life and destiny. In what, then, according to the view of Homer, does sin consist? We may reply, perhaps, that the sphere of ambition open to the individual is strictly limited in Homer by the rights of his fellow-men and of the Gods; and sin consists in the attempt to overstep

the limits thus prescribed. The essence of sin is *πλεονεξία*, self-seeking, or self-assertion: it is accompanied by overweening arrogance and pride, and reckes not either "of the Gods that hold the wide heaven, or of men's indignation in after days."¹ The last stage is reached when the sinner in his blind self-confidence becomes, like Mezentius in the *Aeneid* of Virgil, a *contemptor divum*. "And so would he have fled his doom, albeit hated by Athene, had he not let a proud word fall in the fatal darkening of his heart. He said that in the gods' despite he had escaped the great gulf of the sea; and Poseidon heard his loud boasting . . . and smote the rock Gyraean and cleft it in twain. . . . And the rock bore him down into the vast and heaving deep; so there he perished when he had drunk of the salt sea water."² Here, as elsewhere, we can recognise in Homer the germs of moral and religious ideas which are afterwards more fully developed by elegiac and dramatic poetry, in particular the doctrine which bids us remember our mortality and cherish only mortal aspirations; but they are only the germs, and it is vain, of course, to look for anything further in the Homeric poems.

In its essential nature, therefore, according to the Homeric view, sin would appear to be a breach of the golden law of moderation. What are we to suppose to be its immediate cause? And with whom does the ultimate responsibility rest? It is characteristic of the prevailing intellectual character of Greek morality that Homer, in common with later Greek thinkers, should attribute the origin of sin to infatuation rather than to a depraved condition of the will. The sinner is a fool or a madman, rather than a knave: his intellect is darkened, and he falls. Nor, as a rule, is the sinner himself considered to be primarily responsible for his destruction: he is merely the involuntary victim of circumstance, or

¹ *Od.* 22. 39 f.

² *Od.* 4. 502 ff. B. and L.

Atê, or Zeus. The influence of outward environment upon morality is a favourite topic of Greek writers, who frequently show an inclination to regard affliction as demoralising, and prosperity as tending to improve the character, in contrast with the Christian view that out of suffering we are made strong. By way of illustration, we may refer to the history of words like *πονηρός* and *μοχθηρός*, the original meaning of which would seem to have been "toilworn," "afflicted," whereas in classical Greek they more commonly mean "depraved"; and conversely, the double signification of *εὖ πράττειν*, "do well" and "fare well," was thought by some of the Greeks to be significant of the intimate connexion between prosperity and virtue.¹ According to Simonides, who in this as in other respects is a trustworthy exponent of popular Greek morality, "a man cannot but prove evil, if hopeless calamity overthrow him. Every man if he has fared well is good; evil, if ill: and for the most part, best are they whom the Gods love."² The principle that underlies this view is as old as Homer, who expresses it in words which are often echoed in later Greek literature: "the mind of men upon the earth is even as the day, that is brought upon them by the father of Gods and men."³ We find a pathetic illustration of the sentiment in another passage of the *Odyssey*, where it is said that Zeus takes away the half of a man's virtue, when the day of slavery lays hold on him.⁴ Elsewhere, as we have already seen, Homer is in the habit of laying the responsibility for the sin of erring mortals at the door of Atê, eldest daughter of Zeus, or Zeus himself. "I could not be unmindful of Atê," says Agamemnon, "who blinded me at the first. . . . Blinded was I, and Zeus bereft me of my wit."⁵

¹ I have dealt with this subject in notes on Plato, *Crito* 47 E, *Euthyphr.* 3 A, *Prot.* 333 D.

² *ap.* Pl. *Prot.* 344 C, E, 345 C.

³ *Od.* 18. 136 f.

⁴ *Od.* 17. 322.

⁵ *I.* 19. 136 ff. Myers.

But in Homer, not less than in Aeschylus, although it is the Gods or Fate who are the *fons et origo mali*, it is the sinner who pays the penalty; and the tragic irony of his doom is all the greater that it comes from the very Gods who are ultimately responsible for his transgression. When, for example, Pandarus shoots the arrow at Menelaus, in defiance of the solemn treaty lately sworn between the rival armies, he obeys the suggestion of Zeus, who is himself the guardian of oaths and treaties; but Agamemnon is assured that the self-same God will hereafter take vengeance on the Trojans. "Zeus, the son of Kronos enthroned on high, that dwelleth in the heaven, himself shall brandish over them all his lowring aegis, in indignation at this deceit."¹ Homer is not less profoundly convinced than Aeschylus that sin, whatever its originating cause may be, disturbs the moral equilibrium of the universe; and the business of the Gods, as upholders of justice, is to restore the balance by punishing the sinner. It matters not that the Gods demand a higher standard from men than they impose upon themselves: their duty is to punish mortals for excesses of which they are always setting the example.²

In so far as we can speak of a Homeric doctrine of punishment at all, it is the retributory theory which meets us in his poems: his favourite phrase for the divine vengeance upon sin is *ἀντίτα ἔργα*, "deeds of requital," "acts of recompense." We do not expect to find so early as Homer any hint of the Platonic view, that punishment is a remedial agency intended to cure the sinner of his vice, although the vengeance of the God is occasionally represented by the poet as remedial, or rather deterrent, in respect of its influence upon others; for example, in the prayer of Menelaus before the duel with Paris: "King Zeus, grant me revenge on him that was first to do me

¹ *Il.* 4. 166 ff. Leaf.

² Cf. A. Lang, *Hom. Hymns* p. 29.

wrong . . . so that many an one of men that shall be hereafter may shudder to wrong his host that hath shown him kindness." ¹

I have already said that the action of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, regarded as a whole, fulfils the law that "the doer must suffer"; but the possibility of atonement for sin is not excluded. The Homeric Gods are not implacable: "their hearts by incense and reverent vows and drink-offering and burnt-offering men turn with prayer, so oft as any transgresseth and doeth sin." ² If the sinner makes good what he has done amiss, and offers sacrifice to the offended Gods, he may perchance regain their favour and escape the graver consequences of his transgression. In such a piacular offering there is no suggestion of a transference of guilt from the sinner to the victim, no hint that the animal is a vicarious sufferer: all such conceptions imply a degree of consciousness of sin which is alien from the religious sentiment of the Homeric age. In Homer the sin-offering, like other forms of sacrifice, is conceived as a gift—Plato would call it a bribe—to the Gods in the shape of a meal or banquet designed to change their hostility into a friendlier attitude: "the fragrant fire-distilled essence" or *κνίσα* ascends to heaven and the "sweet savour" turns away their wrath. But although the sinner pleads, there is no assurance that his sacrifice will be accepted; and of the many features which cast a shade of melancholy over Homeric life, this is not the least significant. In the words of Nägelsbach, "Sin is certain, and certain it is that the Gods will punish sin; but forgiveness depends upon the passing mood, the fleeting temper of the gods, and is uncertain. Human life in Homer is a life without the certainty of grace." ³

¹ *Il.* 3. 351 ff. Leaf.

² *Il.* 9. 499 ff. Leaf.

³ *Homerische Theologie* p. 355.

So much for the leading features of Homer's theology, and the obligations which it imposes upon man. It remains for us to consider the attitude of the poet in regard to the question of immortality.

The details of Homeric psychology and eschatology have been often discussed in recent years, but there is much that still remains uncertain and obscure; and it is *a priori* improbable, I might even say incredible, that the authors of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* formed a lucid or consistent theory either of the soul itself or of the existence which awaits it in the other world. In its broader outlines, however, the eschatological belief of the Homeric poems is clear enough; and it is the more necessary for us to apprehend its general character, because there is archæological as well as literary evidence to show that in spite of the prevalence of Orphic and Pythagorean views, the orthodox Greek conception of the underworld even in the fourth century B.C. was still in the main derived from Homer.¹

In the Homeric poems, and indeed in Greek literature generally, the living man is regarded not as a single indivisible substance, but rather as a union of two distinct and separable entities, one of which is the body, and the other the soul. To the question, which of these two component factors, soul and body, constitutes what may be called the personality or *ego*, it is not altogether easy to give a satisfactory or conclusive answer. According to one group of passages, it would seem that the actual self, the *αὐτός*, descends into Hades at death; and as it is usually the soul or *ψυχή* which is said by Homer to pass into the unseen world, we are tempted to identify the *ego* with the soul.² In other and more remarkable instances, where the

¹ P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History* p. 331.

² See Rohde, *Psyche* i. p. 5.

body is expressly contrasted with the soul, the epithet "self" is definitely applied to the body: the deadly wrath of the son of Peleus despatched to Hades many stalwart souls of heroes, and gave *themselves*, that is, their bodies, "to be a prey to dogs";¹ and again, "all night long the soul of hapless Patroclus stood over me, wailing and lamenting, and wondrous like it was unto *himself*."² Relying on these two diverse modes of expression, as well as on other evidence, supplied in part from comparative folk-lore, Rohde has attributed to Homer the belief in a double personality, the *ψυχή* being a kind of "alter ego," "ein anderes ich," present like an invisible guest in the living and visible body, which constitutes another and companion "ego." During life, so long as we are awake and conscious, the "alter ego" is quiescent; but when the body is laid to sleep, the soul awakes and often reveals to us in visions of the night that which is denied to us in our waking moments. This interesting theory lies at the root of ancient views of divination, and we shall have to recur to it again in later lectures. We shall find reason for connecting it with Orphic and Pythagorean ways of thought, rather than with indigenous Greek culture; but in the meantime it must be said that, although such a view was certainly familiar to Pindar, Aeschylus, and Plato, not to speak of Aristotle and the Stoics, the evidence for ascribing it to Homer is very slight. If we desire to arrive at Homer's conception of the respective shares of body and soul in producing what we may call the true self or personality of the individual, we ought to assign most weight to those places in which the body and soul are contrasted with one another; and in these, as we have seen, it is the body, and not the soul, which is designated "self." That Homer is sometimes inconsistent

¹ *Il.* 1. 1 ff.

² *Il.* 23. 106 ff.

in his phraseology, merely shows that he was after all a poet and not a psychologist.

We may take it, then, and the fact is of great importance for the intelligent appreciation of the Homeric eschatology, that in the union of soul and body which we call life, the body, rather than the soul, supplies the element of personality or "self." Or, if this conclusion appears somewhat too definite and precise, as perhaps it is, for the psychological standpoint of so primitive an age, we may, I think, at least affirm that Homer regards the body as more essential to the personality than the soul. With the development of self-consciousness and the progress of reflective thought in Greece, it was only natural that the conception of personality should be modified; and in the philosophy of Plato, as will afterwards appear, it is always the soul—or rather, let us say, the mind (*νοῦς*)—and not the body, which constitutes the man.

But to return to Homer. If that which we call life is the union of soul and body, that which we call death is their separation. The soul may leave the body for a time, as in fainting, for which the later Greek word is *λιποψυχεῖν*, *linqui animo*;¹ but at death the partnership is finally dissolved. The *ψυχή*, which is a material substance of the nature of breath or air, issues out of the mouth or the wound: man's soul, says Homer, returneth not again, "when once it hath passed the barrier of his teeth,"² and elsewhere, "the soul through the stricken wound sped hastily away, and darkness enveloped his eyes."³ In shape, it is an *eidolon* or phantom of the living man; as it were a shadow, a vision in a dream, a vapour of smoke. The soul of Patroclus appeared to Achilles in a vision

¹ So in Homer, τὸν δ' ἔλιπε ψυχή,
Il. 5. 696.

² *Il.* 9. 409.

³ *Il.* 14. 518.

of the night "in all things like the man himself, in stature and fair eyes and voice, and the raiment on his body was the same."¹ Achilles "reached forth his hands, but grasped him not; for like a vapour the soul was gone beneath the earth with a faint shriek."² According to Homer, it is only this phantom, this image, that survives: what kind of existence does it lead, and where? In the answer to these questions we have Homer's whole conception of immortality.

As soon as the last rites are fulfilled, the soul crosses once for all the river, Oceanus, it may be, or Styx, which separates the land of the living from that of the dead.³ Till then, it retains, apparently, some shred of substantial semi-corporeal existence, hovering uneasily between the gate of the nether world and the body it has left. The realm of shades, known to Homer as Erebus, lies in the depths of the earth; and the entrance thereto is far in the west, beyond the Ocean stream and the city of the Cimmerians, on which the sun never shines, but a pall of deadly night broods evermore.⁴ Hard by the entrance is "a waste shore and the groves of Persephone, even tall poplar trees and willows that shed their fruit before the season,"⁵ features indicative to the Greeks of barrenness and gloom. The kingdom of the dead itself is ruled over by Hades, "most loathly of all the Gods," and "dread" Persephone.⁶ In it we read of dwellings dank and gruesome, the abomination of the very gods,—*σμερδαλέ', εὐρωέντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ*,—and meadows of asphodel, the dreariest of plants, together with the rivers that play so large a part in later Greek pictures of the underworld, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, Cocytus, and Styx, names which, as Plato testifies in his censure of Homer's eschatology,

¹ *Il.* 23. 66 ff.

² *Il.* 23. 99 ff.

³ *Il.* 23. 73.

⁴ *Od.* 11. 13 ff.

⁵ *Od.* 10. 508 ff. B. and L.

⁶ *Il.* 9. 159, 457.

“no Greek could hear without a thrill of horror.”¹ Above all, and to the ancient Greek this was perhaps the most appalling feature, the kingdom of Hades was a land of perpetual night: “a land of thick darkness, as darkness itself; a land of the shadow of death, where the light is as darkness.”

The existence which Homer assigns to the disembodied shades is if possible still more terrible than the land in which they dwell; or at least it must have appeared so to a nation endowed with so abounding a sense of vitality as the Greeks. Rohde puts the case well when he observes that we do wrong to speak of a future *life* in Homer: it is only a little more life than that of our image in a glass.² Themselves only shadows or images of the living, breathing man, the departed spirits lead not life, but only a pale and ineffectual shadow of life. Their very utterance is but the shadow or ghost of that which we call voice: it is a shrill attenuated shriek (*τρίξεν*), a timorous inarticulate cry, compared by Homer, when it issues from many ghostly throats at once, to the squeaking of a flock of bats when it is disturbed, and to the clamour of fowls flying terrified in all directions.³ The souls of the dead are *ἀμνηνὰ κάρηνα*, “strengthless heads,” wholly intangible and elusive, without bones and flesh, without diaphragm or *φρένες*, and therefore destitute of intelligence or sense, *ἀφραδέες*, as Homer says; for it is the diaphragm which is the physical seat of intelligence in the living man.⁴ In the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey*, which, though doubtless later than the bulk of the poem, represents at least a very early stage of Greek belief about the future life, the ghost of the seer Teiresias alone retains something of the substantiality of actual physical existence: “the other

¹ *Il.* 20. 65; *Od.* 24. 13, 10.
513 ff. : *Pl. Rep.* iii. 387 C.

² *Psyche*² i. p. 10.

³ *Od.* 24. 6 ff., 11. 605 f.

⁴ *Od.* 11. 29, 476; *Il.* 23. 104.

souls flit to and fro like shadows.”¹ In order to recall them for a moment to consciousness, the poet avails himself of a device that puts their unhappy situation in a singularly vivid light. Odysseus, he tells us, “took the sheep and cut their throats over the trench, and the dark blood flowed forth, and lo, the spirits of the dead that be departed gathered them from out of Erebos. Brides and youths unwed, and old men of many and evil days, and tender maidens with grief yet fresh at heart; and many there were, wounded with bronze-shod spears, men slain in fight with their bloody mail about them. And these many ghosts flocked together from every side about the trench with a wondrous cry.”² The eagerness with which they flock to drink the life-giving draught is a pathetic indication of the source of all their woe. They are both alive and dead: but though alive enough to feel that they are dead, they are hardly dead enough to forget they are alive.

In other respects the life of the departed spirit is for the most part only a spectral copy of its life on earth. The ghostly Minos, seated on a throne, gives judgment as of yore, and Orion pursues along the meadows of asphodel the very beasts he had slain upon the lonely hills.³ Of retribution in the lower world for sins committed upon earth there is but little trace in Homer. The only evidence which might be supposed to point to a penitentiary hell for mortals is in the *Iliad*, where we read of certain Powers, called in one place the Erinyes, who take vengeance on the souls of the forsworn.⁴ It has been plausibly conjectured by Rohde⁵ that the reason why perjury seemed to necessitate punishment after death is on account of the penalties invoked by the perjurer upon himself in the event of proving false to

¹ *Od.* 10. 493 ff.

² *Od.* 11. 35 ff. B. and L.

³ *Od.* 11. 569 ff.

⁴ *I.* 3. 278 ff., 19. 259 ff.

⁵ *Psyche*² i. p. 65.

his oath; and if this is so, we must regard the doom of perjury as exceptional. The punishments of Tityos, Tantalus, and Sisyphus are familiar from the *Odyssey*;¹ but these are half-heroic figures, whose crimes against the Gods deserve and meet with everlasting torment; and we are certainly not justified in regarding them as typical examples of the fate in store for desire and avarice and pride in the mass of human kind. As for Tartarus, the prototype of the Miltonic hell, with its iron gates and brazen threshold, lying as far beneath the earth as the earth is beneath the heaven, that is appropriated to the generation of Gods whom Zeus dethroned.² Among the ghostly dwellers in the realm of Hades, the distinctions of rank and honour prevailing in the upper world are indeed maintained; but it cannot be said that the lot of the majority is in any way affected by the good or evil of their life on earth. The same monotonous shadowy spectre of unsubstantial life is reserved for all.

It is manifest that the Homeric picture of the destiny awaiting men hereafter is one of totally unrelieved gloom. An apparent exception has sometimes been found in the single passage of the *Odyssey* where Homer supplies the germ of the later Greek belief in "islands of the blest." The old man of the seas reveals to Menelaus that he shall escape the common doom of mortals:

"To thee it shall not come
In the horse-kind land of Argos to meet thy death and doom.
But unto the fields Elysian and the wide world's utmost end,
Where dwells tawny Rhadamanthus, the Deathless thee shall
send,
Wherein are the softest life-days that men may ever gain;
No snow and no ill weather, nor any drift of rain;
But Ocean ever wafteth the wind of the shrilly west,
On menfolk ever breathing, to give them might and rest."³

¹ 11. 576 ff.² *I.* 8. 13 ff., 478 ff.³ *Od.* 4. 559 ff. Morris.

Beautiful as this picture is, and important for its influence on the eschatology of Pindar, there are two considerations which show that it ought not to affect our general conception of the Homeric view of immortality. In the first place, the life of which the poet here speaks is a life on earth; and those to whom it is vouchsafed are still alive in the ordinary Homeric meaning of the word, being possessed of body as well as of soul. The Elysian plain, in short, is an earthly paradise, peopled by some few happy individuals who are exempt from that which we call death. And, in the second place, admission to this blissful region is not, so far as we can see, obtained by merit, but only by grace of the immortals. Like Enoch, the dwellers in Elysium are not, because God takes them. The reason why Menelaus is translated, according to the poet, is that, as the husband of Helen, he was the son-in-law of Zeus:¹ and although the proverbial justice of Rhadamanthus may have counted for something, he had Zeus for his father. The resemblance between Homer's description of Elysium and his description of Olympus, the home of the Gods, untroubled by wind or rain or snow, and bathed in everlasting sunlight, is by no means accidental, but seems to show that the poet conceived of Elysium as a kind of inferior heaven, whose denizens are raised to the rank of Gods by the spontaneous and unearned gift of immortality and everlasting youth. Inasmuch as the gates of this happy kingdom are unlocked by favour and not by merit, there is no more religious import in the Homeric Elysium than can justly be attributed to the Epicurean heaven.

I have now placed before you what I take to be the most characteristic and important religious ideas contained in the Homeric poems. My object has been to recreate, as far as possible, the kind of religious atmosphere which the authority of Homer tended to

¹ *Od.* 4. 569.

diffuse among the Greeks, in order that we may be the better able to understand and appreciate the nature and extent of the philosophic revolt, as well as the progress effected by later Greek poetry. With this object in view, I have abstained from touching on what is known as the Homeric question. Whether the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are by the same author or not, and if not, by what processes or in what different hands the poems assumed their present shape—these and similar questions do not concern us here, since it is generally agreed that the Greeks of the age of Thucydides, and probably still earlier, read their Homer in essentially the shape in which we read him now, and assigned both poems to the same hand. For a similar reason I have ignored the points of difference between the religion of the *Iliad* and that of the *Odyssey*. There is little or no indication that they were noticed by readers of Homer in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ; and in point of fact, although we find divergencies of detail, and the distance between Gods and men grows somewhat greater in the *Odyssey*, leading in the later poem to a somewhat more spiritual conception of the Godhead, the general religious standpoint is not changed.

There remains, however, a further question as to the relation between the Homeric religion and the Homeric view of life. The strain of melancholy running through the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* has often been remarked upon. A note of sadness is heard in nearly all the reflective passages. "Surely there is nothing more pitiable than a man among all things that breathe and creep upon the earth."¹ "Of all the creatures that breathe and creep upon the earth, man is the feeblest that earth nourishes."² A multitude of passages might be quoted in illustration of such sentiments as these. In Homer, of course, unlike the poets of the Greek anthology, the pathetic vein is

¹ *Il.* 17. 446 f.

² *Od.* 18. 180 f.

free from every element of self-analysis or affectation. To what extent is Homer's melancholy a natural or necessary consequence of the Homeric faith? It is impossible, of course, to distinguish between cause and effect in any inquiry of this kind; but no one who realises how entirely man, in Homer, is dependent on the Gods, will deny that Homer's ideas of the Godhead and of immortality are closely connected with his general conception of human life and destiny. The actual services of religion, indeed, in the Homeric poems, are for the most part associated with sentiments of joy and gladness. Perhaps there is no more beautiful and characteristic expression of this phase of Greek feeling than in the hymn to Apollo, where the poet tells how "the long-robed Ionians gather" in honour of the God of Delos, "with children and shame-fast wives. . . . Who so then encountered them at the gathering of the Ionians, would say that they are exempt from old and death, beholding these so gracious, and would be glad at heart, looking on the men and fair-girdled women, and their much wealth, and their swift galleys."¹ And in the *Iliad* we read that "the livelong day they propitiated the God with song, chanting the beautiful paean, the sons of the Achaeans, singing to the Far-darter; and his heart rejoiced to hear."² Even in such passages as these, however, an ominous note is sometimes struck. "Thus she spake praying; but Pallas Athene averted her face."³ "I offered him up to Zeus, even to the son of Cronos, who dwells in the dark clouds, and is lord of all. . . . *But he heeded not the sacrifice*, but was devising how my decked ships and my dear company might perish utterly."⁴

And if we consider the theoretical side of Homer's religion, we shall find no lack of reasons for the undercurrent of sadness in his poems. The existence of

¹ 147 ff. tr. Lang.

² 1. 472 ff.

³ *Il.* 6. 311.

⁴ *Od.* 9. 551 ff. B. and L.

physical evil and suffering is accepted by Homer as a fact from which there is no escape, and ascribed, as we have already seen, to the immediate agency of the Gods. "This is the lot the gods have spun for miserable men, that they should live in pain; yet themselves are sorrowless."¹ It gives additional bitterness to the cup of human misery that the sufferer is uniformly represented as one who is hated by the very Gods who are responsible for his calamities;² nor can he who has incurred the hatred of Heaven expect the sympathy of man. It is true that the Gods are givers of good as well as of evil; but on the floor of Zeus there are two urns of evil to one of good. They control the destinies of individuals and nations, and even, it would seem, of humanity in general; but whatever the principle of their administration may be, and it often varies with the mood or passion of the moment, their primary concern is not the good or happiness of those whom they direct. Sometimes, indeed, they speak as if it were unworthy of the blessed Gods to vex themselves about the creatures of a day. "Shaker of the earth," says Apollo to Poseidon, "of no sound mind wouldst thou repute me if I should fight against thee for the sake of pitiful mortals, who like unto leaves now live in glowing life, consuming the fruit of the earth, and now again pine into death. Let us with all speed cease from combat, and let them do battle by themselves."³ At other times there is nothing to which they will not stoop on behalf of their favourites; but their sympathies are usually determined by motives of self-interest and self-regard, and even where his religious idealism soars highest, Homer is far removed from the Socratic belief in a providence overruling all things for the good of man; nor indeed was such a conception possible for him without an entire transformation of his idea of God.

Od. 24. 525 f. Myers.
² *e.g.* *Od.* 10. 74.

³ *Il.* 21. 462 ff. Myers.

With regard to moral evil, which Homer similarly accepts as an indisputable reality, the case is still worse; for though the Gods are the appointed guardians of justice, the *ex officio* champions of the moral order of the universe, they deliberately lead men into sin, are themselves the slaves of sensuality, envious, lying, and revengeful: in one word, as I have already said, guilty of all the excesses which they punish in their inferiors. That it is a function of the Godhead to serve as a moral ideal to mankind, is a belief of which there is only, I think, one solitary indication in the Homeric poems. Phoenix implores Achilles to relent on the ground that even the Gods are moved by prayer: *στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί.*¹ In point of fact, any one who practised the Pythagorean maxim "Follow God," taking Homer's Gods for his example, would have been scouted both by Gods and men in the Homeric age. The mainspring of Homeric morality is not the *imitatio Dei*, but that which Homer calls *αἰδώς*, a word which combines the meanings of "noble shame" or *pudor* with regard for the opinion of one's fellow-men, and possibly also fear of the divine vengeance. It is the voice of *αἰδώς* speaking in the heart of man that tells him what is right and what is wrong. A further point to be noticed is that although in their official capacity the Gods rarely leave wickedness unpunished, we seldom hear of their rewarding virtue. There is, indeed, one well-known passage of the *Odyssey* where the poet tells of "the blameless king who feareth the Gods and upholdeth justice; and the black earth yields him wheat and barley, and the trees are heavy with fruit, and his flocks and herds grow and multiply, and the sea provides fish, by reason of his good guidance; and the people prosper under him."² But this passage is nearly, if not quite, unique in Homer; and it is characteristic of the whole stratum of religious ideas

¹ *Il.* 9. 497.² 19. 109 ff.

which he represents that the punishment of sin is considered far more necessary than the recompense of virtue. For the most part, virtue, in Homer, is its own reward. Nor is there any prospect that the inequalities and evils of this present life will be redressed hereafter. On the contrary, of all the visions of futurity which the imagination of man has conjured up, none, perhaps, is more utterly and hopelessly sad than that of Homer. There is a world of pathos in the lament of the dead Achilles: "Speak not consolingly of death to me, O great Odysseus! Sooner would I be the slave of another, in the house of a penniless wight who had no great livelihood, than king of all the dead."¹ And thus, as it is said by Gruppe, "behind the woe, in which he deems himself to live, the Homeric Greek beholds a greater, never-ending woe to come."²

If I have dwelt, perhaps at disproportionate length, on the darker features of the Homeric religion, it is in order that we may the more readily understand and appreciate the motives which prompted the philosophic revolt. But there is another aspect of the picture, to which I have hardly yet referred at all; and that is the moral grandeur of the Homeric man. In this respect Homer to a large extent deserved to be, what we have already seen that he was, the teacher of Greece. His poems abound in lessons of piety, moderation, and truth; the virtues of family, social, and political life, friendship and charity, consideration for the rights of others, chivalry and courage, are embodied in many imperishable examples. Nor does the so-called melancholy of Homer ever degenerate into the inert and hopeless pessimism that bewails with folded hands the miseries of human life. Nothing in his poems can fairly be compared with the pessimistic cry that is often heard in Greek poetry from Theognis onwards: "Best it is not

¹ *Od.* 11. 488 ff.

² *Griech. Myth.* p. 1010.

to be born; and next best, being born, to die as soon as possible."¹ On the contrary, it is just the consideration of the weakness and frailty of man, the brevity and uncertainty of human life, which rouses Homer's heroes to their greatest efforts. "Ah friend," Sarpedon makes appeal to Glaucus, "if once escaped from this battle, we were for ever to be ageless and immortal, neither would I fight myself in the foremost ranks, nor would I send thee into the war that giveth men renown, but now—for assuredly ten thousand fates of death do every way beset us, and these no mortal may escape nor avoid—now let us go forward, whether we shall give glory to other men, or others to us."² "Here," as Professor Butcher has said, "the dark destiny of man is the very motive which prompts to heroism."³ Down to the latest times, Achilles was the ideal of Greek chivalry; and it is just this motive that determined Achilles to choose a brief and strenuous life in preference to unlaborious length of days at home. And everywhere there is the same upward impulse, the same indomitable desire to climb the rough and steep ascent of the hill of excellence—*αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπέροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων*. That Greek philosophy had reason to fall foul of the Homeric Gods, is only too true; but it may be doubted whether Plato, when he condemns the educator of Greece, allows sufficient weight to the great and abiding influence of Homer's idealisation of man. }

¹ Theog. 425 ff.

² *I.* 12. 322 ff. Lang.

³ *Aspects of the Greek Genius* p.

176.

LECTURE IV

FROM HESIOD TO BACCHYLIDES

IN the present lecture, we have first to examine the theology of Hesiod; and afterwards we shall endeavour to see how the principal religious ideas of Homer and Hesiod were further developed and expanded in lyric, elegiac, and iambic poetry from Archilochus down to Bacchylides. Although Pindar falls within the period we are about to discuss, his importance is so great that he must be reserved for separate treatment hereafter.

The poems of Hesiod which require to be considered are the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony*. That the bulk of the *Works and Days* is from the hand of Hesiod, may be taken as generally admitted. Pausanias, indeed, informs us that it was the only Hesiodic work which the Boeotians of Helicon conceded to be genuine.¹ About the *Theogony* there is more doubt. In his *Histoire de la littérature Grecque*,² M. Croiset maintains that the poem is later than Hesiod, though emanating from the Hesiodic school: he is inclined to assign it to the early part of the seventh century B.C., whereas Hesiod belongs, he thinks, to the first half of the eighth. Other historians of Greek literature, for example, Wilhelm Christ, while admitting the presence of interpolated passages, consider that far the larger portion of the poem is by Hesiod; and with the exception of the testimony already quoted from Pausanias, it would seem that the Hesiodic authorship was never seriously

¹ ix. 31. 4.

² i. p. 509 ff.

questioned in antiquity. There is, moreover, every reason to believe that both the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony* were read by the Greeks of the fifth century B.C. in nearly the form which they now present; so that we may use each of the two poems indifferently in order to illustrate the religious ideas which the ancients associated with the name of Hesiod.

Whether or not the *Theogony* is later in point of date, there can be no doubt that it represents an earlier stratum of religious thought than we meet with in the *Works and Days*. The poem is at once a cosmogony and a theogony; but as the primitive cosmological causes—Chaos, Earth, and Eros—are deified, it has the appearance of a theogony from first to last. Many, if not most, of the genealogies and legends were doubtless borrowed from earlier and in some cases pre-Homeric hymns. The poet attempts to sift and simplify the mass of current mythological detail, and embody it in a kind of imperfectly co-ordinated system. Here and there we seem to have a purely aetiological myth;¹ and a few of the deities are little more than poetical personifications. In following the successive generations of the Gods, as described by Hesiod, we are sensible of a gradual progress from anarchy and violence to order and law; but it would be too much to say that this is the dominating idea of the poem, since the writer is for the most part satisfied to narrate his story, without betraying, except perhaps in a single passage,² any consciousness of its ethical or religious import.

The doctrine which concerns us chiefly in the *Theogony* is that of separate dynasties of Gods succeeding one another in order of time—the dynasties of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus.³ The poet of the *Theogony* is the first Greek writer who gives full and definite expression to this idea. In Homer there are only a few faint traces

¹ e.g. 535-557.

² 881-885.

³ 154 ff., 459 ff., 617 ff.

of the doctrine. The *Iliad* speaks of Cronus as overthrown by Zeus and imprisoned in Tartarus "below the earth and the unharvested sea."¹ But Homer says nothing about a dynasty of Gods antecedent to Cronus and under the sway of Uranus; and, as Mr. Leaf remarks, "the whole question of these dynasties before Zeus, as they are presented in Homer, is too vague to admit of a certain solution; when we come to Hesiod we find that Greek belief has passed into quite another stage, that of harmonizing the incoherent and inconsistent legends handed down, probably from sources differing by wide distances both of race and place."² Does the author of the *Theogony* recognise any principle or power above and beyond these transitory Gods, and determining their succession? We shall afterwards see that this question is indirectly touched upon by Aeschylus, who appears to find such a principle in Destiny or Fate; and in Hesiod, too, there are one or two suggestions of this idea.³ For the rest, it should be noted that the *Theogony*, as was inevitable from the subject of which it treats, is full of those grossly naturalistic legends to which Greek philosophy took just exception. From the later or ethical point of view, Hesiod's theology in this poem is incomparably cruder than that of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. "There is violence and rudeness," says Grote, "in the Homeric gods, but the great genius of Grecian Epic is no way accountable for the stories of Uranos and Kronos — the standing reproach against Pagan legendary narrative."⁴ Throughout the whole poem the conception of the Gods as moral beings scarcely appears at all; the assessors even of Zeus himself are Violence and Force rather than Justice;⁵ and the only ethical powers, strictly so called, would seem to be the *Μοίραι* or Fates, who

¹ 14. 204; cf. 8. 479 ff.

² n. on *Il.* 8. 479.

³ 464, οὐνεκά οἱ πέπρωτο ἐφ' ὑπὸ καὶ δαῖτηναι. cf. 475. 894

⁴ *History of Greece* i. p. 13.

⁵ 385 ff.; cf. 551 f. (hostility of Zeus to humankind).

"visiting the transgressions of men and Gods never cease from their dread wrath, until they have inflicted dire retribution on him who has sinned."¹

Turning now to the second poem, we may say, I think, that no work of ancient literature more faithfully reflects the moral and religious beliefs of its author than the *Works and Days* of Hesiod. The simplicity and sincerity of tone leave no doubt that here at least the poet is speaking "true things."² As in the *Iliad*, so also in the *Works and Days*, man is wholly dependent on the Gods in every relation of life.³ Zeus, the king of the immortals, is also the supreme governor of men: his eye is all-seeing, his mind all-knowing—*πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας*:⁴ but we can with difficulty spy out his thought:⁵ "there is no prophet among men upon the earth who shall know the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus."⁶ Among the attributes of Zeus, the poet chiefly insists upon Justice. It is from Zeus, he says, that straight judgments proceed.⁷ The maiden Justice is "daughter of Zeus, glorified and honoured by the Gods who dwell in Olympus. And whensoever one doeth her an injury with wrongful chiding, straightway she takes her seat by the side of father Zeus, the son of Cronus, and tells him the thoughts of unjust men, that the people may pay for the infatuation of princes, who with baneful thoughts turn aside from the straight path through wrongful judgments."⁸ In his capacity as guardian of Justice, Zeus is served by a host of invisible daemons or messengers. "Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus upon the all-sustaining earth, immortal, watchers of men that are doomed to die; who watch deeds of justice and works of wickedness

¹ 220 ff.; cf. 793 ff. (punishment of the Gods for perjury).

² *Theog.* 28.

³ 669.

⁴ 267.

⁵ 484.

⁶ *fr.* 177 Goettling.

⁷ 36.

⁸ 256 ff.

passing to and fro upon the earth in a garment of mist." ¹ Hesiod is the first Greek writer in whom we find the notion of daemons, or beings intermediate between Gods and men. In Homer it is not the daemons but the Gods themselves who "in the likeness of strangers from another country roam throughout the cities, surveying the insolence and righteousness of men." ² The difference between the two poets in this respect is one among several indications ³ that in Hesiod's time the Gods were felt to be more distant from men than in the heroic age: though he believes in a common origin for Gods and men, ⁴ it is of the golden age that he is thinking when in a fragment preserved by Origen he speaks of the "common feasts and common meeting-places of immortal Gods and men that are subject unto death." ⁵ We may regard the Hesiodic conception as the earliest symptom of a tendency that afterwards became prominent in Greek philosophical thought—the tendency to remove the Supreme Being from direct and immediate participation in human affairs, by the hypothesis of an intermediate order of beings who are as it were the vehicles of communication between God and man. ⁶ But in Hesiod these daemons are still no more than the invisible police of Zeus. ⁷ They resemble the recording angel of later Greek popular belief. ⁸

We have seen that in Homer the justice of Zeus is chiefly shown in the punishment of insolence or sin. On this topic Hesiod also lays the greatest stress: ⁹ in one place he enumerates among the calamities that overtake the country of evil men, famine and pestilence, barrenness, destruction of armies and walls and ships. ¹⁰

¹ 252 ff.; cf. 122 ff.

² *Od.* 17. 485 ff.

³ Cf. 484, and *fr.* 177.

⁴ 108.

⁵ *fr.* 187 Goettling.

⁶ See, e.g., Plato, *Symp.* 202 E. The Hesiodic doctrine was adopted

by the Stoics: see von Arnim, *Stoicorum vet. frag.* ii. p. 320 f.

⁷ See, however, p. 76.

⁸ Eurip. *fr.* 506 Nauck².

⁹ 236 ff., 242 ff., 284 ff., 320 ff., 327 ff.

¹⁰ 242 ff.

Though Justice may delay her coming, she comes at last;¹ and others besides the guilty individual may be involved in the catastrophe.² But Hesiod dwells more fondly than Homer on the converse of this doctrine; and he regards the prosperity vouchsafed to the virtuous as descending also to their sons.³ Peace, the nurturer of youth, makes her home in the city whose rulers are just: the inhabitants are free from the scourge of famine and sin-engendered woe, and enjoy abundance of good cheer: "the earth yields them plentiful subsistence; on the mountains the oak-tree bears them acorns on its topmost branches, and in its trunk bees make their home; and fleecy sheep are laden with wool. Wives bear children who resemble their parents. They flourish in continual prosperity: nor do they go to sea on ships, for the grain-giving earth yields them fruit."⁴ This is one of the passages selected by Plato to illustrate what he considers the immorality of Greek poetry: virtue should be praised, he argues, not for its results, but for itself.⁵ We must allow that Hesiod generally points to their consequences as a sufficient motive for choosing virtue and rejecting vice: but the same criticism might, of course, be applied to popular teachers of morality in general, and particularly to many parts of the Old Testament.⁶

The observances by which in Hesiod men are to express their obligations to the heavenly powers are the same as in Homer—libation, sacrifice, and prayer; but the sentiment associated with them hardly attains so high a level of religious feeling. The most characteristic embodiment of the poet's view of worship is contained in a passage that clearly indicates the self-regarding nature of Hesiodic morality. "Offer sacrifice to the immortal

¹ 213-218, 333 f.

² 240 f., 261 f., 284 f.

³ 285: cf. Ps. xxv. 13, "His seed shall inherit the land."

⁴ 225 ff.

⁵ *Rep.* ii. 363 A ff.

⁶ e.g. Lev. xxvi. 3 ff.; Deut. xxviii. 1 ff.

Gods according to thine ability, with pure heart and hand (*ἀγνῶς καὶ καθαρῶς*), and burn withal the goodly fat of thighs: at other times propitiate them with libations and incense, both when thou retirest to rest and when the sacred dawn has come, that they may have a heart and soul propitiate unto thee: that so thou mayest buy thy neighbour's lot of land, and not he thine."¹

As between man and man, the divinely appointed rule of conduct is "be just." This is the ever-recurring exhortation throughout the poem.² It is justice, in Hesiod's view, as in that of the Platonic Protagoras,³ which is the distinguishing feature between man and the lower animals: "This law hath the son of Cronus ordained for fishes and wild beasts and winged birds, that they should devour one another, for there is no justice among them: but unto men he hath given justice, which is far the best."⁴ If we press this sentiment for all it is worth, we may see in it a conception of the universe according to which man is placed in the world not to conspire with, but to fight against the law of brute force that prevails throughout the rest of the animal kingdom. It is a condemnation in advance of the "cannibal morality" sometimes advocated in the age of the Sophists: and Hesiod indeed expressly inveighs against the *χειροδίκαι* of his own times, men whose principle of conduct is that "might is right."⁵ Among positive duties, the poet lays stress on kindness to suppliants, strangers, and orphans, on respect for parents and the marriage-tie, and on hospitality to friends. While praising riches, if justly acquired, he applauds contented poverty, and disapproves of the mad pursuit of wealth.⁶ A multitude of additional precepts ^{is} contained in the poem, some of them relating

¹ 336 ff.

² e.g. 213 ff., 275.

³ 322 A ff.

⁴ 275 ff.

⁵ 189, 192; cf. 197 ff., and the

apologue of the hawk and the nightingale, 203 ff.

⁶ 327-332, 342, 313, 320-326, 40 f., 686.

is - correct

to ceremonial obligations, and reminding us frequently of the Pythagorean *symbola*:¹ but the only other point which it concerns us to notice is that Hesiod regards it as hardly less incumbent on the virtuous man to requite evil for evil than to return good for good. "If thy comrade is the first to do thee an unkindness either in word or in deed, forget not to requite him twofold; howbeit, if he would lead thee again into friendship, and is willing to make restitution, do not say him nay."² We have here what is perhaps the first expression in Greek literature of the sentiment sometimes held to be the most distinctive mark of Pagan morality, "Love your friends and hate your enemies."³ This maxim is not, however, exclusively Pagan, but characteristic of primitive ethics in general; not a few illustrations of it might be quoted from the historical books of the Old Testament.⁴ In Greek literature it is all but universal down to the time of Socrates, although, if we trust our authorities, there was at least one famous Greek who at an early period withheld his assent. To Pittacus of Mitylene were ascribed the sayings, "Forgiveness is better than revenge," and "Speak no evil of a friend, or even of an enemy."⁵

We have hitherto considered the moral and religious teaching of the *Works and Days* without regard to Hesiod's general view of the course of human affairs. This is contained in the legend of five successive ages of mankind.⁶ Whatever the immediate sources of the legend may have been, it has its roots in man's innate tendency to glorify the past, and the underlying notion is that of a progressive though not altogether uninterrupted deterioration from a primitive state of innocence

¹ 353-382, 715 ff.

² 709 ff.; cf. 354.

³ A large collection of instances will be found in Nägelsbach, *Nachhom. Theol.* p. 246 ff.

⁴ See Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* p. 73 ff.

⁵ Diog. Laert. i. 76, 78.

⁶ 109-201.

and bliss. In each of these respects the myth offers a curious contrast to the Theogony, in which order gradually prevails over chaos.

The main features of the golden age, which Hesiod places in the reign of Cronus, are such as we find in later descriptions of the same period.¹ Men and Gods were united in a far closer harmony than now,² and pain and sorrow were unknown. "Like Gods, they lived with hearts void of care . . . nor did pitiable old age come upon them, but *with hands like feet and feet like hands* (πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοῖοι) they had joy in banquets evermore, beyond the reach of woe; and they died as though subdued by sleep." The earth spontaneously yielded all manner of fruits; and vegetarianism was universal.³ After death, the men of the golden age become "good daemons above the ground, givers of wealth to mortal men"—apparently a different order of spirits from those already mentioned.⁴ The obscure words which I have italicised receive perhaps some light from the burlesque account in Plato's *Symposium* of the structure of the human frame before the creation of women: in those days man, we are told, was androgynous and round, with four hands and four feet, constructed, it would seem, on the same plan, and rendering it easy to travel rapidly from place to place by a series of somersaults.⁵ In any case, it is tolerably clear that women were unknown in the Hesiodic golden age: for with women evil came into the world; and Pandora, the mother of womankind, was created in the reign not of Cronus, but of Zeus.⁶

We should stray too far from our subject if we described the three races that intervene between the period of gold and the period of iron: still less can we

¹ See esp. Plato, *Pol.* 271 D ff.

² Cf. *fr.* 187 Goettling.

³ 109-120.

⁴ vv. 124 f. are probably spurious.

⁵ 189 E.

⁶ 70-98; cf. *Theog.* 571-590, and Paus. i. 24. 7.

here attempt to discuss the many unsolved problems in Hesiod's account of the silver and bronze races. It must suffice to say that the age of heroes, which the poet interposes between the bronze age and the iron, is a reversion to a higher type, prompted by the almost universal impulse of Greek writers to idealise the life depicted in the Homeric poems. As for the ultimate fate of the heroes, some, says Hesiod, were exempted from death, and transported by Zeus to the farthest limits of the world; where they "dwell with hearts free from care, in the islands of the blest, by the deep-eddying Ocean stream, blessed heroes, for whom the grain-giving earth yields sweet fruit abundantly three times a year."¹ Last comes the age of iron, in which the poet laments that his own unhappy lot is cast. "Would that I had never lived among the fifth race of men, but had either died before or *been born later!* For now it is the iron age; nor ever shall they cease from weariness and woe by day, nor from destruction by night: but the Gods will send cruel cares. Yet even for them shall good be mixed with evil. But Zeus will destroy even this race of mortals, *when men have grey hairs at their birth.*" In point of morality, mankind will reach the lowest depth: the bonds of friendship and family life will be dissolved: there will be no respect for parents and Gods, no regard for truth and justice: might is right, and the workers of evil deeds alone are honoured, until at last Aidos and Nemesis, folding their white robes about them, leave the world and seek refuge with the immortals.² Some have asserted that Greek literature holds out no hope of a golden age in the future as well as in the past. But it is clear from the words in italics that Hesiod believes the iron age to be not less transient than the others, and anticipates a happier period after the present era is fulfilled. The end will come, according to the

¹ 170 ff.² 174-201.

poet, when children are born grey-headed. Now in a Testament quoted by Dr. James in his discussion of the *Revelation of Peter*,¹ we are told that among the signs of the end shall be "children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired." And according to the myth of the *Politicus*, between which and the Hesiodic form of the legend now under consideration there are several points of contact, the golden age returns just when disorder is at its worst; and in the golden age, instead of being born young and growing old, men are born from the earth with grey hairs, and pass through middle age to youth and childhood, till they fade away.² In view of these and other parallels,³ it seems highly probable that the Hesiodic story of five ages is part of a general theory of recurrent cycles in the life of the universe, such as we meet with in Empedocles. In any case it contains, as we have seen, a hint which is fulfilled in the later doctrine of the ἀποκατάστασις or restoration of all things.⁴

The pessimism which shows itself in Hesiod's description of the iron age is one of the most noteworthy characteristics of his poetry. "The earth," he says, "is full of evils, and so is the sea—πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δὲ θάλασσα: by day and night diseases visit men unbidden, bearing evils to mortals, silently; for Zeus, the lord of counsel, hath denied them speech."⁵ What is the origin of all this woe? The answer of Hesiod is given in the legends of Prometheus and Pandora. In the days when the Gods were at strife with mortals, Prometheus, the champion of humanity, attempted to deceive the king of heaven

¹ p. 56.

² *Pol.* 270 E ff.

³ Referred to in my ed. of Plato's *Republic*, vol. ii. p. 296 f.

⁴ Cf. Virgil, *Ecl.* 4. 4 f.: "Ultima

Cumaei venit iam carminis aetas;
*Magnus ab integro saeculorum
nascitur ordo.*"

⁵ 101 ff.

in the matter of sacrificial offerings. Though fully cognisant of the fraud,—observe how the divine omniscience is again implied,¹—Zeus allowed himself to be cheated, “for he was brooding evil against men, evil that should be accomplished.” In revenge, he deprived the human race of fire: but Prometheus stole it back. Thereupon Zeus bound his enemy with indissoluble fetters and sent an eagle to prey upon his liver, till in the fulness of time came Heracles, who with the consent of Zeus slew the eagle and released Prometheus. Mankind was punished by the creation of woman. Out of earth and water Hephaestus compacted a female shape, which the Gods and Goddesses invested with every charm; and Epimetheus or Afterthought received her from the hands of Hermes, forgetful that his brother Prometheus had forbidden him in advance to accept any gift from Zeus. The woman opened the casket of evil,² and did not replace the lid until all the calamities of human life, Hope only excepted,³ had streamed forth.⁴

The legend of Prometheus is one into which an infinite amount of meaning can be read. The quarrel between God and man, the appearance of Prometheus on behalf of mortals and his sufferings for their sake, his ultimate deliverance by the son of Zeus and the consequent reconciliation between man and God: these are topics on which much might be said. But Hesiod was probably quite unconscious of the deeper religious ideas which the story is fitted to suggest. As for the Pandora myth, though in part, perhaps, an allegory, it seems clearly to imply that the creation of woman was later than that of man,⁵ and initiated his misfortunes.

¹ See p. 71.

² See above p. 64. For parallels to this conception, see Frazer on Pausanias i. 24. 7.

³ On *ἄλπις* as an evil in Greek

thought, see Butcher, *Aspects of the Greek Genius* p. 160.

⁴ *O. D.* 47-105; *Theog.* 512-589.

⁵ Cf. Plato, *Pol.* 271 E, *Tim.* 90 E f.

The strain of misogynism in Greek literature begins with Hesiod.¹

In Hesiod, as little as in Homer, are the miseries of human life alleviated by the prospect of a happier existence after death. The earthly paradise of which we read in the *Works and Days*—the so-called “islands of the blest”—is inaccessible to ordinary mortals, being reserved for a few divine favourites of the heroic age.² We have seen that the departed spirits of the golden age become daemons on the earth:³ those of the silver age occupy a somewhat similar position in the underworld.⁴ Of the men of the bronze era it is said that they descended to “the dank halls of chill Hades, and were no more known.”⁵ Hesiod is silent as to the future state of the men of iron: but the presumption is that they too enter all-receiving Hades. In the *Theogony*, we read of the dog Cerberus, pitiless gate-keeper of the house of Death, who fawns on those who enter the dismal abode, but “suffers them not to leave again; but keeping strict watch devours any whom he catches trying to go outside the gates of mighty Hades and dread Persephone.”⁶

The only way of mitigating the ills of life, according to Hesiod, is by stern and unremitting toil. It is vain to sit idle and hope:⁷ Hope is ever a deceiver: we must be up and doing. Nothing is more characteristic of the *Works and Days* than exhortations to work.⁸ The inherent dignity of labour finds apt expression in the famous verse, ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν θνείδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' θνείδος.⁹ Heracles, the type of the strenuous life, is called *πονηρότατος καὶ ἀριστος*, “the best and most laborious of men.”¹⁰ In Hesiod the duty of work, like the other

¹ *Theog.* 590–612.

² *O. D.* 166–173.

³ p. 76. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* v. 469 A.

⁴ *O. D.* 141 f.

⁵ 153.

⁶ 769 ff.

⁷ *O. D.* 498–501.

⁸ 298–316, 388 ff., 410–413, 498 f.

⁹ 311.

¹⁰ *fr.* 95 Goettling.

duty on which he insists so much—that of being just—derives its sanction from the divine ordinance; and Virtue is the prize of toil. “Unto Wickedness men attain with ease, and in large numbers: for the road is short, and she dwells very near. But in front of Virtue the immortals have set labour and the sweat of the brow: the path is long and steep, and rough at the first; but when the summit is reached, the way, though hard before, is thenceforth easy.”¹ We are reminded of the Christian sentiment, “Wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many be they that enter in thereby. For narrow is the gate, and straitened the way, that leadeth unto life, and few be they that find it.”²

So much, then, for the moral and religious teaching of the poetry of Hesiod. The main difference between Homeric and Hesiodic poetry is that the former is predominantly ideal, the latter predominantly practical and realistic; and it is just this presence of idealism which gives to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* a higher religious as well as poetical value than either the *Theogony* or the *Works and Days* can claim.

Before proceeding to consider the further development in gnostic poetry of the ideas we have hitherto examined, a word or two must be said in passing about the body of poems known as the *Homeric Hymns*, the oldest of which probably date from the period intervening between the *Works and Days* and the rise of gnostic poetry. The best known and perhaps the earliest of these hymns is the hymn to the Delian Apollo, which in the form in which we have it is combined with a later and inferior poem in honour of Apollo of Delphi, the production, it would seem, of a writer of the Hesiodic school.³ In the first of these two

¹ *O. D.* 287 ff.

² *Matt.* vii. 13 f.

³ See the edition by Sikes and Allen, pp. 59–69.

poems occurs the already quoted description of the festival of Apollo at Delos, whither the Ionians gathered with "their children and shame-fast wives" to do honour to the God.¹ Apollo in the hymn stands next in dignity to Zeus, and is the prophet of his unerring counsel to mankind. The whole poem is pervaded by the sense of abounding vitality and joy which the worship of Apollo usually inspired among the Greeks. The later hymn, which relates the slaying of the Pythian dragoness by Apollo, and the founding of the Delphian oracle, contains a curious passage in which the sufferings of humanity are represented as furnishing a theme of song to the immortals. When Apollo plays the lyre before the assembled Olympians, "all the Muses together with sweet voice in antiphonal chant replying, sing of the imperishable gifts of the Gods, and the sufferings of men, all that they endure from the hands of the undying Gods, lives witless and helpless, men unavailing to find remede for death or buckler against old age."²

Of the other Homeric hymns, those that celebrate Hermes and Aphrodite exhibit the divine nature in a far from favourable light: but the hymn to Demeter is of quite another kind; and the story of the Goddess seeking for her lost child is told by the poet with a tenderness and purity of feeling seldom surpassed in ancient literature. In the history of Greek religious thought the poem is chiefly remarkable as the earliest literary document in which the promise is made of a happier lot hereafter to those who have been initiated. When Demeter's anger is appeased by the restoration of her daughter for two parts of the year, she revealed to Eumolpus and Celeus "the manner of her rites, and taught them her goodly mysteries, holy mysteries which none may violate, or

¹ See p. 63.

² 189 ff. Lang. Cf. Homer, *Il.* 21. 462 ff. (*supra* p. 64).

search into, or noise abroad, for the great curse from the God restrains the voice. Happy is he among deathly men who hath beheld these things. And he that is uninitiate, and hath no lot in them, hath never equal lot in death beneath the murky gloom.”¹ Whether or not the Eleusinian mysteries expressly taught the doctrine of immortality,—and the prevailing view since Lobeck is that they taught no positive doctrines at all,—it is clearly established by the testimony of the ancients themselves that initiation was believed to be a passport to happiness, in the future world.²

Turning now from epic to lyric and elegiac poetry, let us endeavour to see how the foundation laid by Homer and Hesiod was built upon by their successors from Archilochus in the seventh to Bacchylides in the fifth century B.C. Our material is in most cases too scanty to permit us to frame a theory of development, and assign to each particular poet a definite place in the historical evolution of religious thought. On this account I will take the important topics singly, and illustrate them from the period as a whole. One general statement may be made in advance: the connexion between religion and morality is not less close in the poets we are about to consider than it is in Homer and Hesiod. The moral law still derives its binding force, not, indeed, from the example, but from the ordinances of Zeus.

A notable feature in the theology of these poets is the way in which the figure of Zeus dwarfs and obscures all the other divine personalities. Whereas in Homer the inferior Gods play a large part in the economy of the universe, and are frequently in opposition to the will of the supreme God, there is now hardly any trace of divided counsels in Olympus, and we hear compara-

¹ 474 ff. Lang. Cf. Pindar, *fr.* Sikes and Allen in their note on 137, *infra* p. 137 n. 1.

² See the passages referred to by

tively little of the secondary deities: the divine working in nature and especially in human affairs is generally associated with the name of Zeus. "Zeus, the loud thunderer, controls the issues of all things, and disposes them according to his will":¹ he is "the source of all, the leader of all,"² the "all-ruler," the "father most high" (*μεγιστοπάτωρ*), and so on.³ To assert that Zeus was uniformly represented as more powerful than Destiny, would doubtless be incorrect: on this subject Greek thinkers were seldom quite consistent with themselves. But in early lyric and elegiac poetry there are, I think, no examples of conflict or antagonism between the two powers; and beyond doubt the prevailing rule is to identify Fate with the ordinance or law of Zeus and the immortals. Like Homer, Solon also speaks of the *αἴσα Διός*, the destiny that proceeds from Zeus,⁴ and treats the dispensations of Fate (*μοῖρα*) as equivalent to the gifts of the immortals from which there is no escape.⁵ In Bacchylides, too, we meet with expressions like "the destined ordinance of Zeus," the "all-powerful Fate that cometh from the Gods."⁶ Here and there, where Zeus is distinguished from the Fates, the same religious veneration which Zeus himself inspires is offered to his ministers. A remarkable fragment of a prayer by an unknown author, who lived, perhaps, in the time of Bacchylides, furnishes a case in point. Aisa, Clotho, and Lachesis, nearest of all the Gods to the throne of Zeus, the powers who ratify his will, are invoked to send down the blessings of law and justice and peace upon the poet's country.⁷ There is also, perhaps, a touch of half-religious resignation in the curiously Stoic language of Theognis: "All must suffer what Fate has decreed;

¹ Sem. 1. 1 f. ed. Bergk-Hiller.

² Terp. 1.

³ Bacchyl. 16. 66, 5. 199.

⁴ 2. 1 f. *Of θεῶν μοῖρα*, 12. 30; *θεῶν μοῖρα*, Sem. 7. 104.

⁵ 12. 63.

⁶ 3. 25, 16. 24. Cf. Theog. 1033, "the fated gifts of the Gods."

⁷ *fr.* 80 *adesp.*

but what Fate has decreed, I will suffer without fear."¹ We may compare the words of Cleanthes the Stoic: "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too, Fate, wherever ye have appointed me to go. I will follow fearlessly: or if I play the coward and refuse, I needs must follow just the same."²

The complete dependence of man upon the Gods is a common theme of lyric and elegiac poetry. "No man," says Theognis, "is happy or poor or bad or good without divine agency."³ And in Simonides we read: "Unto excellence none attaineth, neither city nor mortal, without the Gods."⁴ The language in which we are bidden to put our trust in them is not unfrequently steeped in religious feeling. "Pray to the Gods: with the Gods is might, surely without the Gods is neither evil nor good to men."⁵ *τοῖς θεοῖς τιθεῖν ἅπαντα*—"trust all to the Gods; many a time they lift from out their troubles those who lie on the black earth."⁶ Tyrtaeus encourages the Spartans by reminding them that "Zeus hath not yet bowed down his neck":⁷ the Lord God still reigneth. At the same time, we feel that there is now a greater distance between the Godhead and mankind than in the Homeric age. Can man by searching find out God? Solon's reply is in the negative: the mind of the immortals is altogether hidden from men.⁸ "All our thoughts are vain," cries Theognis, "and we have no knowledge: but the Gods accomplish all according to their will."⁹

As in Homer and Hesiod, so also in the elegiac poets, Zeus is above all things the dispenser of justice. A striking quatrain of Archilochus represents him as the

¹ ὅτι δὲ μοῖρα παθεῖν, ὅτι δέδοικα παθεῖν, 818.

² fr. 91 Pearson.

³ 165 f.

⁴ 44.

⁵ Theog. 171 f.; cf. 355 ff., 556.

⁶ Arch. 58; cf. 71.

⁷ ὅπως Ζεὺς ἀχέενα λαζὸν ἔχει, 9. 2. Cf. Soph. *Æt.* 174.

⁸ 16.

⁹ 141 f.

rewarder of right and the avenger of wrong not only among men, but also among the lower animals. "O father Zeus, thine is the dominion of heaven: thou seest men's deeds of wickedness and right: thou regardest the insolence and justice of beasts."¹ As usual, however, the punishment of sin is dwelt upon more often than the reward of virtue. Both Solon and Theognis declare that Wealth, if justly acquired, stands sure: but they lay decidedly most emphasis on the converse principle, that ill-gotten gain leads to destruction.² "Justice," according to Solon, "though she keep silence, knows what is and what hath been, and surely comes to take her fill of vengeance at the last."³ In a highly poetical passage he compares the vengeance of Zeus to a wind that springs up suddenly, spreading devastation on sea and land, till rising to heaven it scatters the clouds, and the sun again shines forth. God "is not a man, that he should be quick to anger at each offence; yet he will not always ignore the sinner, but will reveal him in the end. One pays the penalty now, another afterwards. If the guilty escape, and the doom ordained of Heaven fall not upon themselves, it will surely fall hereafter: the innocent will suffer for the guilty, their children, perhaps, or later generations."⁴

The passage just quoted is the more deserving of our attention, because in the literature of Greece it is one of the earliest passages in which the sins of the fathers are explicitly said to be visited on the children. The doctrine is characteristic of a particular stage in the development of the moral consciousness;⁵ and you will remember that in its Hebrew form it is emphatically condemned by Jeremiah and Ezekiel. "In those days they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten sour

¹ 84. Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 55 ff.

² Sol. 12. 7 ff.; Theog. 197 ff.

³ 2. 15 f.

⁴ 12. 17 ff.

⁵ See Westermarck, *Origin and Development* etc. p. 49 ff.

grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity."¹ More than any other of the elegiac poets, Theognis is afflicted by the moral chaos of the world; and he, too, condemns, not indeed the doctrine, but the stern reality which it expresses. "When the children of an unjust father follow after justice in thought and act, dreading thy wrath, O son of Cronus, loving righteousness from the first among their fellow-citizens, let them not pay for the transgressions of their sires! As it is, the doer escapes, and another is punished."² The same poet elsewhere remonstrates with Zeus for treating the righteous and the unrighteous alike. "Dear Zeus, I wonder at thee: thou art the lord of all; thou hast great power and honour, and knowest well the thoughts of each man's heart. How then, son of Cronus, dost thou think fit to deal the same measure to sinful and just, careless whether their hearts are turned to moderation or to insolence?"³ Nay more, the wicked prosper, and the righteous are forsaken: why then should we reverence the Gods?⁴ This is the familiar difficulty which has always been felt by those who would fain believe in the justice of God. "Righteous art thou, O Lord . . . yet would I reason the cause with thee: wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? Wherefore are all they at ease that deal very treacherously?"⁵

It is plain from these extracts that the moral and religious problems which occupied the mind of Aeschylus were already beginning to be raised in the sixth century before Christ. The truth is that several of the characteristic doctrines of Greek tragedy appear in the gnomic poets. Thus, for example, Theognis tells of the *daemon* that leads men into sin, making evil seem to them

¹ Jer. xxxi. 29 f.; cf. Ezek. xviii.

² 737 ff.

³ 378 ff.

⁴ 743-752. Cf. Solon 14.

⁵ Jer. xii. 1.

good, and good evil;¹ and the conception of the origin and nature of sin which we meet with in the fragments alike of Solon and Theognis has many parallels in Aeschylus. Undue prosperity or wealth (*δύστος*) produces *κόρος*, that is, fulness, satiety, or pride; from *κόρος* comes *ὑβρις*, showing itself in want of moderation, in neglect of the golden mean; and the child of *ὑβρις* is *ἄρη*, "destruction."² Although an attempt is sometimes made to distinguish between God-given riches and the wealth to which the unrighteous by themselves attain, at other times the prosperity that leads to sin is equally attributed to the Gods: so that the final responsibility is with God, and not with man. Hybris, Theognis says, is the first and greatest evil; and God is its author.³ So long as the Gods maintained their position in Greek thought as the sole and universal causes, it was inevitable that the sins of mankind should continue to be laid at their door. At the same time, this view is not, of course, consistently maintained throughout the period we are now discussing. Bacchylides, like the Homeric Zeus, makes man himself responsible for sin and its consequences: "Zeus, who rules on high and beholds all things, is not the author of grievous woes for mortals. No, open before all men is the path that leads to unswerving Justice, attendant of holy Eunomia and prudent Themis: happy the land whose sons take her to dwell with them."⁴

The view of Theognis, that the Gods deliberately lead men astray, is, in principle at least, as old as Homer.⁵ Other unfavourable features of the Homeric theology seem to be less prominent in the poets of this time. It

¹ 401 ff.; cf. 133 ff., 151; Solon 12. 75.

² Solon 12. 11, 16, 75; 2. 7 ff., cf. 35 f.; 4. 3 f.: Theog. 153 f., 605, 693, 1103 f. In Solon and Theognis *ἀρη* generally means

destruction. For praise of *τὸ μέτρον*, see Sol. 7, 15; Theog. 220, 331, 335, 401.

³ 151; cf. 133 ff.

⁴ 14. 51 ff., tr. Jebb.

⁵ *Supra* p. 38.

is remarkable that the fragments of Greek elegiac poetry seldom or never impute the grosser immoralities to the Gods. Occasionally they are said to be deceitful and envious:¹ perhaps the "envy of the Gods" is also to some extent implied in the belief that overmuch prosperity is fatal. So far as we can see, the Godhead appears to be regarded as both omnipotent and omniscient.²

One or two other points may be briefly mentioned. The conception of prayer and sacrifice throughout this period is still in the main Homeric,³ though the lyric poets sometimes strike a more spiritual note.⁴ As for the rule of conduct between man and man, we have repeated illustrations of the precept "do good to friends and evil to enemies,"⁵ with little that is suggestive of a more generous spirit.⁶ In Homer we noted a tendency to look upon wickedness as a condition of the intellect rather than of the will.⁷ The same tendency appears in Solon;⁸ and the other Homeric maxim, that character depends upon environment, is echoed by Archilochus.⁹

It only remains to say a word about the view of life and death reflected in the poetry of this time. The shade of melancholy has, if anything, grown deeper.¹⁰ Of all the gnomic poets, Solon is perhaps the least inclined to pessimism;¹¹ and it is Solon who wrote, "No mortal man is happy, but all on whom the sun looks down are miserable."¹² We hear much about the instability of human life and happiness,¹³ the rapid flight of youth and its

¹ Sim. 25; Corinna 3a.

² Arch. 53, 71, 84; Theog. 373 ff., 1195 f.; Bacchyl. 3. 57 ff., 16. 117 ff.

³ e.g. Theog. 773 ff.

⁴ e.g. Sim. 22. 17 ff.

⁵ Arch. 61; Sol. 12. 5; Theog. 337 ff., 343, 361 f., 1032 f.

⁶ Theog. 1079 f.

⁷ *supra* p. 50.

⁸ 12. 69 f.

⁹ 66, 67.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Sem. 1.

¹¹ See *fr.* 14, 19.

¹² 13.

¹³ e.g. Alcman 5. 37 ff.; Theog. 159 f., 659 ff., 1075 ff.; Sim. 17, 45.

pleasures,¹ the evils of poverty² and old age,³ and the sure approach of death.⁴ "Small is the strength of man," writes Simonides, "and his cares are irremediable: toil upon toil in life's brief span, and the shadow of inevitable death hanging over all: for good and bad have equal share in death."⁵ Theognis pathetically laments that the Gods have not revealed to man the road which he must follow in order to find favour in their eyes.⁶ The contemplation of the moral and political chaos of his own times,⁷ added to the general misery of man's existence, produces in him a feeling of despair: "Best it is not to be born; and next best, when you are born, to pass the gates of Hades as soon as possible."⁸ By way of antidote the duty of resignation is generally enforced;⁹ sometimes the lesson drawn is *carpe diem*:¹⁰ nowhere do we find the hope held out of compensation or redress hereafter. Heroic deeds are rewarded by an immortality of fame;¹¹ but all men, heroes and cowards alike, pass to the "shadowy abode of the dead," whose "dark gates enclose the souls against their will."¹² There "Persephone giveth forgetfulness to mortal men, depriving them of thought" (*βλάπτουσα νόοιο*).¹³ "As soon as the earth covers him, and he descends into Erebus, the home of Persephone, no man rejoices in the strain of the lyre or flute-player, or in quaffing the gifts of Dionysus."¹⁴

¹ Mimnermus 1. 4-10, 2. 1-16; Theog. 985 ff.

² Mimn. 2. 12 ff., and especially Theognis, *e.g.* 178 ff., 267 ff., 351 ff., 383 ff., 621 f., 649 ff.

³ Mimn. 4, 5. 3 f.; Theog. 527 f., 1007 ff., 1131 f.

⁴ Mimn. 2. 7; Anacreon 82; Sim. 19.

⁵ 20.

⁶ 381 f.

⁷ 1185 ff.

⁸ 425 ff. Cf. Bacchyl. 5. 160 ff.

⁹ Arch. 9. 5 ff.; Theog. 591 ff., 1029 ff., 1162 ff., 1178.

¹⁰ Alcaeus, 17; Theog. 567 ff., 877 ff., 983 ff., 1191 f.; Sim. 69. 12.

¹¹ Sim. 84, 85; Bacchyl. 3. 90, 12. 30, 168 ff.; cf. Theog. 237 ff., 367.

¹² Theog. 708 ff.; cf. Anacr. 32. 4 ff.; Sim. 19; Bacchyl. 5. 63 ff.; *fr.* 87 *adesp.*

¹³ Theog. 705.

¹⁴ Theog. 973 ff.

A pathetic fragment of the poetess Erinna tells of the silence and darkness of the underworld—*συνὰ δ' ἐν νεκύεσσι, τὸ δὲ σκότος ὄσσε καταγρεῖ*.¹ In all essential respects the poetical conception of the future life is still what it was in Homer.

¹fr. 3.

LECTURE V

ORPHIC RELIGIOUS IDEAS

EXCEPT, perhaps, in the *Theogony* of Hesiod, we have been concerned, so far, with religious and theological conceptions of which the germ, at least, is usually to be found in the Homeric poems. With Pindar, as we shall see, the case is somewhat different. The eschatological ideas of Pindar are to some extent derived not from Homer, but from a non-Homeric, or rather, perhaps, an anti-Homeric source—I mean from the Orphic teaching as to the nature and destiny of the human soul. To this subject I will therefore invite your attention to-day.

The extraordinary religious movement known as Orphism made its appearance in Greece during the sixth century B.C. It is due to the researches of Rohde, Dieterich, Gruppe, Miss Harrison, and many other investigators during recent years, following in the path marked out by Lobeck, that we are now enabled to form a more or less consistent picture of the phenomenon in question. In its main features, it presents the appearance of a religious awakening or revival; but it was by no means destitute of dogmatic significance and value, and a considerable part of the Orphic teaching about the soul was afterwards assimilated, not only by Pindar, but also by the philosophers, particularly Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Plato. Where the movement originated, or whether it arose in several centres independently, and by what social, political, and economic circumstances it was fostered and promoted, are questions which do not

as yet, perhaps, admit of a final answer. One of the most active centres of early Orphism was the powerful city of Croton in Italy, afterwards the home of the Pythagorean brotherhood. Otto Gruppe, indeed, believes it to be probable that in all the districts where Orphic mysticism makes its appearance in the course of the sixth century, the influence of the Orphic community at Croton was at work.¹ In Athens we hear of three representatives of Orphism living at the court of Pisistratus—Onomacritus, known to history in connexion with the alleged Pisistratean recension of Homer, Zopyrus of Heraclea, and a certain Orpheus of Croton, who may possibly, as Gruppe conjectures, have been summoned from his native city in order to transplant the Orphic doctrine to the soil of Attica.² It is at all events certain that vast quantities of Orphic literature were in circulation at Athens during the next century;³ and the impulse to its manufacture may well have been given by Onomacritus and his associates.

There is, unhappily, no contemporary evidence to show how the Orphic communities were organised during the period with which we are now concerned. The analogy of similar confederations at a later period of Greek history makes it probable that the Orphic votaries, who in Plato's time were known as the saints or holy ones (*ἁγιοί*),⁴ formed themselves into religious associations or *θιασοί*, the constitution of which was usually copied from that of the city in which they were established. These associations were independent of one another, so far as appertained to matters of government and administration; but it may be taken as certain that the eschatological and other doctrines which they professed were fundamentally the same.

¹ *Griech. Myth.* in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch* p. 1034.

² *l.c.*

³ See *infra* p. 103.

⁴ *Rep.* ii. 363 C.

In some respects the position which the Orphic believers occupied towards the State religion must have been analogous to that of modern dissenters; but while on the one hand the theoretical cleavage between them and the established form of religion was much greater, on the other hand there is little or no indication that they abstained from taking part in the religious festivals and services which the city ordained; and so long as they fulfilled their duty in this respect, the State, for its part, with the characteristic toleration of ancient Greek life, left them alone, unless, of course, as happened in the case of the early Pythagorean society, they attempted to use their religious organisation for the furtherance of political ends.

Our knowledge of the history and development of Orphism is not sufficient to enable us to say with certainty at what particular time particular doctrines came into vogue. The most that I can attempt to do is to describe some of the leading features of the Orphic doctrine as it was in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ. In the absence of contemporary documents, we must of necessity be content to reconstruct for ourselves the general character of sixth century Orphism from what we know of it in the two following centuries. The two authorities on whom we shall principally rely are Empedocles and Plato. As for the Orphic fragments, they undoubtedly contain much that descends from a remote antiquity, but they have not as yet been adequately sifted; and it may perhaps be doubted whether so difficult and delicate a task will ever be successfully accomplished. On this account it is seldom safe to make use of Abel's collection¹ except by way of illustrating such conclusions as may be drawn from authorities whose date we know. Even in Plato, allusions to Orpheus and his followers are not very

¹ *Orphica*, 1885.

common; but some compensation is afforded by an archaeological discovery, which throws a good deal of light on the Orphic conception of the soul and its destiny in the future world. In the neighbourhood of the ancient Sybaris, the famous rival city of Croton, the probable headquarters, as we have seen, of Orphism in the Hellenic world, six inscribed tablets of thin gold have been discovered in tombs; and besides these, there is one from Crete and one from the vicinity of Rome. All these tablets—I quote from Miss Harrison's *Prolegomena to Greek Religion*, in which they are fully described and illustrated¹—“have this much in common: buried with the dead they contain instructions for his conduct in the world below, exhortations to the soul, formularies to be repeated, confessions of faith and of ritual performed, and the like.”² They supply, in short, a kind of *vade mecum* to the lower world. In treating of the Orphic eschatology, I shall make frequent use of these inscriptions, the most important of which probably belong to the fourth century before Christ, although the doctrine they embody is much older.

Before, however, we proceed to deal with the eschatology of the Orphics, a word or two must be said about their theological doctrine. This was contained in the numerous and often grotesque theogonies, which represented the successive stages in the evolution of the world under the figure of successive dynasties of Gods.³ The only point which it concerns us to notice here is the element of pantheism in these theogonical poems.⁴ One of the fragments celebrates Zeus as “first and last, the head and middle, out of whom all things are created”:

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένητο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος, ἀργικέραυνος,
Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται.⁴

¹ pp. 573-600, with the critical appendix of Mr. Gilbert Murray, pp. 660-674.

² p. 578.

³ Fragments in Abel, *Orph.* pp. 156-209.

⁴ fr. 123 Abel. Cf. *Orph. Hymn.* 11.

The legend ran that the universe with all its parts was fashioned within the frame of Zeus, after he had swallowed Phanes, in whom, as the offspring of the great world-egg, all the seeds or "potencies" were present.¹ The rest of the fragment describes the world itself as nothing but the body of the God: the heavens are his head, the sun and the moon his eyes, and so on: his mind is the aether.² Whether the whole of this fragment is early, may well be doubted; but the line in which Zeus is said to be the "head and middle" of all things was certainly known to Plato; and he speaks of the doctrine as "an ancient story"—a phrase which he elsewhere applies to primitive Orphic beliefs.³ We shall afterwards find an example of the same kind of pantheism in Aeschylus, and possibly also in Pindar.

Far more important in its influence on subsequent Greek thought is the Orphic conception of the origin and history of the human soul. A passage in the *Cratylus* of Plato will form a convenient starting-point for our inquiry.

Among the words whose derivation is discussed by Socrates in that dialogue, *σῶμα* is one. Three suggestions are made. The first is that *σῶμα* comes from *σῆμα*, it being held by some, says Socrates, that the body is in reality the grave of the soul—*σῶμα σῆμα*. The second proposal also connects the two words, but takes *σῆμα* in the sense of "sign" or "index," and regards the body as that by means of which the soul as it were signifies or indicates whatever she desires to say. Socrates himself is disposed, he tells us, to favour a third explanation. He would ascribe the invention of the word *σῶμα* to Orpheus and his followers (*οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφεία*); and the reason why they called the body by this name is that,

¹ *fr.* 121, 122, 123 Abel.

² Reading *ροῦς*—*ἀψευδῆς* in l. 19.

³ *Laws*, 715 E; cf. *Phaed.*

70 C.

according to their belief, the soul is condemned to incarnation on account of her sins, and the body serves as the enclosure (*περιβολος*) or prison-house (*δεσμοτήριον*) which holds her fast. In this way Socrates derives *σῶμα* from *σώζω*, without, as he triumphantly asserts, the change of a single letter.¹ The second of these derivations does not concern us; but the theories that underlie the first and third are closely related to one another; and it is not unreasonable to infer that if the incarceration of the soul during her life on earth was a tenet of the Orphics, they sometimes expressed what is after all essentially the same belief in a more emphatic way by saying that "the body is a tomb." This inference is supported by the well-known passage of the *Gorgias* in which Plato gives his fullest exposition of the *σῶμα σῆμα* doctrine. "I should not be surprised," writes Plato, "if Euripides speaks truly when he says, 'Who knows whether life is death, and death life?' So that in reality, perhaps, we are in a state of death. I myself once heard one of the wise men say that in the present life we are dead, and the body is our tomb."² There is reason to believe that the representatives of the Orphic way of thinking in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ were sometimes described as the "wise men" or "sages";³ and it is therefore probable that Plato is thinking of the Orphic doctrine in this passage.

If Plato is to be trusted, we may consequently suppose that the conception of the body as the prison-house, and even perhaps the grave, of the soul was entertained in Orphic circles, and that the cause of her imprisonment in the body was believed to be ante-natal sin. "The ancient theologians and seers," says Clement, quoting a fragment

¹ *Crat.* 400 C; *fr.* 221 Abel.

² 492 E f.

³ I have cited the evidence for

this statement in my edition of Plato, *Rep.* vol. ii. p. 379.

of Philolaus, "bear witness that owing to certain sins the soul is yoked with and buried in the body as in a tomb."¹ It is this belief which appears to have supplied the original motive or starting-point of the Orphic religious discipline. Like Buddhism and Christianity, Orphism was a religion of deliverance (*λύσις*), of salvation: the cry of the believer, like that of St. Paul, was, "Who shall deliver me from this body of death?"

We shall frequently have occasion to return to this characteristically Orphic idea of the body as the sepulchre or prison of the soul, and I hope to show you hereafter how Plato made it the basis of that profoundly religious view of the ethical end which he puts before us in the *Phaedo*; but in the meantime let us endeavour to understand its connexion with the rest of the Orphic doctrine. The most important questions with which we have to deal are three in number. In the first place, what is the teaching of Orphism about the soul before her incarnation? Secondly, by what means, if any, is her final deliverance from the prison-house of body to be effected? And, thirdly, what is the destiny that awaits the soul after she has escaped from her prison? I will endeavour to answer these questions, so far as an answer is possible, by sketching in outline the life-history of an Orphic soul; but while on the one hand many details are necessarily wanting, on the other hand it would be rash to affirm for certain that everything which I shall put before you had a place in the Orphic religion so early as the sixth century B.C. It is none the less true that the family resemblance between the different ideas to which I shall call your attention is sufficient to justify their claim to a common ancestry; and in this case we must be content to infer the character of the parent from that of the children.

The first point to be noticed is that the soul, according

¹ Diels² i. p. 245.

to the Orphic view, is of celestial origin and divine. It is a *particula divinæ auræ*, a particle of the pure empyrean substance or aether. "From heaven is my descent, as ye yourselves know also"—such is the language in which the departed soul addresses the Gods of the lower world; and again, "for I, too, claim to be of your blest race." Man is "a child of earth and starry heaven";¹ his body is of the earth, but his soul, as a late Orphic line expresses it, is "rooted in the celestial element"—*ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἐρρίζωται*.² Before entering for the first time into a corporeal tabernacle, each particular soul would seem to have lived in the society of Gods, and was in fact a God. Empedocles speaks of souls incarnate as *daemons* compelled by necessity's decree to wander from the abode of the blessed: he is himself, he says, "an exile and a wanderer from heaven" (*φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης*).³

In what way the Orphics conceived of the descent into the body is not clear. According to Gruppe,⁴ they pictured the process as something physical and material. Some particles of the divine aether sink downwards to the earth, where they become clothed, as Empedocles says, "in a strange garment of flesh."⁵ We are told by Aristotle that in the so-called Orphic verses the soul was said to be carried to and fro by the winds, and drawn into the body by respiration.⁶ If this refers, as apparently it does, to the moment of birth, it would seem that the soul was believed to enter with the first breath we draw: so that we have here an early example of the theory which has sometimes been called *panspermismus*, soul-seeds swarming everywhere, ready to rush into the body as soon as respiration begins. But however this may be, the

¹ Diels p. 495. 3 f., 13.

² Quoted by Gruppe, *Gr. Myth.* p. 1035.

³ *fr.* 115 Diels.²

⁴ *l.c.* p. 1035.

⁵ *fr.* 126 Diels.²

⁶ *De An.* A 5. 410^b 27 ff.; cf. *fr.* 241 Abel.

originating cause of the soul's descent was sin; and its imprisonment in the body has a penitentiary purpose. To one who is fresh from the spacious atmosphere of heaven, the world in which we live appears an *ἀντρον ὑπόστεγον*—a cave roofed over by the sky; an expression which appears to foreshadow the simile of the Cave in Plato.¹ "I wept and I wailed," says Empedocles, "when I beheld the unfamiliar place, the joyless region where Murder and Wrath and troops of other Dooms and loathsome diseases and putrefactions and running sores wander this way and that throughout the meadow of Até."²

As soon at the doors of the prison-house close round her, the soul has entered upon what the Orphics variously called the "circle" or "wheel of generation" and the "circle of Necessity," a long and weary circuit of birth and death which must be traversed before we can return to the place from whence we came.³ The normal duration of this circuit, according to Empedocles, with whose account the myth in the *Phaedrus* of Plato appears to agree, is thrice ten thousand seasons, by which, in all probability, the poet means ten thousand years.⁴ Of its appalling vicissitudes the poet gives a graphic picture. The exile "wanders from the home of the blessed, being born into all kinds of mortal forms, passing from one laborious path of life to another. For the mighty Air chases him into the Sea, and the Sea spits him forth upon the dry land, and Earth casts him into the light of the blazing Sun, and the Sun hurls him into the eddies of Air. One takes him from the other, and he is hated of them all. I also am one of these, an exile and a wanderer from the Gods."⁵

¹ Emp. fr. 120 Diels².

² fr. 118, 121 Diels².

³ Gruppe, *l.c.* p. 1040. The phrase *τροχὸς τῆς γενέσεως* occurs also (with

a different meaning) in St. James iii. 6; see Mayor *ad loc.*

⁴ Emp. fr. 115. 6; Plato, *Phaedr.* 248 E.

⁵ fr. 115. 6 ff.

In her various incarnations, the soul, if we may trust the riotous imagination of the poet, leaves no realm of nature unvisited: she drees her weird in earth and sky and sea. "Ere now," the poet says, "I too have been a boy, a girl, a bush, a bird, and a scaly fish in the sea."¹

While present in the body, the soul is therefore a fallen angel doing penance for her sins. Her ultimate aim is to be released from her chains, and recover the inheritance she has lost. How are the prison-bars to be removed? As we lost our freedom through sin, so we cannot hope to regain it until the stain is purged away. In Orphic language, the soul must be made *pure*. The notion of "purity" and "purification" is one of the commonest and most characteristic ideas in Orphic literature; and when we meet with the conception in Plato, as we often do, particularly in the *Phaedo*, there is generally reason to believe that he is building on an understructure of Orphism. I have already mentioned that the Orphic believers were designated the "pure" or "holy" ones (*καθαροί, δσιοι*). Thus in two of the Italian tablets of which I have spoken, the departed spirit addresses Persephone in these words: "Pure I come from the pure, O queen of the dwellers underground."² We have no right to assume that it was only an external and ceremonial purity to which the devouter followers of the Orphic faith aspired; for, according to the principles of their school, no final emancipation was possible without the inward cleansing of the soul from the pollution of the body. As Miss Harrison has said, "Consecration (*δσιώτης*), perfect purity issuing in divinity is the keynote of Orphic faith, the goal of Orphic ritual."³

One of the ways by which the Orphics endeavoured to make themselves "pure" was through the observance of

¹ *fr.* 117.

² Diels p. 495.

³ *l.c.* p. 478.

a particular mode of life. The "Orphic life," as Plato calls it,¹ was distinguished by several rules of abstinence, such as the rule against partaking of animal food,² except on certain sacramental festivals like the *Omophagia* or "Feast of raw flesh."³ Empedocles elevates this precept into a law of universal obligation,⁴ resembling the eternal ordinances of which we read in Sophocles; and he also brings it into connexion with the Orphic doctrine of metempsychosis. "Do ye not see that in the thoughtlessness of your hearts ye are devouring one another?"⁵ We hear of various other taboos in the Orphic religion, among them the prohibition against beans, of which all kinds of interpretations were current in antiquity. The eating of eggs seems also to have been forbidden: and we are told by Herodotus that it was unlawful for the Orphics to bury the dead in woollen garments.⁶ In general, however, it is clear that asceticism in Greece never attained to anything like the same proportions as in India, even among those of the Orphic and Pythagorean school of thought. Among the Orphics, as Rohde has pointed out, the ascetic life, if such it may be called, is largely ruled by symbolism. An artificial value is attached to certain usages and objects, which the unbeliever would pronounce to be indifferent; and from these the believer abstains, because they are held to be "impure," and consequently tend to retard the deliverance he seeks.⁷

In addition to the rules of life by obedience to which the Orphic brotherhoods sought after "purity," there was also a great variety of rites and ceremonies designed to accelerate this end. To some such ceremony of a purificatory nature allusion seems to be made in the

¹ *Laws* 782 C.

² *Pl. l.c.*; *Eur. Hipp.* 952, and elsewhere.

³ See *Miss Harrison, l.c.* p. 479 ff.

⁴ *fr.* 135.

⁵ *fr.* 136; cf. 137.

⁶ *ii.* 81. See *Rohde, Psyche* ² *ii* p. 125 f.; *Miss Harrison, l.c.* p. 509 ff.

⁷ *Rohde, l.c.*

formula occurring in more than one of the tablets already mentioned, "A kid I fell into milk."¹ In connexion with this phase of Orphism we hear of various classes of religious literature in the time of Plato—*θηποδικά* or sacrificial liturgies, absolutions, incantations, initiations, and so forth, the existence of which points to an elaborate and complicated ritual.² Rohde has called attention to an Orphic fragment which implies that souls in purgatory can be helped by ceremonies performed on earth; but it may be doubted whether this is not a later development.³

That so much ceremonial may have tended to hide from the Orphic worshippers the inner significance of their religion, is probable enough. No Greek thinker had more sympathy than Plato with the spiritual side of Orphism; but he feels nothing but indignation and contempt for the degrading superstitions and practices connected with the Orphic ritual. In the *Republic* he complains of the effect upon the minds of the young by fostering the idea that sin can be expiated and redemption attained by such purely ceremonial and external methods. "Mendicant priests and soothsayers," he observes, "visit the gates of the rich, and persuade them that they have acquired from the Gods by means of sacrifices and charms the power to heal with pleasures and festal rites whatever sin has been committed by a man himself or by his ancestors. . . . They also provide us with a heap of books, bearing the names of Musaeus and Orpheus, sons, we are assured, of the Moon and the Muses, liturgies by which they sacrifice, persuading not only private individuals, but also cities, that there are ways of absolution and purification from sin by means of sacrifices and joyous pleasures, both during life, and also after death, through what they call

¹ Discussed by Miss Harrison, *l.c.* p. 595 ff.

² *Pl. Rep.* ii. 364 E. Cf. *Phaed.* 108 A.

³ *fr.* 208 Abel (Rohde, *l.c.* p. 128). The passages which Rohde cites from Plato do not necessarily, I think, involve this belief.

the mystic rites, which deliver us from the wrath to come; but dreadful is the doom awaiting those who have not sacrificed." ¹ The professional priest or friar of whom Plato here speaks, was a familiar figure in the fourth and third centuries before Christ. Theophrastus mentions it as one of the characteristics of the superstitious man, that he is careful to pay a monthly visit to the Orpheotelestae in company with his wife, or if his wife should be otherwise engaged, in company with his little children and their nurse. ² It is difficult to believe that the ecstatic extravagances which the Orphic mysteries sometimes induced could have been otherwise than detrimental to religion and morality, although there were doubtless many to whom these mysteries brought spiritual consolation and hope. ³

So much then for the means by which purification was sought during life. On leaving the body, the soul enters on an intermediate state of rewards or punishments. In the eschatological myth of the *Republic*, the duration of this period is given as a thousand years, human life being reckoned at a hundred, and the underlying idea being that every good or evil action of our life is expiated or rewarded ten times, a calculation in which Pythagorean influence is clearly to be traced. ⁴ That the early Orphic and Pythagorean eschatologies were equally precise, it would be rash to affirm; but as we meet again with the "wheel of a thousand years" in Virgil, ⁵ whose picture of the lower world is derived in part at least from Orphic sources, it is not unlikely that we have here a relic of some early Orphic apocalypse. The investigations of Dieterich and others have shown that there was a considerable amount of apocalyptic literature in Greece before the time of Plato. We hear in particular of an

¹ ii. 364 B ff.

² *Char.* 16.

³ For a more favourable view, see Miss Harrison, *l.c.* p. 479 ff.

⁴ Plato, *Rep.* x. 615 A f.

⁵ *Aeneid* vi. 748.

early eschatological poem, the *κατάβασις εἰς Ἅϊδου*, or "Descent into Hades," in which the pseudo-Orpheus seems to have related what he saw in his pilgrimage to the unseen world.¹ In this or other writings of the same stamp, many of the features which appear in later Greek apocalypses were certainly described, such as the judgment of the dead, the rivers and lakes of the nether world, the fountains of Memory and Forgetfulness, the abodes of the blessed on the right and of the wicked on the left, together with the different rewards and punishments meted out to souls in Hades.

With regard to the happiness awaiting the just, a fragment of what is apparently an early Orphic poem declares that "they who are pious in their life beneath the rays of the sun enjoy a gentler lot when they have died, in the beautiful meadow around deep-flowing Acheron."² This refers, presumably, to the intermediate state, and not to that reunion with the divine which is the ultimate goal of Orphic aspiration; but for the most part it is difficult to say whether the Orphic descriptions of the bliss in store for virtue should be understood of the intermediate condition or of the final triumph of the soul. As usual in apocalyptic writings, the misery of the wicked appears to have been dwelt upon at greater length and with much more fertility of imagination than the happiness of the good. The feature of the Orphic purgatory most often mentioned in Greek literature is the ever-flowing sea of mud. "The unholy and unjust," says Plato, not without a touch of scorn, "they bury deep in something which they call mud."³ Without attempting to pursue the subject into detail, it must suffice to say in general terms, that so far as we can see, the object of punish-

¹ Dieterich, *Nekyia* p. 128; Abel, *fr.* 153 ff.

² *Rep.* ii. 363 D; *Phaed.* 69 C *al.*

³ *fr.* 154 Abel.

ment hereafter was to promote the end which the Orphics kept steadily in view through life—purification from the flesh.¹

With the exception of those souls who, having reached the end of their journey, are happily exempt from further incarnation, and possibly also of some incurable sinners who remain in Tartarus as warnings to the rest,² the others return again into bodies at the appointed time. Whether the early Orphic eschatologies did or did not admit a "choice of lives," such as Plato describes in the *Republic*,³ we can scarcely doubt that the mode of existence allotted to the soul at each new stage of her career on earth was determined by the degree of "purity" or holiness which she possessed at the moment of re-incarnation. From a comparison of passages in Pindar, Empedocles, and Plato,⁴ it would seem probable that the Orphics arranged the various kinds of life in a graduated series or scale, according to the measure of their "purity." Empedocles held that among the lower animals, the lion occupies the highest place, and among plants, the laurel.⁵ Another fragment describes how those who are approaching the hour of their deliverance become "prophets and singers and physicians and chieftains among men upon the earth: from whence they arise up Gods, supreme in honour, sharing the same hearth and table with the other immortals, exempt from doom and hurt."⁶ Empedocles himself combined most of these professions; and in the opening lines of his *Purifications* he claims to be "no longer a mortal, but an immortal God."⁷

When the wheel of birth and death has run its course, the soul, delivered at last, resumes the inheritance she lost through sin. "I have escaped from the lamentable

¹ Cf. *fr.* 224 Abel.

² See below, p. 135.

³ 617 D ff.

⁴ *Phaedr.* 248 D. For Pindar, see below, p. 138.

⁵ *fr.* 127.

⁶ 146, 147 (reading ἀπόκρητοι).

⁷ *fr.* 112.

and cruel circle: I have set my eager feet within the longed-for ring. I have passed to the bosom of the Mistress and Queen of the underworld."¹ Such is the language in which the triumphant soul announces her redemption in the tablets to which I have already so often referred. In reply, she is thus addressed: "O happy and blessed one, thou shalt be a God instead of a mortal": "Hail, for thy sufferings are past . . . thou art become a God from having been a man . . . hail, hail, thou that farest to the right, through the sacred meadows and groves of Persephone."² You will observe that there is nothing in these lines to suggest that the soul loses her personal existence in the sea of universal being. To the Greeks of the classical and preclassical period, with their strong attachment to individuality and individualism, the idea of absorption was never very congenial. There are many points of contact between the Orphic and the Buddhist systems, but the Orphic heaven, at least, is not Nirvana. It is rather a state of blissful consciousness in which the soul, no longer encumbered by the body, leads the life of a God in company with Gods.

We may perhaps form an idea of the notion of heaven entertained by the better class of Orphic believers, if we look at the description given in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, a dialogue which admittedly owes much to Orphic inspiration. In his *Literature and Dogma*, Matthew Arnold illustrates what he conceives to be the popular English idea of the future state by a quotation from the *Vision of Mirza*: "Persons dressed in glorious habits with garlands on their heads, passing among the trees, lying down by the fountains, or resting on beds of flowers, amid a confused harmony of singing birds, falling waters, human voices, and musical instru-

¹ Diels p. 495. 16 ff. The *στέφανος* is perhaps the imaginary ring or circle which lies around the happy

land (Dieterich, *de hymnis Orph.* p. 35).

² Diels p. 495. 19, 34 ff.

ments.”¹ The *Asiochus* holds out the promise of the same sort of peaceful and idyllic life, with a few mildly intellectual and religious pleasures superadded. We read of a happy land of everlasting spring, free from extremes of heat and cold, bathed in the sun’s soft light, with rivers of pure water, flowery meadows, and ever fruitful trees. For entertainments the inhabitants have philosophical discussions, theatres, cyclic choruses and concerts, well-ordered banquets, and the like; and the religious services which they loved on earth are renewed in heaven.² *Mutatis mutandis*, it is much the same kind of picture which we find in “Jerusalem my Happy Home”:

“O happy harbour of the Saints!³
O sweet and pleasant soil!
In thee no sorrow may be found,
No grief, no care, no toil.⁴

There lust and lucre cannot dwell,
There envy bears no sway;
There is no hunger, heat, nor cold,
But pleasure every way.⁵

Thy gardens and thy gallant walks
Continually are green,
There grows such sweet and pleasant flowers
As nowhere else are seen.⁶

Quite through the streets, with silver sound,
The flood of Life doth flow;⁷
Upon whose banks on every side
The wood of Life doth grow.”

In Plato himself, however, we have a very different story. After censuring Homer and Hesiod because they

¹ p. 223 (ed. 1900).

² *Asioch.* 371 C f.

³ Cf. the Orphic *ἑσοί, εὐαγεῖς*.

⁴ The *ἀλυκία* of *Asioch.* 371 C f.

⁵ ἀκράτος ἀλυκία καὶ ἡδέϊα διαίτα·
οὔτε γὰρ χεῖμα σφοδρὸν οὔτε θάλπος

ἐγγίγνεται, ἀλλ’ εὐκρατος ἀήρ κτλ.
l.c.

⁶ παντοῖοι δὲ λειμῶνες ἀνθεσι ποικίλοις ἐαρυσόμενοι, l.c.

⁷ πηγαὶ δὲ ὑδάτων καθαρῶν ῥέουσι,
l.c.

commend virtue not for itself but only for its rewards, he thus continues: "Still more heroic are the blessings which Musaeus and his son bestow upon the righteous from the Gods. They conduct them into Hades, and lay them on couches, and establish a kind of symposium of saints, and set garlands on their heads, and make them live for ever in a state of intoxication, esteeming the fairest reward of virtue to be an eternity of drunkenness"—*μέθη αἰώνιος*.¹ After making every allowance for the *praefervidum ingenium* of Plato, who is never half-hearted either in praise or in blame, we must still believe that the picture is drawn from life. It is of a piece with his account of the Orphic friars and their degenerate practices. The purer form of the Orphic eschatological doctrine may be inferred from the *Axiochus*.

The soul has now returned to the harbour from which she set sail. Is this, after all, the end? May not the circumstances that brought about her exile at the first recur again and yet again? The doctrine of the *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων* or "restoration of all things" is certainly Pythagorean, and in view of the close connexion between Pythagoreanism and Orphism, it may well have had a place in early, as it appears to have had in later, Orphic doctrine.² Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, observed in one of his lectures that if the Pythagoreans were to be trusted, his audience would have the privilege of hearing him again next *aeōn*. "You will be sitting there and I shall be telling you my story with this little stick in my hand, and everything else will be the same."³ We should infer from this that in course of time the soul must begin her wanderings anew, and traverse and retrace the revolving "wheel of generation" throughout eternity. The apparently hopeless and appalling fatalism of such a doctrine is not of itself a sufficient

¹ *Rep.* ii. 363 C.

² Rohde, *Psyche* ii. p. 123, n. 2.

³ Diels² i. p. 277, § 34

reason for refusing to attribute it to a religious sect. At a later period, the Stoics successfully combined the same theoretical dogma with an eminently religious conception of human life and duty; and experience has often shown that religion can grow and flourish on a soil of fatalism.¹

That some such ideas about the origin and destiny of the soul began to take root in the Hellenic world during the sixth century B.C., no longer admits of doubt; and it is equally clear that they must have tended to weaken the authority and prestige of the old Homeric faith. In all fundamental respects, indeed, the Homeric and Orphic views of life are opposed to one another. Whereas in Homer the centre of interest is this present world, with its manifold joys and sorrows, and the existence awaiting the disembodied soul is shadowy, cold, and comfortless, the follower of Orpheus fixes his eyes upon the future, and looks upon what we call death as the door by which he may escape from prison and ultimately rejoin the society of Gods. In Homer and Hesiod, life is often painted in sombre colours. "The land," says Hesiod, "is full of troubles, and so is the sea." But after all it is life, and not death; and in Homer, at least, a life of strenuous effort, rejoicing in the very difficulties it overcomes. Among the Orphics, the Homeric melancholy, so far as this life is concerned, assumes a deeper hue; for life in the body is no longer life, but death: the true life lies before and after.

For the first time in Greece, again, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is made use of as a moral motive. Our destiny in the intermediate state depends upon our character and conduct now: sin is punished and righteousness rewarded: and in the successive

¹ The Greek doctrine of the "restoration of all things" is connected with the astronomical theory of a Great Year, on which see MS. *Republic of Plato* vol. ii. p. 302 ff.

incarnations which have to be undergone before the circle is fulfilled, we apparently rise and fall in the scale of existences according to the degree of purity we have attained. The aim of the believer is therefore to cleanse his soul not only by rites and ceremonies, but still more by "fasting from sin" (*νηστεύσαι κακότητος*).¹ If he should become exceptionally pure from the defilement of the body, he has, it would seem, some ground to hope that the circle of generation will be abbreviated in his case. In general, as we saw, the cycle was supposed to occupy, perhaps, ten thousand years, in which, according at least to the Platonic view, ten separate lives were included, each of them followed by its appropriate period of reward or punishment.² But in the myth of the *Phaedrus*, those who thrice in succession have chosen the life of "true philosophy," return to the place from which they came in three thousand years:³ and with Pindar also, to have abstained from sin "three times on either side of death" is a passport to the islands of the blest.⁴ The agreement of these two writers on such a point would seem to indicate an early Orphic belief that exceptional piety was rewarded in this way. Herodotus also seems to imply that a cycle of three thousand years had a place in Orphism.⁵

The Orphic conception of sin is not less different from that of the Homeric poems. In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, sin, as I have already pointed out, is always objectively regarded, being identified with the spirit of insolence or pride that seeks to transgress the golden law of moderation and encroach upon the rights of others, be it our fellow-creatures or the Gods. It is an error of the

¹ Emp. fr. 144. Cf. the second of the Logia discovered in 1897, "except ye fast from the world" etc. (*ἐὰν μὴ νηστεύσητε τὸν κόσμον*).

² *Phaedr.* 248 E, compared with *Rep.* x. 615 A.

³ *Phaedr.* 249 A.

⁴ See below, p. 135.

⁵ ii. 123; cf. 81.

intellect rather than of the will; for it springs from intellectual blindness or infatuation; and the ultimate responsibility is usually laid at the door of the Gods. In the Orphic religion, on the other hand, the subjective aspect of sin becomes more prominent. It is on account of defilement contracted in our prenatal state that we are exiled from the society of Heaven; and the soul, while present in the body, is fully conscious of this fact. There is no attempt to shift the responsibility elsewhere; the guilt is our own, and we alone must expiate it. "I have paid the penalty for deeds unjust,"—so speaks the soul, when she has finished her pilgrimage,—“and now I am come as a suppliant unto noble Persephone, beseeching her to be gracious, and to send me into the abodes of the pious.”¹

But the Orphic doctrine that had the greatest influence on Greek thought is that of the celestial origin and nature of the soul. It was adopted, as we shall see, by Pindar, and in one form or another it runs through nearly the whole of Greek philosophy from this time onwards. The belief in man's affinity to God was by no means alien to the religious consciousness of Homer and Hesiod. Not only is Zeus the father of Gods and men, but it is implied in the very nature of anthropomorphic theology that since God resembles man, man in his turn resembles God. Anthropomorphism, in a word, involves theomorphism. But the Orphic interpretation of man's relationship to God gives an entirely new significance to the idea because of the emphasis it lays upon the soul. It is the soul alone which is divine; as for the body, that is only the dungeon, in which the true self is imprisoned. The nerveless, shadowy phantom which Homer called the soul is beginning to disappear, and in its place we have a divine ethereal essence, by the side of which the perishable body is of comparatively slight

¹ Diels p. 495. 25 ff.

account. The Orphic doctrine of the divinity of the soul not only introduces a new and more spiritual conception both of God and man; it also provides a basis for the belief in immortality, as we shall afterwards see.¹

Nor is the ethical significance of the dogma less noteworthy. Greek poetry is always repeating the exhortation: "remember that thou art a mortal," "cherish only mortal aspirations." According to the Orphic religion, on the other hand, the soul is herself, though fallen, still a God; and the whole aim and object of the Orphic discipline was to rid the soul of those impurities and incrustations that besmirch and hide her essential nature. "Beware," says Pindar, "seek not to become a God." "Already thou art a God," is the Orphic precept; "seek to be reunited with the Gods."² The full significance of the contrast between these two ideals of life and duty was apprehended by Plato, when he said, that "envy has no place in the celestial quire." The famous words of Aristotle, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, "put on the immortal, as far as in thee lies," express it for all time.³

The Orphic religion undoubtedly contained much that was superstitious and degrading. Even the doctrine of man's celestial origin was encumbered with a mass of mythology always fantastic and sometimes grotesque. The wicked Titans—so the story ran—fell upon Dionysus Zagreus, son of Zeus and Persephone, tore him in pieces and devoured him; whereupon Zeus destroyed them with his thunderbolt, and from their ashes sprang the human race.⁴ It is for this reason that our nature is a blend of the divine and brutal; we derive the lower ingredients from the Titans, the higher from the God whom they devoured. The sacraments and other religious ceremonies,

¹ p. 131.

² Cf. Miss Harrison, *l.c.* p. 477 f.

³ Pl. *Phaedr.* 247 A; Arist. *EtA. Nic.* x. 7. 1177^b 33.

⁴ Rohde, *l.c.* p. 119.

again, by means of which the Orphics sought to unify themselves with the divine, such as the Omophagia,¹ were sometimes brutalising in the last degree. Nor is it by any means clear that the Orphics always escaped the moral dangers which accompany religious ecstasy. Yet in spite of these defects, it is not easy to over-estimate the significance of the central doctrine of their faith—I mean the doctrine that the human soul is originally and essentially divine, together with its practical corollary, that we must strive even now to realise our affinity with God. Before this great idea could attain to full development, it had still to be freed from the entanglement of ritual and mythology, and elevated from the emotional to the intellectual plane. In one word, it had to be intellectualised. The intellectualisation of this belief, as we shall afterwards see, was effected by Plato.

¹ See Miss Harrison, *l.c.* p. 479 ff.

LECTURE VI

PINDAR

RESUMING our consideration of the poets, we have now to deal with Pindar. (With the exception, perhaps, of Sophocles, it may be doubted whether there is any other Greek poet, the spirit of whose writings is more essentially religious.) In part, no doubt, this distinctive peculiarity of Pindar's odes is due to the occasion which they celebrate. The great Panhellenic games of Olympia and Delphi were in their origin and nature festivals in honour of Zeus and Apollo; and a poem composed to celebrate a victory at the games was necessarily in some sense a hymn of praise to the God who presided over the festival. But the religious sentiments of Pindar are not the merely conventional utterances of a professional writer of epinikian odes. They come straight from the heart; and there is a distinctively personal note about many of them which is absent from the odes of Bacchylides. That his birth coincided with a celebration of the Pythian games¹ seemed to the poet a happy omen of the intimate relationship which was to subsist between him and the God whose chosen minister and prophet he always considered himself to be. The Delphic tradition continued to associate Pindar and Apollo, as may be inferred from more than one legend. Pausanias relates that Pindar used to visit Delphi and sing hymns to Apollo in an iron chair specially reserved for his use; and in the life of Pindar we read that Apollo

¹ *fr.* 193 Bergk.

so loved the poet that he allowed him to participate in the offerings made to himself, the officiating priest on the day of the sacrifice calling out in a loud voice, "Come, Pindar, and join the banquet of the God."¹

The keynote of Pindar's religious doctrine is struck in the opening verses of the sixth *Nemean* ode. "One is the race of men and Gods, and from one mother we both derive the breath of life; but in power we are altogether diverse; for the race of man is nought, whereas the brazen heaven abides, a dwelling-place unshaken for ever. Howbeit we bear some likeness to the immortals, in lofty mind, perchance, or in bodily nature, although we know not what course our master Fate hath mapped out for us to run, either by day or in the watches of the night."² We shall have to touch upon this passage again in dealing with the Pindaric doctrine of the celestial origin and nature of the soul; but at present it concerns us only to observe that Pindar still in the main adheres to the anthropomorphic conception of the Gods, which is everywhere characteristic of the national Greek religion. The Gods are immortal, and stronger than men; but, like us, they are children of Earth, the universal mother, and resemble us in body and in mind. The myths incorporated in the Pindaric odes freely represent the Gods as subject to those desires and necessities which are inseparable from bodily existence. They partake of food and drink, take pleasure in dance and song, and are by no means exempt even from the lower passions incident to human nature.

At the same time, Pindar is far from acquiescing in all the grosser features of the traditional anthropomorphism. Sometimes he pointedly ignores whatever portion of a myth he deems unworthy, true to his principle "that which is displeasing to Zeus, I am fain to bury in oblivion."³ At other times he openly protests against

¹ Paus. x. 24. 5; *vit. Pind.* p. xv Christ. ² *Nem.* 6. 1-7. ³ *fr.* 81.

certain legends, on the ground that they are irreligious and profane. The current form of the myth of Tantalus made the hero slay his son Pelops and serve his flesh at a banquet given to the immortals. From this part of the story Pindar emphatically dissents. "It is meet for a man to speak honourable things about the Gods: for the reproach is less. And of thee, O son of Tantalus, I will speak otherwise than those that have gone before. . . . I dare not call any of the blessed Gods a cannibal."¹ The Pindaric correction of the myth need not detain us, the less so that from the modern point of view it is scarcely an improvement; all we need note is that when a legend appears to Pindar to reflect discredit on the Gods, he alters it into something more in harmony with his own religious feelings. Another illustration is provided by a famous passage in the ninth *Olympian*, where Pindar refuses to accept the Homeric and Hesiodic legends about the Gods. "O my tongue, fling this tale from thee: it is a hateful cleverness that slanders Gods, and untimely boasting chimes in unison with madness. Away with such foolish words! Keep far from the immortals war and battle" (*ἔα πόλεμον μάχην τε πᾶσαν χωρὶς ἀθανάτων*).²

In such ways as these does Pindar seek to purify the traditional theology of Greece. On its positive side, his teaching brings into prominence the nobler and more ideal features of the Homeric pantheon. The Gods "know not disease nor age nor toil: they have escaped the loud-roaring gulf of Acheron."³ They are "the blessed ones who live in Olympus"⁴—the symbols of eternity and calm in a transient and troubled world. In respect of power, they are omnipotent; and Nature knows no parallel to the speed with which they accomplish their design. "The power of the Gods," says the poet, "lightly brings to pass that which exceeds

¹ *Ol.* i. 35 ff.² 35 ff.³ *fr.* 148.⁴ *fr.* 87.

oath and expectation."¹ "I judge no marvel incredible that is wrought by Gods."² "It is in the power of God out of black night to call forth the stainless light of day, and to shroud the day's pure gleam in cloudy darkness."³ "Swift is the achievement, and short the ways of Gods when they are eager to achieve their end."⁴ Perhaps the most famous of the poet's sentiments about the Godhead is in the second *Pythian*: "God accomplishes every end according to his expectation; God, who overtaketh even the winged eagle and outstrippeth the dolphin of the sea, and bringeth many a proud man low, vouchsafing to others renown that grows not old."⁵

Pindar never wearies of reminding his readers that the Gods are the authors of whatsoever good or evil happens to mankind. "Zeus giveth this and that; Zeus the lord of all."⁶ "It is God," the poet says, "who accomplishes all things for mortal men."⁷

"God's is the only armoury
Doth man's weak will with power for good supply.
Wisdom from His completeness,
And strength of arm and fleetness
He gives, and speech's sweetness."⁸

A Pindaric fragment preserved by Clement identifies God with "the all": *τὸ θεός; ὁ τὸ πᾶν*.⁹ If the words are genuine, it is hardly likely that they were intended to suggest the kind of poetical pantheism which they would have expressed in the mouth of Euripides. To Pindar they probably meant no more than that God is the universal cause.¹⁰

The philosophical question of the relationship between Fate and the Deity does not perplex the poet. The "law"

¹ *Ol.* 13. 88.

² *Pyth.* 10. 49.

³ *fr.* 142.

⁴ *Pyth.* 9. 67.

⁵ 49 ff.

⁶ *Isthm.* 5. 52 f. *τὰ τε καὶ τὰ* = "good and evil."

⁷ *fr.* 141.

⁸ *Pyth.* 1. 41 f., tr. W. R. Paton; cf. *fr.* 108.

⁹ *fr.* 140.

¹⁰ They may, however, be inspired by Orphic pantheism; see above, p. 96.

of which he says in one of the fragments that it is "king of all, mortals and immortals alike,"¹ has been by some interpreted as a Power to which the Gods themselves must yield; but it is only a certain rule of conduct universally observed—so Pindar here suggests—by Gods and men. Pindar often insists on the inevitability of Fate, so far as human creatures are concerned. "The decrees of destiny (τὸ μόρσιμον) none can escape": "destiny (μοῖρα) leads the race of mortal men": "as for me, whatsoever excellence our master Fate (πότημος) hath given, well I know that the march of time will bring it to fulfilment."² But Pindar seldom, I think, implies that Fate can override the will of Zeus;³ and there are passages in which the will of Zeus is itself conceived as Fate. We read of "the fated decree of Zeus," the "fate ordained of God,"⁴ and so on. It is also in keeping with the religious interpretation of Destiny when the poet prays to Clotho, Lachesis, and Fortune (Τύχη) as unto benignant and not unyielding Goddesses. "I call upon high-throned Clotho and her sister Fates to hearken unto the instant prayers of my friend."⁵ Or again: "I beseech thee, daughter of Zeus the deliverer, keep watch over Himera's broad domain, O saviour Fortune: for by thee swift ships are piloted upon the sea, and upon land thou art the guide of impetuous wars and meetings of councillors."⁶ A German scholar has justly remarked on the difference between this conception of the Goddess Fortune and that which prevailed in later times, when she was represented as a wholly arbitrary and irresponsible power, dispensing her gifts blindfold.⁷ The θεΐη τύχη or "divine chance" of which Herodotus

¹ fr. 169. See Plato, *Gorg.* 484 B.

² *Pyth.* 12. 30; *Nem.* 11. 42, 4. 41 ff.

³ One such instance in *Isthm.* 8. 83 ff.; cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 886 ff.

⁴ τὸ μόρσιμον Διόθεν πεπωμένον,

Nem. 4. 61; θεοῦ μοῖρα, *Ol.* 2. 21; cf. *Pyth.* 5. 76; *Ol.* 9. 26, 28.

⁵ *Isthm.* 6. 16 ff.

⁶ *Ol.* 12. 1 ff.

⁷ Buchholz, *Sittliche Weltanschauung d. Pind. und Aesch.* p. 15.

sometimes speaks, is a parallel conception to that of Pindar.¹

We may take it, then, that according to Pindar the supreme control of the universe and man belongs not to a blind or implacable fate, but to certain personal beings whom he calls by the name of Gods. Let us now inquire what attributes, other than that of power, of which we have already spoken, he ascribes to these beings. In the first place, they are omniscient as well as omnipotent. On this point Pindar is especially emphatic. "If a man thinks to elude the eye of God when he doeth aught, he is mistaken."² The "all-knowing mind" of Apollo, we read in another place, "neither God nor mortal can deceive in act or in design."³ Apollo is addressed in these words: "Thou that knowest the appointed end of all things, and all the paths thereto: all the leaves that earth puts forth in spring, and the number of grains of sand whirled to and fro by waves and roaring winds: and discernest well the future and whence it shall be."⁴ Although Homer also attributes omniscience to the Gods, some of the episodes in the *Iliad* are wholly inconsistent with such a view.⁵ In this respect, as in many others, the theology of Pindar marks a distinct advance.

Secondly, the Gods are just, and manifest their justice by rewarding virtue and punishing vice, both here and hereafter. I will touch on this subject presently; but in the meantime it may be noted that the justice of God, when shown in the recompense of virtue, sometimes appears as a kind of Providence watching over the righteous. According to Pindar, the just are the objects of God's especial care:⁶ "surely the great mind of Zeus pilots (*κυβερνᾷ*) the destiny of those whom he loves."⁷ The

¹ e.g. i. 126. See Stein on i. 62.

² *Ol.* 1. 64.

³ *Pyth.* 8. 29 f.

⁴ *ib.* 9. 44 ff.

⁵ See above, p. 33.

⁶ *μάλα μὲν ἀνδρῶν δικαίων περικα-
δόμενοι, Nem.* 10. 54.

⁷ *Pyth.* 6. 122 f.

same metaphor is elsewhere employed by the poet to express the guidance of communities or states by God. "It is an easy thing even for the weak to shake a city; but to stablish it in its place again, is difficult indeed, unless God suddenly take the helm (*κυβερνατήρ γένηται*) and aid the rulers."¹ We shall afterwards find that Heraclitus had already described the operation of the divine intelligence by means of this figure: "There is but one wisdom," he says, "to know the intelligence by which all things are piloted (*κυβερνάται*) through all."² In both cases the idea in the mind of the writers is akin to what we call Providence; but whereas Heraclitus conceives of Providence as a philosophical principle, embracing in its jurisdiction the realm of nature as well as of mankind, to the poet it is a narrower, more personal, and for that very reason, perhaps, more religious conception, to be compared with the view of the Platonic Socrates, that "for the good man there is no evil either in life or after death; nor are his interests neglected by the gods" (*οὐδὲ ἀμελείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα*).³

Pindar lays stress, in the third place, upon the truthfulness of the Godhead. Truth is the daughter of Zeus: *θυγάτηρ Ἀλάθεια Διός*.⁴ "Faithful is the race of the Gods."⁵ Of Apollo, in particular, we read that "he has no part in lies."⁶ It was the more natural for Pindar to ascribe this quality to the Gods, since there is none which he more highly values in men. One of the fragments makes Truth the foundation of virtue: *ἀρχὰ μεγάλης ἀρετᾶς, ἄνασσ' Ἀλάθεια*:⁷ and the duty of truthfulness is enjoined by Pindar in public as well as in private life. "In every commonwealth he that is straight of speech is best; in a despotism, or when the impetuous multitude hold sway, or when wise men

¹ *Pyth.* 4. 272 ff.

² *fr.* 19 Bywater.

³ *Ap.* 41 D.

⁴ *Ol.* 10. 3 f.

⁵ *Nem.* 10. 54.

⁶ *ψευδέων δ' οὐχ ἀπτεται, Pyth.* 3. 29.

⁷ 205.

guard a city.”¹ In refusing to believe that God is capable of deception, Pindar parts company with Homer, and approximates to the theology of Plato.

↳ The divine nature is consequently possessed of the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, justice, and truth. It is the Gods who are the arbiters of human destiny, exercising a providential care over the lives and fortunes of the righteous, and punishing the wicked for their sins. Are there any suggestions of monotheism in Pindar? It is urged by some that his frequent use of the singular *θεός*, *δαίμων*, and so on, when speaking of the supernatural, though it does not imply a belief in one God, is at all events a step in the direction of monotheism. We may admit that such an idiom involuntarily recognises the existence of certain common attributes by which the divine is always distinguished from the human; but it in no way implies that the Godhead is numerically one, in the sense in which Xenophanes, for example, seems to have asserted the unity of God; and Pindar’s polytheism is not less candid and sincere than that of Homer. “Nearly every ode,” as Gildersleeve remarks,² “is full of gods.” Pindar, of course, knows nothing of the philosophical tendency to construe the inferior Gods as particular names or aspects of the one supreme Being. At the same time, that which Plato regarded as a necessary consequence of polytheism, the diversity of interests and the clash of contending wills among the different Gods,³ is scarcely to be found in Pindar. I have already pointed out that he definitely rejects the traditional legends of theomachies as derogatory to the divine dignity. He clearly holds that there is but one divine purpose shaping the course of events, the purpose of Zeus. “With thee, O Father Zeus, is the fulfilment of all deeds”: *πάν δὲ τέλος ἐν τῷ*

¹ *Pyth.* 2. 86 ff.² p. xxix.³ *Euthyphro* 7 A ff.

ἔργων.¹ It is accordingly to the "deep-mouthed lord of lightnings and of thunders" that we are bidden to pay highest honour:² and Pindar's aspiration is to find favour in his sight—εἶη Ζεῦ, τὴν εἶη ἀνδάνειν.³

What is the attitude of Pindar towards the doctrine of the envy of the Gods? Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to explain a little more precisely the traditional form of that doctrine, as we find it, above all other writers, in Herodotus. The *locus classicus* upon the subject is the speech which the historian puts into the mouth of Artabanus, when seeking to dissuade his nephew Xerxes from invading Greece. "Thou seest how the God smites with his thunderbolts the tallest animals, and does not allow them to exalt themselves, whereas the smaller animals in no way stir his wrath: thou seest how he ever hurls his shafts at the highest buildings and trees, (for the God is wont to cut down whatever exceeds in point of greatness) (φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν). Thus a mighty host may be destroyed by a small one, when the God, becoming envious, smites them with panic or with lightning, so that they perish in a manner unworthily of themselves: (for the God will not suffer any but himself to think high thoughts.)"⁴ The idea of Herodotus is not that excessive prosperity engenders sin, and sin provokes the Gods to anger: it is simply that (God is jealous, as though his own position were endangered.) Exactly the same conception underlies the story of Polycrates. In the warning letter addressed to him by Amasis occur these words: "Your great successes do not please me, knowing as I do that the divine nature is jealous. I would prefer that I myself and those I care for should be successful in some things and unsuccessful in others, ex-

¹ *Nem.* 10. 29 f.

² *Pyth.* 6. 23, ff.

³ *ib.* 1. 29.

⁴ vii. 10.

perienicing through life alternate good and evil fortune, rather than that they should invariably succeed. For I have never yet heard of any one who was successful in everything, without perishing miserably, root and branch, at the last. Therefore hearken to me, and in view of the successes you have gained, act thus. Consider on what object you set the highest value, what it will grieve you most to lose, and take and throw it away, so that it shall never return among men."¹ In the sequel, of course, the remedy failed; but it is clear from the nature of the remedy proposed that Amasis attributes no moral obliquity to his friend. He instinctively feels that so much prosperity exceeds the proper limit or measure prescribed by the Gods for human kind: it is a violation of the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*: and the way to correct the error is for Polycrates to bring himself again within the limits by a voluntary sacrifice of what he holds most dear.²

Such would seem to be the doctrine of the *φθόνος θεῶν* as it was popularly believed among the Greeks. We shall find that Aeschylus sometimes gives an ethical meaning to the superstition, by representing the "envy" of the Gods as their just resentment at the violation of the moral law by man; and the question which suggests itself is whether the Pindaric form of the doctrine is more allied to the ordinary view or to that of Aeschylus. The passages in which Pindar expressly touches on this subject are three in number.³ In the thirteenth *Olympian*, after praising the city of Corinth, he appeals to the "sovereign lord of Olympia" not to let his "envy" be awakened by such laudatory words—*ἵπατ' εὐρυναύσσων' Ὀλυμπίας, ἀφθόνητος ἔπεσσω' γένοιο χρόνον ἅπαντα, Ζεῦ πάτερ.*⁴

¹ iii. 40.² See also Hdt. i. 31, 32; vii. 46 *ad fin.*³ Cf. also *Oi.* 1. 60–64.⁴ 24 ff.

To much the same effect he prays in the tenth *Pythian* that the family of the Aleuadae may continue to prosper without incurring the divine displeasure. "Of the joyous things of Hellas they have received no scanty portion: I pray that they meet with no reverses from the envious Gods."¹ And finally, in a remarkable passage of the seventh *Isthmian*, the poet thus writes of himself: "I will set flowers upon my hair and sing; but let not the envy of the immortals bring on me confusion—ὁ δ' ἀθανάτων μὴ θρασυέτω φθόνος. Whatsoever joy is offered day by day, serenely I will follow and o'ertake, till old age come, and the appointed term of life. For we all alike die, although our lot in life is different (*δαίμων δ' αἴσιος*); howbeit, if any lift a covetous eye to that which is afar, yet is he too weak to attain unto the bronze-paved seat of Gods. Thus winged Pegasus threw his lord Bellerophon, when he was fain to come to the habitations of heaven and join the company of Zeus. Bitter is the end that awaits unrighteous joy."² In the first of these three passages there is nothing that goes beyond the ordinary version of the envy of the Gods as we find it in Herodotus; and the same is true of the second, unless, which is perhaps the case, the prayer of the poet conveys a covert warning to the Aleuadae against insolence and pride. But with the third passage it is otherwise. The sequence of ideas in the poet's mind is plainly this: let me escape the "envy of the Gods" by avoiding presumptuous sin, for *unrighteous* joys are doomed to end in sorrow. In just this way Aeschylus for his part tries to reinterpret the belief.

Pindar's conception of sin is in general agreement with the views we have already met with in Greek poetry. Sin is egoism, self-seeking, *πλεονεξία* — the

¹ 19 ff.² 39 ff.

overstepping of the limits appointed for the individual in his relations both to his fellow-men and to the Gods. The duty of self-repression and the dangers of arrogance and pride are themes upon which the poet continually dilates. In nearly all his eulogies there is heard a note of warning. "Seek not to become Zeus; if these high honours fall to thee, thou hast already all. Mortal things befit a mortal"—*θνατὰ θνατοῖσιν πρέπει*.¹ Remember that thou art mortal; seek not to be as God—this is the perpetual refrain of Pindar's exhortations.² "But if any one shall possess wealth, and excel others in beauty, and have won distinction by display of strength in games, let him not forget that his raiment is on mortal limbs, and that the earth shall be his garment at the last."³ And so on through a great variety of formulae, sometimes of a half-oracular or prophetic kind, such as the oft-repeated warning not to sail beyond the pillars of Heracles. "By their manly prowess they have touched the pillars of Heracles, at the limits of the world. Beyond that I bid them seek for no further excellence."⁴ Pindar is thoroughly Greek in his advocacy of the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. He praises Lampon as one who "with his mind pursues the mean, and cleaves thereto in act"—*μέτρα μὲν γνώμα διώκων, μέτρα δὲ καὶ κατέχων*.⁵

The question as to the ultimate responsibility for sin is not directly raised by Pindar; but he generally seems to lay the blame upon the transgressor himself, and not upon Zeus or Fate. Thus in his account of Ixion it is said that "when he gat a pleasant life in the house of Cronus' gracious children, he could not endure his great prosperity (*δλβος*) . . . but Pride (*ὑβρις*) drove him into exceeding folly (blindness, infatuation, *ἄτη*); howbeit soon he suffered his deserts, finding a misery

¹ *Isthm.* 5. 14 ff.

² *Ol.* 5. 24; *Pyth.* 3. 61 f. *al.*

³ *Nem.* 11. 13 ff.

⁴ *Isthm.* 4. 11 ff.; cf. *Ol.* 3. 43 f.; *Nem.* 3. 20 f.

⁵ *Isthm.* 6. 71.

unique."¹ Here there is nothing to suggest that the *fons et origo mali* is a malignant power from outside, although a deeper analysis might perhaps make Zeus responsible for the prosperity whence sin is born. In Pindar, *δλβος* is the mother of *ὑβρις*, *ὑβρις* of *κόρος*,² and *κόρος* of destruction; but he clearly implies that we have it in our power to resist the temptations of wealth and affluence. "If any man to whom Fortune has given glorious prizes or might of wealth represses in his heart dire insolence (*αἰανῆ κόρον*), worthy is he to receive the praises of his fellow-citizens."³ Occasionally, however, we find a suggestion of the popular belief that man is beguiled into sin by a supernatural power or *daemon*.⁴ According to Buchholz,⁵ Pindar may have conceived of the whole matter in some such way as this. Man is a free moral agent, with the power of building up his own character. Of his own free will he commits an act of *ὑβρις*, and in so doing exposes himself to the divine vengeance. After the initial transgression, the Gods intervene and smite the offender with blindness or infatuation (*ἄτη*), in consequence of which he plunges more and more deeply into sin, until at last he is destroyed. This, as we shall afterwards see, is the theory of Aeschylus; but the evidence is hardly enough to justify the conclusion that Pindar entertained so definite and precise a view.

I have already said that the justice or righteousness of the Gods is manifested, according to Pindar, both in the punishment of evil-doers and in the rewards bestowed upon the virtuous. On the subject of punishment for sin, Pindar's views are in harmony with the teaching

¹ *Pyth.* 2. 25 ff. It is possible, however, that *ἀάρα* here means no more than calamity, as elsewhere in Pindar, e.g. *Nem.* 9. 21; *Ol.* 1. 56; *fr.* 42.

² *Ol.* 13. 10. So also in an oracle

quoted by Hdt. 8. 77 (Buchholz, *l.c.* p. 93). Contrast the doctrine of Greek elegy (*supra*, p. 88).

³ *Isthm.* 3. 1 ff.

⁴ *Pyth.* 3. 34 f.; cf. *Ol.* 7. 30 f., 45 ff.

⁵ *l.c.* p. 92.

of Greek elegy, except that he speaks of punishment hereafter as well as here. That the innocent sometimes suffer with the guilty in this world, he recognises as a truth attested by experience, without touching on the problem as to how our belief in the divine justice can be reconciled with such a dispensation. Coronis had sinned against Apollo, and the God sent his sister "in the fury of invincible wrath" to take vengeance. "*Many of the neighbours shared her doom, and were destroyed together with her, as a fire that from one seed has leapt upon a mountain lays waste an ample tract of wood.*"¹ You will remember that Theognis in a somewhat similar case impugns the moral government of the universe, on the ground that the sins of the fathers cannot justly be visited upon their innocent children; but to Pindar such protests would have seemed to savour of impiety. In general, I think, the poet contemplates with more satisfaction the rewards of virtue than the punishments of vice: we are told that God hearkens to the prayers of the pious,² and that lasting prosperity is theirs who reverence Zeus.³

The religious standpoint of a writer may be supposed to be reflected not only in his sentiments about God and the dealings of God with man, but also in his general outlook upon life. If we consider the poems of Pindar from this point of view, we are struck by the prominence given to the sad and sombre aspects of man's lot. The uncertainty of the future, the fickleness of Fortune, and the inevitability of death—these are the familiar notes of what is called Greek melancholy; and Pindar is always sounding them in our ears. We know not, says the poet, whether we shall bring a single day peacefully to its close with uncorroded bliss: "this way and that run currents bringing joy or sorrow unto men."⁴ "Around the minds

¹ *Pyth.* 3. 32 ff.

² *Ol.* 8. 8.

³ *Isthm.* 3. 5 f.

⁴ *Ol.* 2. 32 ff.

of men hang follies innumerable; and it is impossible to discover what is best for a man to win both now and at the last."¹ "The hopes of men are tossed up and down upon the waves of vain deceit; and never hath any one of men upon the earth received from God a sure token of that which shall be hereafter: but the revelations of the future are blind"—*τῶν δὲ μελλόντων τετύφλωνται φραδαί.*² And there is much besides to the same effect, reflections on the frailty of man, the contrast between aspiration and attainment, the brevity of life, and so on. Even the old Homeric formula—"two evils to one good"—finds a place in Pindar. "Thou knowest," he says, addressing his patron Hiero,—“thou knowest, taught by men of old, that for one blessing the immortals divide to mortal men two sorrows.”³ The whole matter is summed up in the famous and often-quoted words, "Man's happiness grows up quickly, and quickly falls to the ground, shaken by a doom adverse. Creatures of a day! what is man, what not? Man is the phantom of a shade—*σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἀνθρώπος.*"⁴ "We are but of yesterday, and know nothing, because our days upon earth are a shadow."⁵

If we should confine our attention to these and similar passages, we might be led to suppose that the tone of Pindar is predominantly melancholy, or even pessimistic. But in reality the opposite is the case. No Greek poet is more keenly alive to the joyous things in life: the praises of youth and manly prowess, of wealth, good fortune, and fame, of all that is sublime and beautiful in nature and in art, are continually on his lips. And even where his reflections are pitched in a minor key, the poet often strikes a happier note before the end.

¹ *Ol.* 7. 24 ff.

² *Ol.* 12. 5 ff.; cf. *fr.* 61, "It is impossible with mortal mind to discover the purposes of the Gods."

³ *Pyth.* 3. 80 ff.

⁴ *Pyth.* 8. 92 ff.

⁵ *Job* viii. 9.

Man is but the phantom of a shade; "howbeit," Pindar adds, "when a glory cometh from the Gods, we are crowned with the bright halo of a life serene."¹ Above all, the Pindaric odes of victory are full of the joy which is born of difficulties faced and overcome. "If toil there was, so much the greater is the joy that follows after: *εἰ πόνος ἦν, τὸ τεργνὸν πλέον πεδέρχεται.*"² As in Homer, the certainty of death becomes itself an inspiration. "Forasmuch as we must die, why should one sit idly in the dark, nursing an old age unknown to fame, without part or lot in noble deeds?"³ The man who has done great deeds forgets death.⁴

There is, indeed, nothing more characteristic of Pindar, despite the warnings against presumption which are so frequent in his poetry, than the conviction that we are impelled by the very constitution of our nature to wrestle and strive towards perfection. "From Zeus there is vouchsafed no sure sign to mortals; but none the less we embark on deeds of high emprise, and meditate many achievements: for our bodies are enthralled by insatiable hope, although the tides of life are hidden from our foreknowledge."⁵ It is tempting to connect this distinctive feature of Pindar's poetry with his belief in the divine origin and affinity of man. "One is the race of men and Gods, and from one mother we both derive the breath of life." If human nature is essentially divine, we shall best attain the end and purpose of our existence by striving to realise the heritage which is ours by birth. There is, however, no authority for attributing such a train of thought to Pindar. The descent of the soul from God, as we have seen, was a cardinal point of the Orphic creed; and Pindar, in all probability, derived the doctrine from that source. But whereas among the

¹ *Pyth.* 8. 96 ff. *Cl. Ol.* 2. 19 ff.

² *Nem.* 7. 74.

³ *Ol.* 1. 82 ff.; cf. p. 64 *supra*.

⁴ *Ol.* 8. 72.

⁵ *Nem.* 11. 48 ff.

Orphics the ultimate goal is reunion with the divine, Pindar's oft-repeated warning is, "Seek not to be as Zeus," "Seek not to become a God." If he borrows the Orphic belief about man's celestial origin, he stops short of the conclusions to which it led. *θνατὰ θνατοῖσιν πρέπει*: "mortal thou art; cherish only mortal aspirations." "Desire not thou immortal life, my soul."¹ His counsel is that we should let our thoughts aspire, but only within the limits prescribed by the ordinances of Heaven; and in this respect he is true to the fundamental principles of ordinary Greek ethics.

I pass now to an examination of what is by far the most remarkable and distinctive portion of Pindar's religious doctrine. His conception of immortality is altogether different from that of earlier Greek poets. Let us first inquire what grounds he alleges for the belief in a future existence. We are here concerned with a fragment of exceptional interest, which may be thus translated:

"The bodies of all men Death the all-conquering follow and die :
But alive there remaineth Life's image : *for that is alone from
on high.*

When the limbs are astir, it is sleeping; but in many a
dream of the night

It reveals to the sleeper a judgment, bringing visions of pain
and delight."²

A curious and characteristic fusion of Homeric and Orphic ideas is observable in these lines. By "Life's image," the image of the living man, Pindar means the soul; and thus far he is in agreement with Homer. But the rest of the passage is totally un-Homeric. We are told that the soul is asleep when the body is awake; and conversely, when the body is asleep, the soul awakes, and, by reason of her affinity with the divine, foresees the judgment that shall be hereafter.

¹ *Pyth.* 8. 61.

² *fr.* 131.

To the same effect Aristotle, in one of his fragments, asserts that "when the soul is alone and by herself in sleep, she recovers her proper nature," that is, of course, her heavenly nature, "and divines and prophesies the future."¹ It is obvious that the body is here regarded as to a certain extent the sepulchre of the soul, from which Sleep, Death's twin brother, brings a kind of semi-resurrection: so that we are clearly on Orphic ground. But what concerns us more particularly now is to observe that the soul is said to be immortal because of her divine origin (*τὸ γὰρ ἔστι μόνον ἐκ θεῶν*). In Pindar, therefore, as sometimes in Plato, immortality rests on the Orphic conception of man's relationship with God.²

What, then, is the kind of immortality foretold by Pindar? I will take as my text the famous picture in the second *Olympian* of the destinies reserved for the good and for the evil in the world to come. "The guilty souls of the dead," says Pindar, "straightway pay the penalty here on earth; and the sins committed in this kingdom of Zeus are judged by One beneath the ground, hateful Necessity enforcing the doom he speaks. But ever through nights and ever through days the same, the good receive an unlaborious life beneath the sunshine. They vex not with might of hand the earth or the waters of the sea for food that satisfieth not, but among the honoured Gods, such as had pleasure in keeping of oaths enjoy a tearless life; but the others have pain too fearful to behold.) Howbeit they who thrice on either side of death have stood fast and wholly refrained their souls from deeds unjust,) journey on the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronus, where the ocean-breezes blow around the island of the blest, and flowers gleam bright with gold, some on trees of glory on

¹ *fr.* 12. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* ix. 571 D ff.

² I have discussed and illustrated

the Pindaric fragment at greater length in *Cambridge Praellections*, 1906, pp. 29-67.


the land, while others the water feeds; with wreaths whereof they entwine their arms and crown their heads." ¹

From whatever source or sources Pindar draws the materials for this picture, there is no mistaking the fact that it is altogether unlike the ordinary Greek conception of the other world. If we endeavour to reconstruct the kind of eschatological background of the poet's description, we may say perhaps that there are three leading ideas in his mind. The first is metempsychosis, or rather, let us say, rebirth (*παλιγγενεσία*); the second, retribution and reward; and the third would seem to be the prospect of ultimate deliverance from the circle of incarnation by removal to the islands of the blest. I will conclude this lecture by some remarks upon each of these three doctrines as they appear in Pindar.

First, then, with regard to *παλιγγενεσία*. This doctrine is most clearly expressed in a fragment preserved by Plato.² "The souls of them from whom Persephone has accepted atonement for an ancient woe, she restores in the ninth year to the light of the sun above the earth. And from these souls come glorious kings and such as are strong and swift and excel in wisdom; and throughout all future time they are called holy heroes by mankind." It should be noted that the reward consists not in restoration to the upper earth from the darkness of the underworld, but in the kind of life which is assigned to the purified souls when they return again into the body. They become kings and princes in the land. It has already been pointed out that, according to Empedocles, the souls about to be freed from the circle of generation become "prophets and singers and physicians and princes among men upon the earth." The similarity between the two passages makes it highly probable that Pindar is here dependent on Orphic and

¹ *Ol.* 2. 57 ff.

² *Meno* 81 B f.; *fr.* 138 Bergk.



Pythagorean traditions.¹ Pindar's conception of metempsychosis presents at least one interesting and apparently novel feature. In common, perhaps, with Empedocles, and certainly with Plato,² he regards the human soul as continually traversing the circumference of a circle, one half of which is life and the other death; and the evil we do in the semicircle representing life is expiated in the other semicircle. But in Pindar the converse holds good also: the evil done by the soul when separate from the body is expiated during her life on earth. This is Mezger's explanation of the words, "the guilty souls of the dead straightway pay the penalty here on earth"; and no other explanation that I know of does equal justice to the Greek.³ In this way, to quote the phrase of Gildersleeve, Earth and Hades become "mutual Hells"; or rather, perhaps, mutual Hells and mutual Heavens: for if our present miseries are the punishment of sins committed in the intermediate state, we may equally suppose that our present happiness is the reward of ante-natal merit. According to the Orphics, the soul, before her expulsion from heaven, left the paths of virtue and was punished by incarceration in the flesh.⁴ This Orphic belief would seem to have suggested the Pindaric idea that in each successive incarnation we suffer for sins committed in the other world.

During the interval between two incarnations the soul makes atonement for the evil she has wrought above the ground.⁵ Nowhere, in his extant works, does Pindar describe the punishment as purgatorial: but he probably conceived of it in this way. We find, however, clear traces of an Inferno in some of the poems of Pindar. The languid rivers of black night belching forth infinite darkness⁶ seem to belong to the Inferno. As examples

¹ See p. 106.

² *Phaed.* 72 A ff.

³ A different view is taken by Rohde, *Psyche*² ii. p. 208, n. 3. But

ἔσθρις ἐκατέρωθεν in *Ol.* 2. 68 favours Mezger's interpretation.

⁴ See p. 97 f.

⁵ *fr.* 133.

⁶ *fr.* 130 *ad fin.*

of the incurable class of sinners,¹ the poet, in agreement with the *Odyssey*,² refers to Tantalus, Ixion, Sisyphus, and Tityos, all of whom endure a "hopeless life of never-ending woe" in recompense for their egregious crimes.³ For these, and possibly also for some others,⁴ there is no hope; but they perform a useful service as παραδείγματα, or warning examples to those whose condition is less hopeless than their own. Of Ixion we read: "By command of the Gods, men say, Ixion proclaims this message to mortals as round and round he spins upon his winged wheel: *Him that is thy benefactor, visit and requite with gracious recompense.*"⁵ The idea that the incurably wicked suffer eternal punishment in order to provide a warning for the rank and file, occurs also in the myths of Plato and in Virgil.⁶ We may with probability ascribe it in all three cases to the influence of early Orphic eschatologies.

Hitherto in Greek literature, as we have seen, the "islands of the blest" are appropriated to certain favourites of the Gods, on whom the hand of death has not fallen. In Pindar all this is changed. "They who thrice on either side of death"—that is, during three successive incarnations together with the corresponding periods in the other world—"have refrained their souls from wickedness, travel on the road of Zeus⁷ to the tower of Cronus,⁸ where the ocean breezes blow around the island of the blest." There, presumably, like the souls who have "purified themselves by philosophy" in Plato's *Phaedo*, they dwell "without bodies for all future time,"⁹ delivered at last from the "wheel of

¹ *of ἀνάτωρ ἔχοντες*, Plato, *Phaed.* 113 E.

² See p. 60.

³ *Ol.* i. 55 ff.; *Pyth.* 2. 21 ff.

⁴ *ὑπὸ ζεύγλαις ἀφύκτοις κακῶν*, fr. 132; but the fragment is probably spurious. See Rohde, *Psyche* ii. p. 218, n. 3.

⁵ *Pyth.* 2. 21 ff.

⁶ Plato, *Rep.* x. 616 A, *Gorg.* 525 A ff.; Virg. *Aen.* 6. 618 ff.

⁷ *Ol.* 2. 68 ff.; cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 248 E.

⁸ Cf. Hesiod, *O. D.* 169, τοῖσιν Κρόνος ἐμβασιλεύει.

⁹ 114 O.

generation." Besides the second *Olympian*, we have another exquisite picture of the life of the blessed in a fragment preserved by Plutarch in his *Consolation to Apollonius*:¹ "For them shineth below the strength of the sun while in our world it is night, and the space of crimson-flowered meadows before their city is full of the shade of frankincense-trees, and of fruits of gold. And some in horses, and in bodily feats, and some in dice, and some in harp-playing have delight; and among them thriveth all fair-flowering bliss; and fragrance streameth ever through the lovely land, as they mingle incense of every kind upon the altars of the gods."² It is the same kind of picture as appears in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, a dialogue admittedly full of Orphic ideas.³ For the rest, it need only be remarked that Pindar, in agreement with what we know from Aristotle to have been a widely diffused belief in Greece,⁴ attributes to the departed souls some interest, slight though it be, in the fortunes of their descendants upon earth. "Even the dead," says Pindar, "have part in sacrifices duly offered; and the dust hides not from them the goodly glories of their kindred." "Perchance, with such intelligence as there is beneath the ground, they hear of his mighty prowess sprinkled with song's soft dew beneath the outpoured hymn of praise, wherefore they rejoice in common with their son Arcesilas at the triumph he hath justly won."⁵

Much of what this poet-prophet sings about the Gods and their relation to mankind is only a purer and more spiritual version of the teaching of his predecessors; but his conception of immortality is almost unique in literature until we come to Plato. For it is Plato who is in this respect the true successor of the poet we have

¹ c. 35; *fr.* 129 Bergk.

² *tr.* Myers.

³ See p. 108.

⁴ *Eth. Nic.* i. c. 11.

⁵ *Ol.* 8. 77 ff.; *Pyth.* 5. 98 ff.

been considering. We must turn to the Platonic myths—to the supra-celestial world of the *Phaedrus*, and the earthly paradise of the *Phaedo*—in order to find a parallel to Pindar's representation of the happiness in store for virtue in the life to come. We ought not to insist upon the details; like other religious teachers, Pindar uses sensuous imagery to awaken "transcendental feeling." No one will ever determine exactly how much of what he says the poet himself believed, and how much is only poetic fancy. For us the relevant consideration is that these ideas, from whatever source they were taken—Homeric, Orphic, or Eleusinian,¹ and however incompatible with one another they may be, are present in the poetry of Pindar, and exercised an influence on Greek thought. In a fragment preserved by Plato, the poet tells how "sweet hope cherishes the soul of him who has lived in piety and justice, the nurse of his declining years and the companion of his life."² The poetry of Pindar is full of this "sweet hope"; and one of its sources is the hope of immortality.

¹ *fr.* 137, "Blessed is he who having seen those rites shall pass beneath the ground. He knoweth

the end of life, yea, and its celestial origin (*διόσδορον ἀρχάν*)." ² *Rep.* i. 331 A; *fr.* 214.

LECTURE VII

AESCHYLUS

ALIKE in its origin, and throughout the most flourishing period of its history, Greek drama was intimately associated with the services of religion. The seed from which tragedy sprang was the dithyramb or choral hymn in honour of Dionysus; and after the tragic art had attained to its maturity in Athens, it was still only at the solemn festivals of Dionysus that plays were exhibited. The representation of a tragedy was thus in a true and proper sense an act of public worship rendered by the State to one of its Gods.¹ If the spirit of Greek drama is pre-eminently religious, it is therefore no more than we should expect from a consideration of its origin and history. But in the case more particularly of Aeschylus, we may well suppose that the circumstances of his childhood and youth contributed to give a strongly religious bias to his mind. Born about 525 B.C., the scion of a noble family belonging to Eleusis, he lived for a time in the immediate precincts of the temple which, next to that of Apollo at Delphi, was the most widely honoured of all Greek temples—that of Demeter and Corê, the patron Goddesses of the Eleusinian mysteries. In early manhood he witnessed the tide of barbarism rolled back from Greece by the heroic efforts of Athens; and he himself fought at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea. It is natural that in so great a deliverance Aeschylus

¹ Croiset, *Littérature Grecque* iii, p. 52.

should have seen the hand of the Gods; and the *Persae* remains as a memorial to show that the defeat of Xerxes was interpreted by the poet as an example on a gigantic scale of the law of righteousness by which God rules the world.

The lofty prophetic tone characteristic, as we have seen, of Pindar, is not less characteristic of Aeschylus; but in the tragedian it is combined with a greater intensity of moral purpose, and a far profounder treatment of moral and religious problems, than either the subject of Pindar's odes, or the peculiar quality of his genius, allowed. The conception which lies in the background of Aeschylus' theology is the old Hesiodic story of successive dynasties of Gods. This conception appears from time to time throughout the other plays,¹ and is, in particular, the pivot on which the action of the *Prometheus Bound* revolves. In that tragedy, Cronus and his allies are engulfed in the abyss of Tartarus, and except for one possibility of danger, it would seem that Zeus is firmly and for ever seated on his throne. Prometheus, who has incurred the wrath of Zeus on account of his friendship for humanity, holds in his keeping the secret that alone can save the newly-established tyrant from suffering the fate of his predecessors.

" Yea verily shall Zeus, though stubborn-souled,
 Be humbled yet; such marriage he prepares
 Which from his throne of power to nothingness
 Shall hurl him down; so shall be all fulfilled
 His father Kronos' curse, which erst he spake
 What time he fell from his primeval throne.
 From such disasters none of all the gods
 To Zeus escape can show, save I alone;
 I know it and the way."²

¹ *Ag.* 178 ff., (Uranus, Cronus, Zeus); *Eum.* 644 *al.* Wecklein.

² 939 ff., tr. Miss Anna Swanwick.

It is because Prometheus stubbornly refuses to yield the secret that he is subjected to age-long torture. But even in pronouncing sentence, the divine messenger holds out the hope of ultimate deliverance :

“ But of such pangs look for no term, until
Some god, successor of thy toils, appear,
Willing to Hades' rayless gloom to wend,
And to the murky depths of Tartaros.”¹

In the sequel, as seems to have been related in the *Prometheus Delivered*,² Heracles, the son of Zeus, in accordance with the decree of Destiny, and by his father's will, released the hero. Prometheus, taught perhaps by suffering,³ discloses the secret, with the result that a reconciliation is effected, and Zeus escapes the danger by which he was threatened.

Such, in broad outline, is the Aeschylean version of the old legend. To a modern reader, the interest centres chiefly round the figure of Prometheus; but if the other two members of the trilogy survived, we should probably see that the idea which gives unity to the whole is the substitution of Harmony and Justice for Discord and Violence in the government of the world. According to the Orphic anthropology, man is a composite creature, half-bestial and half-divine, combining something of the Titan and something of the God; and the path of progress lies in starving the Titanic element and nurturing and developing the divine. The Promethean trilogy, so far as its theological ideas are concerned, seems to be inspired by a somewhat similar conception. That which the Orphic religion represented as an ideal for the individual is here represented as having happened in the dynasty of heaven. The Titans whom Zeus overthrew were

¹ 1058 ff., tr. A. Swanwick.

² Cf. *P. V.* 206 ff.

³ Cf. line 528 f. with *Ag.* 186 ff. (Miss Swanwick, p. 363).

deified impersonations of the reign of force and terror. With the accession of Zeus, a new era is about to begin, in which wisdom and justice will take the place of blind force. It is true that the Zeus of the *Prometheus Bound* exhibits many characteristics of the previous era. His servants are Violence and Might; and he had conceived the design of destroying humanity and founding a new race of mortals. But even in this play there are not wanting indications of an ulterior purpose seeking to bring good out of evil. The nymph Io, after her wanderings are ended, is to be restored by Zeus to human form, and become the foundress of a race whence Heracles should arise to free Prometheus and confer inestimable good upon mankind.¹ And we must remember that the *Prometheus Bound* represents only the transition from the old era to the new. After the empire of Zeus was finally established by a reconciliation with Prometheus, Justice and not Force became the sceptre of his rule.

In the *Prometheus* it is implied throughout that Fate is stronger than Zeus.

“Not yet nor thus is it ordained that fate
 These things shall compass; but by myriad pangs
 And tortures bent, so shall I 'scape these bonds;
 Art than necessity is weaker far.’
 ‘Who then is helmsman of necessity?’
 ‘The triform Fates and ever-mindful Furies.’
 ‘Is Zeus in might less absolute than these?’
 ‘E'en he the fore-ordained cannot escape.’”²

We may infer from this passage that Aeschylus sometimes conceived of a transcendent principle, at once superior and prior to the Gods, and determining the succession and duration of their dynasties. The *Theogony* of Hesiod, as we have already seen, contains the same

¹ 787 ff., 874 ff.

² 527 ff., tr. A. S.

idea, though in a less explicit form. But except in the *Prometheus*, Aeschylus is hardly more consistent than his predecessors on the subject of the relation between Zeus and Fate. Though he frequently distinguishes between the two powers, and sometimes brings them into collision,¹ yet the tendency of his drama as a whole is undoubtedly to exalt the authority of Zeus, and to make Destiny either his coadjutor or simply that which he decrees. At the close of the *Eumenides*, "all-seeing Zeus" and Fate are in perfect harmony;² and throughout the whole of the *Suppliants*, Destiny is nothing but the will of Zeus.

"Whate'er is fated that must sure befall;
The will of Zeus, almighty, absolute,
None may transgress."³

The predominance of Zeus is indeed one of the great distinguishing features of Aeschylean theology. Zeus is "the king of kings, most blessed among the blessed, of perfect powers most perfect," the "all-seeing," "all-powerful father,"⁴ the cause and accomplisher of all things (*παναίτιος, πανεργέτης, παντελής, τέλειος*),⁵ without whose will nothing either good or evil happens to man.⁶ Many other epithets and sentiments might be quoted from nearly all the plays, to illustrate man's dependence upon the Almighty Father in the different relationships of life; but it is perhaps in the *Suppliants*—one of the most truly religious poems in ancient literature—that Aeschylus' conception of Zeus reaches the highest point. Nothing can convey to us a more vivid impression of the religious sentiment of the poet than the choruses

¹ *s. g. fr.* 199; cf. *Eum.* 173 f.

² *Eum.* 1046 f. Cf. *Choeph.* 305 ff.

³ 1058 ff., tr. A. S. Cf. 681, 829 ff.; *Pers.* 103 (*θεόθεν μοῖρα*); *Ag.* 1010 f.

⁴ *Suppl.* 583 ff., 145; *Eum.* 919.

⁵ *Ag.* 1487; *Sept.* 111; *Ag.* 964.

⁶ *Ag.* 1488 f.

in that play: and I will venture to put before you Mr. Morshead's admirable version of two typical passages:

“Justly his deed was done,
 Unto what other one,
 Of all the gods, should I for justice turn?
 From him our race did spring;
 Creator he and King,
 Ancient of days and wisdom he, and might.
 As bark before the wind,
 So, wafted by his mind,
 Moves every counsel, each device aright.
 Beneath no stronger hand
 Holds he a weak command,
 No throne doth he abase him to adore;
 Swift as a word, his deed
 Acts out what stands decreed
 In counsels of his heart, for evermore.”¹

“Though the deep will of Zeus be hard to track,
 Yet doth it flame and glance,
 A beacon in the dark, 'mid clouds of chance
 That wrap mankind.
 Yea, though the counsel fall, undone it shall not lie,
 Whate'er be shaped and fixed within Zeus' ruling mind—
 Dark as a solemn grove, with sombre leafage shaded,
 His paths of purpose wind,
 A marvel to men's eye.
 Smitten by him, from towering hopes degraded,
 Mortals lie low and still:
 Tireless and effortless, works forth its will
 The arm divine!
 God from his holy seat, in calm of unarmed power,
 Brings forth the deed at its appointed hour!”²

In these two poems, as well as elsewhere throughout the dramas, the poet clearly assumes the essential unity of the divine purpose as manifested in the world. It would nevertheless be an error to suppose that Aeschylus is in any proper sense of the term a monotheist. He constantly recognises a plurality of Gods; and nowhere

¹ 598 ff.

² 88 ff.

does he contend against the prevailing polytheism. There is, indeed, one fragment which appears to deny the existence of more Gods than one. "Zeus is aether, Zeus is earth, Zeus is heaven: Zeus, in truth, is all things and more than all."¹ We have here an interesting anticipation of the half-poetical, half-philosophical pantheism which among ancient poets is characteristic chiefly of Virgil, and among modern, of Wordsworth and Tennyson.

"The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills, and the plains,
Are not these, O Soul, the Vision of Him who reigns?"²

But no other passage in Aeschylus strikes exactly this note; and the fragment, if genuine, probably refers to some pantheistic doctrine of the Orphic type.³

The most that we can fairly say on the subject of Aeschylean monotheism is that in Aeschylus the personality of Zeus overshadows that of all the inferior Gods to a much greater extent than formerly; and that in the dynasty of Gods to which Zeus belongs, there is but a single purpose, a single ruling will, the will of Zeus himself. Hence it is to Zeus that the thoughts of the chorus spontaneously rise in seasons of perplexity and danger:

"Zeus, whoe'er he be, this name
If it pleaseth him to claim,
This to him will I address;
Weighing all, no power I know
Save only Zeus, if I aside would throw
In sooth as vain this burthen of distress
Who the victor-strain
To Zeus uplifts, true wisdom shall obtain."⁴

¹ *fr.* 70.

² Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism*.

³ See p. 95.

⁴ *Ag.* 170 ff., tr. A. S.



Of all the divine attributes, there is none upon which Aeschylus lays so much stress as Justice. Justice is the daughter of Zeus — Δίκη, rightly so named from Διὸς κόρα:¹ and everywhere in Aeschylus, Zeus is her champion and avenger. The poet by no means ignores the beneficent aspect of Justice. If Zeus is the punisher of sin, he is also the rewarder of virtue, distributing "blessing to the good, and to the wicked bale" — ἄδικα μὲν κακοῖς, ἔσθια δ' ἐννόμοις.² The seed of the righteous, say the Chorus in the *Agamemnon*, shall be blessed.³ But for one passage of this kind in Aeschylus, there are probably ten or more which proclaim the penalties of sin; and that which gives its great distinguishing feature to Aeschylean drama is the unique and almost appalling emphasis with which the poet dwells upon this theme. He is above all things the prophet of retributive justice, calling to his fellows to be just and pious: for human action is irrevocable, and sin must ever be expiated by suffering.

What is the view of Aeschylus as to the nature, development, and history of sin? This matter is put very briefly in a couplet spoken by the shade of Darius in the *Persae*:

ὑβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ' ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν
ἀτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἐξαμᾶ θέρος.

"For bursting into blossom, Insolence
Its harvest-ear, Delusion, ripeneth
And reaps most tearful fruit."⁴

Sin is ὑβρις, overweening pride or insolence, showing itself outwardly in the attempt to encroach on the rights of others or the Gods. It is—so Aeschylus appears to hold—a kind of disease or madness,⁵ which fastens on

¹ *Choeph.* 948 ; cf. *Sept.* 649.

² *Suppl.* 409a.

³ *Ag.* 758 f. ; cf. 767 f. ; *Eum.*

538 ff. *al.*

⁴ 823 f., tr. A. S.

⁵ νόσος φρενῶν, *Pers.* 752.

the soul of the sinner, confounding his intelligence so that he can no longer discriminate between right and wrong. The sinner is *μάταιος*, the slave of idle delusions: like a child pursuing a winged bird, so he vainly strives to attain the unattainable.¹ Aeschylus portrays the development and consequences of sin in many passages of extraordinary vehemence and power. It must here suffice to quote a single example:

“Child of designing Ate’s deadly womb,
The wretch Temptation drives him to his doom.
Then cure is all in vain. The vice he wears
He cannot hide; sinister gleam declares
His mischief; as base metal at the touch
And trial of the stone, he showeth smutch
(This fond man like a child a-chase of wings),
And the awful taint on all his people brings:
To prayers is not an ear in Heaven: one frown
All conversant with such calls guilty and pulls down.”²

Here, and in other passages of the kind, there is little that goes beyond the teaching of Solon, though in Aeschylus we have more elaboration and prophetic fire. But the question which it concerns us chiefly to consider is whether Aeschylus believed that the original seed or germ of sin is implanted in the individual by his own spontaneous act, or by a supernatural agency beyond his control. A number of passages might be quoted from the plays to support the view that the individual is not in this matter a free agent, but is led astray by some divine power. The opening chorus of the *Persae* contains a clear expression of this belief:

“But ah! what mortal baffle may
A god’s deep-plotted snare,—
Who may o’er leap with foot so light?
Até at first, with semblance fair,

¹ *Eum.* 338 *al.*; *Ag.* 404.

(*Cambridge Praelections*, 1906,

² *Ag.* 396 ff., Dr. Headlam’s tr. p. 108). Cf. esp. *Eum.* 552 ff.

Into her toils allures her prey,
Whence no mere mortal wight
May break away."¹

And elsewhere we hear of an evil *daemon* or *Alastor* confounding men's senses and hounding them on to ruin.² A fragment of the *Niobe*, as we have already seen,³ declares in so many words that "God engenders guilt in mortal men, when he is minded utterly to destroy their house."⁴ But in the case of a dramatic poet, we cannot determine a question of this kind by an enumeration of isolated sentiments, many of which are spoken by characters whom the poet clearly means us to condemn. We must have regard to the general drift of Aeschylus' teaching, as shown in the catastrophe of his plays, and formulated from time to time by those speakers who, like the chorus in the *Agamemnon*, and Darius in the *Persae*, point the moral of the dramatic situation. If we adopt such a criterion, we shall conclude, I think, that the position of Aeschylus with reference to this matter was analogous to that of Jewish theology. It has been said that "in no part of the Old Testament is God represented as the primary author of evil thoughts or actions in men; if He instigate them to evil, it is in punishment or aggravation of evil they have already committed."⁵ A similar statement applies to the drama of Aeschylus. The idea that sin is originated by divine agency he found deeply rooted in antecedent and contemporary thought.⁶ With this idea he does not entirely break; but he distinguishes two moments or stages in the career of the sinner: one when he commits the first transgression, and the other when he persists in his wickedness. It is in the power of the individual to refrain from taking the initial step;

¹ 94 ff., tr. A. S.

² e.g. *Pers.* 356 f., 726.

³ See p. 37.

⁴ *fr.* 156.

⁵ Hastings' *Dict. of the Bible*, i. p. 98^b.

⁶ For examples, see p. 88; and Nägelsbach, *Nachhom. Theol.* p. 55 ff.

but, as soon as he has transgressed, infatuation follows from the Gods, and his doom is sealed. This is the meaning of the line in which the ghost of Darius moralises on the Persian downfall: ἀλλ' ὅταν σπεύδῃ τις αὐτός, χῶ θεὸς ξυνάπτεται: when of our own free will we rush into sin, God himself becomes our ally.¹ As Professor Butcher says, "It is the dark converse of 'God helps those who help themselves.'"² In Aristotle's *Ethics* we find a noteworthy parallel to this conception. The philosopher admits that one who is fairly embarked on a career of vice cannot any longer be virtuous. But he contends that the original acts which generated the vicious habit were entirely in the man's own power; and on this account we must pronounce him a voluntary agent, even though he cannot act otherwise than he does. "True, you cannot alter your character now; but it was open to you at first not to become wicked: and you are therefore voluntarily wicked."³ Moral freedom, in Aeschylus, has apparently the same foundation.

I have confined myself, so far, to Aeschylus' view of sin, as it appears in the life of the individual; but the theme of his most powerful tragedies is the history of sin as it reveals itself in the successive generations of a crime-stained family. The legends connected with two royal houses, the Labdacidae and the Pleisthenidae, supply the poet with materials for this subject. In the case of the Labdacidae, the primary infatuation or crime (πρώταρχος ἄτη)⁴ was Laius' wilful disobedience to the repeated warnings of Apollo, that he should die without issue; among the Pleisthenidae, it was the unholy banquet which Atreus, Agamemnon's father, offered to Thyestes. In the trilogy of which the *Seven against Thebes* was the concluding play, Aeschylus

¹ *Pers.* 744 f. Cf. *fr.* 22, 395.

² *Aspects of the Greek Genius*, p. 118.

³ *Eth. Nic.* iii. 7. 1114^a 19.

⁴ *Ag.* 1191.

painted with tremendous power the appalling consequences of Laius' transgression. The son begotten by Laius in defiance of Apollo's warning slew his father and married with his mother: this is the first recrudescence of the ancestral crime. When the awful truth was revealed, Oedipus, in a frenzy of despair, put out his eyes, and finally abdicated in favour of his two sons, Eteocles and Polyneices. In course of time, stung by the ignominies put upon him by his children, Oedipus prayed that they might fall in battle by one another's hands. The fulfilment of this prayer forms the subject of the *Seven against Thebes*; and throughout the whole play we are conscious that each new development is only, as it were, a fresh shoot thrown out by the parent stock of sin. The Oresteian trilogy is dominated throughout by the same idea. The primal curse brought upon the family by Atreus breaks forth anew in the murder of Agamemnon by Clytaemnestra, and in that of Clytaemnestra by Orestes; and only by the intervention of Apollo and Athena is the spectre finally laid. In the last chorus of the *Choephoroi* the whole tragic history is thus summed up:

“Now in Mycenae's royal halls,
 The storm, o'er Atreus' race that lowers,
 Running its course, for the third time hath burst.
 Child-devouring horror first,
 Brooded o'er these walls;
 Next a monarch's deadly bale,
 When the chief whom we bewail,
 War-leader to Achaia's martial powers,
 In the bath lay dead.

Now, behold a third is come,—
 Saviour, shall I say, or doom?
 From what quarter sped?
 Full-accomplished, when shall Fate,
 Lulled to rest, her stormy ire abate?”¹

¹ 1063 ff., tr. A. S.

In such a network of calamity, it is difficult to see any room for moral choice. Whether the original transgression was voluntary or involuntary, there appears to be no real hope for those in the second generation. It is true that Aeschylus invariably makes the victim of ancestral guilt a sinner also on his own account. The familiar characteristics of a sinful frame of mind—stubbornness, self-will, and impiety—are attributed to Agamemnon as soon as he consents to the sacrifice of his daughter.

“Then harnessed in Necessity’s stern yoke
An impious change-wind in his bosom woke,
Profane, unhallowed, with dire evil fraught,
His soul perverting to all daring thought.”¹

And in like manner Eteocles, at the crisis of his fate, is overcome by impetuous and unreasoning passion.² But this very passion is itself a sign that the avenging *daemon* of the family is at work. Sin, we read in the *Agamemnon*, does not die childless, but begets a numerous progeny. “In the hearts of evil men, sooner or later, when the appointed hour arrives, the old Insolence (*ὑβρις*) begets a young Insolence in the likeness of its progenitors, an avenging spirit (*δαίμονα*), working in darkness,³ irresistible, unconquerable, unholy Recklessness (*θράσος*), bringing black destruction upon the house.”⁴ We cannot but feel that the responsibility belongs of right not to the doer of the deed, but to the never-sleeping *Alastor* or *Erinyes* that haunts the crime-stained race from the moment the first seed of guilt was sown. Over the body of the murdered Agamemnon the Chorus see in fancy the evil genius of the household chanting its ill-omened strain of triumph.⁵ Clytaemnestra, too, after

¹ *Ag.* 228 ff., tr. A. S.

² *Sept.* 679 ff.

³ Reading *βαθύσκορον* (with Dr. Headlam).

⁴ *Ag.* 760 ff.; cf. 718 ff., and *Eum.* 935 ff.

⁵ 1473 ff.

the first transports of revenge have subsided, is fain to disclaim all responsibility for her deed of blood :

“Dost boast as mine this deed?
Then wrongly thou dost read,
To count me Agameunon’s wife;—not so;
Appearing in the mien
Of this dead monarch’s queen,
The ancient fiend of Atreus dealt the blow;—
Requiting his grim feast,
For the slain babes, as priest,
The full-grown victim now he layeth low.”¹

The justice of the plea is half-admitted by the Chorus in their reply :

“That thou art guiltless of this blood
Who will attest? Yet by thy side,
Haply, as thy accomplice, stood
The Fury who doth here preside.”²

But even if the responsibility rests with Fate, it is still the doer who must suffer. It is in vain that Clytaemnestra, as she shrinks from the avenging sword, exclaims :

ἡ μοῖρα τούτων, ὦ τέκνον, παραίτια.
“Fate, O my child, must share the blame thereof.”

The reply of Orestes leaves no loophole of escape :

καὶ τόνδε τοίνυν μοῖρ’ ἐπόρουνεν μόρον.
“This fatal doom, then, it is Fate that sends.”³

Situations of this kind, it will be allowed, are already sufficiently tragic ; but the tragedy is not unfrequently heightened by representing the offence committed by the individual as in itself the fulfilment of a moral obligation. It has been said that the true tragic conflict “is not between right and wrong, but between right and right.”

¹ *Ag.* 1498 ff., tr. A. S. ² *506 ff.*, tr. A. S. ³ *Ch.* 909 f.

The remark holds good of Aeschylus. When Agamemnon is called upon to slay his daughter, he has to choose between two conflicting duties—that which he owes to family, and that which he owes to country.¹ In fulfilling the one, he necessarily violates the other; and whichever alternative he selects, calamity is certain. At the close of the *Seven against Thebes*, Antigone is placed in a similar dilemma. She must either defy the edict of the State, or disobey the still higher law which enjoins that the rite of burial shall be accorded to the dead.² But it is in the *Choephoroi* and *Eumenides* that this warfare of contending obligations appeals most powerfully, if not to the ancients, at least to us. On the one hand, the duty of avenging his father's death is laid upon Orestes by Apollo; on the other side, there is the reverence due to a mother. If he obeys Apollo, he is exposed to the vengeance of the Furies who pursue the shedder of kindred blood. In the event of disobedience, torments even more terrible are threatened by the God. At the supreme moment he hesitates; but Apollo's command prevails.³

The question may be asked: Does Aeschylus provide any solution of this dark problem? Does he anywhere succeed in reconciling the claims of Justice with what would appear to be due to the individual, if we are to assume the moral government of the world?

I do not think that the ethical difficulty is ever solved by the poet. In the case of Orestes, it is true, the *Eumenides* offers, not so much a solution, as a kind of explanation. The fugitive is tried before the Areopagus court. Apollo, representing the newer and more benign theocracy, becomes his champion against the vengeful Furies, who belong to the older, less humane generation of Gods; and by the intervention of Athena, he is

¹ See esp. *Ag.* 215 ff.

² *Ch.* 898 ff.

³ *Sept.* 1017 ff.

acquitted and delivered from the curse. At the same time, the Furies are propitiated by receiving a shrine in Athens, and take their place henceforward as loyal supporters of the dynasty of Zeus. It is obvious that we have here a mythological rather than an ethical solution. The collision of moral principles is referred to the antagonism between the Chthonian and the Olympian powers, and as soon as they are reconciled, it disappears. "It is Aeschylus's conviction," writes C. O. Müller, "that the conflict between those ancient orders and the powers that sway the present world is merely *transient*, existing for a certain epoch, a crisis preparatory only to a higher development. With him the world of Olympian Gods is in perfect unison with the original powers, and, as it were, nothing more than an improvement upon them."¹ This is undoubtedly correct; but it must be remembered that the matricide by which Orestes incurred the vengeance of the Furies was enjoined upon him by Apollo; and from the ethical point of view, his ultimate acquittal affords no adequate compensation for the torments he endured. In other cases, Aeschylus apparently offers no solution at all. Eteocles must either take the field against his brother, or fail in his duty to the kingdom over which he rules.² The claims of honour and patriotism prevail, although, as I have already pointed out, Aeschylus contrives to make it appear that he is also swayed by passion; with the result that the curse of Oedipus is fulfilled through the mutual slaughter of the brothers. In like manner the sacrifice of Iphigeneia by Agamemnon, a duty from which he could not escape except by surrendering every title to command the Grecian fleet, is represented as a contributory cause of his destruction. It is perhaps the function of the tragic poet—it certainly was the favourite field in which Greek tragedy worked—to utilise such situations for the purpose

¹ *Dissertations on the Eum.* p. 184.

² *Sept.* 660 f., 670, 704.

of purifying our emotions of pity and fear rather than to suggest a solution by which the rights of the individual as well as the demands of Justice shall be satisfied; but in any case we cannot, I think, maintain that Aeschylus has solved the mighty problems which he raises.

Enough has now been said to enable us to understand the Aeschylean conception of sin, in its effect upon the life both of the individual and of the family; and I proceed to consider the law of punishment as expounded by the poet. In Greek literature, as elsewhere,¹ we find two conceptions of punishment, the retributory and the remedial. The principle of the former theory is expressed in the Hesiodic line: *εἴ κε πάθῃσι τὰ τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεὶα γένοιτο.*² It is simply the *jus talionis*: the doer must suffer in his own person that which he has done to others. The remedial view of punishment appears at a later stage of civilisation. It conceives of sin as a kind of spiritual disease, for which punishment is the appointed cure. In Aeschylus, of course, punishment is for the most part retributory. Again and again throughout the *Oresteia* he proclaims this principle in emphatic tones:

"Let tongue of Hatred pay back tongue of Hate;
Thus with her mighty utt'rance Justice cries,
Due penalty exacting for each deed.
Let murder on the murderous stroke await!
Doer of wrong must suffer.—This sage lore,
Tradition utters, trebly hoar."³

"For law it is, when on the plain
Blood hath been shed, new blood must fall:
Carnage doth to the Fury call;
Avenger of the earlier slain,
She comes, new Ruin leading in her train."⁴

¹ See Westermarck, *Origin and Develop. of Moral Ideas* p. 80 ff.

² *fr.* 217 Goettling.

³ *Ch.* 308 ff., tr. A. S.; cf. *Ag.*

587 f., 1317 ff., 1322 ff., 1337 ff., 1431, 1561 ff.; *Ch.* 144; *Eum.* 264 f.; *Pers.* 815 f.

⁴ *Ch.* 399 ff., tr. A. S.

The blood of Iphigeneia calls from the ground for Agamemnon's death : and it is the murdered Agamemnon who drives home the sword of Orestes in Clytaemnestra's bosom.¹ In the *Choephoroi* no element is wanting to complete the tragic parallel. By the side of the dead Clytaemnestra and her paramour, Orestes places the net in which his father was entangled and slain, to justify himself before the all-seeing sun :

“Mark this device, my wretched father's snare,
His hands which fettered and his feet which yoked.
Unfold it,—form a ring,—and, standing near,
Display the Hero's death-robe, that the Sire,
Not mine, but He who all these woes surveys,
Helios, my mother's impious deeds may mark ;
So in my trial, at some future time,
He by my side may stand, and witness bear
That justly I did prosecute to death
My mother.”²

In none of these passages is there any hint that the divine justice has regard to the interests of the criminal ; but the poet more than once expresses the milder and more Sophoclean belief, that suffering is the way by which God leads men into knowledge. “We learn by suffering” (*πάθος μάθος*), “Wisdom cometh by constraint”³—such is the language in which this thought is clothed. “It is Zeus who guideth mortals on the road to wisdom, who hath appointed the sure ordinance—*by suffering thou shalt learn*. In sleep the anguish of remembered suffering breaks out before the heart, and wisdom cometh to mortals in their own despite.”⁴ We have exactly the same sentiment in the Book of Job : “God speaketh once, yea twice, though man regardeth it not. In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, in slumberings upon the bed ;

¹ *Ch.* 926.

² *Ch.* 978 ff., tr. A. S.

³ *Eum.* 523 f.

⁴ *Ag.* 186 ff. ; cf. 261 f.

then he openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their instruction, that he may withdraw man from his purpose, and hide pride from man."¹ It is particularly to be observed that Aeschylus ascribes the law of πάθος μάθος to Zeus. The retributive principle, δράσαντι παθεῖν, is a τριγέρων μῦθος, an immemorial precept, older, we may presume, than the Olympian dynasty.² Its champions, in Aeschylus, are the Furies and the Fates.

We have next to consider how Aeschylus interprets the traditional doctrine of the "envy of the Gods." It has already been remarked that, according to the usual Greek view, the divine jealousy is awakened by a man's success, without the imputation of sinful action or desire: and we have also seen that it may be averted by the voluntary sacrifice of some highly-valued possession.³ One of the choruses in the *Agamemnon* contains a reminiscence of the second of these ideas. There is no limit, the poet says, to the pursuit of prosperity; but misfortune is close neighbour to success. Suddenly, when holding a straight course, we strike upon a hidden reef; and then, if fear casts out part of the cargo, the whole house does not sink by reason of the calamitous freight, nor is the vessel engulfed in the sea.⁴ "Too much praise," we read elsewhere, "is dangerous: the mountain peaks are blasted by the eyes of Zeus."⁵ The messenger who relates the defeat of Xerxes attributes it to the "envy of the Gods":⁶ but Darius assigns the disaster to a different cause—the anger of Zeus at Xerxes' "overweening thoughts":⁷ and this is, of course, the poet's own view. That Aeschylus disbelieved in the popular interpretation of the "envy of the Gods" is evident not only from the pervading spirit of his drama, but also from

¹ *SS.* 14 ff.

² Cf. *Ag.* 1563 (θέσμιον γάρ).

³ See p. 124.

⁴ *Ag.* 993 ff. Cf. *Sept.* 754 ff.

⁵ *Ag.* 474 f.; cf. 912, 937.

⁶ *Pers.* 365.

⁷ *Pers.* 829 f. Cf. *Ag.* 136 ff.

the deliberate protest which he makes against the doctrine in one of those relatively few places where he expressly challenges traditional beliefs.

“Lives among men this saw, voiced long ago :
Success consummate breeds apace,
Nor childless dies, but to the race
From prosperous Fortune springeth cureless Woe.
 Apart I hold my solitary creed.
 Prolific truly is the impious deed ;
 Like to the evil stock, the evil seed ;
 But fate ordains that righteous homes shall aye
 Rejoice in goodly progeny.”¹

According to Aeschylus, the resentment has for its object not the prosperity, but the sin ; so that the “envy of the Gods” is only an expression for the divine Nemesis when directed against those in whom prosperity has engendered pride. In the *Prometheus Bound*, it is true, Zeus is represented as jealous of the whole human race.² But in this, as in other respects, the *Prometheus* stands apart. We may be sure that the subsequent reconciliation between man’s champion and Zeus was at the same time a reconciliation between Zeus and man.

Does Aeschylus attribute untruthfulness to the divine nature ? Plato severely censures him for making Thetis accuse Apollo of deception. Apollo, at the marriage of the Goddess, had

“Dwelt on her happy motherhood to be,
 Diseaseless lives, crowned with long happy years.
 Fondly I deemed that Phoebus’ voice divine
 Stooped not to lies, rich in prophetic skill.
 But he that at the banquet sang of joys
 To come, he that foretold these blissful days,
 Even he with his own hand hath slain my child.”³

¹ *Ag.* 749 ff., tr. A. S. ² 11, 28 ff. and *passim.* ³ *ap. Pl. Rep.* ii. 383 B.

But it is obvious that this passage has only a dramatic value. In the *Prometheus*, on the other hand, we read that "the voice of Zeus cannot speak falsely, but he shall fulfil every word";¹ and in the *Seven against Thebes*, Apollo is said either to keep silence or to speak truly.² On the other hand, Hermes, as usual, is still in Aeschylus the God of guile:³ and according to two fragments, God is not averse to "just deception."⁴ It is clear that truthfulness is a necessary part of the conception of Zeus which we find in most of the Aeschylean choruses; but it is not a feature on which the poet specially insists: nor did he disdain to employ his art on those ancient stories of divine transformations which Plato ranks in the same category with the legends ascribing to them deceitfulness and lies.⁵

The same may be said with reference to those myths which represent the Gods as subject to carnal desires. Aeschylus does not, any more than Pindar, discard such legends. But he draws a veil over whatever of grossness they contain; and in the *Suppliants*, Zeus' passion for Io furnishes the theme of a chorus which is second to none in Aeschylus for depth and purity of religious feeling. I will give you Mr. Morshead's version of the poem:

"Whose hand was laid at last on Io, thus forlorn,
 With many roamings worn?
 Who bade the harassed maiden's peace return?
 Zeus, lord of time eterne.
 Yea, by his breath divine, by his unscathing strength,
 She lays aside her bane,
 And softened back to womanhood at length
 Sheds human tears again.
 Then quickened with Zeus' veritable seed,
 A progeny she bare,

¹ 1064 f.

² 606. Cf. *Pers.* 802 ff.; *Eum.* 618; *Ch.* 557.

³ *Ch.* 808 ff.

⁴ 301, 302.

⁵ See, e.g., *fr.* 99. Cf. *Suppl.* 305.

A stainless babe, a child of heavenly breed,
 Of life and fortune fair.
His is the life of life—so all men say,—
His is the seed of Zeus.
Who else had power stern Hera's craft to stay,
*Her vengeful curse to loose?"*¹

In the hands of Aeschylus the legend is half-spiritualised into a kind of symbolical expression of that union between the divine and human which, as will afterwards be shown, is one of the fundamental ideas of Platonism, and lies at the root of Christianity itself.

The last of the topics with which we have to deal is immortality. Aeschylus speaks of death as the "never-ending sleep,"² the great deliverer from the pains and sorrows of life. A fragment of the *Philoctetes* runs thus:

"O healing Death, hear thou my prayer and come!
 Sole cure art thou of woes incurable;
 For Pain lays not her hand upon the dead."³

Sentiments of this kind are easily compatible with a belief in immortality; and Aeschylus makes frequent allusion to a future state. "Child," say the Chorus in the *Choephoroi*, "Fire's ravening jaw doth not subdue the spirit of the dead."⁴ We have seen that Pindar believes the soul to be divine and therefore imperishable.⁵ Aeschylus, too, in more than one passage shows himself acquainted with the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine of the divinity of the soul. When he says that the eye of the mind sees clearly during sleep, but in the day men cannot look into the future,⁶ we are entitled to suppose, in view of the Pindaric parallel,⁷ that the soul foresees the future through her affinity

¹ 580 ff.

² *Ag.* 1452.

³ *fr.* 255.

⁴ 322 f.

⁵ See p. 132.

⁶ *Eum.* 104 f.

⁷ See p. 131.

with God. The belief in the divine origin of the soul is also to some extent implied in the idea that we are taught of God in sleep.¹ The importance attached by Aeschylus to dreams and visions of the night² points in the same direction; and even when the body is awake, in moments of prophetic ecstasy, such as he depicts in the person of Cassandra, and in those ominous forebodings which oppress the Argive elders, the soul appears to betray her kinship with the Gods. But Aeschylus does not, like Pindar, bring the doctrine into relationship with immortality. Sometimes Aeschylus' picture of the underworld resembles that of Homer. We read of Charon's "black-sailed galley, sunless, untrodden by Apollo, that leads to the invisible, all-receiving shore."³ The ghost of Darius says grimly that the powers beneath the ground are more skilled to seize than to let go:⁴ nor is there a single ray of hope in the words he utters before returning to the realm of Hades:

"But I to nether darkness now depart.
Farewell, ye elders; although ills surround,
Yet to your souls give joyance, day by day,
For to the dead no profit is in wealth."⁵

Elsewhere we find mention of the "sapless dead," insensible alike to pleasure and to pain, in whom is "no vigour nor veins that flow with blood."⁶ Aeschylus also makes reference to degrees of rank in Hades.⁷ At other times the poet admits several un-Homeric features. Throughout the *Oresteia*, the dead are no longer "phantoms of men outworn"; they retain feeling, intelligence, and will, and are able to help or harm the living.⁸

¹ See p. 155.

² e.g. *Pers.* 179 ff., 521 f.; *Ch.* 521 ff.

³ *Sept.* 842 ff.

⁴ *Pers.* 691 f.

⁵ *Pers.* 841 ff., tr. A. S.

⁶ *fr.* 229, 230, 266.

⁷ *Pers.* 693; *Ch.* 355 ff.

⁸ *Ch.* 39, 322 f.; *Eum.* 94 ff.; cf. *Pers.* 223 ff.

The shade of Agamemnon is invoked to co-operate with Orestes and Electra in exacting vengeance from his murderers.¹ But the most important difference between Homer and Aeschylus in regard to eschatology is that Aeschylus, like Pindar and the Orphics, recognises a judgment and penalties hereafter.

“There thou shalt see in durance drear,
 ‘Gainst god or guest or parents dear,
 Like thee who sinned, receiving their due meed.
 For Hades, ruler of the nether sphere,
 Exactest auditor of human kind,
 Graved on the tablet of his mind
 Doth every trespass read.”²

Dr. Headlam has also pointed out an allusion in Aeschylus to a sort of Purgatory.³ But there is apparently no trace whatever in his plays of an Elysium for the just; and the consequence is that his eschatology is steeped in an atmosphere of totally unrelieved gloom.

If, in conclusion, we ask what is the peculiar claim of Aeschylus to be regarded as a great moral and religious teacher, our reply, I think, must be, that more emphatically, perhaps, than any other ancient writer, he proclaims the government of the world by justice. “Justice guides all things to their goal.”⁴ This is the one great lesson which he draws from the history alike of families, individuals, and nations. That it is chiefly the punitive side of the divine justice on which he insists may be due in part to the nature of the subjects he selects for treatment. But it is impossible to study the drama of Aeschylus without forming the impression that the poet himself was far more profoundly convinced of the retribution awaiting

¹ *Ch.* 130 ff.; cf. 477 ff.

² In *Ch.* 61. See *Cl. Rev.* xvi.

³ *Eum.* 269 ff., tr. A. S.; cf. 340; p. 348.
Suppl. 236 f., 421.

⁴ *Ag.* 773.

sin than of the rewards in store for virtue. To call Aeschylus a pessimist would be a ludicrous perversion of the truth. His characters indulge, of course, occasionally, in the usual Greek commonplaces about the frailty of man and the troubles of human life.¹ But the poet sees the hand of Zeus too clearly in the administration of the world to permit himself to despair.

"Weighing all, no power I know,
Save only Zeus, if I aside would throw
In sooth as vain this burthen of distress."²

It is none the less true that Aeschylus' constant preoccupation with the problems of sin and suffering deprives his teaching of that serene tranquillity which characterises his great successor, of whom a sympathetic writer has well said that "the undertone of divine vengeance running through the dramas of Aeschylus seems in Sophocles to pass away into an echo of divine compassion, and we move from the gloom of 'sin and sorrow' towards the dawning of a brighter day in which strength is made perfect in weakness."³

¹ e.g. *Ag.* 1326 ff. ; *Ch.* 1016 ff. ;
fr. 401.

² *Ag.* 173 ff., tr. A. S.
³ E. Abbott, *Hellenica* p. 66.

LECTURE VIII

SOPHOCLES

IN passing from Aeschylus to Sophocles, we are sensible at once that a change has come over the spirit of Greek drama. The predominant feature of Aeschylean tragedy was the extraordinary power displayed by the poet in grappling with the deepest problems of religion and life, such as the origin and propagation of sin, together with its effects on the individual, the family, and the State. More effectively, perhaps, than any other ancient poet except Euripides, he makes us realise the contending forces that determine the destiny of man; and his own profound belief in the righteousness of Zeus hardly suffices to dispel in us the doubts which he awakens. In Sophocles, on the other hand, though he is by no means unconscious of the discordant elements in human life and destiny, the prevailing note is one of reconciliation, harmony, and peace—in a word, *εὐφημία*. It is this which distinguishes his poetry from the storm and stress of Aeschylean drama on the one hand, and on the other hand from the drama of Euripides, in whom the apparent contradictions in the divine administration of the world have engendered a strong current, if not of irreligion, at least of hostility to the traditional faith of Greece.

All that we know of the life and character of Sophocles is in keeping with the spirit of his Muse. In a comedy produced just after he had died, a contemporary poet thus writes his epitaph: "Happy was Sophocles. He died after a long life, blest by the gods and skilful in his art,

having composed many beautiful tragedies. He suffered no evil, and his end was peace.”¹ Aristophanes, in a well-known line, describes him as “cheerful in Hades’ kingdom as on earth.”² According to the life of Sophocles, the charm of his character was such that all men everywhere loved him, and he was dear to the Gods beyond all other men—*θεοφιλής, ὡς οὐκ ἄλλος*.³ “It was his temperament,” says Sir Richard Jebb, “to look around him for elements of conciliation, to evoke gentle and mediating influences, rather than to make war on the forces which he regarded as sinister:—it might be said of him, as of a person in one of his own plays, *οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφν*.”⁴

I have said in a former lecture that of all the great Greek poets, Sophocles is, perhaps, the most religious. In ordinary Greek ethics, as we have often seen, the most fundamental concept is that of moderation or self-control (*σωφροσύνη*). With Sophocles it is rather piety (*εὐσέβεια*). As Dronke has observed, he gives a higher consecration to human virtue by connecting it with religion, the source and fountain from which, as he believes, all virtue springs.⁵ It is the duty of reverence (*εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς*) which the deified Heracles declares to be supreme above all other duties.

“Revere

The gods: all things my father Zeus to this
Counts second. Piety dies not with men;
But, whether they live or die, yet it endures.”⁶

Let us endeavour, if possible, to discover those elements in the drama of Sophocles to which its distinctively religious character would seem to be due.

¹ Phrynichus, *Musae* 1 Meinelke.

² *Frogs* 82.

³ 39 ff. Dindorf.

⁴ Preface to *O. T.* p. xxvii. *Ant.* 528, “’Tis not my nature to

join in hating, but in loving” (Jebb).

⁵ *Die relig. u. sittlichen Vorstell. d. Aesch. u. Sophokles* p. 66.

⁶ *Phil.* 1441 ff., tr. Whitelaw. *Of. Ant.* 1348 ff.; *Aj.* 127 ff.

We note at the outset that Sophocles is not disposed to reject the orthodox representations of the divine nature. He is in no sense of the term an iconoclast, like Euripides; nor does he definitely break with any of those conceptions of the Godhead which, however unworthy they might be, had still a sanction in the religious consciousness of his age and nation. Once or twice he seems to criticise them, but that is all.¹ In Sophocles, the omnipotent Gods are still the givers of evil as well as of good:² he does not ascribe to them moral purity, any more than Aeschylus or Pindar;³ and he is not concerned to deny the truth of the old adage that the Gods make evil seem good to one whom they are minded to destroy.⁴ It is in harmony with the whole attitude of Sophocles that he allows these and similarly crude ideas to maintain their position by the side of purer and more enlightened views, without, as a rule, attempting to refine or spiritualise them into something higher. These conceptions formed part of the national religion, from which he had no desire to cut himself adrift; and he does not scruple to employ them throughout his dramas. It is another question whether Sophocles himself really believed in all the lower elements of the traditional theology. Such a question would have to be considered in the light of his religious teaching as a whole, and the answer would probably be in the negative. But however this may be, for the truly characteristic and essential features of Sophocles' religion we must look elsewhere.

One of the most noteworthy and fundamental of the religious ideas to be found in Sophocles is that of an immutable moral order or law, the origin and sanction of which are alike divine. The clearest affirmation of this doctrine is in a chorus of the *Oedipus the King*, thus

¹ *fr.* 103 (if genuine); cf. *Phil.* 446 ff.

² *Tr.* 1266 ff.

³ e.g. *Tr.* 500 f.; *Ant.* 944 ff.

⁴ *Ant.* 621 ff.

translated by Professor Jebb: "May destiny still find me winning the praise of reverent purity in all words and deeds sanctioned by those laws of range sublime called into life throughout the high clear heaven, whose father is Olympus alone; their parent was no race of mortal men, no, nor shall oblivion ever lay them to sleep; the god is mighty in them, and he grows not old (*μέγας ἐν τούτοις θεός, οὐδὲ γηράσκει*).¹

These divinely-appointed principles are represented by Sophocles as of prior obligation to every human law; and he has illustrated and enforced their paramount claims on our allegiance in what is perhaps the most beautiful and affecting of all his plays, the *Antigone*. The whole action of that drama turns upon the idea of a conflict between the law of God and the law of man. The rival principles come into the sharpest possible collision, with tragic consequences to the chief actors on both sides; but the poet leaves us in no doubt as to the path where Duty points. In a notable passage of his *Confessions*, St. Augustine declares that "when God directs anything to be done against the law or compact of any State, even if it has never been done there, it is to be done; if it were discontinued, it is to be resumed; if it had never been ordered, it is to be ordered."² The play of Sophocles is an excellent illustration of this remark. On the one side stands Antigone, the champion of those unwritten laws whose origin is from on high; on the other side, Creon, representing the principle on which the stability of civic life depends, that of subordination to authority, and unquestioning obedience to the laws and ordinances of the State. Antigone does not deny that in sprinkling a handful of dust upon the body of her brother she had knowingly and deliberately transgressed against the

¹ 863 ff. Cf. *El.* 1098 ff.; *Aj.* 1180 f., 1343 f.

² Book iii. c. 8, § 2, tr. Bigg.

royal edict; but she justifies herself on the ground that otherwise she must have disobeyed the higher law ordained by Zeus himself.

“ Nowise from Zeus, methought, this edict came,
 Nor Justice, that abides among the gods
 In Hades, who ordained these laws for men.
 Nor did I deem *thine* edicts of such force
 That they, a mortal's bidding, should o'erride
 Unwritten laws, eternal in the heavens.
 Not of to-day or yesterday are these,
 But live from everlasting, and from whence
 They sprang, none knoweth.”¹

The subsequent course of the drama makes it certain that Antigone here expresses the poet's own belief, and not merely a sentiment in keeping with the situation in which she is placed. It has frequently, indeed, been thought that Sophocles did not intend to represent Antigone as altogether in the right. The authority of civic law deserves recognition as well as the higher principle of obedience to the law of God; so that the doom which overtakes Antigone might seem to be a vindication of the lower, as the punishment of Creon is a vindication of the higher law.² But as we shall afterwards see, the Aeschylean doctrine that suffering necessarily presupposes guilt is no longer held by Sophocles; and Sir Richard Jebb has made it clear that Antigone would have been pronounced guiltless, both by the poet himself and by his audience. It is true that the Chorus of Theban elders, although they disapprove the edict of Creon, are at first disposed to censure Antigone for having disobeyed it.

“ To furthest brink of boldness thou didst stray,
 And stumbling there, at foot of Justice' throne,

¹ *Ant.* 450 ff. Whitelaw.

² See, e.g., Mr. Churton Collins, *Studies in Shakespeare* p. 161.

Full heavily, my daughter, hast thou fallen.

Religion prompts the reverent deed :
But power, to whomso power belongs,
Must nowise be transgressed ; and thee
A self-willed temper hath o'erthrown."¹

But the attitude of the Chorus undergoes a complete transformation in the course of the play ; and it is their later, not their earlier view, which we must take to represent the poet's own judgment of his heroine.² The Athenian spectators would have agreed with the poet. For, on the one hand, Creon would seem to them an unconstitutional ruler or tyrant, with no real claim on the obedience of his subjects ; and, on the other hand, they would feel that Antigone was "fulfilling one of the most sacred and the most imperative duties known to Greek religion."³ To leave the dead unburied was to inflict dishonour not only on them, but also on the Gods.⁴ We may be sure, I think, that when Antigone claims to be "sinless in her crime,"—*δῶία πανουρηήσασα*,⁵—she is expressing what every spectator, as well as the poet himself, believed to be true.

It would accordingly seem that in the view of Sophocles there is a law eternal in the heavens, beyond and above all transitory human laws. He affirms the right and even the duty of the individual conscience to rebel against the law of the State, whenever they come into deadly conflict with each other. We must obey God rather than man. This is just the principle for which Socrates died.⁶ It should also be observed that what the poet calls the eternal ordinance of Zeus, becomes in philosophy the ordinance of Nature. "There

¹ 852 ff., 872 ff. Whitelaw.

² 1091 ff., 1270, 1349 ff.

³ Jebb p. xxv.

⁴ *Ant.* 76 f. ; cf. *Aj.* 1129, 1343 f.

⁵ 74. See Jebb pp. xxii-xxvii.

⁶ Plato, *Ap.* 37 E.

exists," says Aristotle, "a *natural* and universal right and wrong, even where men have made no compact or bargain among themselves, and this natural right is instinctively apprehended by all" (δ *μαντεύονται* *τι πάντες*). "This," he adds, "is what the Antigone of Sophocles appears to mean, when she declares that it is right to bury Polyneices in spite of the prohibition: she means that it is right *by nature*; for the law in question is 'not of to-day or yesterday, but from all time; and when it was first revealed none knoweth.'"¹ You will see from this passage that the Sophoclean doctrine of a divinely-appointed law, appealing directly to the individual conscience and of higher authority than the decrees of any particular community or State, belongs to a type of thought which has played a great part in subsequent theology. It is, in fact, the basis of what is called "natural religion," for it involves the idea of a revelation written by God or Nature in the heart of man.²

The peculiarly religious character of the drama of Sophocles will appear, I think, from the view he takes of the place of suffering in human life. We have seen that Aeschylus invariably represented suffering as due to sin, thereby saving, in the words of a distinguished critic, "the justice of God at the expense of facts."³ With Sophocles a more reasonable attitude prevails. He recognises, of course, like all the poets, that sin is one of the most frequent and fertile sources of calamity. Thus it is the presumptuous pride and self-confidence of Ajax that brings about his downfall. "Others may triumph with the help of Gods; as for me," cries Ajax, "I am strong enough to stand

¹ *Rhet.* i. 13. 1378^b 6 ff.

² Cf. St. Paul, Rom. ii. 15, with

Sanday and Headlam's Commentary pp. 58-60.

³ E. Abbott, *Hellenica* p. 65.

alone."¹ Athena points the moral to Odysseus in these words:

"So having eyes to see, keep thou thy lips,
And of the gods speak never a boastful word;
And show no swelling port, because thy hand
Is heavier than another's, or than his
Deeper the soundings of thy hoarded gold.
For a day lays low, and a day restores
All human things: and humbleness the gods
Love, but all evil-doers they abhor."²

In like manner the doom that falls upon Creon and his household in the *Antigone* is the immediate consequence of his sin against the unwritten laws of Heaven. But at other times the poet makes it clear that the most grievous sufferings are compatible with the innocence of the victim. *Antigone*, as we have seen, is wholly innocent. An even more striking example is furnished by the story of *Deianeira*, perhaps the most touching and pathetic figure in the whole of Greek drama. The destruction in which she involves both *Heracles* and herself does not result from loyalty to a divinely-established law, as in the case of *Antigone*. The motive which impels *Deianeira* is something tenderer and more human—the desire to reclaim the love of a faithless husband; but none the less does *Sophocles* acquit her of blame. "Ἀπαν τὸ χρεῖμα ἡμαρτε χρηστὰ μωμένη: "This is the sum: she erred, intending well"—³ so *Hyllus* pleads, and so, we may be sure, the dramatist himself believed. In one of the fragments we read, "No one who sins unwillingly is evil" (ἄκων δ' ἁμαρτῶν οὐτις ἀνθρώπων κακός).⁴ The involuntary error as well as the deliberate transgression is sometimes fraught with far-reaching consequences of suffering and woe; but for these consequences the agent is not, in the view of

¹ *Aj.* 767 ff.

² *Aj.* 127 ff. *Whitelaw.*

³ *Tr.* 1136.

⁴ *fr.* 604.

Sophocles, to be held morally responsible. The same lesson may be learnt from the history of Oedipus as dramatised by the poet in *Oedipus the King* and *Oedipus at Colonus*. Some have supposed that Sophocles intended to represent Oedipus as having contracted a moral as well as a ceremonial stain through the terrible deeds which he committed; but Dronke has succeeded, I think, in proving that the poet had no such purpose.¹ The self-reproaches of the hero at the close of *Oedipus the King*, and the cruel penalty which he inflicts upon himself, do not justify us in attributing to him moral guilt: they rather bear witness to his piety, indicative as they are of the horror which a religious nature would feel at having been the unconscious instrument of such unholy acts. But it is to the *Oedipus at Colonus* that we must look for a full solution of this question. In that play, Oedipus is now finally assured of his innocence in the eyes of Heaven. He is a man more sinned against than sinning—τά γ' ἔργα μου ¹ πεπονθότ' ἐστὶ μάλλον ἢ δεδρακότα: ² nay more, as Sir Richard Jebb remarks, "he has come to look upon himself as a person set apart by the Gods to illustrate their will,—as sacred."³ It is in this aspect that Sophocles represents him throughout the greater part of the play, and more particularly in the scene when he makes his mysterious departure from the world.

"On the silence fell

A voice of one who summoned, and its sound
Stiffened with sudden fear the hair of all
Who heard: for the god called, and called again,
'Oedipus, Oedipus, why tarriest thou
With these so long? 'tis time that we were gone.'

But by what manner of death died Oedipus,
No man can tell, but Theseus, he alone.

¹ p. 72 ff. of the monograph cited
on p. 164 n. 5 above.

² O. C. 266 f.

³ p. xxi.

For it was not any firebolt, swift from heaven,
Despatched him, no, nor a whirlwind from the sea
Rose in a minute and caught him from our sight;
But either the gods took him, or the earth
Was kind, and opened for him her cavernous jaws.
For nowise lamentably he passed, nor slain
By sickness, pitiably—a marvel, how—
Whose like was never.”¹

We may therefore conclude that suffering did not to Sophocles of necessity imply the presence of sin. But it is obvious that this brings us face to face with a new difficulty. How is one to reconcile the justice of the Gods with the calamities which they sometimes permit to fall upon the innocent? That the problem sometimes exercised the mind of Sophocles, we cannot but believe; and we have all the more reason for thinking that it did, because Sophocles is not less convinced than Aeschylus that Justice sits by the throne of God.² Even when there is no more help in man, the thought that God is just and will yet avenge the righteous inspires new hope and courage, as when the Chorus comfort Electra with these words—*θάρσει μοι, θάρσει, τέκνον· ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῶ Ἰεὺς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει*:³ “Courage, my child, courage: great Zeus still reigns in heaven, who sees and governs all.” What are we to say, then, about the sufferings of the innocent? Does the drama of Sophocles suggest any explanation of undeserved calamity?

We have seen that in Aeschylus suffering is sometimes regarded as a discipline. “We learn by suffering”: *πάθος μάθος*. In like manner, Oedipus claims to have been taught by suffering and time;⁴ and in spite of the scene in which he spurns his suppliant son,⁵ we feel that Oedipus at Colonus is a different being from Oedipus

¹ 1623 ff. Whitelaw.

² *O. C.* 1382; *El.* 1064; cf. *O. T.* 274; *O. C.* 278 ff., 1536 ff.; *fr.* 11.

³ *El.* 174 f.; cf. *O. T.* 881, *θεὸς οὐ λήξω ποτὲ προστάτην ἔχων*.

⁴ *O. C.* 7.

⁵ 1348 ff.

at Thebes. If not softened, he is at least chastened and enlightened.¹ "Much is revealed to the soul that is cradled in calamity."² The Theseus of the *Oedipus at Colonus* has been called "the one perfect character" in Sophocles, "the ideal for all time of the perfect gentleman, a companion portrait to Shakespeare's Henry V, but of infinitely finer temper":³ and it is in the school of adversity that he has learnt the lesson of charity and human kindness.⁴ At other times a hope is expressed—it is no more than a hope—that the balance may be redressed hereafter. Antigone would fain believe that the Gods for whose unwritten laws she offers up her life will do her justice in another world. In Hades, perhaps, her deed is accounted holy; and longer is the time she must please the Gods below than the Gods on earth.⁵

"But a good hope I cherish, that, come there,
My father's love will greet me, yea and thine,
My mother—and thy welcome, brother dear:
Since, when ye died, I with mine own hands laved
And dressed your limbs, and poured upon your graves
Libations; and like service done to thee
Hath brought me, Polyneices, now to this."⁶

But for the most part—and it is here that the essentially religious spirit of his drama is best seen—Sophocles seems to invite us to lift our eyes from the suffering of the individual to a consideration of the ulterior purpose which Providence is thereby seeking to fulfil. As the action of the *Trachiniae* unfolds itself, we are led to see that Deianeira's involuntary error, with all its tragic consequences, was the appointed means by which Heracles should be delivered from a life of toil,

¹ Butcher, *Aspects of the Greek Genius* p. 128.

² *fr.* 600.

³ Churton Collins, *Studies in Shakespeare* p. 167.

⁴ *O. C.* 560 ff.

⁵ *Ant.* 74 ff., 521.

⁶ 897 ff. Whitelaw.

and attain to immortality, in accordance with the will of Zeus.¹ The long martyrdom of Philoctetes is represented as foreordained by the Gods, in order that Troy might not fall before due time: it subserves the larger purposes of the divine administration. Neoptolemus sees the hand of Providence throughout. "By heavenly ordinance, if such as I may judge, those first sufferings came on him from relentless Chryse; and the woes that now he bears, with none to tend him, surely he bears by the providence of some god, that so he should not bend against Troy the resistless shafts divine, till the time be fulfilled when, as men say, Troy is fated by those shafts to fall."² And at the close of the play, when Philoctetes is about to embark for home, leaving his high destiny unfulfilled, the now deified Heracles appears from heaven to warn him that, by the counsel of Zeus, he is the instrument ordained for the overthrow of Troy. The sufferings he has endured will serve but to enhance his future glory:

"Yea, and know well, this debt is thine to pay,
Through suffering to make glorious thy life."³

The position of Sophocles with regard to the place of suffering in human life is to a certain extent anticipated, I think, by Heraclitus. According to the Heraclitean view, "God accomplishes all things for the harmony of the whole." "Men," Heraclitus says, "deem some things right and others wrong; but to God all things are beautiful and good and right."⁴ I do not, of course, suggest that Sophocles borrowed the idea from Heraclitus: it is an idea to which many religious thinkers have independently attained. I merely say that the Heraclitean fragment seems already to express what Sophocles teaches

¹ *Tr.* 1159 ff.; cf. 1270 (with Jebb's note) and *Phil.* 1418 ff.

² *Phil.* 192 ff., tr. Jebb.

³ 1421 f., tr. Whitelaw.

⁴ *fr.* 81 Bywater.

about the providential government of the world. Since Matthew Arnold wrote his sonnet, it has been a commonplace to say of the Athenian dramatist that he "saw life steadily, and saw it whole." Sophocles would have approved, I think, of the lines of Browning :

"For, what we call this life of men on earth,
This sequence of the soul's achievements here,
Being, as I find much reason to conceive,
Intended to be viewed eventually
As a great whole, not analysed to parts,
But each part having reference to all,—
How shall a certain part, pronounced complete,
Endure effacement by another part?"¹

But it is not only the life of the individual that the poet thus regards. He seems to have extended his outlook to the whole movement of human destiny, and to have seen therein the fulfilment of a single harmonious purpose, which is none other than the will of Zeus. Heraclitus, as will afterwards be pointed out, maintains that the harmony of the universe not only permits, but is actually founded in, discord. Sophocles would certainly have stopped short of so extreme a view; but at the same time he seems to recognise that the universal harmony is not incompatible with partial dissonances, and among these, apparently, we are to reckon the calamities that sometimes overtake the innocent. None the less he would have said, I think, that if only we could see things from the universal point of view—*sub specie aeternitatis*, as it were—we should perceive that even these dissonances promote the harmony of God. "Undeserved suffering," says Professor Butcher, "while it is exhibited in Sophocles under various lights, always appears as part of the permitted evil which is a condition of a just and harmoniously ordered universe."² ✓

¹ *Cleon*.

² *Aspects of the Greek Genius* p. 127.

A further question naturally suggests itself in connexion with Sophocles' belief in a single all-embracing plan or purpose according to which the world is ruled. If there is a unity of purpose, must there not also be a unity of power? In more than one of the early Christian apologists, we meet with a fragment, attributed to Sophocles, in which the unity of God is emphatically affirmed. "There is in truth but one God, who fashioned the heavens and the great earth and the sea's dark gulf and the mighty winds. But in the error of our hearts we mortal men have often set up in solace of our woes statues of Gods in stone or wood, or images fashioned in gold or ivory; and we deem ourselves pious when we offer sacrifices to them, and in their honour hold unmeaning festivals."¹ But this fragment has long been recognised as spurious. It is of a piece with another fragment ascribed to Sophocles by Justin Martyr, embodying the Stoic and Christian idea of the dissolution of the world by fire.² Each of these two passages belongs, in all probability, to the not inconsiderable number of forgeries made about this period with the object of establishing the favourite patristic notion that Greek philosophy and poetry prepared the way for the Gospel. More recently, and with more reason, it has been contended that the polytheism of Sophocles was "if not nominally, at least practically monotheism." In the Essay on "Sophocles and Shakespeare," to which I have already referred, Mr. Churton Collins remarks: "What concerns us is that the poet has sublimated him" (*i.e.* Zeus) "into the Father of Law—the eternal, immutable upholder of Justice and Righteousness and Purity, with Apollo Pythius for his prophet—with all other deities as his symbolized functions or his symbolized ministers; that he

¹ *fr.* 1025 (reading, with Justin etc., τε και ξύλων for η χαλκείων, and τεύχοντες for στέφαντες).

² 1027.

has become πάνταρχος θεῶν, πανόπτας—the All-ruling Lord of Heaven, the all-seeing One, King of kings and Lord of lords, Aristotle's τὸ θεῖον περιέχον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν—the Divine Power containing the whole of nature. Thus 'the Gods' and 'God' become synonymous: thus the polytheism of Sophocles becomes, if not nominally, at least practically monotheism."¹ A kind of "preparation" for monotheism has also been found in the variety of epithets which the poet applies to Zeus, such as ἐρκείως "God of the homestead," ἰκέσιος "protector of suppliants," τροπαῖος "stayer of the fight," and so on, all of them significant of particular aspects of the one Supreme Being, or of particular relations between him and mankind. But in this usage there is nothing peculiarly Sophoclean; and the point rather is whether the Gods (other than Zeus) of whom the poet speaks—and all the most important members of the Homeric Pantheon appear in Sophocles—are only "symbolized functions" or "ministers" of Zeus and nothing more. To me it seems that, with the exception, perhaps, of Aphrodite, whom Sophocles in one of the most remarkable of his fragments,² appears to rationalise into the principle of passion pervading the whole of nature like the *Aeneadum genetrix* of Lucretius, the Sophoclean Gods are still conceived as personal beings, with special characteristics of their own, in addition to those which belong to the Godhead as such. The one essential difference between the polytheism of Homer and the polytheism of Sophocles is that in Sophocles there is no longer any conflict of wills in the celestial hierarchy: the authority of Zeus is not only supreme, but unquestioned. To this extent, no doubt, the theology of Sophocles points towards monotheism, and monotheism is perhaps its logical result; for "where there is no discord, plurality

¹ *Studies in Shakespeare* p. 158.

² 855. Some critics, however, assign this fragment to Euripides.

is a form of unity." But we must still believe that Apollo, Athena, and the rest were believed by the poet to be distinct and separate individualities, unless we are to suppose him capable of the kind of conscious allegorisation which was afterwards practised by the Stoics.

Writers on Sophocles have sometimes laid stress on the distinctively spiritual character of his religious sentiment,¹ as compared with that of earlier Greek poetry. True religion, he seems to suggest, does not consist in outward deeds, but in purity and loyalty of soul. It is the *ψυχὴ εὖνους*—the loyal heart—which is acceptable to the Gods. The most noteworthy expression of this sentiment is when Oedipus asks one of his two daughters to make an offering on his behalf to the Eumenides, at whose shrine he is about to lay down the burden of his life. "I cannot go; for I am disabled by lack of strength and lack of sight, evils twain. But let one of you two go and do these things. For I think that one soul suffices to pay this debt for ten thousand, if it come with good will to the shrine"—*ἦν εὖνους παρῆ*.² The touching and beautiful phrase, *ἀντὶ μυρίων μίαν ψυχὴν*, "one soul in place of ten thousand," from its resemblance to the Christian *λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*, "a ransom for many,"³ has frequently been cited as a *testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae*.

No intelligent reader of Sophocles can fail to be struck with at least one obvious contrast between him and his great predecessor—I mean the note of sympathy for human weakness that makes itself heard throughout his poetry. "All men," says Teiresias, "are prone to error"—*ἀνθρώποισι γὰρ ἰ τοῖς πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστι τοῦ ξαμαρτάνειν*: "but when an error has been made, that man is no longer ill-advised or unblest, who tries to heal the evil into which he has fallen, and remains not immovable."⁴

¹ Dronke, *l.c.* p. 85 ff.

² *U. C.* 495 ff., tr. Jebb. *Cf. fr.* 97.

³ *Matt.* xx. 28; *Mark* x. 45.

⁴ *Ant.* 1023 ff.

The duty of forgiveness, like all other duties, has a religious sanction: for Mercy as well as Justice sits by the throne of Zeus. I have already pointed out¹ that the example set by the Gods is rarely appealed to by Greek moralists before Plato, with whom "assimilation to God" becomes for the first time the ethical end. There is, however, a touching instance in the *Oedipus at Colonus*. "But forasmuch as Zeus himself in all his works hath Mercy for the partner of his throne, shall she not also find a place by thee, my father?"² For a Christian parallel, we have the exhortation of St. Paul: "Be ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving each other, even as God also in Christ forgave you."³

The sufferings as well as the sins of human life move Sophocles to pity. The melancholy of Sophocles is different, I think, from that of other Greek writers, though it clothes itself in similar language: it is quieter and more subdued, more like the pathos of Virgil, a poet with whom in other respects Sophocles has much in common. "Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt." Man is but a breath, a shadow—*πνεῦμα καὶ σκιὰ μόνον*.⁴ Only the Gods are free from trouble:⁵

"To all men sorrow and joy alternate come,
Revolving, as in heaven
The twisting courses of the Bear."⁶

In more than one passage the poet cites the old Greek proverb, "Call no man happy till he dies."⁷ The climax is reached in a chorus of the *Oedipus at Colonus*:

"Not to be born is past disputing best:
And, after this, his lot transcends,
Who, seen on earth for briefest while,
Thither returns from whence he came."⁸

¹ p. 65, above.

² 1267 ff. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 9. 497.

³ Eph. iv. 32.

⁴ *fr.* 12, 859. Cf. *Aj.* 125 f.

⁵ *fr.* 860.

⁶ *Tr.* 129 Whitelaw.

⁷ *Tr.* 1 ff.; *O. T.* 1529 f.; *fr.* 588.

⁸ 1225 ff. Whitelaw.

But against these sombre reflections, the last of which is wrung from the Chorus by the spectacle of Oedipus still buffeted by fortune, should be placed the hymn to man in the *Antigone*, the larger part of which is a song of triumph celebrating man's conquest of reluctant nature. ἄπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔρχεται ἰ τὸ μέλλον: "resourceless he ne'er faces what must come": against Death alone he fights in vain.¹ The melancholy of Euripides sometimes sinks into despair; but in Sophocles the sentiment is chastened and subdued by faith in the Providence that shapes our lives. Even in the darkest hour, the consciousness that God still reigns is never far away: ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς. "Set thine eyes upon the Gods, and should they bid thee travel beyond the right (ἔξω δίκης), thither thou must go: for nought to which the Gods lead is base (αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν ὑφηγοῦνται θεοί)." ²

Finally, we have to consider the attitude of Sophoclean drama on the question of immortality. This is a subject on which very different views have been maintained by different scholars. According to Dronke, immortality is the natural crown and coping-stone of the religion of Sophocles, and we are therefore bound to attribute the belief to him.³ Mr. Churton Collins, on the other hand, declares that in Sophocles, as in Shakespeare, "it is quite impossible to say on which side the balance of probability really inclines,"⁴ whether for or against the view that he believed in immortality.

If we examine the passages in which Sophocles makes allusion to death and its sequel, we shall find, I think, that they fall into three classes. In the first, death is spoken of in the usual conventional way as ὁ αἰένουπος, ὁ παγκοίτας, "the giver of eternal sleep," "the God who

¹ 332 ff.
² fr. 226.

³ *l.c.* p. 88 ff.
⁴ *Studies in Shakespeare* p. 171.

gives sleep to all.”¹ It is needless to say that no inference can legitimately be drawn from these and similar epithets. The second group of passages describe what is virtually the Homeric Hades. The land of the dead, like Homer’s Erebus, lies far in the west,² or beneath the ground,³ a night-enshrouded kingdom⁴ under the rule of Hades and his bride Persephone.⁵ Other Epic features are the lake of Acheron,⁶ and Cerberus, the untameable watch-dog of Hades, lying crouched before the gates of the Stygian halls.⁷ To this land Hermes in his capacity of *ψυχοπομπός*⁸ conducts the shades. Sophocles is still on Homeric ground when he describes the tortures of Ixion,⁹ and when he attributes to the prophet Amphiaraus a more substantial existence than the other shades enjoy.¹⁰ To the third category we may assign those passages which carry us beyond the Homeric conception of futurity. Of these by far the most remarkable is where Antigone expresses the hope that her kinsmen will receive her with loving welcome in the other world :

“But a good hope I cherish, that, come there,
My father’s love will greet me, yea and thine,
My mother—and thy welcome, brother dear.”¹¹

Nowhere else, I think, in speaking of the future life, does the poet strike so individual and personal a note. To the rest of his utterances on the subject, parallels can always be found in earlier Greek poetry. It is repeatedly implied in the *Electra* that the spirits of the departed retain, as Plato might say, both *δύναμις* and *φρόνησις*, power to affect the fortunes of the living, and intelligence

¹ *O. C.* 1578; *Ant.* 804. Cf. *Tr.* 1178 and *fr.* 518.

² *O. T.* 177.

³ *O. C.* 1568.

⁴ *Ant.* 879. Hades as *ἐννεχίω* *ἀνάξ*, *O. C.* 1559.

⁵ *El.* 110; *Ant.* 898 f.

⁶ *El.* 138; *Ant.* 812; *fr.* 480.

⁷ *O. C.* 1568 ff.

⁸ *El.* 111, 1395 f.

⁹ *Phil.* 676 ff.

¹⁰ *El.* 841, *πράμψυχος ἀνάσσει*.

¹¹ *Ant.* 897 ff. Whitelaw.

to understand the prayers and invocations addressed to them by their descendants.¹ This is no more than we constantly find in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus; and Pindar has anticipated the fragment referring to the mysteries:

"Of mortal men
Thrice blessed they, who, having seen these rites,
Pass to the realm of Hades: they alone
Live yonder; with the rest all evil dwells."²

The mysteries alluded to are, of course, the Eleusinian, and not those unauthorised and unofficial mysteries which were associated with the name of Orpheus. Here, as elsewhere, if we except the fragment that speaks of a judgment after death,³ Sophocles keeps his drama pure from Orphic and Pythagorean elements. There is, I think, no certain allusion in his plays or fragments to the familiar features of Orphic ethics and eschatology—the entombment of the soul in the body, metempsychosis and the circle of births, together with purgatorial punishment in the intervening state.

These, then, are the most characteristic and important references to a future state in Sophoclean drama. If we have regard to the nature and conditions of dramatic poetry, we shall be slow to attribute to Sophocles a sure belief in immortality on the strength of isolated passages of this kind. Nor do I think it can be said that such a doctrine is necessarily involved in the dramatic action or in the *dénouement* of any of the plays. Dronke, indeed, maintains that the Sophoclean conception of Providence must of necessity have carried with it the belief in a future existence capable of redressing the inequalities and disproportions of this present life.⁴ I do not think we

¹ 417 ff., 453, 459, 482, 1066. Cf. *O. C.* 91 ff., 787 ff.; *Ant.* 65 f., 89; *Tr.* 1201 f. *et al.*

² *fr.* 753; cf. *fr.* 805, and above, p. 187 n. 1.

³ 703; cf. 480 (lamentation on the shores of Acheron).

⁴ *l.c.* p. 88 ff.

need suppose that the poet developed his ideas with so much consistency; and in point of fact the notion of recompense hereafter is much less prominent in Sophocles than in Pindar. But the question what Sophocles himself believed on this subject is as irrelevant as it is impossible to answer. The relevant consideration here, as elsewhere, is that he gives expression in his poetry to certain ideas which have a value in themselves, whether they spring from any dogmatic creed or not. We can say, at all events, that the thought of immortality was often present to the mind of Sophocles, and that once, at least, in the speech of Antigone, it is clothed in a new and, as it would seem, characteristic form. Hardly less characteristic, perhaps, is the suggestion of immortality in the lines which more than any other single passage express the religious teaching of Sophoclean drama: "Remember that ye show piety to the Gods. All other things our father Zeus counts second to this: for piety dies not with men: whether they live or die, it endures for ever."

οὐ γὰρ ἡίσέβεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς
κἀν ζῶσι κἀν θάνωσι, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.¹

¹ *Phil.* 1440 ff.

LECTURE IX

FROM THALES TO XENOPHANES

WE have already seen that the gradual evolution of theological and religious thought in Greece, so far as it is reflected in Greek literature down to the time of Euripides, follows two for the most part distinct and independent paths. On the one hand, we have the poetical development, culminating in the drama of Sophocles; and, on the other hand, there is the philosophical development, which reaches, perhaps, its highest point in the Anaxagorean doctrine of *Nous*. Up to the present, we have confined ourselves almost exclusively to the poets; but we must now desert the Muses for Philosophy.

The first three thinkers of whom we have to treat are Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, who flourished at Miletus in the sixth century before Christ. With the general character of their doctrine we are not concerned: it will suffice to remind you that they each attempted to explain the universe from a single cosmogonical principle, which Thales identified with water, Anaximander with the "boundless" or "Infinite," a material substance of infinite extent, and Anaximenes with air. They do not touch on ethical questions at all; and such subjects as the moral being and attributes of God lie outside the range of their inquiries. But they are nevertheless credited with certain theological

or quasi-theological beliefs, which deserve attention both for their own sakes, and also because they appear in some instances to anticipate or foreshadow later and more advanced conceptions; and these, or the most important of them, it is now our duty to examine.

Let us begin with Thales. The solitary theological doctrine which we seem to be justified in ascribing to Thales, is expressed in the words, "All things are full of Gods."¹ Unfortunately, it is not possible to decide for certain whether this saying has any relation to Thales' cosmological views, or whether, as Professor Burnet² and M. Bovet³ suppose, it is only a "mere apophthegm of the common type," "a passing expression of Thales' religious sentiment," without any organic connexion with the physical doctrine of the philosopher. It bears a curious resemblance to the remark attributed to Heraclitus when inviting some friends to enter the room where he was sitting: "Even here," said he, "there are Gods."⁴ According to the conjecture of Aristotle,⁵—for it is a conjecture and nothing more,—Thales had in his mind the philosophical conception of an indwelling soul, mingled with the structure of the universe; and this conjecture receives perhaps a little support from another passage of the *de Anima*, in which Aristotle mentions that Thales was believed to have said, "The magnetic stone is possessed of a soul, because it moves the iron."⁶ If Aristotle's conjecture is correct, the germs of the Platonic and Stoic belief in a World-soul, sustaining and moving all that is, are as old as Thales; and we find the maturest form of the doctrine ascribed to Thales by Stobaeus, where he says: "Thales believed that God is the intellect (*νοῦς*) of the world; that the universe is

¹ Arist. *de An.* i. 5. 411^a 8.

² *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 45.

³ *Le Dieu de Platon* p. 88.

⁴ Arist. *de part. An.* i. 5. 645^a 17 ff. Cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 7.

⁵ *de An. l.c.*

⁶ i. 2. 405^a 19 ff.

at once alive and full of spirits; and that a divine power permeates the elementary moisture and communicates to it motion."¹ That Stoic influence is here at work, no one will deny; but the conjecture of Aristotle stands on a somewhat different footing; and if it is true that Thales ascribed a soul to the magnet, he may possibly have believed, as Aristotle supposed he did believe, that movement in general is a result of life or soul.² Nor is it otherwise than in harmony with the general character of early Ionic hylozoism to conceive of the universe as alive, because the original elements, water, air, and so on, out of which the hylozoists construct the universe, perform the function of efficient as well as of material causes, and are therefore in a certain sense themselves endowed with energy and life. But it must be allowed that the words of Thales, taken by themselves, and apart from the explanation of Aristotle, appear to be only a pious sentiment; and historians of philosophy are now for the most part disinclined to attach to the dictum any philosophical significance at all.

The ἀπειρον or "Infinite" of Anaximander is, primarily speaking, a physical concept, being nothing but the infinite or boundless matter which he regarded as the elementary substance out of which the world is produced. The first step towards the formation of a cosmos is when certain pairs of opposites, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist etc., have been separated out from the ἀπειρον.³ What particular kind of matter Anaximander had in view when speaking of the "Infinite," we are nowhere told by the philosopher himself; and many different theories have been advanced.⁴ All that can with certainty be affirmed is that he did not identify the "Infinite"

¹ Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* p. 301^b.

² Cf. Plato, *Laws* 899 B.

³ Diels, *f. d. Vorsokr.*² i. p. 13, §§ 9, 10.

⁴ See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 52 ff.

with any of the four elements. The only question which concerns us in these lectures is whether Anaximander's concept has any relations with theology. In the first place, then, it is no mere dead matter, but a living substance, possessed of eternal motion, and indebted to itself alone for that process of separation which brings the cosmos into being; and, in the second place, Anaximander described it as "immortal and imperishable," "eternal and ageless," "encompassing and steering all things," "encompassing all the worlds."¹ If we remember that the Infinite to Anaximander represents the ultimate cause, and that immortality was always believed by the Greeks to be an attribute of the Godhead, we shall be disposed to see in these characterisations a tendency to identify the Infinite with God; and Aristotle evidently holds that Anaximander's Infinite is in point of fact the same as "the divine" (τὸ θεῖον).² According to this interpretation, we must attribute to Anaximander the same pantheistic conception of the universe which Aristotle, whether rightly or wrongly, attributed, as we saw, to Thales; and I think we can support this conclusion by some further evidence. In a passage of the *de Natura Deorum*, which has been much discussed in connexion with the theology of Anaximander, Cicero says: "It is the opinion of Anaximander that there are created Gods, rising and disappearing at long intervals, and that these are the innumerable worlds."³ The "innumerable worlds," as Professor Burnet has in my opinion proved, are coexistent, or partially coexistent, and not a series or chain of worlds rushing in swift succession "from creation to decay." Professor Burnet's suggestion that the "long intervals" are intervals of space and not of time, appears to me to be supported

¹ Diels, *l.c.* i. p. 14, § 15; p. 13, § 11.

² Diels *l.c.*

³ i. 25. Cicero is apparently following Philodemus or the authority on which he relied. See Diels, *Doz.* p. 121 ff., 581.

by a passage in Stobæus, which shows that Anaximander had considered the subject of the *intermundia* or distances between the worlds.¹ But the point with which we are more particularly concerned relates to this doctrine of "created Gods,"—a doctrine which, in a different shape, recurs again in the *Timæus* of Plato. In Plato the "created Gods" are so called in contrast to the one and uncreated God, who is their father and begetter; and we can hardly avoid the conclusion that Anaximander had a similar contrast in his mind when he called the innumerable worlds begotten or created Gods. Where then are we to look for Anaximander's uncreated Deity? The only possible reply is, to the Infinite or boundless, out of which the created Gods arise, and into which they return again at death. It is therefore probable, to say the least, that Anaximander deified the "Infinite."

For the rest, it need only be remarked that Anaximander anticipates Heraclitus by representing Justice in the light of a cosmic agency or power. "At death things pass into that from which they were born, according to what is ordained; for they make reparation and recompense to one another for their injustice at the appointed time."² The notion, you will observe, is that the "opposites," which have been separated out of the *ἀπειρον*, are apt to encroach on one another's sphere, and pay the penalty by being reabsorbed.

Anaximenes differs from Anaximander, and resembles Thales, in so far as he derives the world from one of the four elements. The primary matter he declared to be air, infinite in quantity and possessed of eternal motion or life, by means of which it is transformed into a cosmos through the agency of rarefaction and condensation.³

¹ Diels, *Dox.* p. 329^b 1 ff.

³ Diels² i. p. 18, § 5.

² Diels² i. p. 13, § 9. Cf. Her. *fr.* 29.

We are told by Cicero that Anaximenes pronounced air to be a God (*aera deum statuit*);¹ and the statement is all the more credible, if Anaximenes, as the ancients believed, was a pupil or associate of Anaximander. Towards the end of the fifth century before Christ, the physical theory of Anaximenes was revived by Diogenes of Apollonia, who certainly deified the element of air; but it is hardly permissible to reason from the later to the earlier thinker, because in this, as in other parts of his philosophy, Diogenes may have been influenced by the Anaxagorean concept of a world-forming and world-upholding *Nous*. The argument from the doctrine of "created Gods," however, is one that applies to Anaximenes as well as to Anaximander; for Anaximenes also held this doctrine.²

One of the surviving fragments of Anaximenes' book is remarkable as the earliest example in Greek philosophy of the favourite argument from man to the universe. The fragment runs thus: "Even as our soul, which is air, holds us together, so breath (*πνεῦμα*) and air encompass the whole universe."³ The world, you will observe, is conceived of as a living, breathing whole, like the human frame; and just as we inhale from outside the breath that constitutes our soul, so also the world respire into the surrounding air. The substance as well as the method of Anaximenes' argument deserves to be carefully noted; for the philosopher has clearly in view something akin to the later conception of a soul of the world.⁴

At this point I will invite you to pause and take a retrospect. As we survey the somewhat barren landscape over which we have travelled, two features appear to arrest our attention. In the first place, each of these three thinkers derives the world from a single, self-

¹ *de Nat. Deor.* i. 26; cf. Diels, *Dox.* 302^b 5; 531^b 2.

² Diels² i. p. 19, § 10.

³ *fr.* 2 Diels².

⁴ With *περιέχει* we may perhaps compare Plato, *Tim.* 36 E (*περικαλύψασα*).

sufficient cause, both uncreated and imperishable, at once material and spiritual, or rather, let us say, possessed of life; and, in the second place, there is a disposition to identify this cause with God. The latter of these statements has been emphatically contradicted by M. Bovet, who maintains that "the idea of God had, properly speaking, no place in any philosophical system anterior to that of Plato."¹ It is obvious that everything here depends on what is meant by "properly speaking." The positive evidence for holding that Anaximander and Anaximenes, not to speak of later pre-Platonic thinkers, conceived of their elementary principles as divine, appears to me deserving of more consideration; but in any case—and for us this is the all-important point—they certainly assign to their elementary substances a variety of attributes and functions which were afterwards ascribed to the Deity. The belief in a single world-creating principle, itself uncreated and immortal, to a certain extent foreshadows the conception of God as the one creative and eternal Being, not, indeed, transcendent, but immanent in the world. The full development of this idea is still to come; but it is important to observe that Greek philosophy contained from the first some elements which were bound to bring it into conflict with Greek polytheism, and which were at the same time capable of developing into a more comprehensive and profound theology than anything that the so-called "Bible of the Greeks" provided.

The way for such a revolt against the authority of Homer was already being prepared by the dissemination of Orphic religious ideas during the second half of the sixth century B.C. I have dealt with this subject in a former lecture, and need only remind you now that nearly all the distinguishing features of the Orphic

¹ *Le Dieu de Platon* p. 177.

discipline were irreconcilable with the religion of Homer, such as the more or less explicit pantheism, the depreciation of the body in comparison with the soul, the shifting of the ethical centre of gravity from the present to the future world in consequence of a new conception of immortality, together with the sense of sin and the longing for purification and deliverance. In a soil already, as it would seem, prepared by Orphism, Pythagoras planted that remarkable union of philosophy and religion which we associate with his name. He was a native of Samos; but about 530 B.C., in consequence, perhaps, of the tyranny of Polycrates, he emigrated to Croton, where the Orphic discipline appears to have been by this time established. It is a plausible conjecture, if nothing more, that he attached himself in his adopted country to some Orphic association, which may thus have furnished the nucleus of his school.¹ However this may be, he became the founder of a half-religious, half-scientific brotherhood, which in course of time began to play a part in politics; and when it ultimately obtained the supreme direction of affairs, ruled in the aristocratic interest till overthrown by a revolution in the latter half of the fifth century. Although the original foundation was suppressed, Pythagoreanism still lived; and the dispersion of the surviving members of the Order effectually spread its principles not only through Southern Italy and Sicily, but also on the mainland of Greece.

Iamblichus and others have described with much detail the organisation of the early Pythagorean brotherhood, as well as the daily life of its members;² but for historical purposes their picturesque and circumstantial narratives are of little value. The tendency to idealise

¹ Ion of Chios said that Pythagoras manufactured some "Orphic" poems (Diog. Laert. viii. 8).

² See Iambli. *vit. Pyth.* 96-99.

both the founder of the society and the original foundation itself, called into existence a vast amount of fable and romance that almost entirely conceals from view the beginnings of Pythagoreanism in Greece. It is clear, however, that what Plato calls the "Pythagorean way of life"¹ bore a general resemblance to the Orphic, so far as concerned those rules of abstinence by which it was sought to facilitate the deliverance of the soul.² The few authenticated fragments that remain of primitive Pythagorean psychology belong to the same type. In the opinion of certain Pythagoreans, says Aristotle, the notes that we see dancing in the sunlight are souls:³ and elsewhere the philosopher complains that in the "Pythagorean myths" the connexion between a particular body and a particular soul is arbitrary and accidental: "any soul may enter any body."⁴ A third passage informs us that the object of thunder, according to the Pythagoreans, was to terrify those in hell.⁵ This curious bit of early Pythagorean eschatology seems to have suggested to Plato one of the incidents in the myth of Er—the bellowing of Tartarus whenever any of the incurable sinners expected to be allowed to pass out.⁶ It is manifest that all these isolated observations are in agreement, so far as they go, with Orphic views.⁷ On the strength of a passage in the *Phaedo*, where the Platonic Socrates refers to the "secret doctrine" that man has no right to unbolt the door of his prison-house by suicide,⁸ the early Pythagoreans are usually supposed to have shared the Orphic conception of the body as the dungeon of the soul; and Pythagoras is probably one of those primitive theologians who held that the soul is as it were buried in the body by reason of her

¹ *Rep.* x. 600 B.

² Details are given by Rohde, *Psyche* ² ii. p. 163 ff.

³ *de An.* i. 2. 404^a 17 ff.

⁴ *de An.* i. 3. 407^b 20 ff.

⁵ *Anal. post.* ii. 11. 94^b 33 ff.

⁶ *Rep.* x. 615 E.

⁷ See p. 105 ff.

⁸ §2 B.

sins.¹ The doctrine of transmigration and the "circle of necessity" is one that may without doubt be ascribed to Pythagoras himself. The oldest and most picturesque piece of evidence to this effect is due to Xenophanes, for it is Pythagoras to whom he alludes in the satirical lines:

"Once he was moved to pity—so men say—
Seeing a dog rough-handled by the way.
'Forbear thy hand: housed in yon cur doth lie
A friend of mine: I knew him by his cry.'"²

Finally, as we have already seen, in the time of Eudemus, at all events, if not earlier, the Pythagoreans believed in the doctrine of the "restoration of all things," as it was afterwards understood by the Stoics.³

If this were all that could be affirmed of early Pythagoreanism, we should have to regard it as only an offshoot from the Orphic discipline and creed. But it is in the highest degree probable that the original Pythagorean society combined to a certain extent the love of knowledge with devotion to their founder's rule of life. The evidence of Heraclitus clearly points in this direction; for in his contemptuous allusion to Pythagoras he selects for special mention, not the religious enthusiasm of the prophet, but the learning of the philosopher (*πολυμαθία*).⁴ In all probability, as Döring has attempted to show,⁵ we should conceive of the matter in some such way as this. The great aim of the original Pythagorean brotherhood was identical with that of the Orphic communities—moral salvation or "release" (*λύσις*). But whereas the Orphics endeavoured to attain this object principally by means of abstinence and ceremonial rites, Pythagoras held that the pursuit of knowledge might also contribute to spiritual emancipa-

¹ See p. 98.

² *fr.* 7 Diels. Cf. Hdt. ii. 123, and Diog. Laert. viii. 14.

³ See p. 109.

⁴ *fr.* 16, 17 Bywater. Cf. Emp.

fr. 129, and Hdt. iv. 95.

⁵ *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil.* v. p. 503 ff.

tion. At a later time, the power of *amor intellectualis* to transform the moral as well as the intellectual nature was fully recognised by Plato; it is, in fact, the main-spring of his educational theory. As time went on, the scientific energy thus engendered in the Pythagorean school grew stronger and stronger, until the original motive was in many cases lost sight of, and the desire for moral salvation insensibly became a quest for intellectual truth.

What then was the scientific doctrine of Pythagoras? A brief consideration of one or two points in Aristotle's account of Pythagorean physics may enable us to give at least a conjectural answer to the question. The Pythagoreans, Aristotle says, reared as they were on mathematical studies, imagined that the elements of mathematical existences are also the elements of the universe. Now the "naturally first" and simplest form of mathematical existence is number; and the elements of number are the odd and the even, whereof the former is "limited" and the latter "unlimited." On what grounds the Pythagoreans declared the odd to be limited and the even unlimited, we need not at present inquire:¹ it is enough for our purposes to note that having once arrived, apparently in this way, at the conception of Limit and the Unlimited, they proceeded to evolve the universe from these two principles. Their cosmology was therefore out and out dualistic; nor does Aristotle lend any support to the monistic interpretation of Pythagoreanism with which we meet in later writers. On the contrary, he expressly states that the Pythagoreans derived the world from opposites—*τάναντία ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων*.²

On the one hand, therefore, we have the principle of Limit, and on the other the principle of the Unlimited—

¹ See Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* § i. p. 351 n. 2.

² *Met.* A 5. 985^b 23–986^b 3.

πέρας and *ἄπειρον*. By what means are they brought into connexion with one another? Aristotle complains that the Pythagoreans threw no real light upon this subject. "They tell us nothing," he says, "about how Limit and the Unlimited, or the Odd and the Even, their only ultimate principles, are to be set in motion, or how, without motion and change, generation and destruction or the movements of the heavenly bodies can arise."¹ Elsewhere he informs us that in the Pythagorean cosmogony, "as soon as the Unit was composed . . . the nearest parts of the Unlimited immediately began to be drawn in and limited by Limit."² The Unit which Aristotle here mentions is probably to be identified with the central fire of the Universe, which according to the Pythagoreans was the first object to take shape in the evolution of the cosmos;³ but the point which alone concerns us is that, according to this passage, Limit appears to play the part of an active or formative principle, whereas the Unlimited, being merely attracted and defined by Limit, is something purely passive. We are to conceive, apparently, of an infinitely extended substance, on which, at a particular point of time, the principle of Limit, which is itself eternal like the other, begins to work, exactly how or why, the Pythagoreans did not attempt to explain. More and more of the Unlimited is gradually brought beneath the sway of Limit, and the cosmos is complete as soon as that particular portion of the Unlimited which is destined to form the world has been reduced into order. But the Unlimited, true to its name, still stretches to infinity outside the world; and the early Pythagoreans sometimes represented it as the air or breath which the Universe inhales.⁴ In this conception, the analogy between the

¹ *Met.* A 8. 990^a 8 ff.

² *Met.* N 3. 1091^a 15 ff.

³ Zeller *l.c.* p. 412.

⁴ *Arist. phys.* iii. 4. 208^a 7; *Aet. Plac.* ii. 9. 1 (*Diels, Dox.* p. 388).

Macrocosm and the Microcosm, which we already found in Anaximenes, is emphatically reaffirmed.¹

It is obvious that the Pythagorean principle of Limit, regarded as the creative agency which forms the universe out of the Unlimited, readily lends itself to a theological interpretation; but it was not interpreted in any such way till after the time of Aristotle. Later writers were in the habit of describing the fundamental antinomy as God and Matter, or Unity and the Indefinite Dyad. Thus in the *Placita* we are told that Pythagoras believed in two original principles, "the monad, God, or the Good, the essential nature of the One, *Nous* alone and by itself; and on the other hand the indefinite dyad, the Evil Spirit or Evil, with which is bound up materiality and multitude" (*τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος*).² Others, it would seem, refusing to acquiesce in so rigid a dualism, postulated a higher unity from which the opposing principles were to be derived, and called it "the Supreme God" (*τὸν ὑπεράνω θεόν*).³ But all this, as I have said, is later than Aristotle, who invariably regards the Pythagoreans as thoroughgoing dualists.

Aristotle nowhere attributes the Pythagorean philosophy to Pythagoras; in this connexion he invariably speaks of "the Pythagoreans." But it is difficult to account for the pervading dualism of subsequent Pythagorean speculation unless we suppose that in some form or another Pythagoras was himself a dualist. Possibly, as has been conjectured, he was influenced by Anaximander's doctrine of the warfare of opposites after they have been separated out of the "Infinite."⁴ For us, however, the real importance of Pythagoras lies, not in his physical theory, if he ever possessed one, but rather in the new conception of philosophy which he introduced

¹ See p. 189.

² *Dox.* p. 802^a 6 ff.

³ *Simplic. Phys.* 181. 10. ff. Diels
(Ritter and Preller⁸ § 70).

⁴ See Burnet, *l.c.* p. 106, and above, p. 188).

into the Greek world. His philosophical predecessors limited themselves to speculations about nature, without, so far as we can see, attempting in any way to regulate the lives of men. Pythagoras, on the other hand, not only made philosophy into a way of life, but established a brotherhood to be the living embodiment of his principles, known and read of all men. Whether he gave his sanction to the political activity of his followers or not, we cannot tell. If he did, we must suppose that he claimed for philosophy the right to determine the policy of the State as well as the conduct of the individual; but in any case the rule of the Pythagorean brotherhood in Croton is the earliest instance in Greek history of that union between philosophy and politics which Plato afterwards declared to be the only hope of salvation for the world. The truth is that philosophy, as interpreted by Pythagoras, exercised many of the functions which we are in the habit of ascribing to religion; and the Pythagorean brotherhood should therefore be regarded as a kind of quasi-religious community or church. It is only from this point of view that we can understand the veneration in which the name of Pythagoras was held among his followers. In a specimen of Pythagorean classification which Iamblichus quotes from Aristotle, it is said that the genus "rational animal" contains three varieties, Gods, men, and the likes of Pythagoras.¹ Later writers describe Pythagoras as of divine origin, the son of Apollo, or even the Hyperborean Apollo himself, and attribute to him diverse prophetic and miraculous powers, all of which are easily intelligible if we realise that to his disciples he was the inspired and half-divine exponent of a new religion, and not merely the discoverer of new truths about the origin and constitution of the world.

I have next to invite your attention to one of the

¹ *vit. Pyth.* 31 (Diels² i. p. 24).

most interesting, though not one of the greatest, figures in early Greek philosophy, Xenophanes of Colophon. Xenophanes is the first Greek philosopher of whose personality we are able to form a distinct and vivid impression. Born about 570 B.C., in the Ionian colony of Colophon in Asia Minor, he appears to have remained in Asia until the subjugation of the Greek colonies by Persia in 545. Thereupon he went to Sicily; and finally, as it would seem, after diverse wanderings through Greece, in the course of which he supported himself by reciting his own poems,¹ he settled in the Phocæan colony of Elea in Italy, where he became the founder of the Eleatic school of thought.² He lived to an advanced age; one account makes him more than a hundred years old when he died.³

In a famous autobiographical fragment Xenophanes seems to imply that he had published at the age of twenty-five a work which afterwards became well known throughout Greece: "by this time" (he says) "my thoughts have been circulating up and down the land of Hellas for threescore years and seven; and then there were five and twenty years from my birth, if I know how to speak truly on the matter."⁴ If this is what the fragment means, we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the work in question was an attack on the theology of Homer and Hesiod. It has been suggested that the luxurious self-indulgence of his Ionian fellow-citizens, and the readiness with which they and most of the neighbouring Greek colonies submitted to the Persian yoke, led Xenophanes to scrutinise the religious and moral foundations of Greek life, and that the iconoclastic spirit thus engendered grew stronger and more intense as he learnt

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 18.

² Zeller, *l.c.* pp. 522, 554 *nn.*

³ Diels² i. p. 35, § 7.

⁴ *fr.* 8. The word *φροντίδα* refers, I think, as Bergk imagined, to

some literary work. Cf. with the fragment in general Theog. 19-22 and esp. 247 (*καθ' Ἑλλάδα γῆν στρωφόμενος ἡδ' ἀπὸ νῆσους*).

more of contemporary standards and ideals in the course of his peregrinations through Greece.¹ The suggestion is interesting, and may be right; but whatever inspired his iconoclasm, no reader of the fragments will question its sincerity and depth. Nor is it only Homer upon whom the lash of his invective falls. He is hardly less severe upon his own Asiatic fellow-citizens, who go to the market-place "in garments of purple, proud at heart, glorying in their fair locks, reeking with exquisite perfumes";² and he protests against the popular preference of athletic to intellectual prowess, in words that strangely anticipate the claim of Socrates to be supported at the public expense on the ground that he is infinitely more useful to the State than any prizeman of Olympia.³ Xenophanes does not, indeed, like Heraclitus, stand aloof from life and fulminate at human folly from the mountain-tops of thought; but his prevailing attitude is nevertheless one of protest and opposition; and that he should have escaped persecution throughout so long a life, is an eloquent testimony to the simple and unaffected nobility of the man, as well as to the toleration of his contemporaries.

It is difficult to estimate how far Xenophanes was affected by the Orphic movement which we have already discussed. His theological doctrine presents some remarkable points of affinity with Orphic pantheism, as Freudenthal has pointed out.⁴ The Orphic conception of Zeus as the Divine Unity, in whom all things exist, bears an obvious resemblance to Xenophanes' "one God," who is the All.⁵ But although Orphism doubtless paved the way for Xenophanes' teaching, and more especially for his revolt against the authority of Homer, there is the less reason to suppose that he derived his theology from

¹ Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* i. p. 157 f.

² *fr.* 8.

³ *fr.* 2. Cf. Plato, *Ap.* 36 B ff.

⁴ *Über die Theologie des Xenophanes* (1886) p. 29.

⁵ See p. 95.

this source, because in other respects he manifests no sympathy with Orphic and Pythagorean ideas. We have seen that he poured contempt upon Pythagoras for believing in metempsychosis; and he is said also to have fallen foul of Epimenides, one of the greatest among the precursors of the Orphic purifying priests.¹ Orphic asceticism could hardly have appealed to the genial writer who in his classic picture of a well-ordered banquet bids the guests praise God "with pious tales and pure words," and then drink as much as they can carry home without a guide—"unless," he considerably adds, "you are very old."²

Xenophanes is the earliest Greek philosopher of whose works a sufficient number of fragments remain to enable us to ascertain his opinions at first hand. I will begin by putting before you the principal fragments about the being and attributes of God, and afterwards proceed to discuss the doctrine which they seem to express.

"Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the Gods everything that is a shame and reproach among men, theft and adultery and mutual deception."³

"For they"—Homer and Hesiod—"recounted many lawless deeds of Gods, theft and adultery and mutual deception."⁴

"But mortals think that Gods are begotten, and have dress and voice and form like their own."⁵

"But if oxen or lions had hands and could draw with their hands and make works of art as men do, horses would draw forms of Gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, giving them bodies after the fashion of their own."⁶

"The Ethiopians represent their Gods as flat-nosed and black; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair."⁷

These are the polemical or destructive fragments: now let us take the constructive.

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 18.

² *fr.* 1. 5 f.

³ *fr.* 11.

⁴ *fr.* 12.

⁵ *fr.* 14.

⁶ *fr.* 15.

⁷ *fr.* 16.

"One God, greatest among both Gods and men, resembling mortals neither in form nor in thought."¹

"He"—i.e. God—"is all eye, all thought, all hearing" (*ὄλος ὄρα, ὄλος δὲ νοεῖ, ὄλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει*).²

"Evermore doth he abide in the same place, moving not at all; nor doth it beseem him to go about now this way and now that."³

"But without toil he rules all things by the purpose of his mind."⁴

Let us now examine the most important doctrines affirmed or apparently implied in these fragments.

X1. "One God, greatest among Gods and men." Is this a profession of monotheism? So the line was understood by Clement of Alexandria,⁵ to whom we owe the fragment; and so it has been interpreted by nearly every scholar till within the last twenty years. In 1886, however, a powerful attack upon the traditional view was made by Freudenthal, in the monograph to which I have already referred; and although he failed to convince Zeller or Diels, he has found a strong supporter in one of the greatest of modern scholars, Theodor Gomperz. Gomperz maintains that "the alleged monotheism of Xenophanes is at once and finally confuted by the single verse *εἰς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος*,"⁶ which he thus translates, not (as it appears to me) quite accurately: "Ein Gott ist der grösste, so unter Göttern als Menschen."⁷ The presence of the plural *θεοῖσι* in the very line which is supposed to affirm the unity of God proves (he thinks) the supposition false. "We much prefer," says Gomperz, "to recognize the reference here to a supreme god who is hardly less superior to

¹ fr. 23.

² fr. 24.

³ fr. 26.

⁴ fr. 25 (reading *κρατῶναι* with Freudenthal. Cf. *Orph. hymn.* 3. 11; 64. 8).

⁵ *Strom.* v. p. 714.

⁶ *Greek Thinkers* i. p. 551.

⁷ P. 130 of the German edition. The English translation has: "there

is a greatest god among gods as well as among men" (*L.c.* p. 158). This rendering entirely ignores *εἰς*. Gomperz translates the *εἰς*, but seems to me wrong in construing *εἰς θεὸς ἐστὶ μέγιστος κτλ.*, and not *εἰς <ἐστὶ> θεός, μέγιστος κτλ.* The latter, I think, is the proper construction of Xenophanes' words.

the lower gods than to mankind."¹ On this interpretation, Xenophanes becomes, not a monotheist, but a "henotheist"—that is, according to Freudenthal's use of the word, a believer in many Gods, depending on a single highest God, who is consequently apt to be regarded simply as the Godhead.²

The question thus raised is clearly of importance for our investigation. In the fragments of Xenophanes, we find the name *θεός* three times in the singular number,³ besides three other passages in which it is the subject to be supplied to a singular verb,⁴ making six places in all which *prima facie* support the unity of God. Two of these six instances have to be discounted as belonging to a category in which Greek linguistic usage permits either the singular or the plural.⁵ There remain, in addition to the fragment beginning *εἰς θεός*, etc., these three cases: "he is all eye, all thought, all hearing," "evermore doth he abide in the same place, moving not at all, nor doth it beseem him to go now this way and now that," and "without toil he directs all things by the purpose of his mind." You will observe that each of these statements, like so much besides that Xenophanes wrote, is deliberately aimed at the Homeric theology. Homer's Gods frequently fall short of the omniscience which theoretically belongs to them; they are not entirely exempt from toil and suffering; they are far from being immovable or unchangeable; nor do they abide in one locality, but constantly pass to and fro from heaven to earth, and "in the likeness of strangers from far countries, put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men."⁶ In like manner, we are bound, I think, to interpret the expression about the "one God" by the

¹ p. 551.

² Freudenthal, *l.c.* p. 33 n. 2.

³ 1. 13; 23. 1; 38. 1.

⁴ 24. 1; 25. 1; 26. 1, 2.

⁵ 1. 13; 38. 1.

⁶ *Od.* 17. 485 ff., tr. B. and L.

light of the theology which Xenophanes would fain demolish, especially as in the very next line—"neither in body nor in mind resembling man"—he definitely attacks the second great feature of the Homeric religion, namely, anthropomorphism.

Now according to Gomperz' explanation of the line, there is no real difference between Homer and Xenophanes as far as concerns the position of the supreme God. Homer would be the first to agree that there is "a greatest God among gods as well as men": the phrase, indeed, exactly describes the Homeric Zeus. What he never would or could admit is the existence of only one God, greatest in heaven and in earth. And if we have regard to linguistic considerations, we cannot but feel that *εἷς* and not *μέγιστος* is the really emphatic word. The metrical ictus combines with the sentence-accent to force the unity of God upon the reader's attention; and with good reason, for it is here that Homer profoundly disagrees. Just as the Jews in their daily repetition of the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord," laid stress, according to Professor Sanday, on "one" to "mark the contrast to the gods of the heathen,"¹ so in *εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος*, Xenophanes must have intended the stress to fall on *εἷς*, so as to emphasise the difference between his own conception of the Godhead and that of Homer. How then are we to explain the phrase "greatest among Gods as well as men"? I have already anticipated the most reasonable answer by describing the God of Xenophanes as "greatest in heaven and in earth." The words are "a popular expression of the idea that God is the absolutely greatest";² nowhere in all the universe is there any like unto him. They are only a petrified formula or idiom, to which the defenders of the view I

¹ Art. "God" in Hastings' *Dict. of the Bible* ii. p. 206.

² Zeller, *l.c.* p. 530.

advocate have collected a number of parallels from Homer and other Greek writers.¹ We cannot assign a distributive value to the expression without imputing to Xenophanes the insipid statement that there is a God who is "greatest among men." To suppose that Xenophanes believed in a plurality of Gods merely because he uses such a phrase, would be hardly less absurd than to accuse a man of polytheism in the present day when he invokes his Maker as "God of Gods, and Lord of Lords."²

For these reasons I believe that Xenophanes definitely intended to affirm the unity of God in opposition to the Homeric polytheism. Some confirmatory evidence has been found in a remarkable statement preserved by Eusebius, the ultimate source of which is Theophrastus' work "On the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers." "Xenophanes declared that there is no hegemony among the Gods; for it is unholy to suppose that any of them is subject to a master; and no God has need of anything at all."³ That the statement is authoritative, no one, so far as I know, denies; and we may note in passing that it cannot be reconciled with Freudenthal's "henotheistic" interpretation of Xenophanes. The "one *greatest* God" must surely exercise dominion over all the other Gods. But in point of fact, as Zeller has shown,⁴ Xenophanes' denial of a hegemony in the celestial commonwealth is tantamount to a denial of polytheism altogether; for a multitude of wholly independent Gods without any degrees of rank would have been inconceivable to the Greek mind. It is incredible that Xenophanes of all men should have discarded the only element of order which we meet with in Greek polytheism.

There are, however, other passages in which the philosopher mentions a plurality of Gods. Sometimes,

¹ Zeller, *l.c.n.* 3. Cf. Diels, *poet. phil. Gr.* p. 42.

² Zeller, *l.c.* p. 532 n. 1.

³ Diels, *Dox.* p. 580. 14 ff.; cf.

Zeller, *l.c.* p. 526 f. Euripides echoes the sentiment in *H. F.* 1341 ff.

⁴ *l.c.*

of course, he is referring merely to the Gods of Homer, Hesiod, and the *profanum vulgus*,¹ against whose theology he protests; but three of the examples are of a different kind. "It is good to fear the Gods alway"; "not all things have the Gods revealed to mortals at the beginning"²—this is manifestly the language of polytheism. How are we to reconcile such language with the monotheistic doctrine which the philosopher elsewhere professes? Perhaps the third and last of this type of passages may suggest an answer. "There never was, and never shall be, any man, who has sure and certain *Knowledge* concerning what I say about Gods and all things; for however much he may hit the mark by accident, yet he himself has no *Knowledge*; but *Opinion* presides over all things."³ In this difficult and much-debated fragment two points are in my judgment clear. One is that Knowledge and Opinion are opposed; the other, that whatever Xenophanes has said "about the Gods and all things" is declared by him to be matter of Opinion and not Knowledge. No one, he says, and the statement must apply to himself as well as to others, ever will have knowledge on these questions; only opinion, and nothing more. Turn now for a moment to Parmenides, who was regarded in antiquity as the pupil of Xenophanes.⁴ The same opposition between Knowledge and Opinion divides the philosophy of Parmenides into two sharply contrasted and mutually antagonistic parts. "It is necessary," he says, "that thou shouldest learn all, both the unshaken heart of persuasive Truth, and the opinions of mortal men, wherein is no sure belief";⁵ and thereafter he proceeds to unfold in the first place his philosophy of Truth, and afterwards his philosophy of Opinion in what he calls a "deceitful array

¹ 11. 1; 12. 1; 14. 1; 15. 4.

² 1. 24; 18. 1.

³ fr. 34. With *ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται*, cf. Pl. *Rep.* 511 E, 534 A.

⁴ See Diels² i. p. 107, § 6.

⁵ fr. 1. 28 ff. (reading *εὐπειθέος*).

of verses."¹ Parmenides' philosophy of Truth substitutes for the theological unity of Xenophanes a metaphysical unity, that of Being, in which polytheism and monotheism are alike excluded; his philosophy of Opinion, which he himself pronounces to be deceptive, offers a physical explanation of the origin of the world, in the course of which Parmenides spoke of a plurality of Gods.² Now it so happens that Xenophanes has also a physical theory, according to which everything that exists originated from two material elements, earth and water. "All things come from earth and all things pass into earth." "All things that come to birth and grow are earth and water." "For we have all sprung from earth and water."³ This theory cannot be reconciled with Xenophanes' belief in a single unchangeable God any more than the physical hypothesis of Parmenides can be reconciled with his metaphysical concept of Being; and it is clear that to Xenophanes also his physical speculations were only "Opinion" and not "Knowledge." When he says that opinion alone is possible about his theory of "all things," I believe the reference is to his physical theory that "all things which come to birth and grow are earth and water." His statements on this subject, as we may infer from another line, are only "opinions resembling the truth."⁴ And similarly, when he declares that what he says about Gods—that is, about a *plurality* of Gods, for the plural is significant—cannot be known, but only opined, I think he indicates that polytheism is no part of his Theology of Truth, any more than the polytheism of Parmenides' "lying verses" belongs to his Philosophy of Truth. We conclude, therefore, that Xenophanes' "true theology" is contained in his description of the "one God," who "neither in body nor in mind resembles man"; and that when he uses polytheistic language, he

¹ *fr.* 8. 52.² *fr.* 13.³ *fr.* 27, 29, 33.⁴ *fr.* 35.

is speaking from the standpoint, not of Knowledge, but of Opinion.

2. The second theological doctrine implied in the fragments of Xenophanes is that God is uncreated. We may fairly draw this inference from the line in which he ridicules his countrymen for believing in begotten Gods. Aristotle has preserved an *obiter dictum* of the philosopher to the same effect. "Those who attribute birth to the Gods are not less impious than those who say they die; for it follows in either case that at some time or other the Gods are not."¹ Xenophanes completes as it were the already half-drawn circle of the eternity of the Godhead, repudiating by implication all those primitive theogonies, whether *Hesiodic* or *Orphic*, that filled so large a space in the theological literature of Greece, together with the unedifying legends they contained—stories of cannibalism, mutilation, and theomachies of every kind: all such relics of primeval superstition are proscribed by Xenophanes, when he denies that Gods are born. They are only "figments of the men of old" (*πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων*).²

3. The third point to be observed is that Xenophanes implicitly affirms the morality and truthfulness of God. He reprobates Homer and Hesiod for ascribing to the Gods whatever is a shame and reproach among men, "theft and adultery and mutual deception." In specifying theft, he thinks, no doubt, of Hermes, the patron-God of stealing and forswearing,³ himself, as depicted in the Homeric Hymn, a God "of many a quirk, wily in counsel, a robber, a cattle-driver, a captain of thieves, a night-watcher, a lurker by the gates."⁴ The second count in Xenophanes' indictment might be freely illustrated from Epic poetry; and of the third we have a

¹ *Rhet.* ii. 23. 1399^b 6 ff.; cf. 1400^b 5 ff.

² l. 22.

³ *Od.* 19. 396.

⁴ 13 ff. (reading *ἡγήτορα φουρῶν*).

notorious example in the *Διὸς ἀπάτη*, the beguiling of Zeus by Hera.¹ Whatever the original intention of this story may have been, there can be little doubt that it had a literal and not a symbolical meaning to the majority of Homer's readers in the time of Xenophanes. But the principle which underlies Xenophanes' censure is more important than the censure itself. He clearly takes it for granted that the character and conduct of the Deity should be such as to furnish an ethical standard to mankind. "It is unnatural and wrong," he seems to say, "that the Gods should be morally inferior to ourselves; they ought to surpass us in virtue as much as they excel us in power; and by following their example, we should merit the praise, and not the reproaches of our fellow-men." Xenophanes is, I believe, the earliest Greek writer who demands that the Gods shall teach by example, and not merely by precept.²

4. The fourth proposition which Xenophanes makes about God is that he "neither in body nor in mind resembles man." It is clear from this and other fragments that Xenophanes entirely rejected all anthropathic as well as anthropomorphic representations of the divine nature.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the revolutionary character of such a protest. To a Greek it would have seemed, I think, at least as revolutionary as the monotheistic doctrine we have seen reason to ascribe to the philosopher. If we fully realise the extent to which in this respect Xenophanes must have violated the religious sentiment of his countrymen, we shall be less disposed to question the traditional view that he was a believer in the unity of God.

5. The positive counterpart of Xenophanes' negation of

¹ *Il.* 14. 294 ff.

² See p. 65. For the significance of this demand in the develop-

ment of religion, consult Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion* i. p. 105 ff.

anthropomorphism is contained in the last three fragments. "He is all eye, all thought, all hearing": "evermore doth he abide in the same place, moving not at all; nor doth it beseem him to go now this way and now that"; "but without toil he directs all things by the purpose of his mind." Taken in their full and literal meaning, the words of the philosopher imply that God is extended in space; he abides, we are told, immovably in one spot, hearing, seeing, and thinking throughout all his frame, instead of moving hither and thither and having his cognitive and perceptive faculties restricted to special organs, as is the case with man. The doxographical tradition adds some fresh points which enable us to define Xenophanes' conception more precisely. We are told by Hippolytus that according to Xenophanes, "God is eternal, and one, and alike in every direction, and finite and spherical, and percipient in all his parts";¹ and in Diogenes Laertius we have this account: "The being of God is spherical, and bears no resemblance to man: he sees all over and hears all over, *but does not respire.*"² The majority of scholars are agreed that Xenophanes is here expressing dissent from the Pythagorean doctrine that the Universe is always inhaling and exhaling the infinite breath or void which surrounds it on every side.³ It follows that Xenophanes' "one God, greatest in heaven and in earth," is just the world in which we live. As Aristotle puts it, he turned his eyes upon the Universe, and said, "The one is God."⁴

To Xenophanes, the World is therefore a visible, incarnate God, beside whom there is none other. Did he conceive of this God as a personal being?

Whatever personality may be, it is not synonymous with anthropomorphism; and we must beware of supposing that Xenophanes denied the personality of God

¹ *Doc.* p. 565. 25 ff.

² *ix.* 19.

³ See p. 195.

⁴ *Met.* A 5. 986^b 24.

simply because he rejected the anthropomorphic elements of the popular religion. There are many expressions in his poems which appear to attribute personality to the World-God. Even when he is combating the theology of Homer, Xenophanes never speaks of God as a philosophical abstraction, like the "Being" of Parmenides, but as a living person, in the fullest sense of the word, possessed of a body as well as a soul, seeing, hearing, thinking, and directing all things by the purpose of his mind. In the face of such language, which might well have exposed the philosopher to the very charge of anthropomorphism which he brought against the poets, it seems to me hazardous to deny that his one and only God was to Xenophanes a personal God, in whatever light he may appear to us. The truth is that the tendency to personify the manifold forces of nature was so deeply ingrained, in the Hellenic temperament, that we need not be surprised if Xenophanes connected the idea of personality with that concept of a single all-embracing, all-controlling Power in which he appears to have found the true and essential unity of things. For just as Greek polytheism was, in part at least, a deification of natural forces, so the monotheism of Xenophanes is in effect a deification of Nature. God is to him the

"End, and beginning of each thing that growes ;
 Whose selfe no end, nor yet beginning knowes ;
 That hath no eyes to see, nor ears to heare ;
 Yet sees, and heares, and is all-eye, all-ear."¹

Xenophanes anticipates to a certain limited extent the curiously personal kind of pantheism which we afterwards meet with in the hymn of Cleanthes ; and this, together with his polemic against Greek polytheism, constitutes his chief claim to be regarded as a religious teacher of the Greeks. His poems contain little or

¹ Giles Fletcher (quoted by Harrison, *Platonism in English Poetry* p. 102).

nothing about the relation of God to man. The efficacy of divination, it is said, he totally denied: *divinationem funditus sustulit*.¹ As to prayer, we find nothing in his philosophical fragments; but in the *Banquet*, he makes a suggestion about the proper objects of prayer which is unlike anything in Greek literature before his time. We should pray, Xenophanes says, not, as we may suppose the antithesis to be, for worldly honours and prosperity, but merely for "power to do that which is right."² The note which Xenophanes here strikes is often heard in the religious teaching of Socrates and Plato. Finally, we owe to Xenophanes a sentiment which in its special application to religious history unconsciously foreshadows the conception of a gradual or progressive revelation, through which man's continual searching after God will be rewarded by a deeper knowledge of his attributes and person. "Not all things have the Gods revealed to mortals at the first; but in course of time by searching men find out a better way."³

¹ Cic. *de Div.* i. 5.

² l. 15 f.

³ *fr.* 18.

LECTURES X AND XI

HERACLITUS

HERACLITUS of Ephesus is unquestionably the most remarkable figure among the Greek philosophical thinkers until we come to Socrates; and his supposed connexion with early Christian theology, through the medium of Stoicism and Philo the Jew, makes it incumbent upon us to consider his doctrine in some detail. We know little that is certainly authentic about his life, or about the influences that moulded his mind and character, beyond what may be inferred from the extant portions of his book. He belonged, it would seem, to an ancient and honourable family, the members of which claimed descent from the founder of Ephesus, and were entrusted with the duty of superintending the rites of Demeter in their native town.¹ The senior representative of the house appears to have enjoyed the titular distinction of "king," in all probability a religious designation, like the *rex sacrorum* at Rome. This title, with its accompanying privileges and duties, Heraclitus is said to have surrendered to his brother; and Diogenes mentions the fact as an illustration of the lofty disdain for which the philosopher was noted.²

Many of the fragments bear witness to the scornful antipathy Heraclitus seems to have felt for his fellow-men. Like Plato, he disliked the principle of

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 6, compared with Strabo xiv. 1. 3. ² ix. 6.

democracy in general: "to me," he says, "one man is ten thousand, if he be the best";¹ and he objurgates the Ephesian democracy in particular for the banishment of his friend Hermodorus. "The Ephesians ought to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and bequeath their city to beardless boys; forasmuch as they have expelled Hermodorus, the worthiest of them all, saying, 'Let there be none among us who is worthiest, or if such there be, let him be so elsewhere and among others.'"² But Heraclitus' misanthropy extends beyond the circle of his fellow-countrymen. Like Bias of Priene, the only one of his predecessors to whom he is in the least polite,—Bias, he says, had more of the *Logos* than other men,³—Heraclitus holds that men are "mostly bad:" they stuff themselves like beasts of the field; they are fools and blind, knowing neither how to listen nor how to speak; like dogs, they bark at those they do not know; like asses, they prefer rubbish to gold.⁴ The religious usages of his countrymen he strongly condemns, such as the worship of images and purification through blood.⁵ Nor does he treat the poets and the philosophers with more consideration than the *profanum vulgus*. Homer and Archilochus, we read in one fragment, deserve to be scourged and cast out of the arena.⁶ To Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Pythagoras he allows the possession of learning, but not of knowledge.⁷ "Hesiod," he says, "is most men's teacher. Men think he knew a great deal; but he knew not even day and night. They are one."⁸ The wisdom of Pythagoras he declares to have been thoroughly mischievous. "Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised investigation more than any other man, and constructed a wisdom of his own,"—a private and particular wisdom, you will observe, not the universal

¹ *fr.* 113 Bywater.² *fr.* 114.³ *fr.* 112.⁴ *fr.* 111, 6, 115, 51.⁵ *fr.* 126, 130.⁶ *fr.* 119.⁷ *fr.* 16.⁸ *fr.* 85.

Logos—"a mass of learning and a mass of mischief."¹ Heraclitus acknowledges no obligations to any previous thinker: he claims to have arrived at the truth by investigating himself—*ἔδιξήσάμην ἐμῶντόν.*² We may compare the exhortation of St. Augustine: *noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas.*³

The book in which the Ephesian philosopher embodied the results of his self-examination was written probably in the first decade of the fifth century before Christ.⁴ It was known to very few of the ancients; but it survived till at least the third century A.D., when Hippolytus, bishop of Portus Romanus, made copious extracts from it, in order to show that the heretic Noetus was a follower of Heraclitus rather than of Christ.⁵ If we consider the fragments for a moment without regard to their doctrinal relationship with one another, we must admit that they are almost unique in ancient literature for impressiveness and strength. Professor Diels has truly said that "he who once hears the sayings of Heraclitus never forgets them for the rest of his life."⁶ The secret of their power depends partly on the thought, but also to some extent on the style. Heraclitus is one of those prophetic spirits who aspire to contemplate "all time and all existence." As Gomperz admirably says, he is for ever building "bridges between the natural and the spiritual life," always constructing "generalisations comprising both realms of human knowledge, as it were, with a mighty bow,"⁷ and, we may add, embracing past, present, and future in a single comprehensive glance. The style of the surviving fragments is not less remarkable. Asyndeton and brevity, elaborate balance of clauses, a preference for half-oracular expressions and words, antithesis, oxymoron,

¹ *fr.* 17; cf. 16.

² *fr.* 80.

³ *de vera relig.* xxxix. 72.

⁴ Diels, *Herakl. von Ephesos* p. vii.

⁵ See Bernays, *Ges. Abhand.* i. p. 74 ff.

⁶ *Herakl.* p. vii.

⁷ *Greek Thinkers* i. p. 63.

and paronomasia, frequent flashes of caustic irony and biting sarcasm—these are some of its principal features; but the one peculiarity which above all others lends distinction to the style of Heraclitus is his constant use of powerful and suggestive comparisons, metaphors, and images, which are none the less imposing because they are occasionally obscure.

For in spite of the verdict of Professor Diels, who declares that "the philosophy of Heraclitus the obscure is by no means so obscure as antiquity and modern times unanimously complain,"¹ it must be confessed that he is only too often enigmatical and dark. Even Socrates, we are told, was baffled by the book. Euripides had lent him a copy, and desired one day to know what he thought of it. Socrates replied: "The parts I understood were splendid; and I suppose what I failed to understand was splendid too; only it would need a Delian diver to fathom it."² The obscurity of Heraclitus has been accounted for on various grounds. Some have thought that he deliberately tried to conceal his meaning from the ignorant multitude, whom he so heartily despised; others, that the resources of the Greek language did not as yet allow him to express his ideas in simpler and less figurative prose. A third consideration is, I think, of more importance than either of these two. For a correct appreciation of the Ephesian sage it is of primary importance to bear in mind that he always regards himself in the light of a preacher and a prophet. The tone of many of the fragments recalls his own description of the Sibyl, who "with frenzied mouth, uttering words unsmiling, unadorned, and unanointed, reaches with her voice throughout a thousand years by reason of the God."³ This firm belief in his prophetic vocation leads him, half-consciously, perhaps, but also half-unconsciously,

¹ *L.c.* p. iii.

² *Diog. Laert.* ii. 22.

³ *fr.* 12.

to clothe his conceptions in oracular and hierophantic garb. In one of the fragments he thus writes of Apollo: "The Lord, whose is the oracle at Delphi, neither utters nor yet conceals his meaning, but speaks by signs" (*σημαίνει*);¹ and elsewhere he remarks that "Nature loves to hide herself."² By these august examples Heraclitus intends, no doubt, to justify the veil of symbolism that half conceals and half reveals the message he is charged with to mankind.

The particular kind of condemnation passed by Heraclitus on his fellow-men, philosophers and laity alike, implies that he was himself, according to his own belief, the possessor of some hitherto unsuspected truth, the half-inspired vehicle, we might almost say, of a new revelation about man and nature, a revelation, too, which mere investigation and research are powerless both to discover and to comprehend. It is said that Heraclitus in his youth professed to know nothing, but declared himself omniscient after he became a man.³ If the story is true, —and Heraclitus invariably speaks with an air of conscious and assured omniscience,—it would seem to point to a sudden intellectual discovery or illumination, analogous to those moral and religious illuminations of which Professor James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, has collected so many curious examples. In any case, whether Heraclitus saw the truth in a sudden flash of inspiration or otherwise, he is profoundly convinced that he *has* seen it; and of this truth, whatever it may have been, he claims to be the prophet.

The exordium of Heraclitus' book has been preserved, and forms the natural starting-point of our discussion. The first sentence is as follows:

"Having hearkened not unto me, but to the *Logos*, it is wise to confess that all things are one."⁴

¹ *fr.* 11.

² *fr.* 10.

³ Diog. Laert. ix. 5.

⁴ *fr.* 1. λόγῳ is Bernays' uni-

The second is to this effect :

“This *Logos* is always existent, but men fail to understand it both before they have heard it and when they have heard it for the first time. For although all things happen through this *Logos*, men seem as if they had no acquaintance with it when they make acquaintance with such works and words as I expound, dividing each thing according to its nature, and explaining how it really is. The rest of mankind”—that is, presumably, all except Heraclitus—“are unconscious of what they do when awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep.”¹

What is this *Logos* of which Heraclitus here and elsewhere speaks? That is the first and most important question with which we have to deal. You will observe, to begin with, that Heraclitus expressly distinguishes between the *Logos* and himself—“having hearkened not to me, but to the *Logos*,” i.e. “it is not I, Heraclitus, who speak, but the *Logos* in or through me: I am the mouth-piece of the *Logos*, and that is why I call on you to hear, not me, but it.” It has, however, been maintained by some distinguished scholars that the *Logos*, here and elsewhere in Heraclitus, is nothing but the philosopher’s own argument, treatise, or discourse. So far as concerns the first of the fragments, this interpretation would in my opinion yield a false antithesis. There is no real opposition between an author and his work: and “listen not to me but to my ‘argument,’ ‘discourse,’ or ‘treatise,’” would therefore be a singularly weak and vapid introduction to a book. But the second fragment makes it clear, I think, that although Heraclitus professes to be going to expound the *Logos*, yet the *Logos* itself is one thing, and his exposition of it another. He asserts in the first place that the *Logos* “always is.” On the theory that *Logos* means discourse, this is supposed to mean “my

versally accepted emendation for *δῆγματος*, a post-Heraclitean word. I agree with Bywater in placing this fragment first, for the reasons

given by Patin, *Heraclitis Einheitslehre* p. 64 ff.

¹ fr. 2.

discourse is always true," "is true evermore";¹ but truth is irrespective of time, and it is not like Heraclitus to waste his words. The natural meaning of the phrase is that the *Logos* is eternal, without beginning and without end; and so it was understood by Cleanthes, who echoes the sentiment in his *Hymn to Zeus*.² Consider in the second place the substance of Heraclitus' reproof to his fellow-men. When they "make trial of his words," they behave *as if they had no experience* (ἀπείρουσι εὐίκασι) of the *Logos* by which all things come to pass. The writer clearly implies that his readers have already had an opportunity of learning the *Logos* by experience, and that is why he blames them for not understanding the *Logos* before they have heard of it from him. "They fail to understand it both before they have heard it and when they have heard it for the first time." It would be absurd to make this a matter of reproach if the *Logos* is merely the philosopher's own discourse; and indeed the whole of the second fragment makes it plain that the *Logos* reveals itself in other ways as well as through the spoken word. The lesson, Heraclitus seems to say, is present in our daily life and conversation, and he who runs may read it; but men are sunk in spiritual and intellectual slumber: they "know as little of what they are doing when awake as they remember what they do in sleep." As he elsewhere complains, "the multitude do not understand the things with which they meet, nor when they are taught, do they have knowledge of them, although they think they have."³ They are unable, in short, to interpret their own experience; for "eyes and ears are bad witnesses to those who have barbarian souls."⁴

The view that Heraclitus, when he mentions the *Logos*, is thinking only of his own discourse, will be found still

¹ See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 138 n. 13.

² ὡσθ' ἕνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἔόντα, v. 21.

³ fr. 5 (reading οἱ πολλοί).

⁴ fr. 4.

less applicable to other two passages where the name occurs in what appears to be its technical Heraclitean sense. We read in one fragment that men "are at variance with the *Logos* which is their most constant companion,"¹ and in another, for our purposes perhaps the most important of them all, "although the *Logos* is universal (τοῦ λόγου δ' ἕντος ξυνοῦ), most men live as if they had a private intelligence of their own."² It is clear that in the last of these passages λόγος cannot possibly mean the discourse of Heraclitus. This is so strongly felt by one of the supporters of that identification that he pronounces λόγου to be spurious, and replaces it by φρονέειν: but the text is beyond suspicion, and we shall afterwards find that the universality of the *Logos* is a fundamental doctrine of Heraclitus.

The positive content of the fragments we have hitherto discussed may be expressed in three propositions. The first is that the *Logos* is eternal—both pre-existent and everlasting, like the World-God of Xenophanes. Secondly, all things happen through the *Logos*—that is to say, giving to the word "all" its full significance, all things both in the material and in the spiritual world. Its authority is not confined to the sphere of human activities, but it is also a cosmic principle, "common" or "universal" (ξυνός). And, in the third place, the duty of man is to obey this universal *Logos* and so to place himself in harmony with the rest of nature; but most men, though in daily converse with the universal, neither see nor hear it, and behave as if they had a private intelligence, a sort of individual *Logos*, of their own, distinct and separate from that which rules the world. The sentiment, "We ought to follow the universal," is certainly Heraclitean, though Heraclitus may not have used the exact words.³

¹ fr. 93 (reading ἀμλέουσι λόγῳ, with Diels, *Heracl.* fr. 72, p. 18).

² fr. 92.

³ δεῖ ἐπεσθαι τῷ ξυνοῦ. Cf. fr. 92.

Patin, *l.c.* p. 83, is disposed to assign the actual words to Heraclitus. Cf. fr. 91, 93.

Are we to suppose, then, that the *Logos* of Heraclitus is only a sovereign ordinance or law, which Nature invariably obeys, and which man must also follow, if he is to play his appointed part in the economy of the world? This is virtually the interpretation given by Heinze, in his instructive treatise on the *Logos* doctrine in Greek philosophy.¹ It will be remembered, however, that in one of the passages already discussed, Heraclitus opposes the universal *Logos* to a sort of private *intelligence*: "though the *Logos* is universal, most men act as if they had an *intelligence* of their own." From so marked an antithesis we may provisionally infer that the Heraclitean *Logos* is itself intelligent; and the inference is supported by two other fragments, in which the allusion to the *Logos* is too obvious to be mistaken. "There is but one wisdom, to understand the knowledge (*γνώμην*) by which all things are steered through all."² The *Logos*, we have seen, is the power through³ which all things come to pass, and consequently identical with the knowledge that steers all things; from which it follows that the *Logos* *γυγνώσκει*, "knows." The second of the two fragments is not less conclusive. "Intelligence" (*τὸ φρονέειν*) "is common (*ξινόν*) to all things. Those who speak with understanding (*ξύν νόφ*)⁴ must strongly cleave to that which is common to all things, even as a city cleaves to law, and much more strongly. For all human laws are nurtured by the one divine law; for this prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all and has something over."⁵ It is clear that the one divine law is identical with that which is common to all things, and that which

¹ *Die Lehre vom Logos* (1872) p. 28 ff.

² *fr.* 19.

³ *κατά*, *fr.* 2. Cf. *κατ' ἐμν*, *fr.* 62. *Ἐμν*, in Heraclitus, is certainly an active force.

⁴ The *paronomasia* *ξύν νόφ*, *ξινόφ* itself suggests that rationality is "the common."

⁵ *fr.* 91.

is common to all things, as we have already seen, is the *Logos*. And further, it is intelligence which, according to this passage, is common to all things; so that we are bound to conclude that Heraclitus' *Logos* is not merely "objective reason,"¹ but possesses, nay, is itself intelligence, and thinks. We shall meet with ample confirmation of this view in later writers; meantime let me add one further point. Since the "one divine law" is identical with the *Logos*, we may suppose that Heraclitus regarded the *Logos* as divine.

I have hitherto confined myself to the *ipsissima verba* of Heraclitus, in order, if possible, to escape the suspicion of having contaminated the Heraclitean doctrine with elements of Stoicism. The result, so far, of our inquiry is that the *Logos* of Heraclitus is virtually the divine reason, immanent in nature and in man. Against this view it has sometimes been urged that *λόγος* never in early Greek means reason; but surely there is something of a *petitio principii* in the objection. Might not the introduction of the usage be due to Heraclitus himself? The only way of determining whether he actually so used the word or not, is by such a comparative study of the fragments as I have attempted, and from this it appears that the Heraclitean *λόγος*, if not exactly synonymous with "reason," is something whose essential nature is rationality, intelligence, or thought. It is another question by what English equivalent we should attempt to render a word so full of meaning. I am disposed to think that if we are forced to select a single term, we shall do well to follow the latest editor, Professor Diels, and speak of "The Word" rather than of "Reason." Two advantages are gained by this translation. In the first place it suggests to an English

¹ The phrase of Heinze, *l.c.* p. 23.

reader the historical fact of the continuity of the *Logos*-doctrine throughout its whole history on Grecian soil from Heraclitus down to Philo, St. John, and Justin Martyr. And, in the second place, I think that the translation "Word" does in point of fact bring out at least one important feature in Heraclitus' representation of the *Logos*. He seems to conceive of it as the rational principle, power, or being which *speaks* to men both from without and from within—the universal Word which for those who have ears to hear is audible both in nature and in their own hearts,¹ the voice, in short, of the divine. "Hearken not unto me but to the *Logos*, and confess that all things are one." There is nothing impossible in such a use of the term *λόγος* so early as Heraclitus: for thought had already been represented by Homer as the language of the soul.² But whatever may be the most appropriate rendering of the word in English, the extant fragments of Heraclitus make it clear, I think, that his *Logos* is a unity, omnipresent, rational, and divine. "From the visible light," says Clement, "we may perchance escape; but not from the intelligible: or, in the words of Heraclitus, 'how can one escape from that which never sets?'" (*τὸ μὴ δύνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι*);³

We have next to consider the question whether the *Logos* of Heraclitus is a purely spiritual essence, or a material substance endowed with the property of thought. The fragments hitherto examined are consistent, so far as they go, with the incorporeality of the *Logos*; but from other fragments it is clear that in Heraclitus' philosophy the spiritual is not yet separated from the material. He is still a hylozoist in the fullest sense, although he leaves the Milesian

Of. Schuster, *Heraklit von Ephesus* p. 19 ff.

² See Her. fr. 27, with Bywater's note.

³ Il. 11. 407, ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός;

thinkers far behind when he invests the primal substance not merely with life, but with rationality or thought. The particular kind of matter forming as it were the body of 'the *Logos*, Heraclitus believes to be Fire. It is easy to establish the identification by comparing some of the fragments in which he treats of Fire with others that describe the *Logos*. Fire, he tells us, is "ever-living," "always was, is, and shall be": and the "thunderbolt"—a semi-oracular word for fire, afterwards borrowed by Cleanthes¹—steers (*οιακίζει*) all things.² Just so we have found that the *Logos* is eternal, and "pilots all things through all." The word *οιακίζει*, "steers," suggests an intelligent helmsman, as we have seen that *Logos* is; and the connexion of intelligence with the dry warm element of fire is attested by the most familiar of all the Heraclitean fragments, "the dry soul is wisest and best."³ "It is a joy," he says, "for souls to become wet,"⁴ plainly implying that it is better to be dry: "a man, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless boy, stumbling, understanding not the way he goes, because his soul is wet."⁵ These observations of Heraclitus are in favour of attributing intelligence to his world-forming Fire; and later authorities un-animously take this view. I will ask your attention more especially to a very remarkable passage in Sextus, where the rationality of the "surrounding element"⁶ is declared to have been a dogma of Heraclitus, and the identity of the *Logos* with this element is clearly shown.

"It is the opinion of the philosopher that what surrounds us is rational and possessed of intelligence (*φρενήρες*). . . . According to

¹ *Hymn* v. 10.

² *fr.* 20, 28.

³ *fr.* 74.

⁴ *fr.* 72.

⁵ *fr.* 73.

⁶ *i.e.* (according to Heraclitus) fire.

Heraclitus, when by means of respiration we draw in this divine reason (*θείον λόγον*), our mind begins to act (*νοεροὶ γινόμεθα*). In sleep we are sunk in forgetfulness, but intelligence returns when we awake. For during sleep, when the sensory avenues are closed, the mind within us is separated from its connexion with the surrounding element, except that the union by means of respiration is preserved as a sort of root; and the mind when it has thus been separated loses the power of memory which it previously had. But when we are awake, the mind peeps out again through the avenues of sense, as if through windows, and coming into contact with the surrounding element, puts on the power of reason (*λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν*).¹ Accordingly, just as embers change and become red-hot, when placed near the fire, but when separated therefrom, are extinguished, so in like manner the portion of the surrounding element which is quartered in our body, becomes all but irrational when it is separated, while on the other hand it is rendered homogeneous with the whole by being connected therewith through the majority of avenues."²

It does not appear that Sextus was himself acquainted with the work of Heraclitus; and here he is following the account given by Aenesidemus the Sceptic, who flourished about the Christian era. Some of the ideas contained in the extract are certainly later than Heraclitus; but the simile of the glowing embers has an unmistakably Heraclitean ring; and the simile is meaningless, if we refuse to allow that the surrounding element is rational. The fire we breathe must be permanently maintained at a level of active thought sufficient to kindle our smouldering reason into a flame; and thus it can only be the "universal *Logos*," the "one divine law" which suffices for all and has something over."³

We conclude, therefore, that the *Logos*, regarded on its material or corporeal side, is Fire, and that Fire, regarded on its spiritual or intellectual side, is the *Logos*.⁴

¹ i. e. mind becomes active. With *δύναμιν*, cf. Pl. *Rep.* vi. 508 E.

² Sextus *Emp.* vii. 127 ff. It is worth while to contrast with this passage the fragment of Pindar discussed on p. 131.

³ *fr.* 91.

⁴ Cf. Heinze, *l.c.* p. 24, "er ist materiell gefasst das Feuer, und das Feuer vergeistigt ist der *Logos*."

Bearing in mind the identity or interchangeability of these two conceptions, let us now attempt to determine the relationship between the *Logos* and the Godhead.

The following are the most important of Heraclitus' theological fragments :

"There is but one Wisdom. It wills and yet wills not to be called by the name of Zeus."¹

"This world-order, the same in all things, no one of Gods or men has made; but it always was, is, and shall be ever-living fire, kindled in due measure and extinguished in due measure."²

"God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger. But he is changed, just as fire, when mingled with different kinds of incense, is named after the flavour of each."³

To these fragments should be added the remarks of a scholiast on a line of the *Iliad*, where the Gods are said to pledge one another in golden goblets as they gaze upon Troy.⁴

"Men say it is unseemly that the sight of wars should please the Gods. But it is not unseemly; for noble deeds give pleasure. Besides, wars and battles appear terrible to us, but to God even these are not terrible. For God accomplishes all things with a view to the harmony of the whole, dispensing what is expedient thereunto, even as Heraclitus says that *to God all things are beautiful and good and right, but men consider some things wrong and others right.*"⁵

From these four passages, some of which have given rise to a vast amount of controversy, we seem to be justified in drawing at least three conclusions. The first is, that God is one; the second, that he is identical with what from one point of view is the *Logos*, and from another, Fire; and the third conclusion is that God is the unity in which all opposites are reconciled.

¹ fr. 65.

⁴ *Il.* 4. 4.

² fr. 20.

⁵ fr. 61.

³ fr. 36, reading *δκωσπερ* < *κῶρ* >
with *Dials.*, *Heracl.* p. 16.

That God is one, and identical with the *Logos*, may be inferred from the first of the fragments I have quoted. The "one Wisdom" manifestly is the *Logos*, the "thought by which all things are steered through all"; it wills to be called Zeus, because it is the true objective reality which men ignorantly worship under that name; on the other hand, it rejects the title for the reasons that prompted Heraclitus to fall foul of Homer.¹ The *Logos* has none of the anthropomorphic attributes belonging to the Homeric Zeus. At the same time, Heraclitus does not refrain from the use of polytheistic language;² and since he regards the One as necessarily also many, it will afterwards be shown that his very conception of the divine Unity involves a species of polytheism.

Clement of Alexandria affirms that "Heraclitus the Ephesian believed Fire to be God."³ Fire, as we have seen, is just the *Logos* conceived as something material; so that the statement is doubtless true. To M. Bovet, indeed, the deification of Fire seems to be only a metaphor;⁴ but historians of philosophy for the most part take it seriously. It is therefore incumbent upon us to consider for a little the part which is played in Heracliteanism by the concept of Fire. In the second of the fragments cited above, Heraclitus identifies the Cosmos with this element. "This Cosmos . . . always was, is, and shall be ever-living Fire, kindled in due measure and extinguished in due measure." Taken strictly, of course, these words involve a contradiction. When Fire is extinguished, it must cease to be; and if it ceases to be, we cannot justly say that it always is. But in saying that Fire is extinguished, Heraclitus means only that it passes into something else; and we must suppose that the other substances into which Fire passes were declared by Heraclitus to be themselves particular forms or mani-

¹ fr. 119.

² fr. 20, 44, 102, 126; cf. 11.

³ *Protreptica* p. 55 Potter.

⁴ *Le Dieu de Platon* p. 102.

festations of that element. In other words, Heraclitus maintained that all things are Fire because Fire is transformed into all things.¹ Fire, according to Heraclitus, is the ever-changing substance to which alone reality belongs. The path of change he calls the "way up and down."² Fire sinks through water into earth; and earth rises again through water into Fire.³ "It is death to souls to become water; it is death to water to become earth; yet from earth is water born, and from water, soul."⁴ In this way the different substances—fire, water, and earth; for Heraclitus seems not to recognise a distinctive element of air⁵—are always consuming and being consumed by one another. What a modern physicist asserts to be the most important lesson taught by the discovery of radium, namely, the "mutability of matter" and the "transmutation of elements,"⁶ is a fundamental principle of Heracliteanism. The theory of immutable elements was for the first time formulated by Empedocles; in Heraclitus, on the other hand, the elementary substances are for ever passing into each other, and upon their perpetual interchange depends the life of the Universe. Rest is only a name for death; like a mixture or posset, we are told, the world would decompose if it were not continually stirred.⁷ We must not, however, imagine that there is any tumult in this ever-oscillating sea. It is all order or cosmos: the elementary Fire is kindled and extinguished *in due measure*. The observation of Heraclitus about the Sun may be applied to all the warring elements; "the Sun will not exceed his measures; or if he does, the Erinyes, who are the ministers of Justice, will find him out."⁸

¹ *fr.* 22.

² *fr.* 69.

³ For details, consult Burnet, *l.c.* p. 153 ff.

⁴ *fr.* 68. Soul is here a synonym for Fire; cf. Zeller, *l.c.* p. 676.

⁵ The mention of air in *fr.* 25

is probably a Stoic falsification; see Diels, *l.c.* p. 18 n.

⁶ Sir Oliver Lodge in a lecture on *Radium and its meaning*, reported in the *Times*, 6th January 1904.

⁷ *fr.* 84.

⁸ *fr.* 29.

The all but unanimous testimony of the ancients from Aristotle onwards attributes to Heraclitus the doctrine of a final conflagration, in which the element of Fire exercises at certain periodic intervals a sole and universal sway, only to pass once more upon the downward path and forge another link in the endless chain of worlds. We are told that Heraclitus went so far as to define the precise duration of the Great Year at the end of which all things return again to Fire, although our authorities differ as to the figures, some giving 18,000 and some 10,800 years.¹ How much truth there is in these assertions, or whether there is any truth at all, is a keenly debated question. It must, I think, be allowed that most of the Heraclitean fragments which have been thought to refer to a periodic conflagration, regarded simply by themselves and apart from what the ancients said about them, are ambiguous and inconclusive. By the kindling and extinction of the ever-living Fire,² Heraclitus probably meant the circulation of the elements in the existing world; and the same may be said of the sentence, "For Fire all things are exchanged, and Fire for all things, even as wares are exchanged for gold and gold for wares."³ A third fragment states that "the sea is poured out and measured by the same tale—ἐξ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον—as before it became earth";⁴ that is to say, according to Zeller's interpretation,⁵ when the time is approaching for the earth to return into Fire, there is an intermediate stage at which it is resolved into precisely the same amount of water as it came from when the world began. If this explanation is correct, the matter is decided once for all; but here again the reference may be to the passage of earth into water⁶ in the ordinary course of

¹ Diels, *Dox.* p. 364^b 5 ff.; Cens. *de die nat.* 18. 11.

² *fr.* 20.

³ *fr.* 22.

⁴ *fr.* 23.

⁵ *l.c.* p. 690 n. 1.

⁶ Heraclitus uses "sea" for "water"; cf. *fr.* 21.

nature. Another interpretation of the fragment is, however, possible. Perhaps Heraclitus meant to say that "the sea is poured out and measured into the same *Logos*" (i.e. the same *Fire*), "which it was before being created."¹ According to this view, which appears to me very plausible, the philosopher is almost certainly alluding to the end of the world. A fourth passage—"upon all things Fire shall come and judge and seize them"²—is supposed by Gomperz³ to be decisive; and the future tense certainly appears to refer to a catastrophe still to come. We are further told by Hippolytus that the words *χρησμοσύνη* and *κόρος*, "craving" and "satiety," were applied by Heraclitus, the one to the formation of the world, and the other to its dissolution in Fire.⁴ It is also, I think, probable that the words "satiety" and "hunger" bear the same meaning in the theological fragment already quoted.⁵ Nor are there wanting analogies in the rest of Heraclitus' doctrine to the notion of worlds succeeding one another through eternity. He maintains that a new sun is created every morning.⁶ This is not a mere symbolical expression: he means that yesterday's sun is extinguished at night, and a new sun lighted to-day. Why then should not that which happens in the case of the sun take place in the history of the world itself? It seems to me quite possible that the imagination of Heraclitus soared to a height from which the entire universe, as we see it now, may have appeared to him only a speck upon the eternal ocean of change, just as every particle which it contains is always passing into something else. The world-creating spirit, he says, is but a child at play: *αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων πεσσεύων παιδὸς ἢ βασιληίῃ.*⁷ In spite of the word

¹ Omitting *γῆ* (with Eusebius). This is Heinze's explanation (*l.c.* p. 25 f.).

² *fr.* 26.

³ *Greek Thinkers* i. p. 536.

⁴ *fr.* 24, with Bywater's note.

⁵ See p. 225.

⁶ *fr.* 82.

⁷ *fr.* 79.

πεσσεύων, it is difficult not to believe that Heraclitus, when he wrote this sentence, was thinking of Homer's delightful picture of the child building and pulling down sand castles on the shore.¹ Just so, perhaps, the Eternal Spirit makes and unmakes the world.

It is clear, I think, that some of these passages are difficult to explain unless on the hypothesis that Heraclitus, like the Stoics, believed in the periodic dissolution of the world by Fire. When he declares the present cosmos to be uncreated, and therefore by implication eternal, we should understand what he says in the light of his identification of the cosmos with the "ever-living Fire";² so that the world, notwithstanding the *ekpyrosis*, remains eternal; for if it is Fire now, it will certainly be not less Fire when the *ekpyrosis* has arrived. But the main reason for ascribing this doctrine to Heraclitus is that nearly all our ancient authorities do so, in particular the Stoics, who are not in the least likely to have invented the doctrine for themselves, and can hardly have derived it from any other source but Heraclitus. It has been argued that the periodical triumph of Fire is incompatible with the statement that Fire is "kindled and extinguished in due measure." In such a case Fire clearly takes more than his share, and we should expect the ministers of Justice to "find him out." But, according to Heraclitus, encroachments of the elements on one another are always possible, provided that, as Professor Burnet says, "an encroachment in one direction is compensated by a subsequent encroachment in the other."³ And if this is so, why should not Fire periodically prevail altogether, so long as its undivided rule is preceded or followed by the sole dominion of one of the other elements? A theory of this sort was

¹ *Il.* 15. 362 ff. So also Bernays, *Ges. Abh.* i. p. 58.

² *fr.* 20.

³ *l.c.* p. 162. Professor Burnet

himself argues strongly against ascribing the *ekpyrosis* doctrine to Heraclitus.

apparently held by those Stoics who asserted that the world is destroyed at certain intervals by water as well as by fire;¹ and Heraclitus may have looked on the universal conflagration itself as a compensatory encroachment on the part of Fire for the previous encroachment on the part of water, which, according to the "way up and down," must necessarily precede the universal conflagration.²

If we accept this view, the Godhead in Heraclitus is the creative Power or Substance which at definite intervals evolves itself into a world, and in course of time absorbs all things again. So long as the world endures, the ceaseless rotation of the elements is always reproducing in detail throughout the whole domain of nature identically the process by which the world as a whole is created and destroyed. The universe itself, as well as each individual part of it, must traverse the "upward and downward road." But the upward and downward road, Heraclitus insists, is one and the same (*ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὄντη*);³ and we have finally to consider the Godhead as the ultimate harmony transcending this and every other opposition.

To Heraclitus, the world is one gigantic battle-field of adverse powers for ever waging internecine feud. "Thou shouldest know," he says, "that war is universal"; "everything happens through strife"; "war is the father of all and the king of all."⁴ Homer is to be censured for praying that Strife might perish from among Gods and men; for without it the universe would pass away.⁵ The doctrine of flux—*πάντα ρεῖ*—is only another way of expressing this universal warfare. Nowhere is there anything that abides: the world is one vast sea of never-ending motion. "The Sun is new every day."⁶ "Into the same river you cannot step twice."⁷

¹ See Pearson on Cleanthes, *fr.*

24.

² cf. *fr.* 23, p. 228, above.

³ *fr.* 69.

⁴ *fr.* 82, 46, 44.

⁵ *fr.* 43, and Bywater *ad loc.*

⁶ *fr.* 32.

⁷ ap. Pl. *Crat.* 402 A.

The influence of this doctrine may be traced in most of the great thinkers of antiquity after Heraclitus; and to the popular imagination it appealed much more than any other part of his philosophy. It is the earliest philosophical doctrine which had the honour to be parodied upon the comic stage.¹ In Heraclitus himself, however, the last word is not multiplicity or discord, but unity and harmony. A noteworthy passage of Philo represents the unity of opposites as the corner-stone of Heracliteanism. "That which is made up of both the opposites is one, and when this one is dissected the opposites are brought to light. Is not this what the Greeks say their great and celebrated Heraclitus put in the front of his philosophy as its sum and substance, and boasted of as a new discovery."² Opposites, says Professor Burnet, are in Heraclitus nothing but "the two faces of the fire which is the thought that rules the world."³ This, then, would seem to be the revelation of which Heraclitus considered himself the prophet; and he virtually announces it in the opening sentence of his book—"having hearkened not to me, but to the *Logos*, it is wise to confess that *all things are one*." "The hidden harmony," he says, "is better than the visible."⁴ Men do not perceive this harmony, and hence they go astray. "They do not understand how that which is discordant is concordant with itself: as with the bow and the lyre, so with the world; it is the tension of opposing forces that makes the structure one."⁵ "Opposition," we are told, "is cooperation" (τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρει): "the fairest harmony results from differences": "were there no higher and lower notes in music, there could be no

¹ Epicharmus, *fr.* 170. 12-18 Kaibel. See the extremely interesting discussion in Bernays, *Ges. Abh.* i. p. 109 ff.

² *Quis rer. div. haer.* 43 (quoted by Bywater on *fr.* 2).

³ *l.c.* p. 145.

⁴ *fr.* 47.

⁵ *fr.* 45 (reading *καλίστητος*); cf. 56.

harmony at all.”¹ The interchange of opposites with one another is itself a proof that they are only different manifestations of the same thing.² The gist of the whole matter is contained in the sentence: “Join together that which is whole and that which is not whole, that which agrees and that which disagrees, the concordant and the discordant: *from all comes one and from one comes all* (ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα).”³ Now what is this One which is at the same time many? What is this Harmony which comprehends all opposites? Heraclitus himself gives the answer clearly in two of the fragments already quoted. “It is God who is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger.”⁴ “To God all things are beautiful and good and right; but men consider some things wrong, and others right.”⁵ In his *Intellectual System of the Universe*, Cudworth speaks of God as “reconciling all the Variety and Contrariety of things in the Universe into One most Admirable and Lovely Harmony.”⁶ This is precisely what is involved in Heraclitus’ view of the Godhead.

To sum up. In Heraclitus the three conceptions, *Logos*, Fire, and God, are fundamentally the same. Regarded as the *Logos*, God is the omnipresent Wisdom by which all things are steered; regarded in his physical or material aspect, that is to say, as Fire, he is the substance which creates, sustains, and in the end perhaps reabsorbs into himself the world; and in both of these aspects at once, he is the ever-changing and yet for ever changeless unity in which all multiplicity inheres. ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα—“the One is All and the All is one.”

It is usual to call Heraclitus a pantheist; and so, no doubt, he was. But pantheism is a notoriously elastic

¹ fr. 46, 43.

² fr. 78, p. 237, below.

³ fr. 59.

⁴ On the meaning of κῶρος and λιμός see above, p. 229.

⁵ fr. 61.

⁶ p. 207.

word; and the pantheism of Heraclitus is altogether different from that of Xenophanes. The World-God of Xenophanes we saw to have been a wholly unmoved and undifferentiated One. To Heraclitus, on the other hand, multiplicity and motion are essential to the very idea of the Unity which he identifies with God. The consequence is that his pantheism is everywhere full of life and animation; it is, in fact, a kind of panzoism. He is said to have declared that "all things are full of souls and spirits" (*δαίμονες*).¹ In the theology of Heraclitus it would seem as if the divinity that belongs to the eternal being is distributed among the kaleidoscopic succession of ever-fleeting forms in which that being reveals itself to our senses. Ancient Greek pantheism frequently contrived to make room for the Gods of the popular religion by regarding them as different aspects of the World-God; but the multiplicity in unity, which is the most characteristic feature of Heraclitean pantheism, seems not only to sanction, but to necessitate a plurality of potencies, each of which is only a passing form of the eternal One. Some such doctrine is apparently contained in the obscure and much debated sentence: "God is . . . changed, just as fire, when mingled with different kinds of incense, is named according to the flavour of each."² It was a favourite theory of the Stoics that *numina sunt nomina*: God is called by various names according to the different kinds of matter through which he passes. The fragment just quoted makes it probable that here, as elsewhere, Stoicism was indebted to Heraclitus.

So much, then, for the doctrine of the *Logos* as it appears in the philosophy of its founder. It remains to consider the ethical and eschatological ideas to which Heraclitus gives expression in the surviving fragments of his book. The theoretical basis of Heraclitean ethics is

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 7; cf. p. 185, above.

² *fr.* 36, p. 225, above.

the doctrine that man's soul is naturally one with the universal *Logos*. The *Logos*, we have seen, is the divine Fire; and in the human soul, to quote the words of Zeller, "the divine Fire has preserved itself in its purer form. . . . The purer this Fire, the more perfect the soul."¹ Sextus Empiricus, in the passage already quoted,² brings out very clearly the connexion between the human and the divine reason; and it is still more definitely affirmed in a remarkable couplet attributed to Epicharmus, though in reality dating from the end of the fifth century B.C. "Man has reason, and so too has God; but man's reason is derived from the divine."³ The famous saying of Heraclitus, ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαίμων, often supposed to mean "man's character is his fate," is probably an assertion of the divinity of the soul;⁴ and that which makes the soul divine is just its unity with the *Logos*. In action, therefore, as well as in thought and word, our aim should be to recognise and fulfil this unity. Most men ignore it altogether, and follow an imaginary wisdom of their own.⁵ In a word, our duty is to follow the universal: δεῖ ἐπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ.⁶

It is possible, perhaps, to form a rough idea of the way in which Heraclitus may have applied this principle in detail. We have frequently seen that the administration of the *Logos* throughout the world is always according to measure or law. The ever-living Fire is kindled and extinguished in due measure; and the Sun may not exceed his measures. The same principle, Heraclitus holds, should rule among mankind both in private and in public life. "*Hybris*"—that is, the violation of measure,—“must be extinguished more than

¹ *l.c.* p. 704 f.

² See p. 223.

³ Diels² i. p. 98, § 57. This is perhaps the oldest reference in Greek literature to Heraclitus' doctrine of the *Logos*.

⁴ *fr.* 121. For ἦθος cf. *fr.* 96, and

for δαίμων, *fr.* 97. Plutarch understood the words in this sense; see Bywater *ad loc.*

⁵ *fr.* 92.

⁶ See p. 219. Cf. the Pythagorean precept "follow God."

a conflagration.”¹ Human laws are nourished by the law divine; and hence “the people should fight for the law as for a tower.”² But the *Logos* does not merely set the example of moderation and law-abidingness: it is also in itself a harmony, and what is more, a harmony that results from discord. From this point of view, we may perhaps be said to “follow the universal” when we recognise that pain and evil are the necessary and inseparable concomitants of good in human life: a state of mind productive of patience and resignation. “It is not good for men to get all that they desire. Sickness makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest.”³ Heraclitus would have agreed with the words of Browning—

“Type needs antitype :
As night needs day, as shine needs shade, so good
Needs evil: how were pity understood
Unless by pain?”⁴

We are to remember that from the highest standpoint there is nothing but order and beauty. “To God all things are beautiful and good and right”: “God accomplishes all things with a view to the harmony of the whole.” I have already pointed out how this profoundly religious sentiment is illustrated by the drama of Sophocles; but the highest expression of it in Greek literature is the *Hymn* to Zeus which Cleanthes composed under the immediate inspiration of Heraclitus’ book.

“Nay, but thou knowest to make crooked straight;
Chaos to thee is order: in thine eyes
The unloved is lovely, who didst harmonise
Things evil with things good, that there should be
One Word through all things everlastingly.”⁵

¹ *fr.* 103.

² *fr.* 100.

³ *fr.* 104.

⁴ *Francis Furini.*

⁵ v. 18 ff.

Nothing could be more characteristically Heraclitean than these lines. But perhaps the chief significance of Heraclitus' exhortation to "follow the universal" lies in the protest which it makes against individualism of every kind. In the words of Alois Patin, "there is no such thing as a permanent *ego* in Heraclitus. The human soul, as a portion of the one rational life, without any independent existence of its own, is exposed to the universal process of change. And thus it appears as if Heraclitus, with his characteristic tendency to express a variety of meanings by a single word, desired to indicate the irreconcilable antagonism between himself and all other teachers, the entire idiosyncrasy of his doctrine, in other words, his denial of the *ego*, by the very words with which he begins his book: 'Listen not unto me, but to the *Logos*: οὐκ ἐμεῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.'" ¹

The eschatological fragments of Heraclitus are, if anything, more obscure than the others, and have been interpreted in an infinite variety of ways.² "Like a light in the night-season," Heraclitus says, "man is kindled and extinguished."³ Several of the fragments seem, nevertheless, to imply that the soul still exists after death; and of these the majority have a *prima facie* connexion with Orphism. "The living and the dead, the waking and the sleeping, the young and the old are the same; for the latter when they have changed are the former, and the former when they have changed are the latter."⁴ This is the view which Plato afterwards developed in his so-called cyclical proof of immortality;⁵ and one of the analogies on which Plato relies, that of sleeping and waking, is apparently suggested by Heraclitus. The theory that the living are born from the dead Plato describes as an old-world story

¹ *l.c.* p. 100.

² Some of the different interpretations are enumerated by Schäfer, *Die Phil. d. Heraklit von Ephesus*, etc. (1902) p. 109 ff.

³ *fr.* 77.

⁴ *fr.* 78.

⁵ *Phaed.* 71 C ff.

(παλαιὸς λόγος),¹ a phrase by which he sometimes refers to the Orphic doctrines; nor is there any doubt that the theory is Orphic.² The curious statement about souls retaining the sense of smell in Hades³ probably comes from the same source. According to Plato, some pleasures are "pure," and others "impure." Most of the bodily pleasures, he maintains, are impure, but the pleasures of smell belong to the other class. Now we have seen that "purity" and "impurity" are characteristically Orphic ideas; and I have elsewhere conjectured⁴ that Plato's whole theory of pure and impure pleasures is suggested by the Orphic belief that whatever is contaminated by the body is impure. If this is so, the reason why "souls smell in Hades" is because they are no longer imprisoned in the body. Pure souls may be expected to enjoy pure pleasures. Another fragment seems to connect the final conflagration with the Orphic doctrine of a judgment hereafter.⁵ In the enigmatical saying, "immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living the immortals' death, and dying the immortals' life,"⁶ we may recognise, perhaps, the familiar conception of the body as the sepulchre of the soul. Some of the ancients, at least, understood the fragment in this sense; for it is thus paraphrased by Sextus: "Both living and dying are present in our life and in our death; for when we live, our souls are dead and buried in us, and when we die, our souls revive and live."⁷ There remains the prediction that certain of those who have died will arise again to be "guardians of the quick and the dead."⁸ Hippolytus, *more suo*, sees in this an obvious reference to the doctrine of a bodily resurrection; but Heraclitus is no doubt thinking of the departed spirits of the golden age who are said by Hesiod to keep watch over mortal men. Accord-

¹ *Phaed.* 70 C.

² See p. 106.

³ *fr.* 38.

⁴ Plato, *Rep.* ix. 584 B n.

⁵ *fr.* 26; cf. perhaps 118, 122.

⁶ *fr.* 67.

⁷ *Pyrrh.* iii. 230. Cf. *fr.* 77 Diels.

⁸ *fr.* 123.

ing to Professor Diels, however, there is also an allusion to the ritual of the Orphic mysteries.¹

If these fragments express what Heraclitus himself believed, and not rather certain views which he is combating,² we must allow, I think, that his eschatological beliefs can hardly be reconciled with the rest of his philosophy. To the recurrent cycle of life and death a certain analogy might possibly be found in the life-history of the world, alternating between the evolution of things from fire and their resolution into fire again. But for the doctrine of individual immortality there is no room in Heraclitus, seeing that he virtually denies the persistence of the individual even during life. Nor do we find any other indications throughout the fragments of sympathy with Orphism. On the contrary, Heraclitus speaks with contempt of "night-roamers, magians, bacchanals, wine-vat priestesses and initiates," and declares that "men are sacrilegiously initiated into the mysteries that prevail among them."³ But in any case, whether Heraclitus believed in immortality or not, his importance in the history of religion depends entirely on his doctrine of the *Logos*. In Heraclitus the *Logos*, as we have seen, is God, and identical with the ever-living Fire which is the world. By the Stoics the Heraclitean concept of *Logos* was further elaborated, but the elements of pantheism and materialism still remained. From the Stoics the doctrine passed to Philo, who under Platonic influence clearly separates the *Logos* from the supreme God, letting pantheism give place to theism. At the same time the *Logos* is frequently personified and described in terms which, as Mr. Purves remarks, "often bear striking resemblance to New Testament descriptions of Christ."⁴ To quote a few among many such charac-

¹ *Herakl.* p. 16 n.

² Cf. Patin, *l.c.* p. 13 ff.

³ *fr.* 124, 125. Cf. *The Wisdom of Solomon* 12. 4 ; 14. 23.

⁴ *Dict. of the Bible*, art. "Logos," p. 135^a.

terisations, the *Logos*, in Philo, is the Divine Word, the first-born son of God, the image of God, God's vicegerent in the world, his prophet and interpreter, the high-priest who intercedes with God for the whole world, the intermediary between God and man, himself partaking at once of the nature of both.¹ Then came the great and decisive step, for which the teaching of post-Aristotelian philosophy in Greece had itself prepared the way, by its ever-increasing disposition to personify the ethical ideal. The link between Greek philosophy and Christian thought was once for all established by the author of the Fourth Gospel when he proclaimed that the *Logos* had become incarnate in Jesus Christ. ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῶν: "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us."² In his lectures on Christian mysticism, Mr. Inge, on the strength of a passage of Amelius quoted in Eusebius,³ hazards the suggestion that "the apostle, writing at Ephesus," deliberately refers in his prologue to the "lofty doctrine of the great Ephesian idealist."⁴ We can hardly make sure of this; but at all events it is Heraclitus' doctrine of the *Logos* which made him be counted among the "Christians before Christ." "They who have lived in company with *Logos* (μετὰ λόγου)," says Justin Martyr, "are Christians, even if they were accounted atheists. And such, among the Greeks, were Socrates and Heraclitus."⁵

¹ Heinze, *l.c.* pp. 204-297.

² St. John i. 14.

³ *Praep. Ev.* xi. 19.

⁴ p. 47 n. Cf. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* ii. p. 473.

⁵ *Apol.* i. 46.

LECTURE XII

FROM PARMENIDES TO ANAXAGORAS

PARMENIDES of Elea is the first of the philosophers whom we have to discuss to-day. According to what appears to be the trustworthy evidence of Plato, he lived from about 515 to 449 B.C. or later.¹ By the ancients he was said to have been the disciple of Xenophanes; and his philosophy is most readily understood as a metaphysical development of Xenophanes' doctrine of the one God, who is the world.

The poem in which Parmenides unfolds his theory of nature falls into two divisions, the former of which he calls the "trustworthy discourse, the thought about truth,"² whereas the latter is a "wholly untrustworthy road,"³ containing the "opinions of mortals, wherein is no true belief."⁴ Historians of philosophy are far from agreed as to the value which Parmenides himself attached to his "Way of Opinion"; but in the face of such emphatic statements it seems impossible to regard it as otherwise than illusory and false, whatever may have been his motive in building a house upon the sands. "From this point onwards," he says, when about to pass to the second section of his poem, "learn the opinions of mortals, and give ear to the deceptive array of my verses."⁵

The so-called "Philosophy of Opinion," in which

¹ See the discussion in Burnet, *l.c.* p. 180.

² *fr.* 8. 50 f.; cf. 4. 4; 1. 29.

³ *fr.* 4. 6 (reading *παρὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν*).

⁴ *fr.* 1. 30; cf. 8. 51 f.

⁵ *fr.* 8. 51 f.

Parmenides traced the origin of things to Light and Darkness, was by no means destitute of theological conceptions. We read of a Goddess or Daemon throned in the centre of the world and "steering the course of all" — *δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ*.¹ This Daemon, whom Parmenides called variously "Justice," "Necessity," and the "Key-bearer," is the mother of Eros, the oldest of the Gods, and "sends souls at one time out of the visible into the invisible, and at another time back again from the invisible into the visible."² It is obvious that we are here on Orphic and Pythagorean ground; and indeed one of the theories about the second part of Parmenides' poem is that it is "nothing but a summary of contemporary Pythagorean cosmology."³ However this may be, if we would understand what Parmenides himself believed, we must "restrain our thoughts from this way of inquiry,"⁴ considering only the path of Knowledge, which alone can guide us to the Truth.

According to the "Way of Truth," the belief in generation, multiplicity, and change is but a delusive road on which "mortals that know nothing wander to and fro, facing both ways at once; for utter helplessness directs the wandering thought in their breasts: deaf at once and blind, they are swept along in stupefied bewilderment, indiscriminating tribes who think that 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same and not the same, and that everything returns upon itself" (*πάντων δὲ παλιτροπός ἐστι κέλευθος*).⁵ In such vigorous language does Parmenides denounce the Heraclitean doctrine of the "upward and downward path" on which all things are for ever travelling. In the view of Parmenides, that which he calls "not-being" is not, for it can neither be thought nor named; generation and

¹ *fr.* 12. 3.

² Diels² i. p. 111, § 37 (cf. *fr.* 1. 14; 10. 6); also *fr.* 13.

³ Burnet, *l.c.* p. 197.

⁴ *fr.* 1. 33.

⁵ *fr.* 6. 4 ff. (reading *πλάζονται*).

destruction, movement and change, are empty words; reality there is none but Being.¹

Being, according to Parmenides, is a single uncreated and imperishable whole, immovable and changeless. It never was nor shall be, but only *is*.² Parmenides' further specifications of the concept show that he regarded Being as a material substance. He declares it to be continuous and indivisible; for it is uniform throughout, and there is no more of it in one part than in another, but everything is full of it, and Being is everywhere in contact with itself. It is, moreover, finite and not infinite, equally poised from the centre on every side, resembling the mass of a well-rounded sphere.³ Several of these characterisations appear to have been suggested by Xenophanes' description of the World-god, "ever abiding in the same place and moving not at all"; but it is important to observe that Parmenides nowhere assigns to Being any kind of psychical attribute or function. Compared with the World-god of Xenophanes, "all-eye, all-mind, all-hearing," the Being of Parmenides appears to be only a "motionless corporeal *plenum*." It has consequently been held that, so far from being the "father of idealism," Parmenides may more truly be called the "father of materialism," since "all materialism depends upon his view of reality."⁴ At the same time, though the reality in which he believes is clearly something material, it is not apprehended by the senses, but only by thought;⁵ it is the changeless unity which is hidden from us by the deceptive appearance of plurality and change. To this extent the philosophy of Parmenides has affinities with idealism; nor would Plato have venerated him so highly if he had been a materialist in the same sense as, for

¹ *fr.* 4. 5 ff.; 8. 8 f., 38 ff.

² *fr.* 8. 3 ff.

³ *fr.* 2; 8. 22-49.

⁴ Burnet, *l.c.* p. 194 f.

⁵ *fr.* 1. 35 ff.; cf. 8. 34.

example, Democritus. For the student of theological ideas, however, Parmenides and his successors in the Eleatic school are of little or no importance. The concept of God disappears for them in that of Being.

On the one hand, therefore, we have Heraclitus and his followers, who emphatically assert that the real is always changing; and, on the other hand, Parmenides proclaims with not less vehemence that the real is always immutably the same. This is the fundamental antithesis of pre-Empedoclean philosophy in Greece; and almost every philosophical system after Parmenides may be regarded as an endeavour to adjust or reconcile the two opposing points of view. The solution that first recommended itself to Greek thinkers may be thus expressed. They agree with Parmenides that Being, in the strict sense of the word, is necessarily uncreated, indestructible, and changeless; and they explain Becoming as the combination and separation of those eternal and changeless elements which they identify with Being. There is no creation out of nothing, and no dissolution into nothing: the elements merely unite and fall asunder. In the words of Empedocles, whom we now proceed to consider, nothing is born or dies; "mingling and separation of the mingled—that is all; birth is but a name men give to these."¹

Empedocles, of Acragas in Sicily, was born in the early part of the fifth century before Christ. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the reputation he enjoyed during his lifetime, or upon the manifold legends that were afterwards associated with his name; nor are we concerned with the details of his physical doctrine, except in so far as they are connected with his theology. According to Empedocles, the four "roots" of the Universe are Fire, Air (or, as he generally calls it, Aether), Water, and Earth.² These elements are un-

¹ *fr.* 8; *cf.* 11, 12.


² *fr.* 6.

created, imperishable, and in themselves unmoved; so that, if they are to combine and form a cosmos, it can only be by the operation of some moving power distinct and separate from themselves. As soon as philosophy abandoned the standpoint of monism, a distinction between the $\acute{\upsilon}\phi'$ $\omicron\upsilon$ and the $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}$ $\omicron\upsilon$, the efficient and the material cause, became inevitable; and Empedocles is the first of the Greek philosophers in whom this distinction, so important in the history of theological as well as of philosophical thought, begins to appear. But inasmuch as the elements not only unite with one another in so-called birth or generation, but also fall asunder in "death," Empedocles is not content with a single moving cause. Two causes, he believes, are necessary, the one to account for the combination, and the other to account for the separation of the elements. To suppose that one and the same agent performs both functions would be to sacrifice its uniformity and changelessness, and therefore its reality or being; for changelessness, as Parmenides had taught, is an essential attribute of that which *is*. The power that combines the elements into things Empedocles calls "Love" or "Friendship"; the opposite or disintegrating power he designates by the name of "Strife" or "Hatred." These two rival forces contend with one another throughout the whole of nature. "At one time," says Empedocles, "all the members that fall to the lot of the body are united through Love, and then life's bloom is at its height; at another, severed by hateful strife, they wander apart by themselves, where the waves of life are breaking" (*περὶ ῥηγγμῖνι βίωιο*). "It is the same with shrubs, with fishes in their watery halls, with wild beasts that couch in the mountains, and with birds that move on wing."¹ Love and Strife are of course eternal, like the elements which they move; so that Empedocles in reality affirms

¹ fr. 20.

the existence of six uncreated principles, Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, together with Love and Hatred.¹ In his own words, "these and these only are; but, running through each other, they appear as different things at different times, although they are always the same."²

The phenomena which we call birth and death, generation and destruction, are therefore, according to Empedocles, nothing but the union and separation of fire, air, water, and earth under the action respectively of Love and of Hatred. He believes, further, that each of these two powers alternately prevails over the other. The life of the world, as imagined by Empedocles, follows a circular course, in which there are four well-marked stages. In the circle ABCD, the point A may be taken to represent the period when the four elements, together with Love, are mingled in one indistinguishable



A = Period of Unity. AC = Transition to Period of Separation.
C = Period of Separation. CA = Transition to Period of Unity.

whole, which Empedocles calls the Sphere. "Therein are distinguished neither the Sun's swift limbs, nor yet the shaggy strength of Earth, nor the Sea; so firmly bound in Harmony's close canopy stands the rounded

¹ Arist. *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 1. 314^a
16 f.

² *fr.* 17. 34 f.; cf. 21. 13 f.; 26. 3 ff.

Sphere, rejoicing in exultant loneliness."¹ While the elements are so completely blended, there can be no individual existences of any kind; nothing but the solitary all-embracing One. It is in this period that Love holds undisputed sway, the rival principle being temporarily subdued. But in due time Hatred waxes strong again "within the limbs of the Sphere,"² and a struggle ensues, in the course of which Strife gradually gains the upper hand. A tremor ran through the mighty mass—"all the limbs of the God," Empedocles says, "quaked in succession";³ and then the elements began to separate. For a time Love is still sufficiently powerful to keep the disintegration within limits. The result of the conflict between Harmony and Strife is in the first instance to create the cosmos; and when the point B is reached, the battle is apparently a drawn one, and the Universe in its prime. At this stage dissolution and decay set in: Hatred encroaches more and more upon Love, until at the point C the separation of the elements is complete, and Love in turn has yielded the sceptre to her rival. Here, again, all individual existence ceases; for the elements refuse to combine. In the return journey from C to A the process is reversed, Love gaining upon Strife until unity is once more reached in the Sphere. Such, according to Empedocles, is the history of the universe, and it repeats itself at intervals throughout eternity. Love and Hatred, he says, "were aforesaid and shall be hereafter; nor ever, I think, shall infinite time be emptied of those twain. They prevail alternately as the circle comes round, disappearing before each other, and waxing again in their appointed turn."⁴

In this rapid sketch of Empedocles' physical theory I

¹ *fr.* 27 (reading *περιγηθεί*). The Sun is a synonym for Fire, and Harmony for Love.

² *fr.* 30. 1.

³ *fr.* 31.

⁴ 110-113 Stein; Diels² *fr.* 16, 26. 1 f.

have introduced only the minimum of detail which seemed to be necessary in order that we may understand what he has to say about the Godhead; but the Empedoclean doctrine of cycles is itself of no little interest in connexion with religious thought. In the first place, it apparently involves the same kind of belief in an ἀποκατάστασις or "restoration of all things" with which we have already met in the Orphic religion;¹ for we may fairly conjecture that, when the circle is once fulfilled, the world again pursues exactly the same course as in the former aeon; at all events, Empedocles says nothing to indicate that there is any change. And, in the second place, inasmuch as Empedocles deifies the Sphere,² we may say that, according to his theory, all individual existences are ultimately, though only for a time, absorbed in God, much as the divine Fire in Heraclitus resumes all things into itself at the expiration of each successive period in the history of the world.

We are now in a position to consider the theology of Empedocles. The most striking of the theological fragments are the following:

"We cannot bring God nigh to us, that we should see him with our eyes; nor can we lay hold on him with our hands—the two highways by which faith enters into the heart of man."³

"For he is not provided with a human head upon his limbs: two branches do not spring from his shoulders: he has no feet, no swift knees, no hairy members: he is only a sacred and unutterable mind shooting with swift thoughts through all the world (ἀλλὰ φρήν ἱερὴν καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μῦθον, ¹ φροντίσι κόσμον ἄπαντα καταίσσομεν βοῆσιν).⁴

The second of these remarkable fragments appears to be inspired by Xenophanes' account of the "one God,"

¹ See p. 109.

² fr. 51.

³ fr. 133.

⁴ fr. 134.

neither in body nor in mind resembling man, ruling the universe merely by thought; and we are tempted to suppose that Empedocles is here thinking of the Sphere-God, the nearest parallel in his philosophy to the World-God of the Colophonian. This explanation has been offered both in antiquity and in modern times;¹ but the last two verses—"a sacred and ineffable mind shooting with swift thoughts through all the world"—cannot easily be understood of that temporary union of the elements which is necessarily dissolved in the formation of the cosmos. We are told by Ammonius, to whom we owe the longer of the two fragments, that the poet was referring primarily to Apollo, though secondarily also to the divine nature as a whole; and this interpretation, which Zeller and Diels uphold, appears more likely to be correct.² Greek religious thought, as we have already seen, naturally tended to spiritualise Apollo. In Empedocles this impulse may have been exceptionally strong; for he was firmly assured of his prophetic vocation, and Apollo was the God of prophecy. At all events we have in these lines a more explicit assertion of the spiritual nature of God than we have hitherto found in Greek philosophy.

Among other compounds of the elements we hear of certain "long-lived Gods" (*θεοὶ δολιχάωνες*),³ created and perishable, destined to suffer dissolution at the end of every Great Year, when the elements are fused or separated by Love or Strife. In Anaximander, as I have already remarked, the "created Gods" are to be identified with the "innumerable worlds";⁴ but the "long-lived Gods" of Empedocles seem to be those of ordinary Greek polytheism,⁵ interpreted in the light of

¹ See Diels, *fr.* 29; and cf. Karsten, *Emp. Carmina* p. 505, and Burnet, *l.c.* p. 269.

² See Diels, *l.c.* and *i.* p. 157, § 23; Zeller⁵ *i.* 2. p. 815 n. 2.

³ *fr.* 21. 12; cf. 23. 8.

⁴ See p. 187.

⁵ Cf. Zeller, *l.c.* p. 813.

his physical theory. Elsewhere Empedocles calls upon the Muse to aid him while he reveals a "good discourse about the blessed Gods."¹ From this it is clear not only that he treated of theology at some length, but also that he set himself to reform and purify the prevailing conception of the Godhead, as in the passage already quoted about Apollo. Nowhere, however, does he maintain, like Xenophanes, that God is one; and a belief in the divine unity cannot well be reconciled with the pluralism of his physics.

In addition to the Sphere-God and to the created Gods, Empedocles also deified the four elements, together with the two efficient causes.² Some of his Ionic predecessors had already conceived of their elementary substances as divine; but since Empedocles for the first time tries to separate the moving cause from that which is moved, it is necessary to inquire whether any new theological idea is involved when he ascribes divinity to Love and Hatred. In the judgment of Aristotle, the conception at which Empedocles is aiming, though he fails to give it adequate expression, is that Friendship is the cause of good, and Strife the cause of evil; so that in a sense he was the first to recognise the Good and the Evil as independent principles; for the cause of good must be the Good, and the cause of evil the Evil.³ To Empedocles, Love is clearly the beneficent, and Hatred the malevolent power: he tells of "the gentle immortal onrush of blameless Love,"⁴ whereas his epithets for Strife are "accursed" and "deadly";⁵ and in the golden age, we are told, Love reigned alone. At the same time, although Love may be regarded as a benignant Deity who makes war upon the principle of Evil, no real or lasting progress is effected; for whatever ground Love gains in her struggle

¹ *fr.* 131. 4. Cf. *fr.* 132.

² *fr.* 59. 1, with *Arist. de Gen. et Corr.* B 8. 333^b 12.

³ *Met.* A 4. 985^a 4 ff.

⁴ *fr.* 35. 13; cf. 17. 23.

⁵ *fr.* 20. 4; 17. 19.

with Hatred, she must surrender in course of time to her rival. In these circumstances, a teleological interpretation of nature is impossible; nor does Empedocles appear to have recognised any trace of design either in the structure of the world or in the evolution of animal life.¹

I have said that Empedocles, for the first time in the history of Greek philosophy, makes an attempt to separate the efficient from the material cause, or, as we ought rather to say, the moving principle from that which is moved. But the separation which he succeeds in effecting is very far from complete. On the one hand, he still conceives of Love and Hatred as corporeal, and puts them in this respect on the same plane with the four "roots of things."² Some of his expressions clearly imply that the moving principles are physically present in the compounds which they create;³ and others prove not less clearly that both Friendship and Strife are extended in space.⁴ Aristotle consequently blames Empedocles for treating Friendship as if it were not only an efficient but also a material cause: "he makes it part," says Aristotle, "of the mixture."⁵ And, on the other hand, each of the four elements, as well as Love and Hatred, are, according to Empedocles, endowed with perceptive and cognitive power. "With earth we see earth, with water, water, with air, bright air, with fire, devastating fire, with Love, love, and strife with baneful Strife."⁶ It amounts to the same thing when Empedocles declares that "the blood about the heart is man's thought";⁷ for it is in the blood, as he supposes, that the elements are most completely mingled.⁸ These considerations make it clear that Empedocles was unable to break with the hylozoism of his Ionic predecessors;

¹ *fr.* 59 virtually denies design.

² *fr.* 17. 27 f.

³ *fr.* 17. 22 f.; and esp. *fr.* 109.

⁴ 17. 19 f.

⁵ *Met.* A 10. 1075^b 3 f.

⁶ *fr.* 109.

⁷ *fr.* 105. 8.

⁸ Theophrastus, *de Sensu* 10; cf. *fr.* 98. 5.

but even the imperfect distinction which he draws between the active and the passive constituents in the formation of the world is a step towards the dualism of Anaxagoras.

Empedocles believes that the mind is entirely dependent upon the material substances out of which it is composed.¹ We learn from Theophrastus that he took no small pains to devise appropriate physical explanations for the various types of mental constitution. Those persons, for example, in whom the elements are blended in equal or nearly equal proportions, without being too far apart, too small, or too large, he held to be the wisest, and so on.² This is that "proportion," or *λόγος τῆς μίξεως*, as to which Aristotle pertinently asks whether Empedocles meant it to be his explanation of soul or not.³ But the truth is that Empedocles has no philosophical theory of the soul as distinct from the body; and inasmuch as he thought the elements could themselves perceive, he must have supposed that any kind of mixture would have resulted in a soul of some sort or other. In point of fact, he not only attributed to plants intelligence, desire, and feeling, but declared in so many words that "all things have wisdom and participate in thought."⁴ If we develop this idea to its logical conclusion, at the same time remembering that the elements are divine, it will land us in pantheism; and some have maintained that Empedocles was really a pantheist. Karsten considers the Sphere-god to be only an expression for the harmony of the universe, identical with the "sacred and unutterable mind shooting with swift thoughts through all the world," and he interprets the elements and moving principles as only particular aspects or embodiments of the universal mind. By this means

¹ *fr.* 105, 106, 108, 109. Cf. Parm. *fr.* 16 (in the "Way of Opinion").

² Theophr. *de Sensu* 11.

³ *de An.* A 4. 408^a 20.

⁴ Diels² i. p. 164, § 70; *fr.* 110.10.

he arrives at the conclusion that Empedocles' system is an apotheosis of nature—"est, ut ita dicam, naturæ ἀποθείωσις"¹—to be compared with the poetical pantheism of Virgil—

"deum namque ire per omnes
terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum."²

It is obvious that there are pantheistic elements in the philosophy of Empedocles, but Karsten's view cannot be upheld unless we are prepared to regard the poem *On Nature* as an allegory throughout; and we have no reason to suppose that it was anything of the kind. The truth is rather that Empedocles, though he has flashes of insight and inspiration, fails to make his doctrine into a consistent and harmonious whole.

The religious and ethical teaching of Empedocles has already been touched upon in connexion with Orphism. In the fragments of the poem called *Purifications* we meet with most of the leading Orphic doctrines—such as exile from Heaven in consequence of sin, metempsychosis, the duty of abstaining from animal food, and finally, when the purification is complete, reunion with the Gods. It cannot be affirmed that Empedocles did anything to clarify or intellectualise the Orphic religion; nor is it possible to reconcile his religious belief in personal immortality and pre-existence with his philosophical doctrine of the combination and separation of the elements through Love and Strife.

We have next to examine the views of a more robust and powerful thinker, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, about whom Aristotle says that, in declaring *Nous* to be the cause of the cosmos, he is sobriety itself by the side of the rambling utterances of his predecessors.³ Though somewhat older than Empedocles, Anaxagoras

¹ *Emp. Carm.* p. 391. Cf. pp. 503-506.

² *Georg.* iv. 221 f.

³ *Met.* A 8. 984^b 15 ff.

appears to have written and published his book after Empedocles' poem was already before the world.¹ With the name of Anaxagoras are associated two principal doctrines—that of an infinity of original particles or seeds, and the far more famous doctrine of a world-creating and world-ruling intelligence or *Nous*. It is the second of these conceptions which is of importance for the student of theology; and I will touch upon the first only in so far as may be necessary to enable us to understand the doctrine of *Nous*.

Anaxagoras agrees with Empedocles in denying ἀπλῆ γένεσις or creation out of nothing. "The Greeks," he says, "use words wrongly when they speak of generation and destruction; for nothing is generated or destroyed, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. They would be right," he adds, "if they called generation mingling, and destruction separation."² What, then, are the uncreated and indestructible substances out of which things are formed? Empedocles, as we have seen, identified them with the four elements—fire, air, water, and earth—and accounted for the variety of things by saying that the proportion of the mixture, the λόγος τῆς μίξεως, differs in different cases. Bone, for example, is composed of two parts of earth, four of fire, one of water, and one of air; while flesh apparently consists of each of the four elements in equal amounts.³ Anaxagoras, on the other hand, regards the qualitatively determined bodies as the more original, and the Empedoclean elements as not less composite than anything else; and he accordingly postulates an infinite number of infinitely various elements, or rather, as he calls them, "seeds." Let us suppose that Empedocles and Anaxagoras are attempting to explain, for example, the composition of a piece of timber.

¹ *Met.* A 3. 984^a 11 f.
² *fr.* 17.

³ *Emp. fr.* 96; see also Diels² i. p. 166, § 78.

Empedocles would say that timber is one particular combination of fire, air, water, and earth; while Anaxagoras would say that it results from the union of a number of seeds or particles of timber; but at the same time—and this is the further point which requires to be noticed—he would take care to add that the piece of wood contains particles not only of wood, but also of every other object. If we call it wood, that is only because the particles of wood in it predominate;¹ as soon as the particles of fire within it prevail, we call it fire; but in fire, too, there are particles of wood, and indeed of all other things whatsoever. You will see that, according to this theory, every particular object in the universe is itself a kind of world in miniature. “In everything there is a portion of everything except *Nous*.”²

Such, briefly expressed, is Anaxagoras’ theory of matter. Without stopping to criticise so fantastic a hypothesis, let us endeavour to see how it is related to his theory of mind. In the present condition of the world all these infinitely numerous and infinitely various particles are distributed throughout the different organic and inorganic compounds which make up the ordered universe or cosmos. But in the period before the world began they were completely intermingled with one another in a kind of spurious unity, which is the Anaxagorean equivalent of Empedocles’ Sphere. “All things,” writes the philosopher, “were together—*ἁμῶν πάντα χρήματα ἦν*,—infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small was also infinite. And when all things were together, none of them was distinguishable by reason of its smallness.”³ This primeval “mixture” or chaos is absolutely motionless, and cannot of itself become a cosmos. In order that it may do

¹ *fr.* 12 *ad fin.*

² *fr.* 11; cf. *fr.* 4.

³ *fr.* 1.

so, a moving cause is required; and this Anaxagoras finds in Reason. When the time arrived for the making of the world, Reason stepped in and originated a rotatory movement at one particular point of the mixture, possibly, as has been conjectured, at the point corresponding to that which in the completed universe we call the pole.¹ The gradual extension of this movement in course of time brought the cosmos into being, by a succession of steps which it is unnecessary for our purposes to enumerate.

In this way, then, Anaxagoras' doctrine of *Nous* is connected with his physical theory; and it remains for us to examine in detail his most celebrated concept, the theological significance of which will appear as we proceed.

The relevant fragments are as follows:

"In everything there is a portion of everything except *Nous*, and there are some things in which there is also *Nous*.²

"All other things partake in everything, whereas *Nous* has no part in anything,³ owns no master but itself (*αὐτοκράτης*), is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with aught else, it would partake in all things, if it were mixed with anything; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as I have already said; and the things mixed with it would prevent it from having power over anything in the way it has, seeing it is alone and by itself. For *Nous* is the subtlest and purest of all things, and moreover has all knowledge about everything, and the greatest strength. And over all things that have life, both greater and less, *Nous* has power. And *Nous* had power over the whole revolution,⁴ so that it began to revolve. And the revolution began from a small beginning, but is now more extensive, and will be more extensive still. And *Nous* knows all the things that are mingled and separated off and severed. And *Nous* set in order all the things that were to be, and that formerly

¹ So Dilthey, quoted by Zeller⁵ i. 2. p. 1001 n. 1.

² *fr.* 11.

³ *ἄκρῃσιν* means, perhaps, *ἀκρῖσιν πάντων*, *extrema omnium*. Zeller⁵ i.

2. p. 992 n. 1 suggests either *ἀμείρον*, or preferably *ἀπλόον* (cf. Arist. *de An.* i. 2. 405^a 16).

⁴ *sc.* which generated the world.

were but now are not, and whatsoever things are now; and it set in order this revolution wherein the stars now revolve and the sun and the moon and the air and the aether which are separated off. And this revolution was the cause of the separating; and that which is dense is separated from that which is rare, and the warm from the cold, the bright from the dark, and the dry from the moist. But there are many portions in many things; and no one thing is altogether separated or severed from another except *Nous*. And all *Nous* is alike, both the greater and the less; but nothing else is like anything else, but each particular thing is and was most clearly that whereof it has most in it."¹

"And when *Nous* began to set things in motion, from all that was moved separation took place, and all that *Nous* set in motion was severed; and as things were set in motion and severed, the revolution caused them to be severed much more."²

"*Nous*, which is eternal, is assuredly present even now where all the other things are, in the surrounding mass, as well as in the things that have been separated off and that are being separated off."³

Not a few distinguished writers have maintained that the *Nous* of Anaxagoras, so far from being a spiritual and incorporeal essence, is in reality only a particular form of matter. Professor Windelband, indeed, goes so far in this direction as to suggest that the proper translation of the word in Anaxagoras is not "Mind" or "Thought," but "Thought-stuff" (*Denkstoff*).⁴ It is quite true that on a severely literal interpretation of Anaxagoras' own words, he appears to conceive of *Nous* as something corporeal. We are led to suppose that *Nous* admits of quantitative differentiation: "all *Nous*," he says, "is alike, both the greater and the smaller;" it seems to be extended in space, for it is present in the mixture which it articulates into a world, as well as in what is separated off; and, in the third place, we are told that *Nous* is the "subtlest and purest of all things." But it is by no means clear that these expressions were meant to be

¹ fr. 12.

² fr. 13.

³ fr. 14 (reading ἀποκριθείσι for

προσκριθείσι and ἀποκρινόμενους for ἀποκεκρμένους).

⁴ *Gesch. d. alten Phil.* p. 165.

understood in a literal sense. As soon as we attempt to describe what is spiritual in other than purely negative language, we are almost inevitably thrown back on more or less figurative terms of speech, even at the risk of appearing to ascribe to spirit the attributes that belong to body. The Platonic account of the soul is a case in point. Just as Anaxagoras recognises a greater and a smaller Reason, meaning, no doubt, the world-forming *Nous*, and *Nous* as it appears in animals and plants, so Plato recognises different degrees of reason. The Gods, he says, participate in reason; and so also do men, but the latter only to a small extent.¹ The soul of the world in the *Timæus* of Plato is certainly incorporeal, and yet the language in which it is described attributes to it spatial extension; for God is said to stretch it throughout the entire body of the Universe and wrap it like a mantle round the world.² The later history of theological thought furnishes many examples of this inherent disability of language. "Are we to suppose," asks a German writer on Anaxagoras, "that Anselm believed in the corporeality of God because he describes Him as *id quo maius cogitari nequit*?"³ According to Descartes, there are two forms of extension, *vera extensio* and *extensio per analogiam*: the first belongs to body, the second to mind or spirit; and although in respect of his essence or being God has no relation to space, yet in virtue of his power he is in every place at once.⁴ If this distinction had been propounded to Anaxagoras, and he were invited to say in which of the two senses he considered *Nous* to be present in the mixture which it separates, I think he would have pronounced in favour of the *extensio per analogiam*. In Anaxagoras *Nous* is always that which has power: it "has power over all things that have life,"

¹ *Tim.* 51 E.

² *Tim.* 34 B.

³ Arleth in *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* viii. p. 461.

⁴ Arleth, *l.c.* p. 462.

and it "had power over the whole revolution," which called the cosmos into existence out of chaos.

The statement that *Nous* is the "subtlest" (*λεπτότατον*) "and purest of all things" cannot be so readily explained, on the assumption that *Nous* is incorporeal. As regards the word *χρήματα*, there is no real difficulty: in Greek, as in English, spiritual no less than material entities could be called "things." And inasmuch as *Nous* has already been said to be absolutely alone and by itself, unmixed with anything whatsoever, the expression "purest of all things" may fairly mean "absolutely pure," that is, absolutely free from every foreign ingredient. It must, however, be acknowledged that the attribute of thinness (*λεπτότατον*) is suggestive of corporeality. To meet this argument, parallels have been adduced from Homer and Euripides, who speak of a "subtle wit," a "subtle mind" (*λεπτὴ μῆτις, λεπτός νοῦς*), and so forth. Another solution of the difficulty is perhaps more probable. No Greek thinker had hitherto attempted to distinguish mind and matter; and there was consequently no recognised philosophical terminology by means of which the distinction could be formulated. In trying to make the new idea intelligible to his readers, Anaxagoras had no alternative but to use the materialistic language of his day. Heraclitus had already taken what the ancients held to be the rarest of the elements, namely, fire, and endowed it with intelligence or thought; and if Anaxagoras really desired to separate matter and mind, I doubt whether it was easy for him, at the time in which he wrote, to make his purpose clearer than by implicitly denying that *Nous* is identical even with fire, and asserting that in point of subtlety or rareness it transcends all other things whatsoever. It is worthy of notice that Aristotle himself sometimes associates the idea of "thinness" (*τὸ λεπτόν*) with incorporeality. He remarks, for

instance, that air is thinner than water and more incorporeal, and that "fire is the thinnest" (λεπτομερέστατον) "and most incorporeal of the elements."¹ To Anaxagoras' contemporaries the phrase "thinnest and purest of all things" would probably have conveyed the notion of the immaterial more nearly than any other words he could have used.

Let us now consider the question from another point of view. Supposing for the sake of argument that the Anaxagorean *Nous* really and truly is, as Grote maintains, "one substance, or form of matter among the rest, but thinner than all of them, thinner than even fire or air,"² with what particular form of matter should it be identified? This curious *Denkstoff* must have been wholly different from every other kind of substance, not only in respect of its attributes, among which omnipotence and omniscience are included, but also in respect of its nature; for it is absolutely pure and unmixed, whereas in all other substances there is a portion of everything. What, then, can it have been? Gomperz talks vaguely of a "curious reasoning fluid," "of an extremely refined and mobile materiality";³ but there is nothing in the fragments to justify such a view, and Aristotle clearly implies that Anaxagoras considered his *Nous* to be unmoved as well as pure.⁴ In a famous passage of the *Phaedo*, Plato complains of Anaxagoras because he made little or no use of his great principle in explaining the constitution of the world, but had recourse to "airs and æthers and waters and many other such absurdities."⁵ The contrast which Plato here draws between *Nous* on the one hand, and material substances upon the other, seems to show that he at least considered the Anaxagorean *Nous* to have been incorporeal. By

¹ *Phys.* iv. 8. 215^b 5; *de An.* i. 2. 405^a 6.

² *Plato* i. p. 57.

³ *Greek Thinkers* i. p. 216 f.

⁴ *Phys.* viii. 5. 256^b 24.

⁵ *Phaed.* 98 B f.

Aristotle as well as Plato, Anaxagoras' doctrine of *Nous* was regarded as a landmark in the history of Greek philosophy. This it certainly was not, if *Nous* is only a species of matter endowed with thought; for we have already seen that the ever-living fire of Heraclitus is intelligent and thinks. Or shall we say that Anaxagoras merely replaced the Ionic hylozoism by two forms of matter, the one irrational and dead, and the other alive and rational? Such a frankly materialistic dualism would hardly have seemed to Plato and Aristotle to constitute a real advance. It is certainly a simpler and, as it seems to me, a more reasonable hypothesis to suppose that the Heraclitean unity was resolved by Anaxagoras into a duality in which Mind and Matter stand over against one another as two distinct and mutually exclusive principles.¹

On these grounds I am disposed to agree with Heinze, Arleth, and others in holding that the *Nous* of Anaxagoras was a spiritual and not a material substance. Let us now examine its various attributes, and the part it plays in the formation and administration of the world.

In the first place, then, *Nous* is omniscient. It "has all knowledge about everything": it "knows all the things that are mingled and separated off and severed." Anaxagoras maintains, in opposition to Empedocles, that unlike is known by unlike, and not like by like.² It follows that universal knowledge could not belong to *Nous* if it were in the least like other things: so that the omniscience of *Nous* is yet another indication of its incorporeality.

Secondly, *Nous* would seem to be at once omnipotent and supreme. It "owns no master but itself," and is the "greatest in strength": it "has power over all things that have life," and it "had power over the whole revolution" that made the world.

¹ Cf. Arleth, *l.c.* p. 67.

² Diels² i. p. 310, § 92.

Thirdly, *Nous* is the creator of the Universe, in the sense that it called the cosmos into being out of chaos. We have already seen that it initiated the cosmogonical revolution; and Anaxagoras adds that it "set in order all things that were to be, and that formerly were but now are not, and whatever things are now." Anaxagoras appears to have assigned no special motive for the creation of the world other than is implied in the epithet *αὐτοκράτης*. Mind is its own master, and originates the rotatory motion of its own free will¹ Neither did it occur to him to ask in what way *Nous*, though itself unmoved, communicates motion to the primeval chaos. The Aristotelian "first unmoved mover" is the cause of motion, as being the object of the world's desire: *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*. Of this conception there is no hint in Anaxagoras; he was probably content to suppose that the creative mind moves and rules the universe, just as the human mind moves and rules the body; but how the immaterial mind, whether human or cosmic, can act on matter at all—with this fundamental difficulty of every dualistic system of philosophy it is improbable that he ever grappled.

What part, if any, did Anaxagoras attribute to *Nous* after the creative motion has once begun? In itself, as Plato and Aristotle discerned, the Anaxagorean conception involves a teleological view of Nature such as we meet with in the two greatest philosophers of antiquity. Possessed as it is of universal knowledge and the greatest power, *Nous* may well be supposed to be always working with a definite purpose throughout the entire domain of Nature. And it would seem that Anaxagoras did, in point of fact, sometimes express himself to this effect.² It is, however, clear from the strictures passed on him by Plato and Aristotle³ that Anaxagoras rarely made use

¹ Cf. Arleth, *l.c.* p. 80 f.

² Pl. *Phaed.* 98 B ff.; Arist. *Met.*

³ Arist. *de An.* i. 2. 404^b 1 f. Cf. A 4. 985^a 18 ff.

Diels³ i. p. 318, lines 16 f., 21 f.

of *Nous* in his detailed account of natural phenomena. At most he had recourse to mind as a sort of *deus ex machina* in cases where a purely physical explanation was difficult to invent.¹ For the most part he was content to look for what Plato would have called "concomitant causes" (*συμβατρία*), without endeavouring to show how each particular phenomenon fulfils the purpose of the ultimate designer of the world; but in reply to Plato's criticisms he might fairly have said that these secondary causes are in reality the instruments by which *Nous* works, and that in the long run we shall learn more about the creative mind by a patient study of the laws of Nature than by resorting to premature and *a priori* teleological hypotheses. Anaxagoras occupies, in fact, the position of a tolerably orthodox man of science of the present day, who holds that without the postulate of an omnipotent and omniscient Deity the origin and continuance of the cosmos are alike inexplicable, and who, having once affirmed this principle, thenceforward pursues his scientific inquiries without any theological bias whatsoever. It is interesting in this connexion to observe that almost the same objections which Plato brings against the Greek philosopher were afterwards urged against Descartes and Newton, and on practically the same grounds.² ✓

The doxographical tradition asserts that Anaxagoras identified *Nous* with God.³ In the judgment of M. Bovet, on the other hand, God has no place in the system of Anaxagoras;⁴ and it is quite true that in his surviving fragments there is no mention either of God or of Gods. It is obvious, however, that we have no right to dogmatise about the contents of a book by far the larger part of which has perished; and even if the name of God did not once occur from beginning to end

¹ Arist. *l.c.*

² See Grote, *Plato* ii. p. 177 n.

³ Diels, *Dox.* p. 302^b 11.

⁴ *Le Dieu de Platon* p. 106.

of the work, the statement of M. Bovet would still, in my opinion, be calculated to mislead. For the historically important point is not whether Anaxagoras called *Nous* God or not: it is rather to what extent he ascribed to *Nous* those attributes and functions which, according to the theology of later times, belong to the Deity. We have seen that this uncreated and imperishable mind is a spiritual and not a corporeal essence, that it is omniscient and omnipotent, and creates the world, not indeed *ex nihilo*, but out of pre-existent chaos, in virtue, apparently, of its absolute freedom. And as these are among the most important factors in the theistic conception of the Godhead, we are fully justified in maintaining, with Heinze¹ and Arleth,² that Anaxagoras is the founder of theism in the western world, whether he expressly identified his *Nous* with God or not.

There is but little evidence to show what Anaxagoras believed on the subject of immortality. He is said to have declared that Nature provides us with two object-lessons on death: one is the time before we are born, and the other is sleep.³ This remark, if it is authentic, clearly denies the survival of consciousness after death. Still more explicit is the statement in the *Placita* that Anaxagoras believed the separation of soul and body to involve the death not only of the body but also of the soul (*εἶναι δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς θάνατον τὸν διαχωρισμὸν*);⁴ and it is obvious that for anything like individual immortality the system of Anaxagoras leaves no room. The unique importance of this thinker for the student of theology lies in his doctrine of *Nous*; and that is my justification for having treated of the subject at so great length.

¹ *Über den nous des Anax.* p. 41.

² *l.c.* p. 205.

³ Stobæus ap. Diels² i. p. 300, § 34.

⁴ *Dox.* p. 437. 11.

LECTURE XIII

THE AGE OF THE SOPHISTS

THE principal subject which engaged our attention in the preceding lecture was the Anaxagorean concept of *Nous*. We saw that Reason, as conceived by Anaxagoras, is primarily a cosmic agency or power. Anaxagoras is not yet concerned with Reason as it appears in human beings; for the object which he sets before himself is to explain Nature rather than man, in agreement, of course, with the general trend of pre-Sophistic Greek philosophy. It is nevertheless probable that he arrived at the conception of a cosmic mind from a consideration of the part mind plays in the affairs of man. If mind is the principle of order in the Microcosm, he seems to have argued, it must also be the cause of order in the Macrocosm: indeed, he expressly states that all mind is alike, "both the greater and the less," that is to say, the cosmic and the human. From this point of view, therefore, Anaxagoras' famous doctrine may be regarded as foreshadowing to some extent the new departure Philosophy was soon about to make. But before we proceed to deal with the rise of humanism and the philosophical regeneration which it effected, it is desirable to complete our survey of pre-Platonic natural philosophy by glancing at two thinkers of widely different calibre and culture—Diogenes of Apollonia, who appears to have lived at Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B.C., and Democritus of Abdera, a far more celebrated name.

Diogenes begins by laying it down that all the different objects in the universe are in reality forms of one and the same substance: otherwise it would be impossible, he thinks, to explain the mixture, interaction, and generation of things.¹ This primary substance he conceives to be what men call Air;² and he supposes that Air transforms itself into things by means of rarefaction and condensation.³ Thus far, he is dependent chiefly upon Anaximenes; but the influence of Anaxagoras now begins to appear. We are told that Air is "great and strong and eternal and immortal and *possessed of much knowledge*."⁴ By virtue of its intelligence, the element of Air is able "to preserve the measures of all things, winter and summer, night and day, rains and winds and sunny weather: and anyone," he adds, "who chooses to reflect, will find that all other things are disposed in the best possible manner."⁵ It is by Air, according to Diogenes, that "all things⁶ are steered, and over all things Air has power. For this very thing seems to me God,⁷ and I believe that it reaches to everything and disposes everything and is present in everything; and there is nothing which does not partake of it. Still, no one thing partakes of it in the same way as another, but there are many modes both of Air itself and also of intelligence; for Air is modified in many ways, being warmer or colder, drier or moister, more stationary or in more rapid motion. . . . And the soul of all living creatures is the same, viz. Air that is warmer than the air outside us, in the midst of which we live, but much colder than the air about the sun. But this warmth is not alike in any two kinds of animals, nor indeed in any two men; it is always different, not greatly different, I allow, but just so far

¹ *fr.* 2.² *fr.* 4, 5.³ Diels² p. 329, § 5.⁴ *fr.* 8.⁵ *fr.* 8.⁶ Reading *πάντα* (with Schorn).⁷ *θεός* is Usener's correction for *θεός*.

as is compatible with their resemblance to each other. None of the things which are differentiated can become exactly like another without becoming identical therewith. And as differentiation is of many kinds, there are many kinds of living creatures, many in number, resembling one another neither in appearance nor in way of life, nor in intelligence, owing to the multitude of differentiations: but yet they all live and see and hear by virtue of the same element, and all of them, too, derive their intelligence from the same source."¹

I have translated the larger part of this fragment, because it illustrates so well the thoroughgoing pantheism of Diogenes. In this respect he is like a Stoic born out of due time. It is further noteworthy that the reason Diogenes assigns for attributing intelligence to his primary substance is that all things are "disposed in the best possible manner"—an expression in which we seem to recognise a clearer affirmation of design in nature than we have hitherto found in Greek philosophy. But we know too little about his physics to permit us to decide whether he carried out this principle in detail, or whether he restricted himself, like Anaxagoras, to a purely mechanical explanation of natural phenomena. There is at least no trace of teleology in the fragment describing the human veins.²

We have doxographical testimony to show that Diogenes pronounced the soul to be imperishable.³ It is not difficult to conjecture in what sense he must have intended this statement. The air constituting our souls is part of that all-pervading element which Diogenes identifies with God—is in fact a "fragment of the Godhead" (*μικρὸν μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ*),⁴ and consequently shares in the immortality that belongs to the divine. In a noteworthy passage of Euripides, to be afterwards

¹ *fr.* 5.² *fr.* 6.³ Diels, *Dox.* p. 392 ad fin.⁴ *Dox.* p. 511. 13.

discussed,¹ we meet with the idea of reabsorption after death into the all-embracing element which Euripides sometimes calls by the name of Zeus. Here, as well as elsewhere in his speculations, the poet appears to be influenced by Diogenes.

It was related by Aristoxenus that Plato once expressed a wish to collect the extant copies of Democritus' works and burn them.² The story, whether apocryphal or not, shows that in antiquity Democritus was regarded as the high-priest of materialism. He was above all things a man of science: he is said to have declared that he would sooner discover a single link in the chain of causes than become monarch of the East.³ The few theological or anti-theological ideas attributed to him need not detain us long.

According to Democritus, Mind (*νοῦς*) and Soul (*ψυχή*), between which—so Aristotle affirms—he made no distinction, consist of material atoms, resembling the atoms of fire.⁴ According to the measure in which these atoms are distributed throughout its frame, the Universe is animated by soul. Cicero asserts that Democritus spoke of the *principia mentis* or atoms of mind as Gods;⁵ while the doxographers sometimes ascribe to him the doctrine of a single world-soul or Deity, identical, as it would seem, with the aggregate of fiery atoms in the world.⁶ But, as Zeller points out, if Democritus spoke of the divine in this connexion at all, he cannot have meant a "personal being, or even any single being at all: he means, not a soul, but only soul-stuff, fire-atoms which produce life and motion, and where they are congregated in larger masses, reason also; but this is altogether different from a single force moving the Universe like the Anaxagorean *νοῦς* or the Platonic

¹ See p. 309.

² D. L. ix. 40.

³ ap. Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* xiv. 27. 4 = Diels² *fr.* 118.

⁴ Arist. *de An.* i. 2. 405^a 9 ff.

⁵ *Nat. Deor.* i. 120. See Zeller, i.² p. 908 f.

⁶ Diels, *Dox.* p. 302.

world-soul." To Democritus, as to other materialists, that which we call mind or spirit is only the "most perfect form of matter":¹ he assigns to it no peculiar part or province in the creation or government of the world, and we are told that he expressly disputed Anaxagoras' doctrine.² He himself has no need to postulate a special principle in order to account for the world-producing motion, because movement is an inherent and inalienable property of his atomic bodies.

It would seem, then, that the physical theory of Democritus is complete without the hypothesis of a Mind by which the course of nature is directed and controlled. Following a not uncommon practice of the age in which he lived, he sometimes represented the national Gods as only allegorical expressions of ethical or physical ideas.³ Or, like some of the Sophists, he would ascribe the origin of religion to man's terror at the awe-inspiring phenomena of nature—lightning and thunder, eclipses of the sun and so forth.⁴ Nevertheless, like his follower Epicurus in later times, Democritus himself seems really to have believed in the existence, if not of Gods, at least of something analogous to Gods. We know from Sextus that he spoke of certain anthropomorphic εἰδωλα or images present in the atmosphere, figures of gigantic size, not indestructible, though slow to perish, like the long-lived Gods of Empedocles. These images, he said, are of two kinds, beneficent and the reverse; on which account Democritus prayed that he might meet with "kindly images." When he remarks that they occasionally appear to men and foretell the future, he is doubtless thinking of the common Greek belief in revelation by means of dreams. According to Sextus, these images were the only Gods admitted by Democritus.⁵ The

¹ Zeller, *l.c.* pp. 907, 909.

² See D. L. ix. 85.

³ Diels² *fr.* 2; *cf. fr.* 25 and

fr. 30.

⁴ Diels² p. 365, § 75.

⁵ Sextus, *adv. Math.* ix. 19, 42.

subject is a very obscure one; but there is much to be said for Zeller's view that the "images" in question stand for the ordinary Greek *daemons*, which were long-lived but not immortal. If Zeller is right, we must suppose that Democritus was the "first to enter upon the path so often followed in later times, that of degrading the Gods of Polytheism into daemons."¹

Democritus wrote a book "On Hades,"² in which he collected and, we may presume, also criticised the numerous fables current in antiquity about the resuscitation of the dead. What else the book may have contained, we do not know; but the probability is that it dealt adversely with popular conceptions of the future life. In a remarkable fragment attributed by Stobaeus to Democritus we are told that "Some men who do not understand the dissolution of our mortal nature, but are conscious of the misery in human life, painfully spend their allotted period of life in confusion and fear, inventing lies about the time after they are dead."³ Democritus expressly maintained that the atoms composing the soul are scattered asunder at the moment of death.⁴ He is the first Greek thinker who in so many words denied the immortality of the soul.⁵

The life of Democritus extended well into the fourth century B.C., and more than covered the period usually known as the "Age of Illumination" or "Enlightenment." A notable passage of the *Republic* may serve to suggest to us the leading characteristics of that age. Plato draws a vivid picture of the effect sometimes produced on the individual when he begins to scrutinise his inherited beliefs by the light of reason. We have all of us, he says, certain opinions or beliefs, forming, as it were, our intellectual parentage, under whose care

¹ Zeller, *l.c.* p. 939 ff.

² *περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου*, Diels² *fr.* O. ³ *fr.* 297.

⁴ Stob. *Anth.* i. p. 384. 13 Wachsmuth.

⁵ Rohde, *Psyche*² ii. p. 192.

we have grown to youth or manhood. In course of time we discover, perhaps, that these beliefs cannot be justified on rational grounds; dialectic may show that what we have been taught to consider honourable and just is in certain circumstances not more honourable than base, not more just than unjust; and then there is danger lest our moral constitution should be undermined. We are apt to rush to the conclusion that tradition and authority, law and convention are only artificial devices for checking the legitimate impulses and rights of the natural man, and we become tainted with antinomianism.¹ The phenomenon which Plato thus describes in connexion with the life of the individual was now beginning to happen in the corporate history of the Athenian people. I say "beginning"; for it is quite clear that in the end of the fifth century B.C., and even later, there was still a large body of Athenians who clung to the political, educational, and religious ideals of the past, and obstinately set themselves to stem the advancing tide of rationalism. It is enough to mention Nicias among statesmen, Xenophon among men of letters, and Aristophanes among poets. That the Athenian demos had not yet discarded the old beliefs is plain from the condemnation passed upon Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Socrates. But although the rationalistic movement was by no means universal, it is a testimony to its strength and influence that it aroused such bitter hostility in a society conspicuous for the virtue of toleration; and what is of primary importance, nearly all the younger men of ability and spirit were powerfully affected by the new impulse. Borrowing a Platonic figure, we may say that the young men of the period loved to rend and tear with the fangs of dialectic the political and religious principles on which their fathers had been reared. To an orthodox

¹ vii, 537 D-539 A.

conservative of the type of Nicias it must have seemed as if the foundations of the city-state were being shaken, when men began openly to express their disbelief in divination and even in the very existence of the Gods. The future seemed to be in the hands of the iconoclasts.

It was at this crisis in the history of the Athenian people that the so-called "Sophists" appeared. What effect had the method and teaching of the Sophists on the moral and religious development of Greece? What position did they take up in that contest between faith and rationalism which we have already noted as a distinguishing feature of the period in which they lived? In discussing this question—the only question with which we in these lectures are concerned—it is necessary to be on our guard against attributing any community of doctrine to the various representatives of the class. Down to the time of Grote, the Sophists were generally treated as a kind of quasi-philosophical sect or school, holding certain common principles of a more or less immoral character, by means of which they set themselves to undermine the foundations of society and the state; and any anti-social or antinomian doctrine ascribed by Plato, rightly or wrongly, to a particular Sophist was promptly fathered upon the whole school, who were accordingly denounced in unmeasured terms as responsible for that alleged deterioration in the Athenian character which Grote for his part absolutely denies.¹ Whether the Athenians degenerated or not in the latter part of the fifth century, is a question we need not here examine; but it is now universally agreed that the Sophists were not in any sense of the word a sect or school, united by community of creed, but only a profession of mutually independent teachers called into existence by the growing demand for higher education throughout Greece and more

¹ *History of Greece* ch. 67 (esp. vol. viii. p. 174).

especially in Athens. In the *Protagoras* and elsewhere Plato makes it clear not only that the Sophists taught different subjects, but also that there was no lack of rivalries and jealousies between the different members of the profession. It is consequently, as Gomperz observes, "illegitimate, if not absurd, to speak of a sophistic mind, sophistic morality, sophistic scepticism, and so forth":¹ we must take the relevant fragments of the individual Sophists, and examine them independently by themselves, before attempting to form an estimate of the kind of influence which these remarkable men exerted on the course of Greek thought.

The earliest and perhaps the most distinguished of all the Sophists was Protagoras of Abdera. In the Platonic dialogue called by his name, we have what is probably a true account of the subject he professed to teach. "By becoming my pupil," Protagoras says, "Hippocrates will learn how to deliberate wisely about his private affairs as well as about the affairs of the state. I will teach him how to manage his house in the best way, and he will become fully qualified both to speak and to act in public life." "Do I follow you?" says Socrates. "I suppose you mean the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?" "Yes, that is exactly the profession I make."² If Protagoras had confined his energies within these limits, we might almost have passed him over, although it would still have to be noted that the method by which he taught the "art of words" must inevitably have fostered the impulse towards iconoclasm in his pupils. He was the first to declare that every possible argument on every conceivable subject could be met by another;³ and if Aristotle is to be trusted, he expressly undertook to show men how to "make the weaker argument prevail" (*τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*)—an accusation afterwards freely levelled at the Sophists

¹ *L.c.* p. 415.² 318 E f.³ *D. L.* ix. 51.

in general.¹ But Protagoras was not merely a teacher of the youth; he wrote numerous treatises, among them a work "On the Gods," and another "On Truth"; and the two most celebrated of his literary fragments express a habit of mind which could not fail to obtrude itself even in the exercise of his profession as a teacher.

The first of these fragments is the notorious *homo mensura*. "Man is the measure of all things; of that which is, that it is; of that which is not, that it is not."² According to certain modern critics, the word "man" should here be understood generically, the reference being not to "this or that specimen of the genus, not any individual Tom, Dick, or Harry, but universal man."³ If this explanation is correct, we have before us only a vigorous assertion of that anthropocentric view of the world which was rapidly coming to the front in the time of Protagoras. But the ancients understood the saying in quite another sense. Without exception, they interpreted "man" as the individual and not the genus. Protagoras meant, says Plato, that as things appear to me, so they are to me, and to you they are as they appear to you: since you and I are both included under "man."⁴ In other words, there is no such thing as absolute truth; or, rather the expression "truth" is a misnomer, and for "true" we ought in strictness to substitute "true-to-me," "true-to-you," and so on. Unless, we follow the Platonic explanation of the text, we must suppose that throughout a large part of the *Theaetetus* Plato is fighting a shadow; and we must further believe that all the ancients from Plato and Aristotle down to Sextus Empiricus either misunderstood or deliberately traduced the doctrine of Protagoras.⁵ I therefore cannot but agree with Zeller and others in upholding the

¹ Arist. *Rhet.* 1402^a 23 ff.

² *fr.* 1 Diels.

³ Gomperz, *l.c.* p. 458.

⁴ *Theaet.* 152 A.

⁵ An excellent criticism of the view advocated by Gomperz will be found in Nestle, *Euripides* p. 406 n. 12.

traditional interpretation, according to which Protagoras meant that each man is to himself the standard of what is true or false. It is of more importance to observe that in its ethical and political applications such a theory would seem to be subversive of morality and civic life. It is a legitimate inference from the maxim of Protagoras that every one may do what is right in his own eyes; and in a notorious line of Euripides the inference is plainly stated:

τί δ' αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένους δοκῆ;
 "Nought's shameful, save it seem so to the doer."

The story runs that Plato retorted with the line:

αἰσχρόν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κῆν δοκῆ κῆν μὴ δοκῆ.
 "Shameful is shameful, seem it so or not."

Nothing could illustrate more clearly the opposition between the Platonic and the Protagorean standpoints.¹

The second of the two fragments in question occurred at the beginning of the treatise on the Gods—the earliest of Greek agnostic writings. "About the Gods I cannot know either that they do exist or that they do not exist: for many things prevent me from knowing, the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of life."² Protagoras is said to have read the pamphlet at the house of Euripides, whose plays, as we shall see, abound in similar sentiments. An interesting anticipation of Protagoras' attitude appears in a story told by Cicero about the poet Simonides. Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, requested Simonides on one occasion to explain to him the being and nature of the Deity. The poet begged for a day to reflect, and when the question was repeated on the morrow, he asked two additional days, and afterwards four, and so on, doubling the number of days again and again until the tyrant

¹ Eur. fr. 19, with Nauck's note.

² D. L. ix. 51.

grew weary of waiting. When invited to give a reason for his strange behaviour, he said, "The longer I deliberate, the greater obscurity I find."¹ Protagoras' agnosticism is more explicit. He confesses himself unable either to affirm or to deny the very existence of the Gods, and places the sentiment in the forefront of his treatise. How he developed it in the sequel, we do not know; but that the general tendency of his book was thought to be hostile to religion, may be inferred from the well-authenticated story that it was publicly burnt, while the author had to leave Athens in order to escape a prosecution for impiety.²

Gorgias of Leontini is important chiefly in connexion with the history of style. Alliteration and assonance, carefully balanced clauses, striking and sometimes fantastic metaphors, together with antitheses that please the ear but upon examination prove unsound—these are among the distinguishing features of his diction. Plato in an eloquent passage of the *Republic* condemns such artifices because they encourage men to acquiesce in shams;³ and it is difficult to read Isocrates, the most eminent of Gorgias' literary disciples, without endorsing the verdict of Plato. In his treatise "On the non-existent," Gorgias endeavoured to establish three propositions: first, that nothing exists; second, that if anything does exist, it is unknowable; and finally, that even if something exists and can be known, yet the knowledge thereof cannot be communicated by one man to another.⁴ The object of physical and metaphysical investigation down to the time of Gorgias had been to discover the underlying reality of things; and it is probably this ultra-phenomenal reality or existence which Gorgias intends to deny.⁵ As a practical rhetorician,

¹ *Nat. Deor.* i. 60.

² Cicero, *L.c.* 63.

³ vi. 498 E.

⁴ *fr.* 3 Diels.

⁵ Cf. E. Pfeleiderer, *Sokrates und Plato* p. 12.

concerned with the preparation of pupils for a practical career, Gorgias has no sympathy with the *a priori* hallucinations of the former epoch. Although the threefold thesis of Gorgias does not directly bear upon theology, it is obvious that his categories of the non-existent and unknowable would have included the philosophic as well as the popular conception of the Godhead.

We have seen that Protagoras for his part confined himself to a cautious agnosticism; but others of the Sophists appear to have rationalised the Gods out of existence altogether. Foremost among these stands Prodicus of Ceos, best known in later times for the morally unexceptionable apologue of Heracles at the cross roads.¹ As Cicero remarks, it was tantamount to a complete denial of religion when Prodicus declared that the so-called Gods were only personifications of those objects which experience had found beneficial to the life of man.² Demeter (he affirms) is only bread, Dionysus wine, Poseidon water, Hephaestus fire, and so on. We are reminded of the allegorising rationalism of Democritus and other pre-Sophistic philosophers; but the particular aim of Prodicus is to explain the origin of the belief in Gods, on the assumption that the belief is erroneous. "Primitive man," he says, "deified the sun and moon, rivers and fountains, in a word, whatsoever things benefit our life, on account of the services they render, just as the Egyptians deify the Nile."³ A similar motive inspires another remarkable and highly characteristic fragment of the period of Illumination. The author is the notorious Critias, than whom we find no one more deeply imbued with the iconoclastic spirit of the age. Before civilisation began, he tells us, brute force reigned supreme. Then

¹ Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 21 ff.

² ap. Sext. adv. Math. ix. 18.

³ Nat. Deor. i. 118, *quam tandem religionem reliquit?*

followed the discovery of law, and the beginnings of social order; but law, though it could repress open injustice, failed to prevent secret crime. Thereupon, continues Critias, some wise man came to the rescue, and conceived the idea of certain all-hearing, all-seeing, and all-knowing powers, whom he called Gods. He placed them in the heavens, in order that the celestial phenomena, which men already so much feared, might seem to be their work. The Gods are therefore only a shrewd device of some prehistoric statesman who "darkened the truth by a lie" (*ψευδεῖ τυφλώσας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ*).¹

A few other relics of the earlier Sophistic literature deserve a passing mention. The Sophist Antiphon, when asked for a definition of the prophetic art (*μαντικῆ*), replied: "It is the conjecture of a sagacious man."² Here again Euripides supplies a parallel. "Best seer is he, who doth conjecture well."³ A distrust of oracles and divination was one of the features of the time, at least in educated circles. Thrasymachus complains that "the Gods do not behold the affairs of men: otherwise they would not have overlooked the greatest of human goods, viz. righteousness: for we see that some men do not practise it."⁴ In the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus a remark is quoted from Prodicus to the effect that death cannot touch either the living or the dead—the living, because they are still alive, and the dead, because they have ceased to exist.⁵ The form of the sentence bears a suspicious resemblance to the favourite Epicurean paregoric against the fear of death: "when we are, death is not; and when death is, we are not":⁶ but it can hardly be doubted that Prodicus and the other Sophists whom I have named were agnostics on the subject of

¹ Critias, *fr.* 1. 26 Nauck² p. 771.

² Diels p. 552, § 9.

³ *fr.* 978 Nauck².

⁴ *fr.* 8 Diels.

⁵ 369 B.

⁶ D. L. x. 125.

immortality. Nothing is known of the tract on Hades—*περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου*—which Protagoras is said to have written.

The last of the Sophists whom we need mention is Hippias of Elis, perhaps the most versatile and accomplished of them all. His acquirements included Philology, Mythology, History, Archaeology, and Literature, in addition to the so-called "Arts,"¹ namely, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy; he was also the author of a system of mnemonics, and a prolific versifier in the epic, tragic, and dithyrambic styles; and his acquaintance with the mechanical arts was so extensive that "on one occasion he appeared at the Olympic gathering in garments every part of which, from the sandals on his feet to the plaited girdle round his waist, and the very rings on his fingers, had been manufactured by his own hand."² Perhaps he wished to enter a practical protest against the principle of specialisation characteristic of civilised communities; for he appears to have been entirely on Nature's side in the favourite controversy as to the relative merits of Nature and Convention. About his theological views, we know nothing; but the antithesis of which I have just spoken—that of *φύσις* and *νόμος*—played so important a part in the literature of the period that we must consider it a little more in detail.

The first to apply the opposition of *νόμος* and *φύσις* in the sphere of ethical conceptions was Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras, and the teacher—so we are told—of Socrates. Archelaus declared that right and wrong have no existence in nature, but only through convention or law: *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ*.³ We do not know the reasons that led him to this

¹ See Plato, *Prot.* 318 E, *Rep.* vi. 511 C.

Plato, *Hipp. Minor* 868 B ff., and *Hipp. Maior* 285 B ff.

² Gomperz, *l.c.* p. 431: cf.

³ D. L. ii. 16.

conclusion, but it is not difficult to surmise what they were. The literary as well as the political activity of the Periclean age had familiarised the Greeks with many peculiarities of foreign institutions and manners; and there is evidence to show that men were beginning to reflect on the extreme diversity, and even antagonism between different races in their standards of morality and taste.¹ We may fairly suppose that Archelaus was impressed by the same phenomenon when he declared that ethical conceptions in general owe their existence and authority not to nature—for the natural, in Greek thought, is the universal—but only to fashion, convention, or law (*νόμος*). Herodotus had already applauded Pindar for saying that *νόμος* is lord of all.²

Now it is obvious that this theory of an inherent opposition between natural and positive law must have tended to weaken the authority of established institutions and beliefs, by assigning to them a merely local and transient value in contrast with the eternal and universal ordinance of Nature. Let us hear what Plato has to say upon the subject. "These people," we read in the *Laws*, "would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made. These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. . . . In this way the young fall into impieties, under

¹ See, e.g., Herod. iii. 38.

² *l.c.*

the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine."¹

On its negative side, therefore, the doctrine of an essential antagonism between Nature and Law must have contributed not a little to the moral and religious unsettlement of the period we are now discussing. In respect of its positive content, the doctrine suggests that we should follow Nature rather than Law. And in point of fact the desire for a "return to nature" is frequently expressed in the literature of this time.² The moral value of such an ideal will depend, of course, on the interpretation we give to the word Nature. We may conceive of Nature as "red in tooth and claw with ravine"; or we may think of her as the beneficent mother of all mankind. If we adopt the first of these views, the "life according to nature" will lead us to the "cannibal morality" embodied in such sayings as "might is right," "That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can." On the second interpretation, we shall think little about distinctions of race and nationality, creed and colour and social position: our efforts will be directed towards a realisation of the brotherhood of man, the federation of the world.

Each of these divergent interpretations of the naturalistic ideal seems to have found supporters at the time of which we are speaking. Thrasymachus in the *Republic* and Callicles in the *Gorgias* of Plato powerfully advocate the anti-social view that "Might is Right" and "Justice the interest of the stronger"; and Plato is careful to point out that they were not alone in their opinion. "I hear the same story on every side," says Glauco, "from Thrasymachus and innumerable others; and my ears are ringing with it."³ As a rule or principle of government,

¹ *Laws* 889 E ff., tr. Jowett.

² *Rep.* ii. 358 C. Cf. i. 343 A ff., and *Gorg.* 482 E ff.

³ I have cited some illustrations in *The Republic of Plato*, vol. i. p. 354 f.

it was constantly exemplified by the conduct of Athens towards her allies. The speakers in Thucydides make frequent reference to the doctrine: "We regard it as an eternal law that the weaker should be coerced by the stronger,"¹ and so forth. In the famous dialogue between the Melian and Athenian representatives, after the Melians have expressed a confident hope that Heaven will defend the right, the Athenians thus reply: "We believe that the Gods, as far as we can judge, and that men, from what we see, obey an imperious *law of Nature*, by inflexibly maintaining their dominion wherever they have power. . . *We* did not make this law, nor were we the first to take advantage of its sanction: we found it established, and likely, when we leave it behind us, to continue for ever; and if we now avail ourselves of it, it is in the conviction that you and others, if your power equalled ours, would do so too."² In this way the "definition of justice according to Nature"—ὁ φύσει ὄρος τοῦ δικαίου, as Plato calls it³—came to provide a theoretical justification of absolutism, as manifested in the Athenian empire. By no other argument was it possible even to attempt to justify the imperial rule of Athens in the eyes of a nation which regarded the independent city-state as the only legitimate form of polity. The Athenian empire, from the Greek point of view, was in fact a tyranny; and the institution of tyranny itself was sometimes defended on exactly the same grounds. It was maintained that the "natural" relation between one human being and another is that of "warfare": law is only an artificial covenant or compact, which no one will observe who is strong enough to defy it.⁴ This thoroughly anti-social doctrine is emphatically proclaimed by

¹ i. 76. 2.

² v. 105, tr. Wilkins.

³ *Laws* 714 C.

⁴ Plato, *Rep.* ii. 358 E ff.; *Laws* 626 A.

Callicles in the *Gorgias* of Plato. Nature herself, we are told, declares that it is right for the strong to have more than the weak: for by this principle the whole animal kingdom is ruled. Civilisation with its charms and sorceries seeks to fetter and enslave the strong: but when a *man* appears upon the scene, he "shakes off and rends asunder and escapes from all these chains, tramples under foot our formularies and juggleries and charms and laws that bid defiance to Nature, till suddenly the quondam slave reveals himself our master; and then it is that Nature's justice shines forth."¹

Of the other and more humane conception of Nature, according to which men are naturally not enemies, but kinsmen, we have an interesting glimpse in the sentiment which Plato in the *Protagoras* puts into the mouth of Hippias: "I think that we are all of us kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens by nature, not by law; for like is naturally akin to like; but law, the tyrant of mankind, uses constraint, and is opposed to nature."² The words are addressed to an assembly of Sophists, and do not convey the idea of universal brotherhood, but rather the notion of a brotherhood among men of learning and culture, analogous in some degree to the Stoic community of wise men. But the sentiment which they express is at least a step in the direction of the wider ideal which the Stoics also incorporated in their system, at the same time giving to it a religious significance by basing the brotherhood of man on the universal fatherhood of God.³ We know from Aristotle that the institution of slavery was by some of his contemporaries declared to be "unnatural" and condemned on that score.⁴ A pupil of Gorgias was the author of the saying, "God intended all men to be free:

¹ 483 D ff.
² 337 O f.

³ e.g. in the *Hymn of Cleanthes*
(ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν).

⁴ *Pol.* i. 3. 1253^b 21 ff.

Nature has made no one a slave." ¹ The grounds alleged for this attack on slavery belong to the circle of ideas with which we are now familiar; and it is not unlikely that the attack itself reaches back to the age of the Sophists.

We have now reviewed the principal ideas of which it is necessary for us to take cognisance in connexion with the ethical and religious speculations of the so-called Sophists. Some of these ideas will require our attention again, when we speak of Euripides; but in the meantime let us endeavour to see whether there is not at least a common tendency—we have seen that there is no actual community of doctrine—in the different theories we have enumerated. It may safely be affirmed, I think, that the Sophists agreed for the most part in refusing blindly to acquiesce in the traditional principles of Greek morality, politics, and religion. A certain degree of rationalism is characteristic of them all. In the sphere of religion, it manifests itself sometimes as agnosticism, sometimes, in the case of Prodicus for example, as virtual atheism; in the sphere of politics and ethics, it appears either in the shape of an individualism so extreme as to strike at the foundations of society, or in the form of the not less anti-social doctrine that *Might is Right*, or else it involuntarily tends to substitute for the old conception of the city-state the dream not merely of a Panhellenic but of a universal commonwealth. With the exception of this cosmopolitan and humanistic ideal, which was dimly conceived, perhaps, by Hippias, there is hardly anything constructive in the teaching of the Sophists: they destroyed, but did not, to any great extent, rebuild. If the average Athenian citizen of the older school looked upon them as corrupters of the youth, we must allow that from his point of view something

¹ Schol. on Arist. *Rhet.* 1373^b 18.

could be said in support of the charge. But in the light of later philosophical development, the movement which we associate with the name of the Sophists is seen to have been a necessary stage through which the human intellect had to pass in order to reach a philosophy at once more rational and more spiritual than any which had yet appeared. To quote the words of Zeller: "The fermentation of the time to which the Sophists belong brought many turbid and impure substances to the surface, but it was necessary that the Greek mind should pass through this fermentation before it attained the clarified stage of the Socratic wisdom; and as the Germans would scarcely have had a Kant without the *Aufklärungsperiode*, so the Greeks would scarcely have had a Socrates and a Socratic philosophy without the Sophists."¹

¹ *l.c.* p. 1156: E. T. ii. p. 506.

LECTURES XIV AND XV

EURIPIDES

A RECENT German investigator, who has done much to elucidate the philosophical element in Euripides, affirms that "there is hardly a single important problem that stirred his age, hardly a single theory in Greek philosophy before and during his lifetime, of which Euripides does not take account."¹ His men and women constantly speak the language of the period of "Enlightenment"; and it is chiefly as the poetical interpreter of the age of the Sophists that Euripides demands our attention in a survey of Greek religious thought.

Let us first attempt to answer the question: What position does Euripides usually take up with reference to the recognised Gods of Greece?

Perhaps the best way of approaching this subject is to consider the part played by the Gods in one or two of Euripides' most characteristic plays. The *Hippolytus* and the *Mad Heracles* will serve our purpose best. The first of these tragedies was put upon the stage in 429 B.C. The date of the second is uncertain; but scholars are agreed that it is considerably later than the *Hippolytus*, though not among the latest of the poet's dramas.

The subject of the *Hippolytus* is the vengeance which the Goddess Aphrodite exacts from the hero after whom the play is named. In the prologue, Aphrodite tells

¹ Nestle, *Untersuch. üb. d. philos. Quellen des Eur.* p. 560.

how the chaste Hippolytus has slighted her in word and deed, and declares her intention of revenging herself by a plot involving Phædra's destruction as well as his. Presently Phædra comes upon the stage, a great and noble character, torn with shame and remorse on account of the passion which by Aphrodite's designs she has involuntarily conceived for her stepson. The nurse, after eliciting her mistress' secret, proceeds to tempt her by appealing to the example of the Gods.

“Whoso have scrolls writ in the ancient days,
And wander still themselves by paths of song,
They know how Zeus of yore desired the embrace
Of Semelê; they know how radiant Dawn
Up to the Gods snatched Kephalus of yore,
And all for love; yet these in Heaven their home
Dwell, neither do they flee the face of Gods.”¹

It is more than folly, she urges, it is positive sin (*ὕβρις*), for mortals to resist, where immortals yield.² Phædra remains firm; but her temptress, uttering a prayer to Aphrodite, quits the stage, and, having first pledged him to secrecy, betrays the truth to Hippolytus. Overcome with indignation and horror, the youth threatens at first to publish the scandal, regardless of the oath he has sworn;³ but in the sequel he submits to exile and death, without proving false to his plighted word. On hearing that her secret has been betrayed, Phædra resolves to die. In the next act, Theseus, who has been on a pilgrimage to the seat of Apollo, the God of joy, arrives upon the scene, and is greeted with the news of his wife's suicide. Presently he espies a tablet in the hand of the dead Phædra—it is part of the divine purpose that Phædra should falsely accuse her stepson of disloyalty to his father's bed. He seizes it eagerly and reads. Beside himself with horror, Theseus appeals to the God Poseidon to fulfil upon the head of Hippolytus

¹ 451 ff., tr. Way.

² 478 ff.

³ 612.

one of the three curses he had promised him of old. In the following scene, Hippolytus protests his innocence, but without avail; he is condemned to perpetual exile by his father. The end soon comes. Poseidon frightens the hero's steeds by a monster sent miraculously from the sea; and the mangled Hippolytus is carried home to die. Before his arrival, Artemis appears, the virgin Goddess to whom Hippolytus had consecrated his life; and the truth is made known to Theseus. The last two scenes are full of an infinite pathos. The dying Hippolytus forgives his father; to Artemis he is faithful unto death.

"Ah, perfume-breath celestial!—'mid my pains
I feel thee, and mine anguish is assuaged."¹

But he is keenly conscious of the injustice of his fate.

"Lo, how am I thrust
Unto Hades, to hide
My life in the dust!

All vainly I revered God, and in vain unto man was I just."²

Whatever may be the leading idea of this powerful play, it will scarcely be denied that the author intends to represent the Gods in an unfavourable light. Towards the end, indeed, Euripides covertly impugns the principle on which he suggests that the entire Olympic pantheon is based. A great French critic has truly said that "the presence of Artemis by the side of the dying Hippolytus, desirous to weep and regretting that her divinity prevents her, gives to the closing scene a character of ideal nobility and religious elevation not elsewhere found."³ The religious difficulty nevertheless remains. Why, if Artemis so loved Hippolytus, did she not interpose to save him? The point did

¹ 1391 f. Way.

² 1366 ff. Way.

³ Decharme, *Euripide et son théâtre* p. 383 f.

not escape Euripides ; and here is the answer he makes Artemis give :

“ For Kypris willed that all this should befall
 To glut her spite. And this the Gods' wont is :—
 None doth presume to thwart the fixed design
 Willed by his fellow : still aloof we stand.
 Else be thou sure that, but for dread of Zeus,
 I never would have known this depth of shame,
 To suffer one, of all men best beloved
 Of me, to die.”¹

If this is the principle on which Olympus is organised, little wonder that things go wrong. Such is the moral Euripides probably intended to suggest. There is a world of difference between the spirit of these lines and the *ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς* of Sophocles : “ Courage, my child, still great in heaven is Zeus, who sees and governs all ! ”

In the *Madness of Heracles*, we have the story of Hera's persecution of her stepson. Before setting out for the underworld to bring up Cerberus, the hero had entrusted Amphitryon, his reputed father, as well as his wife and children, to the protection of his father-in-law, Creon, king of Thebes. During Heracles' absence, Lycus of Euboea invaded Thebes, slew Creon, and usurped the throne ; after which, believing Heracles to be lost, and fearing lest the sons of Heracles should grow up to avenge the murder of their grandfather, he purposed to destroy them, together with Megara their mother, and Amphitryon. At this point the action of the play begins. Amphitryon and the others have taken refuge at the altar of Zeus Soter, relying on him to save the offspring of his son. It is unnecessary for us to dwell on the first half of the play, beyond referring to the characteristic passage in which Amphitryon expostulates with Zeus, after Megara and her children have left the altar to array themselves in the robes of death.² The

¹ 1327 ff. Way.

² 339 ff.

apparently providential arrival of Heracles shows, however, that these reproaches are either undeserved or premature. The usurper is slain; and the Chorus sing a song of thanksgiving for the deliverance wrought by Zeus. For one brief moment all seems well; but suddenly the dreadful spectre of Lyssa (Frenzy) appears above the palace, accompanied by Iris, the messenger of Heaven. Now that Heracles' labours are fulfilled, Zeus withdraws his protection, and Hera is permitted to work her will. In a paroxysm of homicidal madness, the father—so Iris explains—is to massacre the children he has just saved. It is in vain that Lyssa herself appeals for mercy: the only answer vouchsafed by Iris is

“Dare not with thine admonitions trammel Hera's schemes and mine!”¹

In the messenger's speech describing Heracles' madness and the fate of his unhappy wife and children, the poet displays even more than his accustomed power; but for us the interest begins again at the point where the hero awakes out of the sleep into which he has been cast by the merciful intervention of Pallas—almost the only Goddess from whom Euripides refrains his sacrilegious hand. On hearing the full extent of his misfortune, Heracles has thoughts of suicide; but before there is time to execute his purpose, Theseus, king of Athens, arrives upon the scene. Overwhelmed by despair, and apprehensive of communicating pollution to his friend, Heracles sits cowering in silence amid the ruin he has caused. At last, with touching words of encouragement and consolation, he is gradually won from his purpose of self-destruction, and induced to accompany Theseus to the hospitable land of Athens, there to be purged of the stain of blood and honoured as a hero for all time to come.

Tantaene animis caelestibus irae? This is the reflection

¹ 855 Way.

forced upon our minds throughout the play whose action I have summarised. The poet reminds us at every stage of the drama that it is the so-called Goddess Hera who is solely responsible for the unmerited sufferings of the great benefactor of humanity. There is no attempt to purify the legend, such as Pindar or Aeschylus might have made. It is set before us in all its naked foulness, and what is the inference we are expected to draw? Simply that the Hera of Greek mythology is no true God, and has no claim on the adoration of mankind.

"To such a Goddess

*Who shall pray now?—who, for a woman's sake
Jealous of Zeus, from Hellas hath cut off
Her benefactors, guiltless though they were!"*¹

It is equally impossible to acquit Zeus: nor does the poet attempt to do so: indeed, there are several passages in the play which reflect upon the King of Heaven.² That the poet frankly disbelieved in the legendary Zeus as well as in the legendary Hera, and in short in the whole circle of legends imputing immorality and imperfection to the Gods, may be inferred from a memorable speech of Heracles in the dialogue with which the play ends. Theseus has been trying to restore the self-respect of his friend, by pointing out that even the Gods have sinned and suffered.³ But Heracles will have none of this consolation; and why? Because all these legends are wholly false.

*"I deem not that the Gods for spousals crave
Unhallowed: tales of Gods' hands manacled
Ever I scorned, nor ever will believe,
Nor that one God is born another's lord.
For God hath need—if God indeed he be—
Of nought: these be the minstrels' sorry tales."*⁴

¹ 1307 Way.

² 212 ff., 339 ff., 498 ff., 1127,
1265.

³ 1314 ff.

⁴ 1341 ff. Way.

No one will dispute that Euripides himself speaks here.

Although it is perhaps in these two plays that the poet brings home to us most forcibly by means of the dramatic situation the malevolence of the Gods, most (though not all) of the other dramas exhibit them from time to time in an obnoxious light. Apollo in the *Ion* appears as a liar and seducer, and is roundly rated for the example he sets to men.¹ The *Andromache* relates a signal instance of Apollo's implacability. It was Apollo who guided the shaft that slew Achilles; and in an agony of grief and indignation Neoptolemus had gone to Delphi and demanded satisfaction for his father's death. Years afterwards, he visited the shrine again in order to seek forgiveness for his presumptuous sin; but Apollo suffers him to be murdered while in the very act of supplication.² The comment of the Messenger who tells the story is in the usual Euripidean strain:

"Thus he that giveth oracles to the world,
He that is judge to all men of the right,
Hath wreaked revenge upon Achilles' son,—
Yea, hath remembered, like some evil man,
An old, old feud! How then shall he be wise!"³

In the *Electra* and still more in the *Orestes*, the entire responsibility for the murder of Clytemnestra and its consequences is laid at the door of Apollo.⁴ It is true that when the dramatic entanglement is complete, Apollo himself appears and cuts the knot; but neither here nor elsewhere does Euripides attempt by his favourite device of the *deus ex machina* to solve the moral and religious difficulties he so often raises in his plays. The God for the most part merely pronounces the epilogue of the piece by foretelling what awaits the characters in the

¹ 436 ff.

² 1112 ff.

³ 1161 ff. Way.

⁴ *El.* 1190 ff. *et al.*; *Or.* 591 ff.

future, just as the prologue generally narrates their previous history so far as is needful for the proper understanding of the action.¹ If he happens to remark on the conduct of his fellow-Gods, the unfavourable judgment which the poet wishes us to form is usually upheld; or else we are presented with so perfunctory a defence that no one can suppose Euripides to have meant it seriously. Thus Artemis in the *Hippolytus*,² and Castor and Pollux in the *Electra*,³ endorse the poet's condemnation, in the one case of Aphrodite, and in the other of Apollo: and Athena's professional apology for Apollo in the *Ion* has the effect of making Apollo seem ridiculous as well as base.⁴

It is unnecessary to illustrate at greater length the prevailing attitude of Euripides towards the Gods of Greek mythology; but we must endeavour to understand the full extent of his iconoclasm. He is not content, like Aeschylus and Sophocles, to ignore or minimise the grosser features of the Olympian religion, and develop its higher and purer elements: he maintains that Gods, who do aught base are not Gods at all: *εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρὸν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί*.⁵ This notorious verse, as Nestle points out,⁶ contains the *Grundgedanke* of Euripides' whole attack upon Greek polytheism; and the contrast between him and his predecessor cannot be more vividly expressed than by setting over against this line the line of Sophocles: *αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν ὑφηγοῦνται θεοί*, "nothing to which the Gods lead men is base."⁷ "It is assumed by both poets," says the German critic, "that God and sin are mutually exclusive terms. But from this assumption they draw opposite conclusions. Sophocles infers: 'It follows that everything the Gods do is good': and in order that there may be no remaining

¹ See Decharme, *l.c.* p. 384 ff.

² 1327.

³ 1302 *al.*

⁴ 1553 ff.

⁵ *fr.* 292. 7.

⁶ *Euripides* p. 126.

⁷ See p. 180.

doubt, he adds: 'even when they bid us go beyond what is right.' Euripides' conclusion is different: 'In that case the sinful Gods of Greek mythology are non-existent.'"¹

Nothing that has hitherto been said is intended, of course, to suggest that Euripides invariably and systematically falls foul of the established religion. In some of his dramas there is little or nothing of a subversive tendency,—the *Alcestis*, for example, and particularly the *Suppliants*. Any one, moreover, who desired to make an anthology of ordinary Greek religious sentiments would find plenty of material even in the rest of the poet's plays and in the fragments. It is unnecessary to suppose that Euripides himself would always have disavowed these sentiments when spoken by the characters which he creates. There were doubtless moments when he fully recognised the purer aspects of Greek religion; nor have we in any case the right to attribute to a poet—least of all to a dramatic poet—consistency in matters of this kind. All that is now maintained is that the really distinctive feature of Euripidean drama—the feature which differentiates it in the religious point of view from the drama of Aeschylus and Sophocles—is just this iconoclastic spirit; and that for the dominant mood of the poet himself we should look not to what he has in common with the other dramatists, but to what distinguishes him from them. That the conservative section of the Athenians looked upon Euripides as a disbeliever, does not admit of doubt. Aristophanes represents him as a proselytising atheist. In an amusing scene of the *Thesmophoriazusae*, he brings upon the stage a widow who blames Euripides for having deprived her of her livelihood—she was a maker of sacrificial garlands—by persuading people in his tragedies that there are no Gods.²

For the purpose of these lectures, however, the im-

¹ Nestle, *l.c.*

² 448 ff.

portant question is this: "What, if any, contributions towards a reformed theology do we find in Euripides?" In denying the Gods of Greece, does he deny the existence of divine powers altogether? Or is he merely an agnostic, like Protagoras? Or, finally, has he any positive suggestions to make on his own account?

There are passages in the plays and fragments of Euripides which appear to deny or call in question, not only the Gods of Greek mythology, but even the existence of any Deity at all. The most notorious of these is a passage quoted by Justin Martyr from the *Bellerophon*. We do not know the situation, but in themselves the words are sufficiently emphatic.

"Doth any say that there are Gods in heaven?
Nay, there are none."¹

We are told that Diagoras of Melos, in the time of Euripides, became an atheist by reflecting on how the wicked prosper and calamities befall the righteous. The atheism of this fragment was prompted by similar reflections; and I have already pointed out that Theognis had long ago been troubled by the same difficulty, although he did not draw the same conclusion.² Elsewhere we meet with many sentiments expressing perplexity and doubt, rather than positive disbelief. "Full many a time the thought has crossed my mind: is it Fortune or some power divine that sways man's lot?"³ Like Protagoras, the poet confesses himself baffled by the obscurity that surrounds every question connected with the existence and nature of the Gods. The Chorus in the *Helena* complain that no one has ever discovered what is God, or what is not God, or that which lies between—
ὁ τι θεός, ἢ μὴ θεός, ἢ τὸ μέσον.⁴ A similar agnosticism

¹ fr. 286.

² See 1 f. p. 87. Cf. also Eur. *El.* 583 f., fr. 434, 832.

³ fr. 901. Cf. *Hec.* 488 ff.

⁴ 1187 ff.

betrays itself in the formula *Ζεύς, ὅστις ὁ Ζεύς*—"Zeus, whoever Zeus may be,"¹—and in the highly characteristic line

"The Gods' thralls are we—whatso'er Gods be."²

That God's ways are past finding out is a favourite Euripidean thought.³ Divination cannot reveal him :

"the lore of seers,
How vain it is I see, how full of lies.

.
Sheer folly this
Even to dream that birds may help mankind."⁴

Nor is there any other sure and certain means whereby we can discover the will of God.

Reflections of the type which I have thus briefly illustrated are incomparably more frequent in Euripides than in either of his two great predecessors on the tragic stage; and what is more important, they are in harmony with the general impression which is left upon our minds after reading some of his most powerful plays. Without doing violence to the canons of dramatic poetry, we may reasonably, I think, suppose that Euripides was sometimes disposed to doubt not merely the traditional Greek conception of the divine nature, but even, perhaps, the providential government of the world in any sense of the term. At all events, these and similar passages contain no positive suggestions capable of developing into something higher than the theology which Euripides attacked. Let us see whether any such ideas meet us elsewhere in his plays.

At the outset, then, we observe that Euripides' indictment of the Gods of Greece itself proceeds on certain assumptions as to the true nature of the Godhead. Of

¹ *H. F.* 1263; cf. *fr.* 480.

² ὅτι ποτ' εἰσὶν ὁ θεός. *Or.* 418.
Way.

³ e.g. *H. F.* 62, *I. T.* 476 ff.

⁴ *Hcl.* 744 ff. Way. Cf. *I. A.* 957, and *fr.* 795, 973.

the way for the Platonic doctrine of the ethical end—assimilation to God (*ὁμολοῦσι θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*).¹

Two other points are deserving of notice in the speech of Heracles.

“Tales of Gods’ hands manacled
Ever I scorned, nor ever will believe,
Nor that one God is born another’s lord.
For God hath need—if God indeed he be—
Of nought: these be the minstrels’ sorry tales.”

In other words, there is no hegemony among the Gods; and the Divine nature is self-sufficient. The first of these two doctrines, as we have already seen, probably comes from Xenophanes.² It clearly points in the direction of monotheism; for no one will suppose that Euripides, any more than Xenophanes, could have found fault with Greek polytheism on the ground that it was not pure and undiluted anarchy. The doctrine that God, if he is really God, has need of nothing, is one about which much might be said. It is almost a commonplace of Greek religious theory from this time onwards, and forms one of the numerous reminiscences of Hellenic thought in the speech of St. Paul before the Areopagus—a speech which in reality, perhaps, laid the foundation of the view that Greek literature prepared the way for Christianity. “Neither is he served by men’s hands, as though he needed anything.”³ It may here be noted that another interesting parallel to this speech occurs in a fragment quoted from Euripides by Clement of Alexandria.

“What manner of house by hands of craftsmen framed
May compass with its walls the form divine?”⁴

In the Acts we read: “He dwelleth not in temples made with hands.” Nauck condemns the fragment as spurious: “Christianus poeta haec scribere potuit, non

¹ *Theaet.* 176 B.

² See p. 204.

³ Acts xvii. 25.

⁴ *fr.* 1130, tr. Way.

potuit Euripides." In point of Greek and versification, the lines are free from fault; and that the sentiment is one which Euripides might well have expressed, will appear from the passages we shall presently discuss.¹

So much for the positive contributions to religious thought which seem to be involved in Euripides' attack upon Greek polytheism. Browning, you will remember, makes Euripides say,

"I incline to poetize philosophy";

and we have next to consider certain noteworthy examples of this tendency as it appears in connexion with the religious ideas of the poet. Let us take as the text of our discussion that "strange prayer"—so Menelaus calls it—which Euripides puts into the mouth of Hecuba in the *Daughters of Troy*. The words of the prayer are these:

"O Earth's Upbearer, thou whose throne is Earth,
Whoe'er thou be, O past our finding out,
Zeus, be thou Nature's Law, or mind of man,
To thee I pray; for, treading soundless paths,
In justice dost thou guide all mortal things!"²

Euripides' Hecuba has been at school in Athens; and if we examine what she says, we shall see that she has learned her lesson well. The whole of the prayer is steeped in the philosophy of Euripides' age. I will endeavour to expound and illustrate the several topics in the order in which they are mentioned.

We have first of all the identification of Zeus with that which at once upholds and rests upon the earth. Now, according to Anaximenes, "even as our soul, which is air, holds us together, so breath and air encompass the whole universe."³ And, further, the Earth—so

¹ The fragment is treated as genuine by Way (ii. p. xxxvii), and also by Nestle, *Euripides* p. 118.

² 884-888 Way.

³ See p. 189.

Anaximenes also maintained—is itself upborne by the air (ἐποχεῖται τῷ ἀέρι).¹ Presumably, then, by “Earth’s Upbearer, throned upon the Earth,” Euripides means Air or Aether—it matters little which term we use, for the words were not always clearly distinguished about this time.² It is not, however, to Anaximenes, but rather to Diogenes of Apollonia that the poet is here immediately indebted. We have already seen that Diogenes deified Air, and spoke of it as omnipresent—“just this,” he said, “appears to me God, and I believe that it reaches to everything and disposes all things and is present in everything.”³ Nor is this the only passage where Euripides gives a pantheistic interpretation to Zeus. Several of the fragments are to the same effect. It will suffice to quote the most celebrated of them all:

“Seest thou the boundless ether there on high,
That folds the earth around with dewy arms?
This deem thou Zeus, this reckon one with God.”⁴

It is not so clear that Euripides had any definite philosophical theory in view when he suggested that this Zeus or Aether is perhaps to be regarded as ἀνάγκη φύσεως—Nature’s Necessity or Law. He may be thinking, perhaps, of the Atomists, who ascribed all the operations of Nature to the working of Necessity, although, of course, they did not for a moment dream of deifying that principle.⁵ But the second of the two clauses—“Zeus, be thou Nature’s Law, or *mind of man*”—takes us back again to Diogenes. In the view of Diogenes, the element of Air, which he affirms to be God, constitutes the soul and mind—ψυχή καὶ νόσις—of living creatures:⁶ so that the “mind of man” is a “little portion

¹ See Diels² i. p. 18, § 6.

² Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*² ii. p. 257 n. 2.

³ See p. 266.

⁴ fr. 941, tr. Way; cf. also 877, 839, 487.

⁵ Leucippus, fr. 2 Diels.

⁶ fr. 4.

of God.”¹ If we may suppose that the two apparently alternative suggestions—“be thou Nature’s Law, or mind of man”—are not really intended to exclude one another (and in a passage of this kind it would be pedantic to suppose that the poet held them to be incompatible), we may perhaps express the general tenor of these speculations by saying that they represent the Deity as an infinite, all-embracing and all-pervading substance, revealing itself in Nature as Law, and in man as Mind. The Euripidean conception has affinities with the half-poetical, half-philosophical kind of pantheism of which we have already found a trace in Aeschylus,² and may also be compared with Wordsworth’s

“something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man,
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.”³

Mr. Way does well to bring into connexion with these lines the beautiful fragment of Euripides in praise of the world-pervading reason.

“Thee, self-begotten, who, in ether rolled
Ceaselessly round, by mystic links dost blend
The nature of all things, whom veils enfold
Of light, of dark night flecked with gleams of gold,
Of star-hosts dancing round thee without end.”⁴

But the point upon which the Euripidean Hecuba lays most stress is this: Whatever Zeus may be, and however our faculties may fall short of comprehending him, we may at least be sure that he guides all mortal things in accordance with justice—*κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνητ’ ἄγεις*.

¹ See p. 267.

² See p. 144.

³ *Tintern Abbey*.

⁴ *fr.* 593, tr. Way. I agree with Nauck in attributing this fragment to Euripides, and not to Critias.

It is accordingly in the concept of a world-ruling Justice that one of the ablest and most learned of recent writers on Euripides conceives himself to have discovered what the poet really believed about the Deity. In the opinion of Nestle,¹ Euripides hypostasises Justice as a quasi-personal being, the *Weltgeist* or *Weltovernunft*, not transcendent but immanent, operating in the spiritual as well as in the material sphere, in man no less than in nature. Regarded on its physical side, the principle in question is nothing but the all-encompassing Aether; in respect of its spiritual attributes, it is, like the Air of Diogenes, omniscient and omnipotent: and here, if anywhere, we have the Euripidean Godhead. Let us consider for a little what is involved in this theory, and whether it deserves to be accepted.

The concept of Justice certainly plays an important part in the drama of Euripides. Among the many memorable sentiments about Justice scattered throughout the plays and fragments, none is, perhaps, more striking than the denial of the widely-spread belief that men's sins are written by some recording angel in the book of Zeus. The truth is rather, says Euripides, that Justice is present with us, here and now:

“Think you that deeds of wrong spring to the gods
On wings, and then some one, on Zeus' book,
Writes them, and Zeus beholding the record
Gives judgment? Nay, the whole expanse of heaven
Would not suffice if Zeus wrote there man's sins;
Nor could he send to each his punishment
From such review. Justice is on the earth,
Is here, is by us, if men will but see.”²

The eye of Justice, we are told, sees even in the dark; and though she may tarry long, in the end she never

¹ *Euripides* p. 145 ff.

² *fr.* 506, tr. Westcott; cf. *fr.* 151, 255. On this belief as it appears

among the Greeks and other ancient races, see Nestle, *l.c.* p. 452 n. 12.

fails.¹ A remarkable passage of the *Hecuba* seems at first sight to personify Law as the one supreme ruler, whom Gods and men alike obey :

“ Yet are the Gods strong, and their ruler strong,
Even Law ; for by this Law we know Gods are,
And live, and make division of wrong and right.”²

Here, however, it may be doubted whether the poet is not rather thinking of the Sophistic opposition of νόμος and φύσις — “convention” and “nature” : certainly the last line distinguishes between Justice and Nomos, and (after the fashion of certain Sophists³) derives the former from the latter. But whatever the explanation of this particular passage may be, Euripides, like the other tragic poets, has much to say on the working of Justice—especially punitive justice—in the life both of the individual and of the family.

On the other hand, the belief that “Justice guides all things to their goal” is not nearly so characteristic of Euripides as it is of Aeschylus, whether we have regard to his *sententiae* or to the *dénouement* of his plays. He was far too much of a realist, and had far too much sympathy with his fellow-creatures, to suppose for a moment that suffering is always a punishment for sin, and prosperity always the reward of virtue. Is it possible, then, to reconcile in any way the apparently unmerited sufferings of the individual with the existence of an all-knowing and all-powerful Justice directing the course of human destiny and of the world at large ? To this question Nestle replies that Euripides was in reality a Heraclitean. In the view of Heraclitus, “the whole world, both material and moral, consists in the reciprocal play of opposites, which, however, for this very reason have no absolute value.”⁴ If we could survey things

¹ *fr.* 555, 223, 979, 885 ; *El.* 954 ff. *et al.*

² 799 ff. *Way.*

³ See Plato, *Rep.* ii. 358E ff.

⁴ Nestle, *l.c.* p. 151.

from the highest standpoint, we should see that what from our finite point of view we call evil contributes to the universal harmony, which is the *Logos*, or, as Euripides prefers to call it,—in this, too, following Heraclitus,—Diké, “Justice.”

It would seem, therefore, if Nestle is right, that Euripides found a solution of life's riddle in the Heraclitean sentiment, “God accomplishes all things with a view to the harmony of the whole.” We have found reason to believe that some such conviction pervades the drama of Sophocles; but in reading Euripides we are much more sensible of the partial discords than of the universal harmony. Certain it is that in many of his plays—the *Hippolytus*, for instance, and the *Madness of Heracles*—he impugns the justice of the Gods in their treatment of the individual without suggesting any solution of this kind. For my own part, I cannot but think that the poet reveals himself more truly in the following passage from one of the choruses in the *Hippolytus*:

“When faith overfloweth my mind, God's providence all-embracing
Banisheth griefs: but when doubt whispereth, ‘Ah but to know!’
No clue through the tangle I find of fate and of life for my tracing:
There is ever a change and many a change,
And the mutable fortune of men evermore sways to and fro
Over limitless range.”¹

Much has been written and said about the “humanism” of Euripides. It reveals itself in many ways—in sympathy for the poor and lowly, in his lofty ideal of womanhood, and in occasional suggestions of something like world-citizenship and the brotherhood of man.² The humanism of the Stoics was based upon the half-philosophical, half-religious doctrine of the immanence

¹ 1102 ff. Way.

² e.g. fr. 777, 902, 1047.

in every human being of a portion of the divine mind :
ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, "for we are thine offspring," as Cleanthes said,¹ meaning that the human reason is a "fragment" of the divine. We have found some traces of a similar doctrine in Euripides; but nowhere, so far as I know, does he bring it into connexion with the sentiment of human brotherhood and human pity. In so far as this sentiment has any bearing on Euripides' religious standpoint, it rather serves as a weapon for attacking the Gods. There are not a few passages in which he appears deliberately to contrast the kindness of man with the malevolence of the Gods. Aphrodite in the *Hippolytus* is unforgiving, and Artemis cold; as a Goddess, she may not weep, or wait for the closing scene :

"Farewell: I may not gaze upon the dead,
 Nor may with dying gasps pollute my sight:
 And now I see that thou art near the end."²

How different are the human actors in the tragedy!

Hipp. "More than myself I mourn thee for thine error."
Thea. "Would God I could but die for thee, my son!"³

In the *Madness of Heracles*, we have a not less vivid contrast between the callous indifference of the Gods and the brotherly love of man. When Heracles is forsaken by Zeus, it is a human friend who, with manly yet gentle words of consolation, alleviates his despair. Unlike Artemis in the *Hippolytus*, Theseus, the merely human friend, fears no pollution :

"No haunting curse can pass from friend to friend."⁴

¹ *Hymn of Cleanthes*, 4.
² 1437 ff. Way.

³ 1409 f. Way.
⁴ 1234 Way.

The truth is that Euripides would seem to have looked to humanity itself for the ideal which he could not find in the Gods. His dramas furnish from time to time ideal types of men, and still more frequently, perhaps, of women. The Euripidean Theseus is the type of chivalrous courage linked with courtesy and human kindness, Hippolytus of stainless purity, Alcestis of conjugal devotion and motherly love; while of patriotism and self-sacrifice consenting unto death we have a galaxy of illustrious examples, Meneceus, Macaria, Iphigenia and Polyxena, besides others in the plays, of which only fragments survive. Perhaps the poet rendered some service to religion by his new and deeper interpretation of humanity.

In the account which I have so far given of the religious teaching of Euripides, I have made no reference to the *Bacchae*. The explanation, of course, is that the play in question has often been supposed to occupy an altogether unique position among the poet's works. Written at the close of his life, in a totally different atmosphere from that of Athens, it seems to breathe a more religious spirit than most of the earlier dramas; and many scholars have interpreted it as a recantation of the sceptical opinions so freely uttered by the poet in the past. The apparently exceptional character of the *Bacchae* makes it desirable that we should briefly consider the religious teaching of that extraordinary drama by itself; but before proceeding to do so, let us first examine the different ideas about immortality with which we meet in Euripides.

Here, as elsewhere, the poet puts before us a number of constantly shifting and dissolving views. Sometimes he recognises that the problem is insoluble:

"If better life beyond be found,
The darkness veils, clouds wrap it round;
Therefore infatuate-fond to this

We cling—this earth's poor sunshine-gleam :
 Nought know we of the life to come,
 There speak no voices from the tomb :
 We drift on fable's shadowy stream."¹

It is only our ignorance, Euripides says, that makes us fear death. "We know what life is, but of death we have had no experience; and that is why all men fear to leave the light of the sun."² Yet there is comfort in the thought that death, whatever it may be, is not a violation, but a fulfilment of Nature's law. "Why lament over that which Nature requires us to pass through? Nothing that men *must* suffer is really to be feared" (*δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς*).³ There is a touch of almost Sophoclean serenity and resignation about these words. Elsewhere we have the conventional view of death as a dreamless sleep, a return to the nothingness of the time before we were born.⁴ Regarded in this light, death, to the unhappy, is the physician who cures all ill.⁵ And yet we cannot rid ourselves of the fear that death may not be the end. How much better if it were! I doubt if anything in Greek tragedy is more pathetic than the speech in which the virgin-martyr Macaria gives expression to this thought:

"I have failed you nought,
 Have stood your champion, for mine house have died.
 My treasure this shall be, for babes unborn,
 Spousals foregone;—if in the grave aught be:
 But ah that nought might be!—for if there too
 We mortals who must die shall yet have cares,
 I know not whither one shall turn: since death
 For sorrows is accounted chiefest balm."⁶

Like other Greek poets, again, Euripides sometimes paints the future world in the usual Homeric colours, as

¹ *Hipp.* 192 ff. Way.

² *fr.* 816. 10 f.

³ *fr.* 757. 7 f.

⁴ *Troad.* 631. Cf. p. 264, above.

⁵ *fr.* 833.

⁶ *Heracl.* 588 ff. Way.

a joyless land of everlasting night.¹ In other passages the spirits of the dead are supposed to sympathise and co-operate with their surviving kinsmen—a conception we have already found in the two older dramatists.² Of somewhat greater interest is the well-known fragment: "Who knows whether life is death, and death in the world below is accounted life?"³ Here, of course, Euripides alludes to the Orphic doctrine that the soul lies buried in the body until death sets her free. It would have been strange if so suggestive a view of immortality had escaped the notice of the poet; but it is only one of his many reflections on the subject, and whatever Euripides may have been, he was certainly not a whole-hearted follower of Orpheus.⁴ To the Eleusinian mysteries Euripides seldom refers.⁵

So far, there is little or nothing in the eschatological ideas of Euripides to which parallels might not be adduced from earlier Greek poets. It remains to consider a small group of passages showing the characteristic Euripidean fusion of philosophy and poetry. One of these passages occurs in the most orthodox of Euripides' plays—I mean the *Suppliants*:

"Let now the dead be hidden in the earth,
And each part, whence it came forth to the light,
Thither return, *the breath unto the air,*
To earth the body; for we hold it not
In fee, but only to pass life therein."⁶

Considered in and by themselves, no doubt, these verses merely reproduce the sentiment expressed in the fifth century epitaph over the Athenians who died fighting at Potidaea: "Aether received their souls, and earth their bodies: by the gates of Potidaea they were slain."⁷

¹ e.g. *fr.* 533.

² *El.* 677, *Or.* 1231 *al.*

³ *fr.* 638; cf. 838.

⁴ See Nestle, *l.c.* p. 145.

⁵ *H. F.* 613, *Hipp.* 25.

⁶ 531 *ff.* *Way.*

⁷ *C. I. A.* i. 442. Cf. Epicharmus (?), *fr.* 245, 265 Kaibel.

But when we remember that Euripides, in agreement, as we have seen, with Diogenes of Apollonia, sometimes identifies the all-pervading Air or Aether with the immanent and omnipresent Godhead, the words of the poet suggest to us something like the return of the human soul at death to the universal soul or mind from which it came. Such a doctrine is clearly affirmed in a remarkable passage of the *Helena*, the authenticity of which some critics have—unfairly, as I think—disputed:

“Albeit the mind
Of the dead live not, deathless consciousness
Still hath it when in deathless aether merged.”¹

The general conception underlying these lines may perhaps be expressed in some such way as this. The human soul, or rather, perhaps, the reason present in the soul,—for in the *Helena* *νοῦς*, and not *ψυχή*, is the word employed,—the human reason, then, is a portion or fragment of the heavenly aether,² and when death comes and the body returns to the earth from which it came, the reason is in like manner reunited with the aetherial element, which is its source and fountain. In this way the rational part of man is immortal, and after its separation from the body enjoys undying consciousness or knowledge;³ but it does not live, in the commonly accepted meaning of the word—that is, presumably, it has no individual existence, but only, we may suppose, a kind of cosmic immortality, such as we sometimes read of in Aristotle and the Stoics. I have elsewhere ventured to conjecture that one of the most extraordinary of the poet's fragments is inspired by the same thought of ultimate reunion with the divine: “Upon my back sprout golden

¹ 1014 ff. (Way's translation, substituting “mind” for “soul.”)

² See p. 99.

³ *γνώμην*. The correction *μνήμην* introduces an idea to which Euripides would hardly have assented.

wings: my feet are fitted with the winged sandals of the Sirens: and I shall soar to the aethereal firmament to unite with Zeus." ¹ It is not unlikely that by Zeus Euripides here means the "immortal aether" with which he sometimes appears to identify the God. ²

I have now enumerated the principal ideas on the subject of immortality contained in the plays and fragments of Euripides. The view with which the poet had himself most sympathy is probably that which we have just considered; but it would be an error to suppose that his eschatological opinions were ever fixed or definite. His reflections on immortality reveal the same spirit of openmindedness and vacillation which we have already witnessed in connexion with his theology. Neither in the one case nor in the other does he appear to have attained to any permanent and assured conviction, capable of satisfying not only his moral and religious aspirations, but also the demands of his intellect. And it is this consideration which explains, in part at least, the shadow of pessimism, sometimes bordering on despair, that darkens so many of his dramas—notably the *Hecuba*, the *Andromache*, the *Daughters of Troy*, and *The Madness of Heracles*. The all-pervading gloom is hardly relieved by a single ray of light, except the heroism and resignation of humanity in its unequal contest with the Gods and Fate. The sincerity and depth of Euripides' pessimism might be illustrated by a large number of those *sententiae* with which his dramas are studded. He reiterates again and again nearly all the conventional sentiments of Greek melancholy, and adds some others, which, if not altogether new in Greek literature, were new, at least, so far as one can see, upon the Attic stage. Herodotus relates that a certain Thracian tribe were in the habit of singing a dirge over the

¹ fr. 911.

² *Cambridge Praelections*, 1906, p. 47.

newly-born, but made merry at a funeral, reflecting on all the miseries from which death sets free.¹ To the same effect we read in a fragment of Euripides :

“ With tears in mournful throng the newborn babe
 ’Tis meet we welcome to a life of woe :
 But him whom death releases from his toil,
 With songs of gladness speed upon his way.”²

We need not, however, multiply examples of a strain of thought so characteristic of the “most tragic” of Greek poets. I would only remark that the pessimism of Euripides cannot be entirely due to the political and social convulsions of the period in which he lived, which Thucydides, for example, paints in his reflections on the revolutions at Corcyra.³ Sophocles lived through the same events, and yet the iron never entered into his soul ; and Socrates, too, was all through life an indomitable optimist. Each of these two thinkers was sustained by belief in a Providence that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we may. If Euripides had occasional glimpses of the thought that

“ o’er falsehood, truth is surely sphered,
 O’er ugliness beams beauty,”

it was not given to him permanently to continue at so high a level of religious faith ; and, as I have already stated, the strong current of pessimism in Euripidean drama is partly due to this cause. It is at all events a noteworthy fact that the most genuinely optimistic of his plays—the play in which Theseus denies the old Greek saying that evil outnumbered good in human life by two to one⁴—is almost entirely free from sceptical and irreligious sentiments and insinuations.

It only remains for us to consider the problem ✓

¹ v. 4.

² *fr.* 449.

³ *iii.* 82 ff.

⁴ *Suppl.* 195 ff.

presented by the *Bacchae* of Euripides. This wonderful tragedy, the latest, or almost the latest, of the poet's plays, written at the court of Archelaus, king of Macedon, and originally intended for production in that country, did not appear upon the Athenian stage until after its author's death. With its transcendent poetical merits we are not here concerned. The *Bacchae* is unique in classical Greek literature for a certain passionate enthusiasm of thought and language, born of an ecstatic sense of man's affinity with Nature. For the student of religious ideas, however, the interest of the drama centres in the much-debated question whether it represents a reaction towards orthodoxy, a sort of recantation, or, if not a recantation, at least an *eirenicon*, an attempt on the part of the poet to put himself right with public opinion before he died. There is a certain *a priori* attractiveness in the theory that the most speculative of ancient poets returned in his closing years to the faith from which he had departed: *ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ τελευτᾶν*—we should die, as Plato says, not in storm and tumult, but in calm.¹ The subject is nevertheless one about which opposite views have been and still are held by writers of acknowledged authority. According to Mr. Pater, for example, "Euripides has said, or seemed to say, many things concerning Greek religion at variance with received opinion; and now, in the end of life, he desires to make his peace—what shall at any rate be peace with men. He is in the mood for acquiescence, or even for a palinode."² In the judgment of Mr. Gilbert Murray, on the other hand, to say that the *Bacchae* "is a reactionary manifesto in favour of orthodoxy, is a view which hardly merits refutation."³ Let us briefly consider the religious significance of the play.

¹ *Phaed.* 117 E.

² See Tyrrell's edition p. lvi. Cf. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* ii. p. 14.

³ *Greek Literature* p. 272. See also Nestle, *l.c.* p. 74 ff.

The theory which finds in the *Bacchae* a sort of retractation of the poet's heresies, is supported chiefly by the utterances of the chorus of Bacchanalian women who have left their homes to follow the new God Dionysus in his missionary progress through the world. The choral odes repeatedly inveigh against rationalism.

"'Tis the life of quiet breath,
 'Tis the simple and the true,
 Storm nor earthquake shattereth,
 Nor shall aught the house undo
 Where they dwell. For, far away,
 Hidden from the eyes of day,
 Watchers are there in the skies,
 That can see man's life, and prize
 Deeds well done by things of clay.
 But the world's Wise are not wise,
 Claiming more than mortal may."¹

The moral teaching of these lines—and there are many other passages to the same effect²—is as characteristically Greek as anything in Pindar or Sophocles. In particular, the words τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία—“the world's Wise are not wise”—sound like a renunciation of speculative inquiry as something essentially irreligious and profane. It is also noticeable that in proportion as knowledge is depreciated, piety and unquestioning faith are praised:

“The simple nameless herd of Humanity
 Hath deeds and faith that are truth enough for me!”³

The development of the dramatic action to a certain extent conveys the same lesson. It is true that Pentheus gradually alienates our sympathies by his violence and self-will; but he is nevertheless the champion of reason and rationalism, not only in the stand which

¹ 388 ff., tr. Murray.

² e.g. 427 ff., 883 ff., 1005 ff.

³ 430 f., tr. Murray.

he makes against the Dionysiac cult, but also when he declines to admit that Dionysus is a God at all, maintaining that his mother deliberately sought to screen her frailty by fathering the offspring of an illicit amour upon Zeus.¹ After Pentheus' destruction, the aged Cadmus points the moral in these words :

"If any man there be that scorns the Gods,
This man's death let him note, and so believe."²

On the other hand, in spite of the Chorus' protestations against τὸ σοφόν, the poet's conception of Dionysus himself is frankly rationalistic. For who, or what, in the view of Euripides, is this new God, whom the Chorus so passionately extol? Is he a personal God, or only the personification of a principle? That Dionysus in the *Bacchae* was not really conceived by Euripides as a personal God at all, may be inferred, I think, from the lines which the poet puts into the mouth of the prophet Teiresias when trying to overcome the opposition of Pentheus.

"Two chiefest Powers,
Prince, among men there are : divine Demeter—
Earth is she, name her by which name thou wilt ;—
She upon dry food nurtureth mortal men :
Then followeth Semelê's Son ; to match her gift
The cluster's flowing draught he found, and gave
To mortals, which gives rest from grief to men.

He is the Gods' libation, though a God,
So that through him do men obtain good things."³

Some writers have supposed that Euripides does not here express his own opinion ; but Teiresias, in Greek drama, generally speaks with authority, and what is more important, the view represented in the prophet's speech appears to throw light upon the problem with which the whole play deals. The Sophist Prodicus, as

¹ 243 ff.

² 1326 f. Way.

³ 274 ff. Way.

we have already seen, maintained that Dionysus was only the apotheosis of wine, as Demeter of corn, Poseidon of water, and so forth.¹ In the lines just quoted, Teiresias takes the same view; but from the rest of the speech, as well as from other indications in the play, it is clear that to the poet himself Dionysus is the embodiment not merely of alcoholic enthusiasm, but of the principle of enthusiasm in general, the principle which Plato has described so powerfully in the *Phaedrus*. The Platonic Socrates in that dialogue draws a distinction between two forms of madness—the salutary and the pernicious. Of the salutary madness he enumerates four varieties, namely, love, prophecy, the species of inspiration which through purifications and mysteries opens out a way of deliverance from sin, and, finally, the madness that “lays hold upon a tender and untrodden soul, and rousing it to bacchanalian frenzy” — ἐκβαρχειύουσα — gives birth to lyrical and other measures.² With the first of these—the enthusiasm of the lover, as portrayed by Plato in the *Symposium*—Euripides is not here concerned; but he recognises its connexion with Dionysus in the lines:

“When wine is no more found, then Love is not,
Nor any joy beside is left to men.”³

To the other varieties of “salutary madness” the poet does full justice throughout the play. There is no Greek poem which illustrates so well as the *Bacchæ* what Plato means by the poetical frenzy—none in which the writer is himself so truly “possessed.” Prophetic madness, again, is definitely associated by Teiresias with the God.⁴ As for the religious form of “possession,” that is represented by the chorus of Bacchanals, and constantly illustrated in the choral odes. Out of many

¹ See p. 277.

² *Phædr.* 244 A ff.

³ 773 f. Way.

⁴ 298 ff.

possible examples, I will put before you Mr. Murray's exquisite rendering of part of the opening hymn :

“ Oh, blessed he in all wise,
 Who hath drunk the Living Fountain,
 Whose life no folly staineth,
 And his soul is near to God ;
 Whose sins are lifted, pall-wise,
 As he worships on the Mountain,
 And where Cybele ordaineth,
 Our Mother, he has trod :
 His head with ivy laden
 And his thyrsus tossing high,
 For our God he lifts his cry ;
 ‘ Up, O Bacchae, wife and maiden,
 Come, O ye Bacchae, come ;
 Oh, bring the Joy-bestower,
 God-seed of God the Sower,
 Bring Bromios in his power
 From Phrygia's mountain dome ;
 To street and town and tower,
 Oh, bring ye Bromios home ! ’ ” ¹

It would accordingly seem that Dionysus in the *Bacchae* is not, in the intention of the poet, a personal God, but stands for the spirit of enthusiasm in the ancient Greek meaning of the word. And if so, the main problem which the action of the play suggests is wider than it has sometimes been supposed to be. It is not so much a question of orthodoxy *versus* unbelief: it is rather a question of the relative value of reason and enthusiasm in human life. Euripides, when he wrote the *Bacchae*, was plainly on the side of enthusiasm. τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία—“ Ah, not with knowledge is Wisdom bought ” ²—that is the principal lesson of the drama. There is something stronger and greater than reason in the life of man. No doubt some weight should be allowed to the special circumstances in which the play was composed. Macedonia was the home of the

¹ 72 ff.

² 395 Way.

Dionysiac cult; and nothing could be more natural than that in a play intended for a Macedonian audience Euripides should have selected for poetic treatment the worship of Dionysus. But the poet writes throughout as if he felt profoundly what he so rapturously says. The greater part of the play is pervaded by the kind of joyous exaltation which accompanies a new discovery or illumination. Euripides had just escaped from the scene of his lifelong battle against Athenian conservatism in matters of religion and art, and he writes as if the spirit of the Macedonian mountains had taken possession of his soul. No other ancient poem shows so rapturous a feeling of the kinship between man and nature. The very hills are "thrilled with ecstasy" in sympathy with the frenzied votaries of the God.¹ We feel that Dionysus has become a power pulsating throughout the whole of nature, both inorganic and organic, making the universe into a living, breathing whole; and we are stirred with a new sense of unification with the mystery that surrounds us. Professor James has said that "if religion is to mean anything definite for us, . . . we ought to take it as meaning this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of espousal, in regions where morality strictly so called can at best but bow its head and acquiesce. It ought to mean nothing short of this new reach of freedom for us, with the struggle over, the keynote of the universe sounding in our ears, and everlasting possession spread before our eyes."² It seems to me that in the *Bacchae* of Euripides we have this "added dimension of emotion," this "new reach of freedom"; and if religion really does mean this, we may fairly say that the *Bacchae* is a religious drama, though not a "reactionary manifesto in favour of orthodoxy." We should remember, too, that the Athenian drama was ostensibly an act of homage rendered to the God Dionysus.

¹ 726.² *Varieties of Religious Experience* p. 48.

It is fitting that the poet should close his career by giving us his own interpretation of the God in whose service he had spent so strenuous a life.

Our general conclusion, therefore, is that the leading motive of the *Bacchae* is praise of Dionysus, and that Dionysus represents the principle of enthusiasm or inspiration both in nature and in man. As compared with enthusiasm, reason and rationalism are relegated to a subordinate position. Whether the new impulse would have proved permanent, is another matter; but we have the less reason to suppose that it would, because even here Euripides, towards the close of the play, relapses again into the old iconoclastic manner. The colloquy between Agave and Dionysus is quite in the vein of that peculiarly Euripidean sort of rationalism which we have already met with in the *Ion* and elsewhere.

Ag. "Dionysus, we beseech thee!—we have sinned.

D. Too late ye know me, who knew not in your hour.

Ag. We know it: but thy vengeance passeth bounds.

D. I am a God: ye did despite to me.

Ag. It fits not that in wrath Gods be as men.

D. Long since my father Zeus ordained this so."¹

If, in conclusion, we try to estimate the effect of Euripides on the development of religion and religious thought, we must distinguish between the negative and the positive aspects of his teaching. On its critical or destructive side, the drama of Euripides gave a most powerful impulse to that dissolution of the old Homeric faith which the attacks of Xenophanes had long ago foreshadowed, and which was now being rapidly effected by the many iconoclastic currents of thought at work in Athens during the latter part of the fifth century before Christ. No other Greek writer, Plato alone excepted,

¹ 1345 ff. Way.

did so much in this direction. On the positive or reconstructive side, we find a multitude of suggestions, without, so far as I can see, any single dominating principle. As compared with Sophocles, we may say, I think, that Euripides never achieved a final and complete unification of his moral and intellectual nature. To borrow a Platonic expression, he was at no time altogether *εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν*.¹ But it is just this peculiarity which renders the writings of Euripides of such pre-eminent value for the student of religious thought. He raises nearly all the fundamental questions which men will always ask and never fully answer. It was said of Pericles that his oratory always left a spur or sting behind in those who heard it. The same remark may be applied to Euripides. He is one of those who (in the phrase of Matthew Arnold) "seasonably disconcert mankind in their worship of machinery."² No one can read any of his more powerful dramas without being made to think; and it is as a stimulative or maieutic force, rather than on account of any positive doctrine, that this great thinker and still greater poet deserves to be reckoned among the religious teachers of Greece. No sooner had he died than Aristophanes declared that his poetry had died along with him. Never was there a more absurd miscalculation. In antiquity, he soon became the most widely known and loved of all the dramatists; and at the present day he is to many the object of an admiration so enthusiastic that it may almost be called a cult.

¹ *Rep.* iv. 443 E.

² *Culture and Anarchy* (1901 edition) p. 69.

LECTURES XVI AND XVII

SOCRATES

IN the foregoing lectures we have witnessed the stream of pre-Socratic religious thought as it pursues its way in two concurrent channels, that of Philosophy and that of Poetry. From this point onwards we are concerned with Philosophy alone; for no poet after Euripides has any appreciable claim to be called a religious teacher of the Greeks. The period upon which we are about to enter is one of the utmost interest and importance to the student of religious thought. A new intellectual and spiritual era begins with Socrates. It is chiefly Socrates and Plato whom the Christian Fathers had in mind when they spoke of Greek philosophy as a preparation for the Gospel; and our investigation of Socratic and Platonic thought will tend, I think, to show that to a certain extent this view is right. The fundamental religious ideas of Platonism, in particular, as will afterwards be seen, have much in common with those of Christianity.

Professor James has characteristically said that "when a superior intellect and a psychopathic temperament coalesce—as in the endless permutations and combinations of human faculty they are bound to coalesce often enough—in the same individual, we have the best possible condition for the kind of effective genius that gets into the biographical dictionaries."¹ If for the somewhat sinister adjective "psychopathic" we substitute

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience* p. 28 f.

“transcendental,” the sentence just quoted gives a fair description of the two apparently opposite poles in the character of Socrates. (On the one hand, a fixed and unalterable conviction that he stood in a peculiar relation to the Godhead, and was entrusted with a divine mission to his countrymen; and, on the other hand, a singularly clear and penetrating intellect, which refused to acquiesce in anything that reason could not justify—these are the two predominant characteristics of the man. The union of prophet and rationalist is so rare in our experience, that writers on Socrates have often unduly emphasised one of the two sides of his character at the expense of the other. A century or so ago, the tendency was to regard him as a preacher and not much more; now the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme. In the view of a distinguished German scholar, for example, Socrates abstained from positive exhortations altogether, and was content to try and purge men’s minds of the false persuasion of knowledge.¹ But we must insist that each of these two aspects of the personality of Socrates is attested by each of our two principal authorities, Xenophon and Plato, although Xenophon, as we should expect from his distinctively religious type of mind, lays more stress upon the one, and Plato, in his dialogues at all events, upon the other.

What I have ventured to call the vein of transcendentalism in Socrates reveals itself most of all in connexion with a peculiarity which he shared in common with not a few of those who have believed themselves entrusted with some divine communication to their fellow-men. I refer, of course, to his *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον* or “supernatural sign.” In the dialogues of Plato, the “divine sign” is represented as a “voice” which Socrates heard frequently throughout his life from childhood onwards. Its operation, according to Plato, was always inhibitory; it never positively

¹ Schanz in his edition of Plato’s *Apology* p. 104 ff.

suggested or enjoined any particular course of conduct; and, as a rule, it interfered only in cases where the intended action would have been harmful or inexpedient, rather than morally wrong. Yet in at least one instance of which Plato speaks, its timely warning enabled Socrates to perform a religious duty he would otherwise have neglected.¹ We are further told that the voice sometimes made itself heard on very trivial occasions; but, if Plato may be trusted, the effect of its repeated inhibitions was not trivial; for we read in one place that the opposition of the divine sign prevented Socrates from taking part in politics, and in another that the voice indicated to him whom he should admit into the circle of his associates, and whom he should refuse.² How important a part this mysterious messenger must have played in the life of Socrates is evident from the concluding chapters of Plato's *Apology*. No sooner is Socrates condemned, than his thoughts revert to the inward monitor, from whose approving silence from first to last throughout the trial he draws the inference that death is for him no evil, but a good.³ The *daemonium*, as Plato depicts it, is, in short, a kind of internal oracle, which its possessor believed to have been almost, if not altogether, unique in the history of mankind. "It has been granted," says the Platonic Socrates, "to few or none of those who have lived before me."⁴ The testimony of Xenophon is in general agreement with that of Plato, except that he attributes to the *daemonium* positive as well as negative commands, and otherwise enlarges the sphere of its activity, representing it sometimes as a prophetic faculty or gift exercised by Socrates on behalf not only of himself, but also of his friends. "He was in the habit," writes Xenophon, "of advising his associates to do this, or refrain from doing that, on the authority

¹ *Phaedr.* 242 B f.

² *Ap.* 31 D; *Theast.* 151 A.

³ *Ap.* 40 A-C.

⁴ *Rep.* vi. 496 C.



of the divine sign. Those who obeyed would prosper; those who disobeyed had reason to regret their indifference."¹ It need only be added that when Plato calls the phenomenon a "voice" (*φωνή*), the word should probably be understood in a literal and not in a metaphorical sense. We are to suppose, in other words, that Socrates was subject to what is called a hallucination of the sense of hearing. "I seemed to hear a voice," he says in the *Phaedrus*.² Writers on the *daemonium* have quoted many examples tending to show that similar hallucinations are compatible with perfect rationality in other respects; and they are, of course, a familiar accompaniment of abnormal religious conditions. Du Prel, who in his *Mystik der alten Griechen* discusses the *daemonium* of Socrates as a problem in transcendental psychology, finds a curious parallel in the voice which Campanella, according to his own account, so often heard. "When anything evil presents itself to me," writes Campanella, "I am in the habit, whether asleep or awake, of hearing a voice, which calls out quite clearly, 'Campanella, Campanella!' Sometimes I hear other words also; and though I attend to the matter at once, I can see nothing, nor can I discover who it is. Assuredly, if it is no Angel, it must at least be a Daemon or Spirit, or a Genius like that which accompanied Socrates."³

The question as to the actual psychological basis of this remarkable phenomenon is one of much interest, and has frequently been discussed in recent times. Speaking broadly and generally, we may say, perhaps, that the explanations offered fall into two classes, according as they ascribe the phenomenon to "ordinary psychological causes," or represent it as something transcendental and supernormal, if not, indeed, abnormal and psychopathic.⁴

¹ *Mem.* i. 1. 4.

² 242 C.

³ Quoted by Du Prel, *l.c.* p. 153.

⁴ See *s.g.* on the one hand Riddell, *Apology of Plato* p. 114, and on the other hand Myers, *Human Personality* ii. pp. 96, 103.

For us, however, in trying to understand the character of Socrates, the important point is not what the *daemonium* really was, but rather what Socrates himself believed it to be. There can be no question that Socrates regarded it as a special and all but unique revelation from the Gods. Nor are there lacking other peculiarities about Socrates from which we can see that although no one ever served the cause of reason better, he was not by any means a rationalist pure and simple. According to the testimony of Xenophon, he had a high regard for oracles and divination in general, and we may infer from Plato that he frequently attached a supernatural significance to dreams and visions of the night.¹

That Socrates conceived himself as a divinely-appointed minister to Athens is clear from the *Apology* of Plato. The *Apology*, in purpose and effect, is a representation of the historical Socrates as he appeared to the one disciple who by opportunity, sympathy, and insight was fully qualified to understand his master; and throughout the whole of that noble speech there breathes the consciousness of a mission from on high. "It is the God," says Socrates, "who has laid this duty upon me, by means of oracles and dreams and every way whereby God manifests his will to man."² "Now, therefore, men of Athens, so far from pleading my own cause, as might be supposed, I am pleading yours, lest by condemning me ye should sin in the matter of God's gift to you. . . . But perhaps ye will obey Anytus, and lightly put me to death, and then sleep away the rest of your lives, unless the God in his love for you sends you some other missionary."³ And again: "Some one perhaps may say: 'Can you not go away, Socrates, and dwell in another city, keeping silence and living a quiet life?' Alas! it is so difficult to persuade you on this

¹ *Ap.* 33 C, *Crito* 44 A, *Phaed.* 60 E; cf. *Xen. Mem.* iv. 3. 12 *al.*

² 33 C.
³ 30 D ff.

point. For if I say that to do this would be to disobey the God, you will not believe me, but think I speak ironically."¹ "Men of Athens, I should be guilty of a crime indeed, if . . . through fear of death or anything else whatever, I should desert the post to which I am assigned by the God; for the God ordains . . . that I should *follow after wisdom and examine myself and others.*"²

This special relationship to Apollo—for Apollo is the God whose servant Socrates here and elsewhere claims to be³—is not without significance in connexion with the general character and tendency of Socratic teaching. It is not merely that the precept *γνώθι σεαυτόν*, "learn to know thyself," which Socrates made the basis of his doctrine, was engraved on the walls of Apollo's temple; nor is it only that his attitude on questions of religious cult and ceremony was in harmony with the large and tolerant spirit which dictated the Pythian priestess' advice to "worship the Gods according to the custom of your city."⁴ Socrates was Apollo's minister in yet another sense. The oracle of Delphi was not the exclusive possession of any one Greek city, or even of the whole of Hellas; in the words of Livy, it was the "commune humani generis oraculum"⁵—a kind of religious centre for all mankind, barbarian as well as Greek. And it is certain that Socrates' life and teaching led the way to a more perfect realisation of the religious aspect of human brotherhood than had hitherto been dreamed of by Greek thinkers.

In attempting to describe how Socrates fulfilled his mission, I will begin by reminding you of the words which Plato attributes to him in the *Apology*. "I do nothing but go to and fro, endeavouring to persuade you

¹ 37 E.

² 28 E.

³ See esp. *Phaed.* 84 E ff.

⁴ *Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 1; iv. 3. 16.

⁵ xxxviii. 48. 2.

all, both young and old, not to care about the body or riches, but first and foremost about the soul—how to make the soul as good as possible. I tell you that virtue is not the child of riches, but riches of virtue; and so with every other good that men possess, alike in private and in public life.”¹ The words are strangely like the text, “What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?”² but I quote them now because they furnish a convenient point of view from which to study the missionary work of Socrates. It is primarily as the *ιατρός τῆς ψυχῆς*—the physician or healer of the soul—that he regards himself.³ His object is to help the Athenians to “make their souls as good as possible.” Let us see how he set about the task.

The first duty of a physician manifestly is to discover the cause of the disease. Now we have seen that in the age of Socrates there was a widespread disposition to call in question the moral and religious principles of the past. Reason had begun to weaken the authority of faith, but was herself too weak to rule the kingdom she would claim; and the consequences of this inward sedition—so, at least, it seemed to Socrates and Plato—were only too manifest in the social and political life of Athens. It might accordingly appear reasonable to attribute the disease of the body politic to the prevailing scepticism; and the conservative section of public opinion undoubtedly took this view. Socrates diagnosed otherwise. In his opinion, the lack of knowledge, and not the lack of faith, was responsible for the evils which he saw around him. What considerations led Socrates to this conclusion? In the first place, he found, or thought he found, nearly every section of a society which seemed to him unsound pervaded by the disease of ignorance in its worst form—the conceit of knowledge

¹ 30 A f.² Mark viii. 36.³ Cf. *Phaed.* 89 A, ὡς εἰ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο.

without the reality. He observed, moreover, that in the sphere of the industrial arts, carpentry, shoemaking, and so forth, right action springs from knowledge, wrong action from ignorance; and he inferred that the same must hold good of the art of life. But these and similar arguments probably counted for less than the unconscious testimony of his own character. Whether in his early years Socrates passed through a period of struggle for self-mastery, we do not know for certain. In itself, it is not improbable that a nature so full and strong had experienced the power of passion; and there is some slight evidence to this effect. A certain Zopyrus, who prided himself on reading the mind's construction in the face, is said to have once enlarged on the vices reflected in the physiognomy of Socrates. Most of those present disagreed; Socrates, however, remarked: "He is right: the vices are there; only reason has dethroned them."¹

But whether this anecdote be true or false, every one must allow that in the maturer Socrates of whom we read in Xenophon and Plato, desire and will were completely under the sway of reason. We are told by Xenophon that he was "so self-controlled, so temperate, that he never at any time chose the sweeter in place of the better." "His self-restraint shone forth even more in his acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the pleasures which flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by riches."² With Socrates, to know his duty was to perform it; and what was true of himself, he expected would prove true of others also.

Moral perversity, in the view of Socrates, is therefore due to ignorance; nay more, he went so far as to maintain that vice *is* ignorance, and ignorance vice. This is the first principle of Socratic doctrine; and we must now

¹ Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 80.

² *Mem.* iv. 8. 11; i. 5. 6, tr. Dakyns.

attempt to understand its significance and value as a contribution to theoretical and practical ethics.

We are struck in the first place by the excessive intellectualism of the theory, all the more remarkable, perhaps, in one who was so fully in touch with concrete human nature. It has already been pointed out that the Greeks were from the first disposed to recognise a strongly intellectual element in morality. The prevailing conception of sin in Homer and Herodotus, in lyric poetry and the drama, treats it as a form of mental blindness or aberration. By Socrates, however, this inherent tendency of Greek thought is carried to what appears to us a paradoxical extreme. Not only does he reduce all the specific virtues to varieties of knowledge, but he constantly speaks as if there were no irrational part of soul at all. To Socrates, the proverbial *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*, would be altogether meaningless: he who knows what is right, does it, and there is no more to be said. Aristotle declares that the identification of virtue with knowledge amounts to a denial of the possibility of incontinence—that is, the state of mind which, knowing the better, deliberately chooses the worse;¹ and the criticism is fair enough. But on a closer scrutiny, the Socratic thesis is less paradoxical than it appears, on account of Socrates' peculiar conception of knowledge. What the word "knowledge" meant to Socrates, will be clearly seen if we contrast his view with that of an eminent prelate, who in a recent address to an assembly of schoolboys is reported to have said that "as to the material we wanted turned out at our public schools, he placed straightness of character first, unselfishness of character second, courage and perseverance to stand up for the faith next, and knowledge last." Here, presumably, knowledge is conceived of as having little or no relation to character and conduct; otherwise it

¹ *Eth. Nic.* vii. 3. 1145^b 25 f.

would hardly be placed last and lowest in the scale. The speaker is obviously thinking of the accumulation of facts within the mind, and nothing more. Now this is not at all what Socrates meant by knowledge. With what we may call pure science, he had little or no sympathy. "Up to the limit set by utility," says Xenophon, "he was ready to join in any investigation, and to follow out an argument with those who were with him; but there he stopped."¹ Geometry, in its original meaning of "land-measurement" (*γεωμετρία*), he regarded as a useful aid to life; but he emphatically condemned what he used to call the "study of unintelligible diagrams."² His attitude towards astronomy and physics might be expressed in the words of Cowper:

"God never meant that man should scale the Heavens
By strides of human wisdom."³

The truth is that knowledge, as understood by Socrates, has the closest possible relation to the character. It is a certain overmastering principle or power that lays hold primarily indeed of the intellect, but through the intellect of the entire personality, moulding and disciplining the will and the emotions into absolute unison with itself, a principle from which courage, temperance, justice, and every other virtue inevitably flow. It seemed to Socrates a monstrous thing, says Aristotle, that a man who possesses knowledge should be overcome and dragged this way and that by any other impulse like a slave.⁴ Socrates' conception of knowledge is the intellectual counterpart of the Christian conception of faith; inasmuch as knowledge must necessarily—so he thought—bear fruit in the life. We may be sure that Socrates would have denied the possession of knowledge to one whose actions

¹ *Mem.* iv. 7. 8 Dakyns.

² *Mem.* l.c. § 3.

³ *Task* iii.

⁴ *Eth. Nic.* vii. 3. 1145^b 23 f.

were immoral or unjust. "By their fruits ye shall know them," and by nothing else.

Seen from this point of view, the identification of virtue and knowledge ceases to be a paradox, and becomes the expression of an ideal. It is, in effect, an exhortation to inward unity: all the different elements of the soul are to be brought into harmony with reason, the highest of human faculties, according to Socrates and Plato. This, I believe, is the full and proper meaning of the doctrine; and in this sense, as I have already indicated, Socrates was himself a living example of what he taught. But the doctrine that vice is ignorance, however one-sided it may at first appear, conveys yet another lesson which we are sometimes in danger of forgetting. A larger proportion of human wickedness and misery than stern-voiced moralists are sometimes apt to suppose, is undoubtedly the offspring of ignorance. The temptation of organised communities is to ignore this fact, because it appears to raise the difficult question of the moral responsibility of the individual. If vice is nothing but ignorance, deliberate wrong-doing, it might be argued, is non-existent: *οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει*, as Socrates used to say: so that we have no right to inflict punishment upon the wrong-doer. This difficulty—whether real or apparent, we need not at present inquire—Socrates seems not to have considered; but it was certainly present to the mind of Plato, and the solution which he offers is entirely in harmony with the spirit of his master's teaching. Because men sin through ignorance, it by no means follows, according to Plato, that we should dispense with punishment: the proper inference is that punishment should in its aim and character be educative or remedial, rather than vindictive or retributory. "In chastising the wicked," Plato says, "our object should always be to make him better": *τὸν κακὸν ἀεὶ δεῖ κολάζειν, ἵν' ἀμείνων ᾖ*.¹ The

¹ *Laws* 944 D.

judge, in the true or ideal meaning of the word, is a spiritual physician—one whose duty is to heal the soul of the disease of wickedness.¹ We have met with several anticipations of this relatively humane conception of punishment in earlier Greek literature, for example in Aeschylus, where he teaches that “through suffering men learn” (*πάθος μάθος*); and from the history of words like *δικαιοῦν* and *σωφρονίζειν*, signifying at first “make just,” “make temperate,” and afterwards “chastise,” it is plain that such a view was not unfamiliar to the ordinary Greek consciousness, though seldom recognised in the penal legislation of antiquity. But the remedial theory of punishment, when it occurs in Plato, is probably a deliberate and conscious inference from the Socratic identification of ignorance and vice.

Nothing is more noteworthy in connexion with Socrates' doctrine of virtue and vice than the faith which it exhibits in the essential goodness of human nature. If a man errs, he errs involuntarily, through ignorance: so that even in the very act of sinning, he is fain not to sin. In other words, all men always and everywhere desire (*βούλονται*) the good—a sentiment than which none is more characteristic of Socraticism. What precisely did the sentiment mean in the mouth of Socrates? To us the word “good” appears to be ambiguous: did Socrates understand by it the morally good and right, or only the useful and expedient? The answer is that he understood the word in both senses at once: for, according to his view, the morally right is that which is useful (*ὠφέλιμον*): only by “useful” in this connexion he invariably meant what is useful or salubrious to the soul, virtue being conceived of as the health of the inward man. Substituting only the word “ignorance” for “sin,” Socrates might have applied to humanity at large what St. Paul says of himself: “The good which I

¹ *Rep.* iii. 409 E ff. ; *Gorg.* 478 D *al.*

would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I practise. But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me.”¹ The Socratic doctrine that “no one is willingly evil”—*οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ποιητός*—recognises the presence in all men of a hunger and thirst after righteousness, which it thus becomes the duty and privilege of the teacher both to stimulate and to assuage. In such a creed there is no room for despair; nor in his life and doctrine did Socrates ever show the smallest trace of pessimism. It is not the least of his claims to be regarded as the prophet of a new evangel, that every word he utters is full of indomitable courage and steadfast hope.

It remains to inquire how this physician of the soul endeavoured to direct men on the way to knowledge. And first of all we are concerned with the method rather than with the substance of his teaching.

Plato, in the *Republic*, declares that a good teacher will begin by a cleansing or cathartic process,² and the historical Socrates invariably observed this rule. The mind of the learner is seldom or never a *tabula rasa*: on the contrary, it is nearly always full of erroneous sentiments and prejudices which must be discarded before any true progress can be made. The aggregate of these prejudices Socrates was in the habit of calling the “conceit of knowledge without the reality.” How did he endeavour to remove this obstacle? By means of the “negative arm of the elenchus”—the destructive or refutative dialectic of which we have so many examples in the so-called Socratic dialogues of Plato. It is unnecessary to dwell on this preliminary stage in the Socratic method, further than to remind you of its general character. An apparently casual conversation leads to the emergence of one of those familiar ethical concepts whose meaning we generally take for granted;

¹ Rom. vii. 19 f.

² *Rep.* vi. 501 A.

and Socrates invites his companion to define the concept. When at last an attempt is made, Socrates proceeds to quote individual cases to which the definition will not apply: other definitions follow, only to suffer the same fate, and in the end the unfortunate victim of the elenchus generally contradicts himself out of his own mouth. It is obvious, of course, that the effect of this interrogatory, which Socrates, true to his principle that "the unexamined life is not worth living," practised in season and out of season, on all sorts and conditions of men, must inevitably have varied according to the character of those on whom it was exercised. In the case of men swollen with self-esteem and still further inflated by the applause of others, the Socratic cross-examination must have been all the more exasperating when they noticed that their discomfiture provided both Socrates and his disciples with a measure of enjoyment which the latter at least made no attempt to conceal. *ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδὲς*—says Socrates in the *Apology*—"it really is a source of satisfaction" to witness the exposure of men who think themselves wise when they are foolish.¹ Others there doubtless were whose hostility was inspired by deeper and less self-regarding motives. There is in every age a type of mind that hates and fears discussion, partly, perhaps, from intellectual impotence, and partly from a sincere and sometimes just alarm lest it should "corrupt" the young. Even in the sceptical atmosphere of Periclean Athens, men of this stamp were common, conservatives without exception, and sometimes patriots, of sufficient intelligence to understand the destructive power of the Socratic elenchus, but unable to appreciate its positive or reconstructive side. From these two classes Socrates might provoke animosity and opposition, but he could not expect to do them good. With all the greater zeal did he throw himself into his true vocation, that of an

¹ 33 C.

apostle to young men. Nowhere, perhaps, is the false conceit of knowledge so common as in that quarter; but at no other period is it so amenable to treatment, provided the physician is a man of skill. And there never was a greater master of the art of dealing with the young than Socrates. He possessed in a unique degree that indefinable, half-magnetic power which attracts even when it puzzles and bewilders; and in spite of, or rather, perhaps, because of, his characteristic *εἰρωνεία* or self-depreciation, he seldom failed to leave the impression that the hand which dealt the wound could also heal. But the immediate effect which the preliminary and purgatorial dialectic of Socrates produced in those who were destined to profit by his teaching was one of extreme perplexity and distress—a necessary stage, as it seemed to Socrates, upon the road to knowledge. Of this state of mind, which in the Socratic school was called *ἀνοπία*, we have several pictures from the pen of Plato, and one at least from Xenophon. After a somewhat drastic application of the elenchus, Euthydemus in the *Memorabilia* expresses himself in these words: “By heaven, Socrates, I used emphatically to consider myself a student of the knowledge which I thought most likely to teach me everything suitable for one who would fain be a good and honourable man; but imagine my despair when, in spite of all my former labours, I find that I cannot so much as answer a question about things which a man ought most of all to know, and have no other way to go, in order to become better.”¹ To a similar effect, but infinitely more powerful and impressive, is the confession which Plato in the *Symposium* puts into the mouth of Alcibiades. “When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, he produces absolutely no effect upon us, or not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly

¹ iv. 2. 23.

repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. . . . My heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well, but I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you will admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others,—he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. . . . Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad if he were to die: so that I am at my wits' end."¹

It is from testimony of this kind, even more than from the records of his actual conversations, that we can best understand the extraordinary power which Socrates wielded over his disciples. What chiefly concerns us at present, however, is to understand the exact nature of that *ἀνομία* which the purgatorial exercise of the elenchus was designed to produce. We have seen that ignorance was the Socratic equivalent of sin, and knowledge in some respects the Socratic equivalent of faith; and in this condition of perplexity, which Alcibiades so powerfully describes, we have the intellectual counterpart of the kind of moral and spiritual awakening which

¹ *Symp.* 215 D ff. Jowett.

so often proves the prelude to a better life. I say the "intellectual counterpart," because here it is the intellect which is primarily affected, whereas in religious experiences it is rather the emotions and the will; but the Socratic *ἀπορία* was moral as well as intellectual. "He made me feel," says Alcibiades, "as though I could hardly endure the life which I am living": *πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθην ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω.*

Before we consider the second or positive stage in Socrates' dialectical method, it is necessary that we should clearly understand the limits within which he worked. It has already been pointed out that he will have nothing to do with mathematical or physical studies. As regards the latter, he justified his attitude by sarcastic observations on the mutually destructive theories of pre-Socratic cosmological inquiry.¹ Socrates concerned himself exclusively with man, considered as an individual, as a member of the community or state, and in his relation to the Gods; and this, of course, is what Cicero means by saying that he called Philosophy down from heaven to earth. But even within the sphere of strictly human interests and concerns, he drew a sharp distinction between what he called things hidden or obscure (*τὰ ἄδηλα*), and certain other matters with which our reason is both qualified and called upon to deal. To the first of these categories belong questions into which an element of uncertainty must always enter by reason of their reference to the future, such as the success or failure of any particular enterprise or undertaking, the vicissitudes of human life, and so forth. Let us hear what Socrates himself says on the subject. "Let a man sow field or plant farm never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits: another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not who will inhabit it. Neither can a general

¹ Xen. *Mem.* i. 1. 13 ff.

foresee whether it will profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether his leadership will turn to evil or to good. . . . To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural folly."¹ The whole of this side of things, Socrates believed, the Gods had reserved for themselves, and denied to human reason; but we are not on that account to leave it out of consideration altogether. Our duty in such matters is to consult the Gods through the appointed channels of communication—that is, by means of oracles and the diviner's art. "About things which are hidden," he would say, "we ought to inquire of the Gods by divination; for the Gods grant signs to those to whom they are gracious."² It follows that "no one who wishes to manage a house or city with success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can afford to dispense with aid from above."³ Here, as well as elsewhere, it has sometimes been supposed that Xenophon unjustly ascribes his own extreme religiosity to Socrates; but surely this distinction between two spheres, the one accessible to reason, and the other suprarational, is the natural result of that peculiar combination of rationalism and transcendentalism which we have already found to be characteristic of the man. At the same time, after having discriminated the two departments, Socrates turns with enthusiasm to that in which, as it seems to him, Reason and not Revelation is our appointed guide. On questions of morality and conduct, he deemed it not less absurd to consult the Gods than to refrain from consulting them in the cases I have described. Our business is to determine all such questions by the exercise of reason, and reason alone.⁴

How, then, did Socrates set himself to establish in his

¹ *Mem.* i. 1. 8 f. Dakyns.

² *Mem.* i. 1. 9.

³ *Mem.* i. 1. 7 Dakyns.

⁴ *Mem.* i. 1. 9.

followers a positive foundation for morality? Aristotle observes that two discoveries may justly be ascribed to him, inductive reasoning and the art of definition.¹ It would lead us too far to illustrate the use which Socrates made of these two weapons in his conversations; and it must suffice to say in general terms that his object invariably was to arrive at some *λόγος* or principle acceptable to the reason, and afterwards to apply this principle in particular cases as a criterion of what ought or ought not to be done. By this method he directed all his own actions;² and he could conceive of no better rule for his disciples. There is nothing mystical or transcendental about the Socratic *Logos*; with that of Heraclitus it has nothing in common except the name. It is simply the general idea, definition, or concept, let us say of justice, or courage, or temperance, arrived at by the comparison of instances not always representative, and sometimes chosen in such a way as to suggest that Socrates, like other preachers of morality, occasionally framed his premises to suit a preconceived conclusion.

One noteworthy feature in Socratic induction is the extent to which its materials were drawn from the scenes of everyday life. It was made a matter of reproach to him by some of his contemporaries that he was always saying the same thing, and always in the same style—continually harping on “shoemakers and fullers and cooks and doctors,” says Callicles in the *Gorgias* of Plato.³ Those who knew Socrates better could not fail to be attracted by the contrast between his plebeian illustrations, and the lessons they were meant to impart; it was like the contrast between the almost grotesque exterior of the man himself and the soul which it concealed. “His words,” says the Platonic Alcibiades,

¹ *Met.* M 4. 1078^b 27 f.

² 491 A. Cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 37.

³ Plato, *Crito* 46 B.

“are like the images of Silenus which open; they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr—for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, so that any ignorant or inexperienced person might feel disposed to laugh at him; but he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honourable man.”¹

Another characteristic mark of Socrates' method of instruction is deserving of particular notice. He expressly disclaims the title of teacher, and prefers to represent himself as a fellow-inquirer, a companion in the search for knowledge and the virtuous life. His motto, it has been said, was *docendo discimus*; truth is brought to light, not by solitary meditation, but rather through the contact of mind with mind. The practical result of this attitude was to establish an intimate personal relationship between him and his disciples, a relationship which the Platonic Socrates playfully describes in language borrowed from the vocabulary of passion. In Plato this conception appears in the form familiar to English readers from the platonising poets of the Elizabethan age—as a kind of spiritual union between two souls for the generation of lofty thoughts and noble deeds, what Shakespeare calls the “marriage of true minds.” The germ of the idea was, however, transmitted to Socrates by Plato; and the same may probably be said of another and kindred notion which plays a great part in the educational theory of the greatest of Socrates' disciples. In the *Theaetetus*² Plato describes the *ἀποπλοία* or “perplexity” of which I have spoken as a form

¹ *Symp.* 221 E f. Jowett.

² 149 A ff.

of intellectual parturition; so that the teacher becomes as it were an obstetrician who brings to light those thoughts and intuitions with which the mind of the pupil is in labour. He does not so much attempt to instil knowledge from without as to educe it from within. The consequences of this view of education are of far-reaching significance, but it would be premature to discuss them now; for it was not Socrates, but Plato, who elaborated the conception, and gave it, as we shall see, a yet deeper meaning by the doctrine that the soul in its essential and uncorrupted nature is divine.

From what has hitherto been said, we may perhaps form some idea of the distinctive peculiarities of the Socratic method, and more especially of the way in which it was calculated to produce a moral as well as an intellectual regeneration—what Plato for his part calls a *περιπαγωγή* or revolution of the entire soul. We have next to consider the substance or content of Socrates' doctrine. As already indicated, he deals exclusively, or almost exclusively, with man: and even within the sphere of human activities he confines himself for the most part to questions which have a practical bearing on life and conduct. The object of nearly all his disputations was to determine "how we ought to live" (*πῶς βιωτέον*): and the first great principle, on which he constantly insisted, was the Delphic maxim, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, "Learn to know thyself." "Tell me, Euthydemus," we read in the *Memorabilia*, "have you ever been to Delphi?" "Twice." "And did you observe the inscription on the temple, 'Learn to know thyself'?" "I did." "Well, now, did you pay no heed to it? or did you attend thereto and try to examine and find out who and what you are?" "No, I did not. I thought I knew that well enough already; for if I did not know my own self, I should indeed be ignorant."¹ Let us consider for a

¹ iv. 2. 24.

moment how Socrates interpreted this text. He did not regard it as a summons to the exercise of self-examination, as practised, for example, by the later Pythagoreans, who at the close of the day were in the habit of asking themselves, "How have I sinned? What duty have I left undone?" Self-scrutiny of such a kind would have appeared to Socrates irrational and morbid. Still less did he find in the Delphic exhortation any hint of the deep religious significance attaching to it in one of the recently discovered "Sayings of Jesus," where we have a notable example of the way in which Greek ideas were absorbed into Christianity at a comparatively early date. "The kingdom of heaven"—I follow Grenfell and Hunt's restoration—"is within you; and whoever shall know himself shall find it. (Strive therefore?) to know yourselves, and ye shall be aware that ye are the sons of the (almighty?) Father."¹ The teaching of this fragment might be illustrated from Plato and Cleanthes,² but scarcely from Socrates, although the phrase "self-knowledge" is doubtless ultimately due to him. In the mouth of Socrates the Delphic precept meant nothing more than "Learn to take the measure of your own capacities, proclivities, and powers." "The man who has self-knowledge," Socrates said, "knows what is suited to himself, distinguishes between what he can and what he cannot do, and by doing what he knows, acquires what he needs, and so does well (*εὖ πράττουσιν*); while, on the other hand, by refraining from what he does not know, he makes no blunders, and avoids ill-doing" (*διαφεύγουσι τὸ κακῶς πράττειν*).³ It is obvious that the Socratic doctrine of self-knowledge has

¹ *New Sayings of Jesus*, etc. (1904) p. 15.

² *ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, Hymn of Cleanthes* 4. For Plato, see p. 356, and cf. *Alc.* i. 133 B ff.

³ *Mem.* iv. 2. 26. Here as often

in Greek literature, *εὖ πράττειν* combines the two ideas of right or virtuous action and happiness. Cf. Plato, *Charm.* 173 D, and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* i. 8. 1098^b 20 f.

nothing metaphysical or recondite about it, but is just an eminently practical assertion of a principle the truth of which men often learn by sad experience.

If one were invited to express the sum and substance of Socrates' teaching in a single word, it would be difficult to find a better than "Noocracy." As far as concerns the relation of the individual to himself, I have already stated that he tried to establish a perfect harmony of all the powers and faculties of the soul under the government of reason, and that he inculcated this ideal by example as well as by precept. We must beware, however, of supposing that Socrates had any sympathy with the kind of asceticism by means of which his followers the Cynics endeavoured to exemplify, as they imagined, the rule of reason in their lives. The inward freedom which Socrates desired for himself and others was that which comes not from self-abnegation, but from "self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control"; it would be quite in the spirit of his teaching to hold that asceticism is a sign of weakness rather than of strength. Alcibiades in the *Symposium* of Plato relates how Socrates, when serving in the army, far excelled his fellow-soldiers in power to endure the miseries incidental to a campaign, hunger, cold, and the like, and yet at a banquet he seemed the only person capable of enjoying himself; he did not wish to drink, but when compelled to do so, no one could keep pace with him, although no one ever saw him intoxicated.¹ It is clear that the noocratical ideal of Socrates did not require or permit him to renounce the world. Monasticism would have seemed to him a form of indolence, or even of betrayal. In its political application, the principle we are now considering takes the form of a demand for an aristocracy of knowledge, in direct and conscious antagonism to the rule of ignorance, which, in the opinion of Socrates, was the most

¹ 220 A. ; cf. 228 C.

dangerous feature of Athenian democracy. He never tires of reiterating that government is not a happy inspiration, but an art or science, like the art of steering, making shoes, and so on; and the ruthless logic with which he exposed the pretensions of self-seeking politicians, as well as his outspoken denunciations of some of the most cherished institutions of the Athenian state, made for him many powerful enemies, in spite of his unflinching loyalty to the existing laws. How perfect that loyalty was, there is ample evidence to show. On one famous occasion he had stood forth as the champion of the laws against the fury of the people; on another, against the tyranny of the Thirty; and at the end of his life, though recognising to the full the injustice of his condemnation, he refused the offer of escape, lest he should violate what Plato calls the law requiring judicial sentences to be enforced.¹ It must be allowed that however much the teaching of Socrates may have involuntarily tended to subvert the purely Hellenic ideal, in practice at least, Athens never had a better citizen.

We have often seen that popular Greek morality considered it a duty to requite evil with evil, no less than good with good. What was the position of Socrates on this subject? In the first book of Plato's *Republic*,² the ordinary Greek view is for the first time assailed by arguments which, alike in form and in substance, are such as the historical Socrates might well have employed. It is urged that to injure a human being under any circumstances whatever is to make him worse in point of human excellence or virtue, just as by injuring a horse or a dog we make them less serviceable for the work in which they for their part are fitted to excel; and from hence the conclusion is drawn that the good man never does harm to any one, whether friend or foe. The *Gorgias*

¹ Plato, *Ap.* 32 B f. ; *Crito* 50 B.

² 335 A ff.

and *Crito* teach the same lesson. Plato knows well that such a doctrine is directly opposed to the usual Greek belief. "Though all the world agree with you," Socrates exclaims in the *Gorgias*, "I, one man, do not agree" (ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ).¹ "It is wrong," we read in the *Crito*, "to requite injustice with injustice, or to inflict evil upon any man, whatever we may suffer at his hand."² No one who fully understands what is involved in this sentence will deny that it opens up a new conception, not only of human duty, but also of humanity itself: essentially the same conception, indeed, which Christ proclaimed in the Sermon on the Mount. Some have doubted whether the new departure was really the work of Socrates, and not rather of his disciple Plato. To me it seems clearly due to Socrates; for by this principle Socrates invariably regulated his life, both in public and in private. "To the state," says Xenophon, "he was never the cause of any evil—neither disaster in war, nor faction, nor treason, nor any other mischief whatsoever. And if his public life was free from all offence, so was his private. He never hurt a single soul either by deprivation of good or infliction of evil, nor did he ever lie under the imputation of any of those misdoings."³ And at the close of the *Apology*, Plato makes him forgive his judges. "I am not angry," he says, "with those who voted for my death."⁴

On the question of the immortality of the soul it is not altogether easy to determine what Socrates believed. There is, of course, a strong *a priori* probability that he gave some consideration to the subject. As Jowett observes, "it may be fairly urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan

¹ 472 B.² 49 C.³ *Mem.* i. 2. 63 Dakyns.⁴ 41 D.

in man and nature.”¹ One thing at least is clear: In the prosecution of his mission, Socrates did not dwell upon the hope of immortality as a motive for piety and virtue in this present life: otherwise we should certainly have found some traces of the doctrine in the *Memorabilia*. The only hint which I can find is contained in the statement that the soul of man participates in the divine (τοῦ θείου μετέχει).² It is the kinship between the human soul and the divine that forms the ultimate foundation of Plato’s belief in immortality. But nowhere in the *Memorabilia* is the suggestion worked out. The *Cyropaedia*, however, contains a notable passage, where Xenophon makes the dying Cyrus express an inclination to hold that man’s νοῦς or reason survives the moment of dissolution, and when freed from the body and its encumbrances, attains to a measure of intelligence far greater than during its imprisonment in the flesh.³ The parallel between the argument of Xenophon and one or two passages of Plato’s *Phaedo* is so close, that we may fairly suppose their common master sometimes reasoned in this way.⁴ At the same time Cyrus refrains from dogmatising on the subject; his last words are, “I shall be in safety, beyond the reach of evil, whether I am with God (τοῦ θείου), or whether I no longer exist.”⁵ This is just the position which the Platonic Socrates takes up in the *Apology*, except that it is not the absence of evil, but the positive presence of good, which is the leading feature of the immortality which he there conceives as possible, or, perhaps we should rather say, as probable. In the *Apology* it is said that there are two possibilities, and no other. Death must either be annihilation, or another form of life: and each of these alternatives—observe how Socrates herein reveals his lifelong optimism

¹ *Plato* ii. p. 191.

² iv. 3. 14; cf. i. 4. 8.

³ viii. 7. 19 ff.

⁴ *Phaed.* 66 A-67 E, 79 B f.; cf. *Rep.* ix. 572 A, x. 611 E.

⁵ *Cyr.* viii. 7. 27.

—is good. In the one case, rest from labour, a dreamless sleep that knows no waking; in the other, fellowship with the mighty dead, Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer. What greater happiness than to continue in the other world the service to which God had called him here, examining the heroes of old, Agamemnon, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, to see which of them is wise and which foolish, though wise in his own esteem—a missionary, as it were, to the spirits in prison? But the last word is *non liquet*: ἀδελον παντι πλην η̄ τῷ θεῷ—no one knows but God.¹ During the month which elapsed between the condemnation and the death of Socrates, his hope of immortality, perhaps, grew stronger: there may be more historical foundation for the *Phaedo* of Plato than is commonly supposed. Of one thing, however, according to Socrates, we may be sure. The soul may perish, or it may survive; but for the good man neither life nor death has any terrors: his interests are safe with God.² “Our times are in His hand; trust God, nor be afraid.”

Our consideration of Socrates' views on immortality has brought us by natural stages to the last division of our subject. What did Socrates teach about the Gods, and man's duty towards the Gods? I cannot here attempt to discuss the critical questions that have lately been raised with reference to those passages of the *Memorabilia* which profess to give an account of Socrates' theological opinions. It must suffice to say that while in agreement with Gomperz I believe them to have really been written by Xenophon, I go further than Gomperz, and hold that Xenophon is in all probability reproducing some of the actual conversations of his master. The tendency of some recent works has been to look upon Aristotle, rather than Xenophon, as our primary and most trustworthy source for the doctrine of the

¹ *Ap.* 40 C ff.

² *Apol.* 41 D. Cf. *Rom.* viii. 28.

historical Socrates.¹ But the effect of this assumption—more than an assumption it cannot well be called—is to represent not only the teacher, but also the man himself in a different light from that in which he appeared to those with whom he lived in daily converse. To them Socrates was not in the first instance what he was to Aristotle, the founder of “inductive reasoning and definition,” but rather, as we have already seen from many testimonies, a spiritual guide, philosopher, and friend. And, in point of fact, the particular form which Socrates’ theology took, if Xenophon is to be believed, was just what we should expect from the rest of his teaching. One who consistently preached the rule of Reason in the individual and the state, might well conceive of God as the Reason that rules the world.

To Socrates the whole of Nature appeared to bear the impress of design. Anticipating in scope and purpose, though not, of course, in detail, the “Anatomist’s Hymn” of Oliver Wendell Holmes, he enlarges on the adaptation of means to ends discernible in the structure of the human body, arguing that it cannot be the work of chance, but only of a wise artificer, who loves the creatures he has made (*σοφοῦ τινὸς δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου*).² The same lesson, he maintains, is even more clearly taught by a study of man’s psychical nature. Those involuntary instincts which ensure the safety of the individual and the species, the reproductive impulse, the love of parents for their children, our natural love of life and hatred of death; the faculty of speech, by which alone society, civilisation, and law are rendered possible; how are they all to be accounted for, except on the hypothesis of a Being who deliberately planned the existence and happiness of man? Consider again the religious endowment of the human race. Man is the

¹ See, for example, Joël’s learned and exhaustive treatise, *Der echte*

und der Xenophontische Sokrates, 1893–1901.

² *Mem.* i. 4. 7.

only animal who can apprehend the existence of Gods, the only creature who is privileged to do them service. Or consider the faculty of reason, by which we draw conclusions from what we perceive and devise contrivances for enjoying the good and repelling the evil. Surely in all this we have the strongest proof of a creative intelligence deliberating for the interests of mankind. And if we turn from man to outward nature, the spectacle is just the same. Socrates expatiates on the movements of the heavenly bodies, on the blessed gift of sunlight, on the silence of the nocturnal hours designed as if to invite repose: he points to the earth yielding her fruit in due season, to the beneficent operation of the other elements, and insists so powerfully on the adaptation of universal nature to human needs, that Euthydemus is disposed to doubt whether the Gods have any other occupation except to minister to man, till he remembers that the other animals also partake in many of these benefits. True, replies Socrates; but the lower animals are themselves created for the sake of man, to supply him with food and labour and so on. And finally, in matters appertaining to the future, where human reason is of no avail, the Gods are ready and willing to help, through the medium of oracles and divination. The inference which Socrates draws from all these apparent instances of design is that in nature, as in man, there is an indwelling intelligence or mind, ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησις, invisible, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, itself in need of nothing, but always working on behalf of human creatures, both individually and collectively. This is the Socratic conception of God, as described by Xenophon; and Socrates further suggests that the human mind is itself only an efflux or fragment of the universal or cosmic mind—a theory which we have already met with in Greek thought.¹

¹ *Mem.* i. 4. 8.

The two conversations¹ thus briefly summarised represent in a primitive and rudimentary form the physico-theological argument which has played so great a part in the history of theism. It is doubtless correct to look upon Socrates as the originator of this proof, in the sense that he was the first who deliberately employed the *a posteriori* traces of design in nature with a view to establish the existence of a rational and beneficent Deity: but the doctrine of a supreme intelligence controlling and directing all things was not of course a new one. By the poets, especially Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, we are constantly reminded that Zeus is the universal ruler, and one of his attributes is Reason. Among the philosophers, Xenophanes speaks of the World-God as "ruling all things by the purpose of his mind": the omnipresent *Logos* of Heraclitus we have seen to be divine and rational: and, according to Anaxagoras, the ultimate cause of the World-order is *Nous*. The teleology of Socrates looks at first sight like an imperfect attempt to develop the pregnant suggestion of Anaxagoras; but the reasoning is much too anthropocentric to deserve to be regarded as an adequate interpretation of the Anaxagorean concept. For that we must look to Plato, and still more, perhaps, to Aristotle. Socrates' discourses on this subject should rather be compared with a noteworthy passage of Herodotus, where it is remarked as an indication of the divine providence (*τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ προνοῆς*) that timorous and edible animals, such as the hare, have been created prolific, whereas those which are dangerous to man and unfit for food, like lions, vipers, and winged serpents, breed very sparingly.² Or we may compare the lines in which Euripides, inspired, perhaps, by Socrates himself, enumerates the blessings we owe to the God

"who shaped in order's mould
Our lives redeemed from chaos and the brute,"

¹ *Mem.* i. 4 and iv. 8.

² iii. 108.

dwelling successively on the gift of reason, the faculty of speech, the bountiful produce of the earth, and so on, concluding, just like Socrates, with a reference to the art of divination by which the Gods disclose what human reason cannot see.¹ The truth clearly is, that in its immediate aim and purpose the theology of Socrates is hortatory rather than philosophical. At the same time, by representing God as the immanent reason of the world, as well as by insisting, however narrowly, on the adaptation of means to ends in nature, he exercised a considerable influence on later theological thought, as may be seen from the second book of Cicero's *de Natura Deorum*.²

It remains to consider briefly Socrates' religious teaching on its practical side. Plato in the *Euthyphro* makes him say that every blessing we enjoy is the gift of Heaven.³ Hence the object of worship, according to Socrates, is not to win the favour or appease the anger of the Gods, but simply to express our gratitude. If it is urged that the Gods are too exalted to require our homage, Socrates replies, "The greater the power that tends us, the more we are bound to do it honour."⁴ How then are we to honour the Gods? So far as external forms and ceremonies are concerned, we should obey the oracle of Delphi, and worship God according to the law or custom of our country (*νόμῳ πόλεως*).⁵ Xenophon assures us that Socrates invariably enforced this principle by example as well as precept; and Plato's evidence is to a similar effect.⁶ I conceive that the injunction to "worship God according to the custom of your city" carries a twofold implication. It seems to

¹ *Suppl.* 201f. Way.

² esp. § 73 ff.

³ 14 E. A Scholiast on this passage cites the parallel, "Every good gift and every perfect boon is from above" (St. James i. 17).

⁴ *Mem.* i. 4. 10.

⁵ *Mem.* i. 3. 1.

⁶ *Mem.* i. 3. 1. Cf. Plato, *Phaed.* 118 A, and *Rep.* i. 327 A.

suggest on the one hand that all men everywhere worship the same God, though under different names and with different forms and ceremonies. A similar lesson is indirectly taught by the doctrine of eternal laws or principles, implanted by the Gods themselves in the consciences of all mankind, without distinction of nationality or race; and we may infer from Xenophon that Socrates was one of those who entertained this belief.¹ In the second place, the Delphic command appears to imply that the essence of true religion does not consist in observances and rites. It is of comparatively slight importance how or with what ritual we worship—we should acquiesce in the form of religion appointed by the State, and give ourselves no further anxiety on that score. What really matters is the spirit—the inward character of mind and soul—with which we sacrifice and pray. Speaking of Socrates' view of sacrifice, Xenophon thus writes: "If with scant means he offered but small sacrifices, he believed that he was in no wise inferior to others who make frequent and large sacrifices from an ampler store. It were ill surely for the very gods themselves, could they take delight in large sacrifices rather than in small, else oftentimes must the offerings of bad men be found acceptable rather than of good; nor from the point of view of men themselves would life be worth living if the offerings of a villain rather than of a righteous man found favour in the sight of Heaven. His belief was that the joy of the gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver, and he was ever an admirer of that line of Hesiod which says,

"According to thine ability do sacrifice to the immortal gods."²

As for prayer, we are told by Xenophon that Socrates

¹ *Mem.* iv. 4. 19 ff. See p. 165 ff.

² *Mem.* i. 3. 3 Dakyns. Hes. *O.D.* 336. Cf. Eur. *fr.* 946, "He

who with pious heart doth sacrifice, Small though the offering be, salvation wins."

“used to pray for that which is good, without further specification, believing that the Gods best know what is good.”¹ In the second of the two Platonic dialogues named after Alcibiades, Socrates quotes with approval an old Lacedaemonian prayer: “Give us, O King Zeus, what is good, whether we pray for it or not; and avert from us the evil, even if we pray for it.”² In its perfect faith and self-suppression, the Socratic formula of prayer is more Christian than Greek.

I have dwelt so long upon the doctrine of Socrates, that we may be in danger, perhaps, of forgetting that the secret of his influence over his disciples lay in what he was even more than in what he taught. Lest we should fall into this error, let me remind you of the words with which Xenophon ends the *Memorabilia*: “To me, personally, he was what I have myself endeavoured to describe: so pious and devoutly religious that he would take no step apart from the will of heaven; so just and upright that he never did even a trifling injury to any living soul; so self-controlled, so temperate, that he never at any time chose the sweeter in place of the better; so sensible and wise and prudent that in distinguishing the better from the worse he never erred; nor had he need of any helper, but for the knowledge of these matters, his judgment was at once infallible and self-sufficing. Capable of reasonably setting forth and defining moral questions, he was also able to test others, and where they erred, to cross-examine and convict them, and so to impel and guide them in the path of virtue and noble manhood. With these characteristics, he seemed to be the very impersonation of human perfection and happiness.”³ This obviously sincere and heartfelt testimony will show us what the living Socrates was to his followers; but there is something still to be said.

¹ *Mem.* i. 3. 2.

² *Alc.* ii. 148 A.

³ *Mem.* iv. 8. 11 Dakyns.

Great as was the influence of his life, the power he exercised through his death was not less great. That the most truly moral and religious of the Greeks should have been condemned on the double charge of corrupting the youth and introducing new Gods, cannot but appear a signal instance of the irony of Fate. And yet it is not difficult to understand the causes which brought about the martyrdom of Socrates. Some part, no doubt, was played by personal rancour and hostility; we are told in the *Apology* that he had made not a few enemies in the exercise of his vocation.¹ The repeated attacks of the comedians, culminating in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, may also have done something to instil and foster in the public mind a prejudice against one whom they invariably represented as the leading champion of the so-called sophistic culture. But these two causes, if such they may be called, were at most subsidiary; otherwise Socrates could hardly have escaped persecution for so long. It is indeed a remarkable testimony to the toleration of his countrymen, that so outspoken a critic of Athenian democracy and statesmen should have made his first acquaintance with a law court at the age of seventy.² We must therefore look for circumstances of a more special character to explain why he was put on trial at that particular time. The date was 399 B.C., four years after the restoration of the democracy. Although a formal amnesty had been proclaimed, the rule of the Thirty had left bitter memories which it was not easy to efface. Socrates himself had taken no part in any of the revolutions by which Athens had been convulsed; but it could not be forgotten that the majority of his associates were men of oligarchical sympathies, and that he himself, however loyal in his actions, condemned the institution of the lot, and frequently gave utterance to other sentiments of an anti-democratical

¹ 22 E f.

² *Apol.* 17 D.

nature. Above all, the hated Critias had once belonged to the Socratic circle; so, too, had Alcibiades; and both of them had inflicted irreparable harm upon their country. It was beyond doubt this early intimacy with Alcibiades and Critias that was the most powerful factor in the trial and condemnation of Socrates. The orator Aeschines expressly says that the Athenians put Socrates to death because he had taught Critias, one of the Thirty who had overthrown the constitution.¹ Mingled with this motive, there was also, no doubt, a feeling of apprehension for the future. What had happened already might happen again; for Socrates' power over the young was in no way diminished, and he still continued to practise the "art of words." Thus it is little wonder that in the strong republican reaction that had now set in, Socrates should have been regarded by some as a source of danger to the state; and in point of fact, the most dangerous of his three accusers was Anytus, a prominent politician of the day, one of those who had co-operated with Thrasybulus in the re-establishment of the democracy.

But if the immediate cause of Socrates' condemnation was political, the issues involved were infinitely greater. On the day when Socrates was tried, two ideals of life, two conceptions of religion, stood forth as rivals for the allegiance of mankind. The one was the old Hellenic conception of the city-state, strong in its self-centred exclusiveness and isolation, strong in its narrow patriotism and devotion to the Gods of one particular nationality: the other was humanism and the worship of a God who knows no distinction between bond and free, barbarian and Greek, but exercises his providential care over the whole human race. The old ideal had already been undermined by the teaching of Euripides and the Sophists; the future was clearly with the new. It was long before the new ideal triumphed: perhaps, nay

¹ in *Tim.* 173.

certainly, it has not achieved its final triumph even now : but the death of Socrates, so far from impeding its progress, gave it fresh life and vigour. In the *Apology*, Socrates warns the Athenians that others would arise to carry on the work he had begun. "If by putting men to death you hope to prevent others from reproaching you because you do not live aright, you are mistaken. Such a way of escape is neither possible nor honourable : the easiest and the noblest way is not to coerce others, but to make yourselves as good as possible."¹ The prophecy was fulfilled in a far deeper sense than Socrates, if he used these words, could have anticipated. The ideal of which Socrates was the half-conscious prophet and the earliest martyr was never afterwards lost sight of by Greek thinkers. More than any other of the Greeks, Plato prepared the way for its partial realisation in Christianity : and without the life and death of Socrates, we should hardly have had the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. It was something, too, that having taught his followers how to live, Socrates should have been permitted also to teach them how to die. "No one," says Xenophon, "within the memory of man, it is admitted, ever bowed his head to death more nobly. After the sentence he must needs live for thirty days, since it was the month of the 'Delia,' and the law does not suffer any man to die by the hand of the public executioner until the sacred embassy return from Delos. During the whole of that period (as his acquaintances without exception can testify) his life proceeded as usual. There was nothing to mark a difference between now and formerly in the even tenour of its courage ; and it was a life which at all times had been a marvel of cheerfulness and calm content."²

¹ 39 D.² *Mem.* iv. 8. 2 Dakyna.

LECTURE XVIII

PLATO

THE COSMOLOGICAL DOCTRINE

PASSING over the minor Socratic schools, who are of comparatively little importance in connection with the subject of our inquiry, I propose to devote the remaining lectures to Plato.

It is related by Diogenes Laertius that on the night before Socrates met Plato for the first time, he dreamt that a young swan rested for a moment on his knees, and then suddenly grew wings and flew aloft, uttering a sweet cry.¹ The story is admirably devised to illustrate not only the peculiar character of Plato's genius, but also the relation in which he stood to the master whom he so greatly loved and honoured. The most powerful intellectual and moral impulse of Plato's life was communicated to him by Socrates; but although he started from a basis of Socraticism, he soared to heights of religious and poetical idealism which Socrates never contemplated. In another way, too, Plato differs from the teacher of his youth. We have seen that Socrates was interested only in man: physical speculations he abjured, and the so-called exact sciences appeared to him worse than useless. Plato's intellectual horizon is incomparably wider. He was acquainted with all the culture of his own and previous generations. Although first and foremost a humanist, and always prone to

¹ iii. 5.

interpret nature in the light of anthropology, he nevertheless aspired to construct a system of philosophy which should afford an explanation both of man himself and also of the universe in which he lives. The spirit of that philosophy is in a marked degree religious, as I will endeavour to show by a consideration of some of its principal doctrines. So vast a subject would require for its adequate treatment at least a course of lectures to itself, but so far as my powers and opportunities extend, I will try to explain the general religious significance of Plato's thought.

We shall find, I think, that the famous allegory of the Cave in the *Republic* is a convenient starting-point for our investigation. At the end of the sixth book, Plato draws a sharp distinction between the objects of sense-perception and opinion on the one hand, and the invisible objects of knowledge or reason on the other. The simile of the Cave, with which the seventh book opens, is intended to make us realise more clearly the relation which Plato believes to exist between the visible and the invisible. The proportion by which the simile should be interpreted is this: as the Cave stands to the world of visibles, so the visible world stands to that which is unseen and eternal.

We are first invited to conceive of a number of prisoners immured in a long and gradually sloping subterranean chamber. They are so firmly bound that they cannot move head or limb; they see nothing either of themselves or of one another, the necessity of their situation compelling them always to direct their gaze on the wall in which the cave ends. At some distance above and behind the prisoners, a fire is burning, and between them and the fire is a transverse path, flanked by a low wall. Along this roadway carriers are constantly passing, with all kinds of manufactured implements and images upon their heads, statuettes of men

and other animals, wrought in wood and stone and every sort of material. The wall skirting the pathway intercepts, of course, the shadows of the carriers, but the objects they carry overtop the wall, and are reflected by the light of the fire upon the end wall of the dungeon. Thus it happens that the prisoners see only a constant succession of "shadow-shapes that come and go," and having never seen anything besides, they naturally suppose these moving phantoms to be the sole realities. They have no conception of the images by which the shadows are cast, still less of the originals from which these images themselves are copied. "Truly a strange similitude and strange prisoners!" says Glauco. *Ὁμοίους ἡμῖν*, is the reply: "they are like ourselves."¹

The next division of the simile deals with the prisoner's release from bondage. When the chains are unloosed, and he is suddenly compelled to stand erect, and turn round, and walk, and raise his eyes towards the light, he is at first dazzled and perplexed (*ἀπορεῖ*), and in his bewilderment would fain still cherish the delusion that after all there is more light and truth in the shadows he formerly saw, than in the originals he now beholds. Finally, his guide succeeds in dragging him forth into the upper world, away from the "sun-illuminated lantern" into the actual sunlight. Slowly his eyes become accustomed to the brightness. At first he discerns only the shadows and images of what we in this world call real; afterwards he is able to look upon the originals from which they come, and so on progressively from higher to yet higher, until at last he endures to gaze upon the Sun and see him as he is in his own domain. "And then," says Plato, "he will begin to reason concerning the Sun, concluding that it is he who causes the seasons and years, and is the steward (*ἐπιτροπεύων*) of everything in the visible sphere,

¹ 515 A.

and in a certain sense the cause of all that he and his fellow-prisoners formerly beheld.”¹

It would be premature at the present stage to attempt to formulate the doctrine contained in this allegory: we shall understand it better as our exposition advances. In the meantime, let us concentrate our attention on the main lesson which the allegory is intended to teach. Plato means that just as the Cave is an image of the visible world, so the visible is an image of the invisible. The prisoners see only shadows of images produced by a light which is itself no more than an image, compared with the Sun. In like manner that which we see around us is the visible image of invisible reality; it is created by the Sun; and the Sun himself in turn is but an image—the *ἔκγονος* or offspring, Plato says²—of the Father of all, that is, the Good. To Plato the true reality—that which *is*—is the invisible, the perfect, the eternal; the world of sense and opinion is transitory and imperfect, consisting at best only of *ἀντίτυπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν*, “things like in pattern to the true,”³—things that reveal to us the truth darkly, as in a mirror: *βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι’ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι*, as it is said by St. Paul.⁴ It was from the invisible that Plato drew his inspiration: with St. Paul, he might have said, “We look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.”⁵ The substance of Plato’s message to the world could hardly be more accurately expressed than in the words of St. Paul: *τὰ ἄνω ζητεῖτε, τὰ ἄνω φρονεῖτε, μὴ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*: “Seek the things that are above, set your mind on

¹ 516 B.² 507A f.³ Heb. ix. 24.⁴ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.⁵ 2 Cor. iv. 18.

the things that are above, not on the things that are upon the earth."¹ At the end of the *Republic* he says, "We will ever cleave to the upward road (τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἐξόμεθα), and follow after righteousness and wisdom."² The object of all his philosophy is to make the soul look upward (ἄνω ὄρᾶν), to lead us from things seen to things unseen — ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε,³ that we may "set our minds on things immortal and divine."⁴ I have ventured to quote these parallels from the New Testament, partly because outside the circle of Plato's own writings it is impossible to find language better suited to convey his meaning, and partly also with the subsidiary object of calling attention to the real kinship of thought—illuminating, I think, so far as it goes—between Plato and St. Paul.

Returning now to our simile, we have to distinguish three different stages in the career of the prisoner who is ultimately brought out of darkness into light. There is first of all the period before he is released; next in order comes the release itself and subsequent journey up the "rough and steep ascent" into the light of day; and, finally, the goal is attained. By explaining and illustrating from the dialogues of Plato each of these three stages in their natural order, we shall be able to form some idea of the religious affinities of Platonism.

First, then, we have to study the position of the soul while she is still a prisoner. What are the chains by which, in her unregenerate condition, the soul is bound?

Perhaps we shall most readily arrive at the answer to this question by taking the *Timæus* as our guide; and a brief investigation of the leading philosophical and

¹ Col. iii. 1, 2.

² 621 C.

³ *Rep.* 529 A.

⁴ φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα, *Tim.* 90 C.

religious ideas of that dialogue is necessary also on its own account. In the *Timæus*, Plato furnishes us with an account of the creation of the world and the creation of man. Whether the whole or any part of this account is mythical, and what part, if any, should be so regarded, is one of those perennial questions which beset the student of Plato on every side. It is a question which will never, perhaps, be finally settled, because men are made so differently that what one man takes for mere poetic fancy, mere "figurative investiture," as Zeller calls it, another will suppose to be literal. Similar difficulties arise, of course, in connection with the interpretation of the Old Testament and other writings of the kind. For my own part, I think that Plato's emphatic statement about the creation of the world—by which, of course, he means the introduction of order into chaos¹—is intended to be understood literally, and not figuratively; but the details of the exposition are mythical in the Platonic sense of the word—an *εἰκῶς μῦθος*,² that is to say, as we may learn, perhaps, from the *Phædo*, a story about which it may be said, "This or something like it is true."³ The business of a critic of the *Timæus* should therefore be to separate the underlying principles or ideas from the particular form in which they are expressed; and so far as concerns the subject of these lectures, I will endeavour, however imperfectly, to perform this task.

"The World," says Plato, "is a mixed creation, resulting from a combination of Necessity and Reason."⁴ According to the account in the *Timæus*, the Deity is inevitably hampered by the intractable nature of the material on which he has to work. When speaking of the Creator's efforts to make the world beautiful and good, Plato constantly introduces a qualifying phrase. In one passage we read, "God, desirous that all things

¹ *Tim.* 28 B; cf. 53 B.

² *Tim.* 29 D.

³ See *Phæd.* 114 D.

⁴ *Tim.* 47 E f.

should be good, and that, *so far as possible* (κατὰ δύναμιν), there should be nothing evil," etc.¹ In another, it is said that God introduced into this material substance "as many proportions as it was possible for it to receive."² And similarly in other cases: we nearly always meet with a *caveat* — μάλιστα, ὅτι μάλιστα, τὰ πλείστα, or some such expression.³ That these phrases are not otiose, but point to the existence of a Necessity not belonging to God's own nature, we are bound to infer from the attribute of goodness which Plato invariably ascribes to God. Already in the *Republic*, Plato had emphasised the essential antagonism between the necessary and the good;⁴ so that the principle of Necessity, which plays so prominent a part in the *Timaeus*, must be something altogether distinct from the Deity: otherwise the unity of the Divine nature is impaired. It is true, of course, that Necessity, according to the teaching of the *Timaeus*, is to a considerable extent submissive to the will of God. Thus we read that in the process of creation, "Reason ruled Necessity by persuading her to guide the majority of things created to the best end."⁵ But, as Jowett has observed, "the Creator in Plato is still subject to a remnant of Necessity which he cannot wholly overcome."⁶ Plato expressly declares that God made the world perfect *only in so far as Necessity*, willingly, and having yielded to persuasion, *allowed*.⁷ And elsewhere we read that "evil can never perish . . . nor yet can it be situated in heaven; but *of necessity* it haunts our mortal nature and this present world."⁸

It would seem, therefore, although this is another of the many disputed questions of Platonic scholarship, that the cosmology of the *Timaeus* is dualistic. Anaxagoras had said, "All things were together: then Reason came

¹ *Tim.* 30 A.

² *Tim.* 69 B.

³ e.g. 29 E, 30 D, 32 D, 48 A.

⁴ vi. 498 C.

⁵ 48 A.

⁶ *Plato* iii. p. 391.

⁷ *Tim.* 56 C.

⁸ *Theaet.* 176 A.

and set them in order." To much the same effect, only with a characteristic expansion of the teleological idea, Plato writes: "Having taken over all that was visible, not in a condition of rest, but moving without harmony and order, God brought it out of its disorder into order, thinking that this condition was in every way a better one."¹ In itself, the *θεῖον γέννητόν* or "Divine Child"—for so in the *Republic* Plato designates the Universe²—consists, like the human child, of a body and a soul. Plato begins by describing the generation of the body of the world. The Creator takes in hand the primeval matter, and fashions it, as far as Necessity allows, in accordance with the perfect model in his own mind. The details of the narrative do not concern us: they are almost entirely *a priori*, poetical, or fanciful. But Plato's cosmology is nevertheless pervaded from beginning to end by one great idea, the importance of which every physicist must recognise, namely, that the world is constructed on mathematical principles. It is by means of "forms and numbers," that is to say, mathematical forms and mathematical numbers, that the Creator, who, according to the famous Platonic text preserved by Plutarch, is always playing the mathematician—*θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρῆι*—brought order out of chaos.³ The four elements, from which God makes the body of the world, result from the union between certain portions of the original undetermined substance and the specific mathematical forms which are imprinted on them by the Creator.⁴ On its poetical and religious side, as I have elsewhere pointed out,⁵ the Platonic conception should be compared with the famous passage in Isaiah: "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and com-

¹ *Tim.* 30 A.² viii. 546 B.³ Plut. *Quæstiones Convivales*, viii. 2, p. 718; *Tim.* 58 B.⁴ *Tim.* *l.c.* and 58 C ff.⁵ *The Republic of Plato*, vol. ii. p. 163.

prehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?"¹ Or we may compare the lines of Milton, which Isaiah, perhaps, inspired :

"Him all his train
Followed in bright procession, to behold
Creation, and the wonders of his might.
Then stayed the fervid wheels, and in his hand
He took the golden compasses, prepared
In God's eternal store, to circumscribe
This Universe, and all created things.
One foot he centred, and the other turned
Round through the vast profundity obscure,
And said, 'Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds ;
This be thy just circumference, O World !'"²

The scientific import of Plato's notion is precisely expressed by a modern writer, who describes the Laws of Kepler as "three Laws of divine working in Nature, discovered by Kepler,"—a statement which, apart from its theological setting, would, I imagine, be accepted by men of science. We shall afterwards see how this conception of mathematics as the instrument by which God works in Nature, helps to explain the great importance which Plato attaches to mathematical studies. If the Universe is constructed by God in accordance with mathematical laws, it is clear that the way to understand it and its Maker is to study mathematics. We may fairly suppose that this was one of the reasons why on the gate of Plato's Academy were inscribed the words *Ἀγεωμέτρητος μὴ εἰσίτω*.

Besides this fundamental principle, the germ of which was already present in pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism, there is another point deserving of particular notice in connection with the cosmology of Plato. I have spoken of Necessity as the power which is responsible for the evil

¹ xl. 12.

² *Paradise Lost* vii. 221 ff.

and imperfection in the world. But we must carefully observe that, in proportion as Necessity yields to the persuasion of the Deity, her maleficent influence is held in check. Or, to put the same statement in another form, so far as the primeval chaos submits to be mathematically determined, its inherent ugliness and evil are controlled. It is true, of course, as we have already noticed, that Necessity is sometimes obdurate, and that imperfection always cleaves even to the fairest of created things. With the *praeferendum ingenium* characteristic of the idealist, Plato in one remarkable passage of the *Republic* disparages the starry heavens. It is absurd, he says, to imagine that the sun and stars, possessed as they are of visible and material bodies, can possibly be uniform or flawless in their movements. The genuine astronomer will dispense with the visible stars,—τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν,—or at most he will use them only as a kind of orrery for the purpose of illustrating those perfect mathematical movements which they imperfectly reproduce, and with which alone the true science of astronomy is concerned.¹ At the same time, when Plato lets his mind drink in the grandeur of the heavens, when he thinks of the harmonious and well-ordered movements of the celestial bodies in contrast with the life of man upon the earth, he is capable of writing with equal or even greater enthusiasm to the opposite effect, particularly in his latest works, the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. In the *Laws* he declares that the very name of planet or "wandering star" is a blasphemy;² and in the *Timaeus* God is said to have bestowed on us the gift of sight, expressly in order that we might behold the movements of Reason in the sky, and assimilate thereto the kindred movements of our own intelligences.³ No ancient writer has a

¹ *Rep.* vii. 529 C-530 C.

³ 47 B f.

² vii. 821 C ff.

livelier sense of the beauty and magnificence of the Universe: it shows itself again and again throughout the Platonic writings, more especially in the myths of the *Phaedrus*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*; but all the beauty, all the beneficence is of God: whatever is malignant and foul comes from Necessity.

These, I think, are the principal points requiring to be noticed in connection with Plato's account of the way in which God creates the body of the World. Far more important in its bearing on our subject is his theory of the World-soul. Plato is careful to point out that soul is in reality older than body, although in his narrative he describes the creation of body first. "In birth and excellence," he says, "God made soul prior to and older than the body, to be the mistress and ruler whom the body should obey."¹ It is interesting to observe how the Platonic doctrine of a soul that animates the World revives the old analogy between the macrocosm and the microcosm; but the reason assigned by Plato for the existence of the World-soul is just the divine goodness, and nothing else.

"God was good: and no one who is good can ever be jealous of aught at any time: so being free from jealousy he desired that all things should be made as like as possible unto himself."² "To the best it never was and never is permitted to do aught but that which is most beautiful. So the Creator bethought himself and found that of the things which are by nature visible, nothing destitute of Reason, taken as a whole, would ever be fairer than what is possessed of Reason taken as a whole, and that without soul Reason could not be present in anything. Arguing in this way, when he framed the Universe, he set Reason in soul, and soul in body, in order that he might be the author of a work that in its nature should be as beautiful and good as possible."³

Thus the world, according to Plato, lives because of the divine excellence; but out of what elements did

¹ *Tim.* 34 C.

² *Tim.* 29 E.

³ *Tim.* 30 A f.

God fashion this cosmic soul, and what are its attributes?

On the first of these questions we need not go into detail. It will suffice to say that the elements of the World-soul are three in number—Sameness, Otherness, and the substance which is formed by blending the Other with the Same.¹ These three ingredients are first combined by the Creator into a unity or whole, which he afterwards divides and recombines in accordance with certain numerical proportions borrowed or adapted from Pythagorean systems of astronomy and harmonics. In fashioning the soul as well as the body of the Universe, the Deity, you will observe, is still a mathematician—*θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρῆϊ*. The next and penultimate stage is to redivide the substance of the World-soul into two halves; and finally, by means of manipulations which we need not here describe, one of the two halves is made into the outer or exterior motion, that is to say, the movement of the circle of fixed stars, while the other, having been differentiated into seven separate circles, furnishes the motion of the sun, moon, and planets. The outermost circle, revolving daily from East to West, Plato calls the circle of the Same; while the seven inner circles, representing the movement of the planets from West to East, collectively form the circle of the Other, but are also “comprehended” by the movement of the Same; which is Plato’s method of accounting for the apparent daily movements of the planetary bodies along with the celestial sphere from East to West.²

The attributes belonging to the cosmic soul are motion and intelligence. On the first of these attributes I have already touched, so far as it is manifested, in the movements of the planets; but one or two further points

¹ I regard Sameness and Otherness as virtually synonymous with the “indivisible” and the “divisible” (*Tim.* 35 A).

² For details, reference may be made to my edition of the *Republic of Plato*, vol. ii. p. 448 ff.

require to be noted. According to a definition propounded in the *Laws*, soul is ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὴ αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησις—"the species of motion which is able to move itself."¹ The essential quality of soul is self-movement—movement derived from no external source whatever, but spontaneously originated from within.²

It is further to be observed that soul not only moves itself, but is the cause of movement in all other things that move; and to the word "movement" (κίνησις), Plato gives a much more comprehensive meaning than we usually do. In the *Laws* he enumerates ten species of motion, among which are included not only locomotion in its various forms, but also separation and combination, growth, decay, and dissolution, in a word everything comprehended under the name of physical change.³ Of each and all of these movements, therefore, so far as they take place throughout the physical world, we may suppose that the World-soul is the cause. The entire life and energy of the Universe proceed from it.⁴

With regard to the second attribute, that of intelligence) or Reason, if we understand the word in its strictest possible sense, we must hold, I think, that this is coextensive with the element of the Same in the composition of the World-soul; for Reason, according to Plato, is always stable and uniform, like that which it cognises. What then are we to suppose to have been the significance of the two remaining ingredients, namely, Otherness and the mixture of Otherness and Sameness? The quality of Otherness belongs to the world of sense and opinion; for Otherness is the principle of multiplicity and change, just as Sameness is the principle of unity and permanence. In virtue, therefore, of its element of Otherness, the World-soul

¹ *Laws* x. 896 A.

² Cf. *Phaedr.* 245 C.

³ x. 893 B ff.

⁴ Cf. *Laws* x. 896 E ff.

will apprehend the sphere of sensibles; and this, in one passage of the *Timæus*, it is said to do: only Plato is careful to point out that its opinions and beliefs are free from every admixture of error, and in so far, perhaps, we may call them rational.¹ I cannot find that Plato himself anywhere explains the function of the intermediate element—the mixture of Otherness and Sameness—in the constitution of the World-soul. Symmetry would seem to demand that this ingredient should enable it to apprehend certain objects which are at once, in a sense, both Same and Other. Perhaps the realities of mathematics, as they were conceived by Plato, supply what is required. It should be premised that the perfect triangles, circles, squares, etc., which are the true objects of mathematical study, as distinguished from the figures we draw upon the board, were apparently invested by Plato with a substantial existence on their own account. They are the instruments by means of which, as we have already seen, the Deity introduces limit into the unlimited in His creation of the world. Now these mathematical realities—*τὰ μαθηματικά* is Aristotle's name for them—would appear to participate at once in Sameness and in Otherness. By reason of their quality of Sameness, they are eternal and unchangeable, like the transcendent Ideas between which and phenomena they form the connecting link; but to the element of Otherness we must ascribe the plurality which they share in common with the visible world—for Plato, if I understand him rightly, holds that although there is but one Ideal Triangle, many "mathematical triangles" exist; nor does anyone, I think, deny that Aristotle attributes such a view to his master.² If this conjecture is admitted, we must

¹ 87 B. Contrast the *ἔλεγχος ἀληθείας* of the human soul, 69 D.

² This subject is discussed more fully in my edition of the *Republic*

of Plato, vol. ii, pp. 159-162. It is right, however, to say that many distinguished critics deny that Plato himself regarded *μαθηματικά*

suppose that the World-soul, through its three component elements, Otherness, Otherness mixed with Sameness, and Sameness itself, apprehends the three successive stages of truth, namely, Sensibles, Mathematical realities, and Ideas. It need only be added that the World-soul, as described in the *Timaeus*, has nothing analogous to the principles of anger and desire, — *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, — which, according to Plato, constitute so large and turbulent a portion of the human soul. In this negative sense, therefore, as well as by virtue of its intelligence, the soul of the World is rational.

The soul and body of the World being now completed, God

“set the soul in the centre of the body and drew it through the whole framework, yea, and wrapped the whole body with a covering of soul, and made it a sphere revolving in a circle, one only Universe in lonely splendour, but able by reason of its excellence to be its own companion, and needing none other, being sufficient unto itself for acquaintance and friend.”¹

Let us now briefly consider the theological significance of Plato's account of the World-soul. It is to be observed, in the first place, that he calls the World *εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, μονογενής*, “the image of its Maker, only-begotten.” The relation between them is that of Father and Son.² In the second place, the World is itself a God—a *θεὸς αἰσθητός* or “perceivable God,” like the World-God of Xenophanes.³ Further, when the Creator had finished his task, “he abode,” says Plato, “in his own nature,”⁴ or, according to the myth of the *Politicus*, he retired to his watch-tower,⁵ having delegated, ap-

as intermediate between Ideas and Sensibles: see, for example, E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* i. p. 164, and J. Cook Wilson, *Classical Review* xviii. p. 251 ff. The view developed above is like that of

Ueberweg-Heinze, *Gesch. d. Philosophie* i. p. 180.

¹ *Tim.* 34 B.

² *Tim.* 92 C; cf. 37 C.

³ *Tim.* 92 C.

⁴ *Tim.* 42 E.

⁵ 272 E.

parently, his providential functions to the God whom he had begotten. From this point of view, we may look upon the World-soul as the steward or vicegerent of the Creator or Highest God, always present in the Universe. The *Timaeus* draws a clear distinction between the two deities, a distinction which we shall apprehend, perhaps, most readily if we compare the World-soul of Plato with what would seem to be its most noteworthy parallel in early Greek philosophy, the *Logos* of Heraclitus. We have found reason for believing that Heraclitus conceives of the *Logos* as rational and divine; he identifies it, in short, with the immanent, omnipresent Godhead; and so far it corresponds to the Platonic World-soul, although the Heraclitean *Logos* is something material, whereas Plato distinguishes between the soul and the body of the world. But the important point to notice is that in the *Timaeus* there are, if the expression may be allowed, two persons in the Godhead, whereas in Heraclitus there is but one. The Platonic Creator is transcendent, and resembles the world-ordering *Nous* of Anaxagoras, which we found to be mainly, though not perhaps exclusively, transcendent; the Platonic World-soul is immanent, and recalls not only the Heraclitean *Logos*, but also the Socratic conception of God as *ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησις*, "the Wisdom residing in the universe." The distinction which Plato here introduces into the being of the Godhead prepared the way for the theology of Philo. Not a few of the epithets which Philo applies to the *Logos* are taken from Plato, such as *εἰκὼν θεοῦ*, the "image of God." When he calls the *Logos* a *δεύτερος θεός* or "second God," he exactly reproduces the meaning, if not the actual words, of the *Timaeus*. At the same time, Plato recognises a unity in difference, as well as a difference in unity; for the World is itself divine, and possessed of a soul that proceeds from the supreme God. In this conception of the divine nature as a differentiated unity

we may perceive, with Baur, a certain resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, without, of course, endorsing the extravagant speculations of the Cambridge seventeenth-century Platonists on the subject¹ of the "Trinity in Plato,"

One interesting and significant feature in the theology of the *Timaeus* is the extent to which it foreshadows the distinctively Neoplatonic tendency to separate the highest God by an infinite distance from the world and man. "The maker and father of this Universe," Plato says, "it is difficult to discover; nor, if he were discovered, could he be declared to all men."² In like manner Plato in the *Republic* exalts the Idea of Good above both knowledge and existence, though still regarding it as the ultimate cause of both. This belief in the transcendence or *ὑπερουσιώτης* of the Highest rendered it necessary to postulate one or more mediating links between the infinite and the finite; and of these links the World-soul is in Plato the most important. It contributes, as Dr. Caird has said, "a kind of bridge to connect two terms which it is impossible really to unite."³

Before we leave the subject of the World-soul, it is necessary to touch upon the difficult question, "What does Plato mean by describing it as created?" It should be observed that the reason assigned for holding that the Universe is generated, namely, that it is visible, corporeal, and tangible,⁴ does not apply to the soul, but only to the body of the world. Assuming, however, that we are right in supposing the body of the Universe to have been

¹ Baur, "Sokrates und Christus" in *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gesch. d. alten Philos.*, ed. Zeller (1876), p. 301 ff. As to the so-called "Trinity of Plato," see Caesar Morgan, *An Investigation of the Trinity of Plato and of Philo Judaeus*, re-edited by Holden, 1858. The Trinity of Plotinus is ex-

pounded by E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology* ii. p. 258 ff. See also Harrison, *Platonism in English Poetry* p. 167 ff.

² *Tim.* 28 C.

³ *Evolution of Theology*, etc. ii. p. 266.

⁴ *Tim.* 28 B.

constructed by the Creator at the commencement of time, we can hardly escape the conclusion that its soul was also in some sense or other created or "begotten": and Plato certainly speaks of it in this way. But in what sense? There seems to be no alternative except to regard the World-soul as a kind of "power" or emanation from the creative mind.¹ On this hypothesis we should conceive of the whole matter in the following way. At the beginning of Time, God created the Universe. A spirit or soul went forth from him, and inhabited the body which he redeemed from chaos by imprinting mathematical forms on primordial matter.

From the strictly philosophical or scientific point of view, the cosmology of the *Timæus* is full of difficulties, but so is every other religious or poetical cosmology—unless, indeed, we take refuge in the type of allegorical exegesis which Alexandrian Hellenism applied to the first chapter of Genesis; and even then we only exchange one set of difficulties for another. The true view of the *Timæus* is that which was expressed by the rhetorician Menander, when he described it as a "hymn of the Universe."² Considered as a contribution to physical science, it errs by neglecting the maxim laid down by a Platonist of the third century before Christ: "in physical investigation, we should not lay down laws, but rather search out the things of nature."³ But it is difficult to overestimate the influence which the dialogue exercised on religious thought and speculation during the last century and a half before the birth of Christ, and also in the early centuries of the Christian era. The *Timæus* did more than any other literary masterpiece to facilitate and promote that fusion of Hellenism and Hebraism out of

¹ This use of the word *δύναμις*, "power," appears to be foreshadowed in at least one passage of the *Timæus*: *μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμήν*

δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν, 41 C.

² See Grote, *Plato* iii. p. 245.

³ Atticus, quoted by Grote, *l.c.* p. 270 n.

which so much of Christian theology has sprung. This is the surpassing interest and importance of the dialogue to the student of religious history. The way in which it contributed to this great movement is thus described by Grote. "Though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus found little favour among the Grecian schools of philosophy, before the Christian era—it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenising Jews at Alexandria, from Aristobulus (about B.C. 150) down to Philo. It formed the suitable point of conjunction between Hellenic and Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between the Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its in-dwelling Gods—provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of the Jews, degrading the Pagan Gods in comparison. The *Timaeus* was compared with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed that Plato had copied. He received the denomination of the atticising Moses: Moses writing in Attic Greek. It was thus that the Platonic *Timaeus* became the medium of transition, from the Polytheistic theology which served as philosophy among the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent Monotheism to which philosophy became subordinated after the Christian era."¹

¹ *I.c.* p. 284.

LECTURE XIX

PLATO—*continued*

ELEMENTS OF ASCETICISM AND OF MYSTICISM

THE subject which principally occupied our attention in the last lecture was Plato's "probable story" of the creation of the world. To-day we pass from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm—from the Universe to Man. Here again the *Timaeus* provides the most convenient point of departure; but we must first retrace our steps a little, and briefly examine what is said about the minor or created Gods, to whom is entrusted the task of framing the human body, and also, except in the one essential part of it, the human soul.

We have seen that the Demiurgus or Creator is represented in the *Timaeus* as the first or highest God, the universal Father, and the World as his divine son, standing second to him in rank and honour. Besides the World itself, Plato recognises several subordinate or "created Gods." First in order come the Sun, Moon, and Planets, who are jointly the creators of Time. Plato's definition of Time as the "moving image of Eternity" may be illustrated by the lines of Henry Vaughan :

"I saw Eternity the other night.
Like a great ring of pure and endless light,
All calm, as it was bright;
And round beneath it, Time, in hours, days, years,
Driven by the spheres,
Like a vast shadow moved; in which the World
And all her train were hurl'd."¹

¹ *The World*; quoted by Harrison, *l.c.* p. 208.

We may say, perhaps, that Time, in Platonism, has the same relation to Eternity as the particular has to the Idea. The next of the created Gods whom Plato mentions are the fixed stars; and finally, with ironical acquiescence, he admits into his Pantheon the Gods of the poetical cosmologies, Earth and Heaven with all their multitudinous descendants from Oceanus and Tethys downwards.¹ In making room for the last of these three classes, Plato has in view the Delphic and Socratic precept to worship God according to the usage of the State;² but his tone is that of a disbeliever. With regard to the first and second classes, on the other hand, there is little doubt that, in common with the rest of his countrymen, he really looked on the heavenly bodies as "visible gods"; and it is worthy of notice that some of the early Christian Fathers appear to have shared this belief.³

What concerns us chiefly in connection with these minor deities is the office they fulfil in the making of mankind. These are the words in which the Demiurgus appoints their task.

"Three kinds of mortal beings have still to be created" (viz. the animals that dwell on land, in water, and in the air). "Without these the Universe will be incomplete; for it will not have within it all kinds of living creatures, as it must have, if it is to be complete. Howbeit, if these were created by me and received their life from me, they would be made equal to Gods.⁴ In order, then, that they may be mortal, and that this All may truly be all, do ye according to nature apply yourselves to the creation of living creatures, imitating my power as shown in generating you. *Such part of them as is worthy to share the name of the immortals, the part that is called divine and governs in those who are willing always to follow justice and you—of this I will sow the seed and then ye shall take over the work I have begun. For the rest, weaving mortality with immortality, do ye make and beget living creatures, and give*

¹ *Tim.* 37 C-41 A.

² *ἰσοπύτους τῷ νόμῳ*, 40 E.

³ e.g. Origen. See Inge, *Christian Mysticism* p. 29 n.

⁴ Cf. Gen. iii. 4, 22.

them food that they may grow, and receive them back again at death. Having thus spoken, again into the same cup in which he had blended and mingled the soul of the Universe the Creator poured what was left of the elements, mingling them in much the same manner, yet no longer so pure as before, but one or two degrees less pure. And when he had made the whole compound, he divided it into souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star, and placing them in the stars as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the Universe, and told them the laws of Fate—how that their first birth would be ordained the same for all, lest any should suffer wrong at his hands; and how, after being sown into the instruments of time, each into that appropriate to it, they must be born the most God-fearing of animals.”¹

The main idea which Plato here expresses is that in every human soul there is an element of the divine, proceeding from the supreme God himself. We have repeatedly met with the doctrine of the soul's celestial birth and kinship in Greek literature, more especially among those writers who are influenced by Orphic and Pythagorean views; but in Plato it is not the soul, but only the rational part of the soul, which is in the strictest sense divine. “As concerning the sovereign part of soul within us, that which we say, and say truly, dwells at the top of the body and raises us from earth towards our heavenly kindred, forasmuch as we are a heavenly and not an earthly plant,—*φυτόν οὐκ ἔργειον, ἀλλ' οὐράνιον*,—we ought to believe that God has given it to each of us as a *daemon*”²—a kind of genius or guardian angel for the direction of our lives. In the *Republic*, Plato speaks of Reason as the “eye of soul,” akin “to the divine and immortal and ever-existent.”³ The *Phaedo* is from beginning to end pervaded by the same belief;⁴ and indeed it is on this conviction, far more than on any positive arguments, that Plato's faith in

¹ *Tim.* 41 B-42 A.

² *Tim.* 90 A.

³ vii. 518 C, 540 A, 611 E.

⁴ See more especially 79 A ff., 80 A, B, and cf. *Laws* x. 899 D.

immortality is based. Not only does he intellectualise this ancient doctrine, by endeavouring to confine the attribute of divinity, strictly understood, to *Nous* or Reason, but he further implies in more than one passage of the *Republic* that it is just the presence of this divine element which makes us truly and specifically human.¹ He emphatically believed that what is best in us constitutes our true and essential nature; so that to follow sense and sensual things is to be false to ourselves, to lead a life that is not our own: our duty rather is, by leading the life of reason, to enter on our heritage of immortality, so far as may be, even now: ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, ἀθανατίζεω.

But to return to the *Timaeus*. The story proceeds as follows:

“Having ordained for his creatures all these laws, that so he might be guiltless of the evil there should hereafter be in them, God sowed some in the earth, some in the moon, and some in the other instruments of time. And the sequel to the sowing he committed to the younger Gods, that they should fashion mortal bodies, and having wrought all the remainder of the human soul that had still to be added, and everything in harmony therewith, should rule and guide the mortal creature as well and nobly as they could, except in so far as it brought evil on itself.”²

The duty of the created Gods is thus twofold—to fashion the perishable body and the perishable or mortal species of soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θνητὸν γένος).³ Borrowing from the body of the universe portions of earth, water, air and fire, on the understanding that they should be returned again, they welded them into mortal bodies for the reception of the immortal principle created and handed over to them by the Father. “Imitating the spherical shape of the Universe” (says Plato), “they imprisoned the two divine revolutions in

¹ vi. 501 B, ix. 589 A-D.

³ *Tim.* 69 E.

² 42 D, E.

a globe-shaped body, that which we now call the head, the divinest part and lord of all within us.”¹ The rest of the body they made the vehicle or chariot (*ὄχημα*) of the immortal element;² and at the same time they “built into the body another kind of soul, that which is mortal, having within itself dire and irresistible affections, first, pleasure, evil’s most alluring bait; next, pain, averter of good; rashness, moreover, and fear, two foolish counsellors; anger, hard to assuage, and hope, that leads astray; these by irresistible laws, having mingled with reasonless sensations and all-daring love, they framed the mortal soul.”³ In this inferior soul there is again a higher and a lower part. The higher, situated, according to the *Timaeus*, in the breast, is what in the *Republic* Plato calls *θυμοειδές*, the source of anger, ambition, and courage. In the nobler type of man this element allies itself with the reason against the third and lowest part of soul, namely, the concupiscent or *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, which is the source of desire, situated in the region below the diaphragm.⁴ It will be noticed that according to the *Timaeus* the perishable soul is an accompaniment of life in the body, and does not exist until the circle of incarnation begins; but although Plato calls it mortal, we are not to suppose that it necessarily perishes in each several dissolution: only that it must die before the immortal part of the soul returns to the place from whence it came.⁵

I have told the story as Plato tells it, without stopping to consider how much dogmatic significance he would have attached to the various details. In view, however, of certain pre-sophistic anthropological speculations, it appears to me more probable than not that he believed there was once a time when human creatures did not yet

¹ *Tim.* 44 D.

² 69 C.

³ 69 C, D.

⁴ 69 E-70 A.

⁵ cf. *Phaed.* 81 B ff.

exist; and if the World-soul should be regarded as an emanation from the divine mind, there is no further difficulty in supposing that each particular immortal soul was conceived by Plato to have afterwards emanated from the same source. But for the correct appreciation of Plato's moral and religious teaching, the question whether his account of the soul's creation should be understood as mythical or otherwise, is of little importance; what really matters is that we should apprehend the nature and meaning of the dualism which affects the soul while present in the body. Ignoring for the moment the intermediate or "spirited" part of soul (*τὸ θυμοειδές*), we have on the one hand reason, linking us to the immortal and divine, and on the other hand, all those irrational passions and desires which Plato attributes sometimes to the concupiscent part, sometimes, as in the *Phaedo*, directly to the body, and which we share in common with the lower or bestial creation. In this way man, according to Plato, is a compound of mortality and immortality—

"With th' one hand touching heav'n, with th' other earth."¹

From what has now been said, it will be obvious that the chains by which the prisoner in the cave is bound, are intended to symbolise the lower irrational or animal nature in man. In childhood and youth—so Plato implies²—the activity of Reason is checked by the demands of the appetitive element; but as we advance in years, Reason, if reinforced by education, may recover her true place. It has often been pointed out that Plato inverts the relation which Wordsworth and other Platonising poets are fain to establish between childhood and maturity. He does not believe that "Heaven lies about us in our infancy"; still less, when manhood comes, does he make the glory "die away and fade into

¹ George Herbert, *Man's Medley*.

² *Tim.* 43 A ff.

the light of common day." On the contrary, in Plato's way of thinking, we ought to be nearer to Heaven in manhood than in youth; for only as we grow older does Reason lift the veil which has descended on the pre-natal vision. But, of course, in many cases the fetters of the soul, instead of being loosened and removed as years advance, are still more firmly riveted by acts of self-indulgence and perverted ambition. We read in the *Timaeus* that when a man is always burrowing about the objects of ambition and desire, he must needs lose all that can be lost of immortality, forasmuch as he has cherished only the mortal part of his nature.¹ In the *Republic*, Plato compares the lower impulses of humanity to leaden weights, which through gluttony and other sensual indulgences become as it were incorporate with the soul, and turn her vision downward.² And besides the vicious influences that come from within, there is also the corrupting effect of bad government, bad education, and evil principles enunciated in private and public life, so that it is little wonder if the efforts of Philosophy to bring about the soul's deliverance are only too often frustrated.³

Before proceeding to the next division of our subject, in which we must treat of the way in which the imprisoned soul is released from chains and led upwards to the light, it may be permitted to draw attention to the parallel between Plato and St. Paul in respect of their conception of man. Under the name of *πνεῦμα* or "spirit," St. Paul, as is well known, recognised in human nature an element corresponding to the Divine Spirit and fitted to be the sphere of His operations.⁴ This highest part of us, the *πνεῦμα*, "is what it is by virtue of its affinity with God";⁵ and so far it

¹ 90 B.

² vii. 519 A f., cf. x. 611 C ff.
Cf. also vii. 523 D, and *Phaed.*
83 C f.

³ *Tim.* 87 B.

⁴ Swete in *Hastings' Dict. of the Bible* ii. p. 409.

⁵ Sanday and Headlam, *Romans* p. 196.

corresponds to *Nous* in Platonism, though, of course, the Platonic *Nous* is primarily "intellect" rather than "spirit." St. Paul, however, is not more rigid in his terminology than Plato; and he occasionally designates the higher principle by the Platonic term: for *νοῦς* in St. Paul would seem to be nothing but "the *πνεῦμα* operative as a faculty of knowledge directed toward Divine things."¹ "I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind" (*τοῦ νοός μου*). "I myself with the mind (*τῷ μὲν νοῷ*) serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin."² A further analogy reveals itself when we examine St. Paul's conception of the lower side of human nature. Usually it is called by him "the flesh" (*σάρξ*); in a few passages, where he speaks of the opposition between the "spiritual" and the "natural man"—the *πνευματικός* and the *ψυχικός*—it appears as *ψυχή*, that is, the existence which we share in common with the beast, the merely animal life, with the further implication of carnality and sensualism. In the *Phaedo* of Plato, although *σῶμα*, and not *σάρξ*, is the word employed, the opposition between the body and reason is not less striking than the antagonism of flesh and spirit in St. Paul. "The flesh," says the apostle, "lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: for these are contrary the one to the other."³ This sentence might serve as a motto for the ethical part of the *Phaedo*, if we substituted "mind" for "spirit" and "body" for flesh. In like manner, the Pauline use of *ψυχικός*, when contrasted with *πνευματικός*, cannot but suggest to the student of Greek philosophy, Plato's so-called mortal part of soul, between which, or rather between the lower portion of which, and reason, there is an internecine feud. The different ways in which the two thinkers develop their dualism should not be

¹ Findlay in Hastings, *l.c.* iii. p. 720^b.

² Rom. vii. 23, 25.

³ Gal. v. 17.

allowed to blind us to what is after all a real affinity of thought.

We have next to consider the means by which the prisoner's release is accomplished. How are we to "move upward, working out the beast, and let the ape and tiger die." I will not endeavour to force into a co-ordinated dogmatic theory all that Plato says upon the subject; we shall better apprehend his meaning if we successively examine the most characteristic aspects in which he depicts the soul's ascent into the realm of Being.¹ The three discourses with which we have chiefly to deal are the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and the *Republic*.

Throughout the *Phaedo*, Plato attributes evil to the body, rather than to the lower part of soul, and indeed *ψυχή*, in that dialogue, is virtually a synonym for *νοῦς*, the celestial element in man. In harmony with Orphic and Pythagorean views, the body appears as a prison-house in which the soul is immured.² Out of this dungeon Philosophy tried to set her free (*λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ*), by showing that "what delights the sense is false and weak," and by exhorting her "to be gathered and concentrated within herself and trust none other, believing only in that which by herself alone she grasps through the power of Reason, even as the object of knowledge is likewise self-existent." Nothing is to be considered true except what the soul apprehends by herself without the aid of the senses—in other words, only the intelligible and invisible. The aim of Philosophy is thus to lead us from the seen to the unseen, from the temporal to the eternal; and perceiving this, "the soul of him who truly loves Wisdom withholds herself from pleasures and desires and pains and fears as far as she can," knowing that every new indulgence will add to the chains from which she desires to be released.³ Thus the true philosopher is one

¹ τοῦ ὄντος ἐπάνοδον, ἢν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φησομεν εἶναι, vii. 521 C.

² *Phaed.* 62 B, 82 E.

³ *Phaed.* 83 A ff.

who mortifies the body for the sake of the soul; his entire life is indeed a *μελέτη θανάτου*—a study, or rather rehearsal, of death.

Let us see how Plato develops this famous idea, to which there is nothing precisely parallel in Greek literature before his time, although it is closely related to the Orphic doctrine of the body as the sepulchre of the soul.¹ "Psychology," says a recent writer, "has effectually disposed of what Professor James calls 'the whole classic platonising Sunday-school conception' of the soul and body as two separate things, of which the body is necessary to the soul only in this world of sense."² Be this as it may, Professor James' description applies exactly to the *Phaedo*, throughout which dialogue the temporary union of a particular soul with a particular body is held to constitute life, while death is the separation of the two elements (*λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος*).³ The word "death" bears this meaning in Plato's definition of Philosophy as a "rehearsal of death." The lover of Wisdom tries to "separate" as far as possible his soul from communion with the body,⁴ by holding aloof from corporeal pleasures and from the distracting and delusive representations of the senses: whence it may truly be said that he dies every day he lives. To call the philosophic life a process of *κάθαρσις*, or "purification," is only another method of conveying the same lesson; for, according to Plato, the true meaning of this ancient watchword is that we should keep ourselves pure from the contamination of the body, until God shall finally accomplish our deliverance.⁵

The Platonic *meditatio mortis* is therefore no mere theoretical dogma, but a practical rule of conduct. Like the apostle Paul, we are to "die daily"—die, that is,

¹ See p. 97 above.

² S. H. Mellone, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1904, vol. ii. p. 733 f.

³ 67 D *al.*

⁴ *Phaed.* 64 E.

⁵ 67 A f., 69 C ff., 82 D ff.

to the body with its affections and lusts. But the precept acquires a new significance, when we consider it in the light of the doctrine that the body is the tomb of the soul (σῶμα σῆμα). If life in the body is the death of the soul, and the death of the body the life of the soul,¹ the μελέτη θανάτου of which Plato speaks ceases to be a *consuetudo moriendi*, and becomes rather a *consuetudo vivendi*, the practice or habitude of *life* in the truest meaning of the word, that is to say, spiritual, or as Plato would rather say, noetic life, the life of the immortal and divine part of our nature. Further, according to the σῶμα σῆμα theory, it is obvious that Death may be regarded as the resurrection of the soul. It follows that the *meditatio mortis* of the true philosopher is in reality a means of spiritual resurrection during life—a beginning of that complete deliverance from the bodily tomb which the soul hopes to attain at death.

Let us turn now to the Pauline Epistles, and see what analogies they furnish to the doctrine of the *Phaedo*. The apostle sometimes appears to represent the body as virtually a kind of prison. He calls it "the earthly house of our tabernacle" in which "we groan, being burdened" (στενάζομεν βαρούμενοι).²

The Platonic μελέτη θανάτου is also strikingly parallel to many exhortations in St. Paul. "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth": νεκρώσατε οὖν τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.³ "I buffet my body and bring it into bondage."⁴ We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh: for if ye live after the flesh, ye must die; but if by the spirit ye mortify the deeds of the body (τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε), ye shall live."⁵

¹ Cf. *Gorg.* 493 A, quoted above, p. 97.

² 2 Cor. v. 1-4. Much more Platonic, however, is the sentence which St. Paul seems here to have in mind: φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει

ψυχὴν, καὶ βρῖθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνο σου πολυφρόντιδα (*Wisd.* ix. 15).

Cf. *Rom.* vii. 24.

³ *Col.* iii. 5.

⁴ 1 Cor. ix. 27.

⁵ *Rom.* viii. 12, 13.

It will scarcely be denied that in point of doctrine as well as phraseology, these passages naturally recall to us the teaching of the *Phaedo*; but among other points of difference, the Pauline conception of *Necrosis* involves a new and distinctive element, which at once differentiates the religion from the philosophy. The sum and substance of this new element cannot be expressed more clearly or concisely than in the words of Matthew Arnold: "to die *with Christ* to the law of the flesh, to live *with Christ* to the law of the mind."¹ The same writer has remarked that in St. Paul the words "life" and "death" often mean something different from "the ordinary physical life and death. Death, for him, is living after the flesh, obedience to sin; life is mortifying by the spirit the deeds of the flesh, obedience to righteousness. Resurrection, in its essential sense, is therefore for Paul the rising, within the sphere of our visible earthly existence, from death in this sense to life in this sense."² I have pointed out that the Platonic *meditatio mortis*, when interpreted by the light of the *σῶμα σῆμα* doctrine, contains the germ of this idea of a spiritual resurrection; but Platonism lacks, of course, the motive power of a divine yet human personality in whose life we live by dying unto sin. "Socrates inspired boundless friendship and esteem; but the inspiration of reason and conscience is the one inspiration which comes from him, and which impels us to live righteously as he did. A penetrating enthusiasm of love, sympathy, pity, adoration, reinforcing the inspiration of reason and duty, does not belong to Socrates. With Jesus it is different. On this point it is needless to argue; history has proved."³

From the *Phaedo* we now pass to the *Symposium*. The *Symposium* describes the prisoner's release positively rather than negatively, laying stress not upon asceticism and

¹ *St. Paul and Protestantism* p. 51, ed. 1889.

² *l.c.* p. 57.

³ Matthew Arnold, *l.c.* p. 53.

self-suppression, but upon the love of Beauty and Goodness as the ladder by which we are to climb from earth to heaven. If the *Phaedo* represents the quasi-ascetic side of Platonism, the *Symposium*, more than any other dialogue, more even than the *Phaedrus*, represents its imaginative and artistic, perhaps we may say, its nuptial side.

We may find a point of union between the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium* in the saying that "Philosophy is the highest Music"—*φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μουσική*.¹ In its wider sense, the word "Music" meant to a Greek intellectual culture, or rather the culture, not merely of the intellect, but of the character also; and it is in this extended signification that Plato here employs the term.

What the sentiment precisely means, we may learn from the *Republic*, where it is said that "musical education should culminate in the love of the beautiful": *δεῖ δὲ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά*.² This is the dominant idea in the *Symposium*; and it is by gradually rising from stage to stage in the pursuit of Beauty that the Soul at last succeeds in regaining the freedom she forfeited at birth.

Let us consider the doctrine of the *Symposium* a little more in detail. A succession of speeches is delivered in praise of the God Love. For the kernel of the dialogue, we must look, of course, to the conversation which the Platonic Socrates professes to have had with Diotima; but some of the earlier speeches contain ideas and suggestions that prepare the way for Diotima's rhapsody. By *Phaedrus*, with whose discourse the dialogue proper begins, Love is represented primarily as the passionate sentiment of devotion awakened by the sight of physical beauty. At the same time, that which he chiefly emphasises is the power of this sentiment to inspire

¹ *Phaed.* 61 A.

² iii. 403 C.

us to deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice: so that Love is idealised from the very first. "The God Love," says Phaedrus, "is not only the oldest and most honoured of the Gods, but also the most powerful agent in imparting excellence and happiness to human beings both in life and after death."¹ Pausanias, who follows Phaedrus, blames his predecessor for treating of Love as a single undifferentiated notion. He maintains that there are two different Gods called by the name of Eros, the earthly and the heavenly. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the heavenly Eros is that its votaries love beauty of soul more than beauty of body: so that a kind of intellectual union is created for the cultivation of virtue, analogous to the relation which the historical Socrates desired to establish between the teachers and the taught. Up to this point, Love has been regarded as a principle affecting only human nature, but Eryximachus enlarges the connotation of the word; and Love now becomes a universal or cosmic principle, or rather it represents two cosmic principles, the one evil and the other good; for the two kinds of Love are still kept separate. The idea underlying the extravagant and truly Aristophanic speech of Aristophanes is that Love effects a temporary return to the state of bliss in which man lived till overweening ambition brought about his fall. Aristophanes' discourse is a kind of anticipatory burlesque in a grossly materialistic vein of the spiritual conception of Eros which Diotima afterwards unfolds in her dialogue with Socrates. The speech of Agathon is an elegant scholastic exercise after the style of Prodicus, without any philosophical significance; and we may now turn to the speech of Diotima.

The prophetess begins by protesting against the ordinary Greek view, that Eros is a God. Since Love is desire of the beautiful, he cannot, she says, be himself

¹ *Symp.* 180 B.

possessed of that Beauty which he desires; and consequently he is not, strictly speaking, divine: for the divine is always beautiful. Nor yet, on the other hand, is Love endowed with a merely mortal nature. The truth is that he stands midway between the mortal and the immortal. He belongs to the category of *daemons*, angels, as we should say, or spirits, whose function it is to act as messengers between Gods and men, conveying men's prayers and sacrifices to heaven, and bringing back from heaven the commands and recompenses of the Gods, as it were spanning the distance which separates the human from the divine.¹ Love may therefore be regarded as a kind of golden chain linking the finite to the infinite.

In like manner, Love is neither altogether wise nor altogether foolish, but occupies an intermediate position between knowledge and ignorance. Were he a God, and not merely a *daemon*, he would be already wise. As it is, he is *φιλόσοφος* — a seeker after Wisdom. "For Wisdom" (Plato says) "is a thing most beautiful; and Love is love of the beautiful; so that Love must needs be a philosopher or lover of Wisdom."² In this way Plato identifies Love with the philosophic impulse—the *Drang nach Wahrheit* which he holds to be part of the original endowment of the soul. We may compare one of the many Platonising passages in the *Wisdom of Solomon*: "Her I loved and sought out from my youth, and I sought to take her for my bride, and I became enamoured of her beauty—*ἐραστής ἐγενόμην τοῦ κάλλους αὐτῆς*."³

From another point of view, Love (continues Diotima) is the desire of immortality. All men desire to possess the good, and not only so, but to possess it for ever; so that immortality, taking the word in its strict etymological

¹ *Symp.* 201 E-203 A.

² viii. 2.

³ 203 E-204 B.

sense of exemption from death, is among the objects to which Love aspires. It is in this instinctive hatred of death and longing for life—this innate yearning of mortality for immortality—that Diotima finds the key to the extraordinary power of Love throughout the whole domain of Nature. Mortal creatures cannot, indeed, become immortal in their own persons; but they can attain to immortality through generation: for the father still lives in his children and children's children. There is, however, another and higher form of immortality—that which comes from the begetting of spiritual children, that is to say, deeds of high emprise and words and thoughts of virtue, such as bring an immortality of fame and influence among contemporaries and posterity. As represented by Diotima, these children are the offspring of a kind of spiritual union between two minds¹—a glorified and transfigured form of the Socratic notion of teacher and pupil united in a common search for truth and virtue.²

Up to this point, we have described what Diotima calls by implication the lesser mysteries, now we enter on the higher. The keynote of this portion of Diotima's speech may be expressed in the words of Milton:

“Love . . . is the scale
By which to heavenly Love thou may'st ascend.”³

I will translate the sections with which we are chiefly concerned.

“He who would proceed correctly in this matter,” that is, in the pursuit of the beautiful, “should commence in youth by paying court to beautiful bodies. And first, if his guide directs him rightly, he will love a single body out of all the number, and make it the mother of beautiful discourses” (*ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλοῦς*).⁴ Thereafter he will of himself discover that the beauty

¹ τόκος ἐν καλῷ, 206 B.

² 206 A-207 A.

³ *Paradise Lost* viii. 589 ff.

⁴ ἐνταῦθα = ἐν τούτῳ. Cf. τίκτειν ἐν, 210 D; τόκος ἐν τῷ καλῷ, 206 E.

in any particular body is sister to the beauty in another, and that if he is to pursue the beautiful in form, it is the height of folly not to believe in the unity and identity of all physical beauty. When he has observed this truth, he will become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and abate his consuming passion for one, as something trivial and unworthy : after which he will consider the beauty of the soul more precious than that of the body, and be satisfied with one whose soul is virtuous, although his bloom of body be but small ; and he will love him and cherish him, and search out and bring to birth such words and thoughts as shall improve the young, that he may be constrained to rise yet higher and contemplate the beautiful in institutions and in laws, and perceive that it is all of one family with itself, and so may consider bodily beauty a trivial thing. And after he has surveyed institutions, he will be led to the sciences, that he may now perceive the beauty of knowledge, and looking at last on the fulness of beauty may no more be an unworthy trifler, no more enslaved like a menial to beauty dwelling in a single object . . . but facing the full sea of the beautiful and gazing thereon, may by bountiful Philosophy become the father of many words and thoughts full of beauty and scope sublime. And when he has gained strength and stature here, he will decry a single science, such as treats of the Beauty I shall next describe.”¹

At this stage of the exposition a strict adherence to our plan would require us to desist ; for the Beauty of which Diotima proceeds to speak is the transcendental idea of Beauty ; and we have reserved the ideas for subsequent treatment. But we can hardly understand the religious significance of the upward progress here described unless we follow it to the end ; and on other grounds it is desirable that we should now make a preliminary survey of the land to which the soul is travelling. Diotima thus continues :

“He who has been thus far instructed in Love’s mysteries, beholding things beautiful in proper sequence and after the right method, on approaching the end of his initiation will suddenly decry a wondrous Beauty, even that for the sake of which all his former toils were undertaken. The Beauty in the first place is ever-existent, uncreated and imperishable, knowing neither increase

¹ *Symp.* 210 A-210 D.

nor decay ; in the second place, it is not beautiful in one way and ugly in another, or beautiful at one time and ugly at another, or in one relation beautiful and in another ugly, or beautiful here and ugly there, as if beautiful in some men's eyes, and ugly in the eyes of others. Nor will he imagine that the Ideal Beauty is like unto a face or hands or any other portion of the body, or any discourse or science, or that it dwells somewhere in something other than itself, as, for example, in an animal, or in earth or heaven, or in aught else, but rather that it is separate and self-existent, simple and everlasting, while all other beautiful objects participate therein, yet in such a manner that although beautiful particulars are generated and perish, the Ideal Beauty neither waxes nor wanes, and changes not in any way.¹ . . . Suppose it were permitted to one to behold the Beautiful itself, clear and pure and unalloyed, not tainted by human flesh or colours or any of the manifold varieties of mortal existence, but the divine Beauty as it really is in its simplicity, do you think it would be an ignoble life that one should gaze thereon and ever contemplate that Beauty and hold communion therewith? Do you not rather believe that in this communion only will it be possible for a man, beholding the Beautiful with the organ by which alone it can be seen, to beget, not images of virtue, but realities, for that which he embraces is not an image but the truth, and having begotten and nourished true virtue, to become the friend of God and attain to immortality, if ever mortal has attained?"²

In his recent Gifford Lectures, Dr. Caird has said that "if we look to the development of thought after Plotinus, we can see that it was mainly through him, and through St. Augustine as influenced by him, that Mysticism passed into Christian Theology and became an important element in the religion of the Middle Ages and of the modern world."³ This statement is, no doubt, historically true; but the passage which I have just translated contains a number of ideas to which close parallels occur in Christian mysticism, and to some of these parallels I will now briefly call your attention.⁴

¹ 210 E-211 B.

² 211 D-212 A.

³ *Evolution of Theology* etc. ii. p. 210.

⁴ In what follows it will be seen

that I am largely indebted to Mr. Inge's Bampton Lectures, and also to Mr. Harrison's *Platonism in English Poetry*.

It will be observed, in the first place, that according to Plato the Divine or Ideal Beauty is not only transcendent, but also immanent in the world; for it is by "participating" in the Idea of Beauty, in other words, by the "presence" of Ideal Beauty in them, that all things beautiful are rendered beautiful. The form in which this doctrine appears in Christian thinkers may be illustrated by the remark of St. Augustine, that "all that is beautiful comes from the highest Beauty, which is God."¹ In a poem entitled "Seraphic Love," by John Norris, one of the last of the Cambridge seventeenth-century Platonists, it is said that

"All mortal beauty's but a ray
Of His bright, ever-shining day";

and God is expressly identified with

"the light archetypal,
Beauty in the original."

Here, as elsewhere, it is clear that Platonism is being grafted upon Christianity.

A further point of contact between the *Symposium* and Christian mysticism is the notion of a ladder or *scala perfectionis* up which the soul must travel in order to attain that union with the divine which is the ultimate goal of the mystic. As Mr. Inge has pointed out,² St. Augustine, following Plotinus, distinguishes in the ascending scale three grades of Beauty, "corporeal, spiritual, and divine." The Platonic classification is virtually the same—first beauty of body, next beauty of soul and spiritual things, and, finally, the divine or Ideal Beauty. According to the Christian view, "our guide on the upward path, the true hierophant of the mysteries of God, is love."³ There is, of course, a world of difference

¹ Quoted by Inge, *Christian Mysticism* p. 130.

² *I. c.* p. 129.

³ Inge, *I. c.* p. 8.

between the New Testament conception of love and the Eros of Plato; but in this instance we should look for parallels, not to the earlier Christian teachers, but rather to the sonnets of Michael Angelo, and to the Platonising poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in our own country, more especially Spenser, whose "Hymnes" have truly been called "the most comprehensive exposition of love in the light of Platonic theory in English."¹

"Love fits the soul with wings, and bids her win
Her flight aloft nor e'er to earth decline;
'Tis the first step that leads her to the shrine
Of Him who slakes the thirst that burns within."²

We have seen that Love, in Plato, is not only *φιλόκαλος*, but also *φιλόσοφος*—a seeker after Wisdom (*σοφία* or *φρόνησις*). Similarly, in later religious thought, the Divine Wisdom is frequently personified as the object of man's passionate adoration and love. I have already cited one example from the *Wisdom of Solomon*.³ It was the vision of this celestial Wisdom that inspired the mystic Suso in the fourteenth century;⁴ and Spenser devotes a part of his "Hymne of Heavenly Beautie" to celebrating her praises in language which sometimes suggests that he is thinking of the *Logos*. The figure of Una in the allegory of the *Faerie Queene* is also, as Mr. Harrison has pointed out,⁵ a kind of hypostatized Platonic Wisdom. The same writer has drawn attention to another interesting though somewhat fanciful application by Spenser of a doctrine contained in the *Symposium*. Identifying God with the Highest Beauty, and at the same time combining the Christian conception of the Godhead as Love with the Platonic view that Love is the

¹ Harrison, *l.c.* p. 122.

² Michael Angelo, Sonnet 53, tr. Symonds. Cf. Spenser's "Hymnes in honour of Heavenly Love and Heavenly Beautie," *passim*.

³ See p. 389.

⁴ See Inge, *l.c.* p. 172 ff.

⁵ *l.c.* p. 2.

desire of fatherhood in the beautiful (τόκος ἐν τῷ καλῷ), Spenser makes the "High Eternal Powre," through love of His own beauty, beget, first the Son, afterwards the Angels, and finally Man.¹ But the most important analogy between Platonic and Christian mysticism relates to the final stage in which the soul is united with the divine.

In Plato the *Nous* or rational part of soul, itself, as we have seen, of heavenly origin and nature, "draws nigh unto and marries" the ultimate object of desire and thought, called in the *Republic* Being,² and in the *Symposium* Beauty. Then only does the soul find life—true life and nourishment.³ Already in St. Paul the symbol of marriage is once or twice employed to express the relation of the believer's soul to the divine;⁴ but for the most part he makes use of this figure only when speaking of the mystical union between Christ and the Church.⁵ Later Christian mysticism often recognised three main stages in the progress of the soul—the purgative, the illuminative, and the unitive:⁶ the last of which is sometimes represented as a kind of spiritual marriage between the soul and God, more especially in the devotional poetry of the seventeenth century. Mr. Inge is disposed to think that the metaphor in question was introduced into Christian thought from the mysteries, through the medium, perhaps, of Alexandrian Judaism.⁷ It seems to me not unlikely that the influence of Plato was also operative to some extent, although here, as in other parts of his religious symbolism, Plato himself no doubt owed something to the Eleusinian rites.⁸

Taking a retrospective view of the kind of spiritual

¹ "Hymne of Heavenly Love," 29 ff.

² vi. 490 A ff.

³ *Rep. l.c.* Cf. *Symp.* 211 D ff.

⁴ 1 Cor. vi. 17; perhaps also iv. 15 (cf. *τίκτω ἐν, Symp.* 210 D).

⁵ See Inge, *l.c.*, Appendix D.

⁶ Inge, *l.c.* p. 9 ff.

⁷ *l.c.* p. 369.

⁸ See p. 430.

ascent described in the *Symposium*, we can hardly fail to note that it combines two features not altogether easy to reconcile with one another. The speech of Diotima reveals, on the one hand, a strong bias towards intellectualism. The Love of which she speaks is primarily an *amor intellectualis*, and aims at accomplishing a union between *Nous* and the highest of its objects, a union whose offspring are Truth and Reason, or rather, the active exercise of Reason, Reason actualised into *νόησις*, together with true virtue, by which Plato means the virtue which is based on knowledge, and not upon "opinion" or belief.¹ In the very climax of her rhapsody, Diotima is careful to point out that the Ideal Beauty is to be learnt by means of a certain science, that is, as will afterwards be seen, Dialectic; and the proximate stage to the discovery of the Highest Beauty is the beauty of the sciences. So far, therefore, we seem to have only a kind of overwhelming zeal for knowledge, and nothing more, the sort of "passion of the reason" which may perhaps, as Jowett says, belong to "one or two in a whole generation, in whom the light of truth may not lack the warmth of desire."² On the other hand, we cannot but feel that the enthusiasm which animates Diotima springs from religious at least as much as scientific inspiration. It is not without reason that Plato makes Diotima a prophetess, and puts the kernel of her discourse into a framework borrowed from the Eleusinian mysteries. The instantaneous character of the illumination, the beatific vision itself, the mystical union with changeless and Eternal Beauty whence arises the virtue by which we become the friends of God and attain to immortality—all these are what we should call religious rather than scientific conceptions. But the truth is that from Plato's point of view there is at bottom no fundamental difference between the

¹ *Rep.* vi. 490 B; *Symp.* 212 A. ² *The Dialogues of Plato* i. p. 533.

enthusiasm of religion and the enthusiasm of science. The *φιλοσοφία*, or love of knowledge, on which Plato so constantly insists, is of necessity and from the first a religious aspiration, because of the way in which he regards not only the organ, but also the object of knowledge. The realm of sensibles—the twilight land which lies between the darkness of Not-Being and the light of Being—can never be known; of the seen and temporal there is no knowledge, but only, at best, “opinion”; that which alone we can know, is the unseen, the eternal, the divine; in the last resort, as we shall afterwards see, the Idea of Good or God. In this way the lover of knowledge in Plato inevitably becomes a seeker after God.

LECTURE XX

PLATO—*continued*

THEORY OF EDUCATION

IN the preceding lecture we were principally occupied partly with the ascetic, and partly with the mystical elements of Platonism. We saw that the *meditatio mortis* of the *Phaedo* and the *intellectualis amor* of the *Symposium* are inspired by one and the same idea. The ultimate object is to reach those eternal and unseen realities to which the soul, or, strictly speaking, the rational part of the soul, is itself akin. The scheme of education which Plato in the *Republic* devises for the guardians of his ideal city is directed towards the same end, and on this account it requires to be considered in any attempt to understand the position of the Platonic philosophy in the history of religious thought.

To nothing, perhaps, does Plato assign so much importance as to education. It was to the practical work of an educator that he devoted the larger share of his energies throughout an unusually long and laborious life. The Academy which he founded is the earliest example of what we should call a College or University, the type and model of all the philosophical schools that followed it. "Among his contemporaries," says Grote, "he must have exercised greater influence through his school than through his writings."¹ From the well-known passage of the *Phaedrus* where written discourse is depreciated

¹ *Plato* i. p. 216.

in comparison with the living word, we may reasonably infer that Plato himself considered his literary productions of less importance than the work he endeavoured to accomplish as a teacher. The development of the intellect and concomitantly also of the character by means of oral discussion and debate, the mind of the teacher acting directly upon the mind of the pupil, without any intermediate vehicle such as deaf and speechless books supply—this, according to the *Phaedrus*, is the primary business of the educator. The writing of books may be useful as an innocent pastime, or to preserve the records of oral discussion against the forgetfulness of age, or by way of guidance to those who may afterwards pursue the same track; but literature is a much less efficient means of education than the spoken word.¹

So much it appeared necessary to say with the view of guarding against the idea that on educational questions Plato was merely a theorist and nothing more. We should remember that the principal work of his life was to educate the students of the Academy; and that he had probably already tested by experiment many of the theories on education with which we meet throughout his writings.

Let us now proceed to consider Plato's doctrine of education, as it is unfolded in the *Republic*.

The *Republic* contains two discourses or treatises on education, the one concerned with the preliminary training of the character in boyhood and youth, the other with the training, primarily of the intellect, but secondarily, and as a consequence, also of the character, in youth and early manhood. It is the second of these two treatises that chiefly demands our attention; but inasmuch as the earlier scheme is intended to lead up to the later, and itself comprises not a few ideas which are of importance for Plato's moral and religious teaching, we must give to this also the consideration which it deserves.

¹ 275 D-277 A.

Plato discusses the subject of "musical" education under two main heads, the first dealing with the content, and the second with the form of what is to be taught. It will be enough if we consider the leading principles that come to light in the course of the discussion, so far as it bears upon the subject of our lectures.

Concerning the being of the Godhead, the fundamental rule prescribed by Plato for the guidance of teachers of the young is that God must always be represented as He really is.¹ Now, in the first place, God is good; and since that which is good can never be the cause of evil, whatever there is of evil in the world must be assigned to another cause and not to God. The view here taken is in harmony with the dualism of the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, where evil is attributed, in the one case to Necessity, and in the other to a malevolent World-soul;² but in the *Republic*, Plato is more concerned to affirm the negative position that evil does not come from God, than to determine the nature of the principle from which it actually comes. As regards the problem of suffering, however, an alternative explanation is admitted. Suffering may also be regarded as a form of chastisement designed by God to improve and benefit the sufferer.³

The doctrine of the divine goodness, which in the preliminary stages of education Plato would inculcate as an article of belief, prepares the way for that intellectual apprehension of the metaphysical Idea of good, to which, when correct opinion is replaced by knowledge, the guardians of Plato's city are expected finally to attain. A similar remark holds good of the second doctrine on which Plato here insists—that of the changelessness of God; for the Idea is itself essentially uniform and changeless. It is particularly to be observed that Plato makes the immutability of

¹ *Rep.* ii. 379 A.

³ *Rep.* ii. 379 A-380 C. Cf. p.

² See p. 362 f., and *Laws* x. 896 D ff. 449 f.

God a result of his perfection. If God should suffer change, we are told, the operating cause must be either something external to himself, or his own free will. The former alternative is inadmissible; for analogy shows that things are liable to change in proportion as they are evil, and in God there is no evil at all. Neither will he desire to change himself, inasmuch as the only possibility of change for that which is the best is towards the worse; and no one, whether God or man, deliberately chooses to make himself worse than he was before. Our conclusion, therefore, is that God "ever abides immutably in his own form"—*μένει ἀεὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ μορφῇ*.¹ Nor can it be supposed that the Godhead, while himself remaining immutable, is nevertheless prone to beguile mankind by false and unreal appearances or visions, or by means of a lie expressed in words. There is absolutely no taint of falsehood in the divine nature.²

These two dogmas—the goodness and the unchangeableness of God—are formulated by Plato in the course of a severe and frequently unfair attack upon the religious teaching of the poets. The feud between Philosophy and Poetry, kindled by Xenophanes, breaks out afresh in the *Republic*, and rages with more violence than ever. In Plato's criticism of the poetical theology the dominating idea is that the character of the Godhead must necessarily be such as to furnish a moral standard to mankind: for his own conception of the ethical end, as we have already seen, is "assimilation to God"—*ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ*.³ He points out that Homer continually represents the Gods and heroes as lacking the virtue of self-control, prone to insubordination, lustful, avaricious, revengeful, gluttonous, and mean. The inevitable effect—so Plato maintains—

¹ ii. 381 C.

² ii. 380 D-383 C.

³ See p. 18; *Theaet.* 176 B.

of these and similar representations is to encourage the same vices in the young. No one, he says, will be otherwise than indulgent to his own iniquities, if he believes that the Gods and their kinsmen set the example of immorality.¹ For this reason, as well as because they are impious and untrue, all such legends ought to be proscribed.

So much, then, for the theological beliefs which Plato desires to instil into his guardians during the period of childhood and adolescence. It is obvious that they are more in harmony with Christian thought than with the traditional theology of Greece. Proceeding in the next place to consider the form of the instruction to be imparted to the young, Plato again develops his own views by an attack upon Greek poetry. Without pursuing the subject into detail, we must be content to apprehend the nature of Plato's own conception of what Poetry and Art should be. According to the Platonic theory, the two antagonistic principles of beauty and ugliness, good and evil, surround us on every side; they reveal themselves in the works alike of nature and of man, and we can discern them also in human character and conduct. The business of the artist, whether poet, painter, sculptor, or architect, or whether he devotes himself to any of the subordinate departments of imitation, is wholly to ignore whatever is unbeautiful and base, and, searching out the beautiful and good, to embody this and this alone in the material on which he works. Thus it comes to pass that, "dwelling as it were in a healthful region, our youthful citizens will imbibe good influences from every quarter, whencesoever from fair works of art there smites upon their eyes or ears as it were a health-bringing breath from goodly places, unconsciously leading them from earliest childhood into likeness and

¹ iii. 391 E.

friendship and harmony with the beauty of reason.”¹ In this way the mind becomes a “mansion for all lovely forms,” the memory a “dwelling-place for all sweet sounds and harmonies.” But the ultimate end of musical education has not been reached until we are able to recognise the beautiful and good, not only in the works of imitative art, but also in the originals from which these works are copied. Poetry and Art should lead the youthful mind to apprehend, and in apprehending to assimilate, the principles of beauty and goodness wherever they manifest themselves, either in the physical world or in the lives of human beings. Musical education, according to Plato, is consequently the means whereby we “learn to read in the moral world”: its object is only then attained when we have conceived an abiding passion for the beautiful in the comprehensive meaning attached to the word *καλόν* in ancient Greece—moral and spiritual beauty, as well as the beauty of material objects.²

Mr. Nettleship has pointed out that the Platonic conception of the true office and function of Poetry in a well-ordered commonwealth has been affirmed by no one in statelier or more impressive language than by Milton, in the famous passage where he expresses on his own behalf the hope of leaving “something so written to after-times, as they should not willingly let it die.” The poet’s abilities, Milton declares, “wheresoever they be found, are the inspired gift of God, rarely bestowed, but yet to some (though most abuse) in every nation; and are of power, beside the office of a pulpit, to imbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of virtue and public civility, to allay the perturbations of the mind, and set the affections in right tune; to celebrate in glorious and lofty hymns the throne and equipage of God’s almightiness, and

¹ *Rep.* iii. 401 C.

² *Rep.* iii. 401 A-403 C.

what he works. . . Lastly, whatsoever in religion is holy and sublime, in virtue amiable or grave, whatsoever hath passion or admiration in all the changes of that which is called fortune from without, or the wily subtleties and reflexes of man's thoughts from within; all these things with a solid and treatable smoothness to paint out and describe."¹ In all essential features, this is just Plato's view of what Poetry ought to be.

It was stated at the outset of this lecture that the ultimate aim of education, as conceived by Plato, was to raise the soul out of the temporal and visible into the sphere of that invisible and eternal Being to which she herself, by right of birth, belongs.

But the preliminary discipline, regarded in and by itself, does not and cannot bring the soul into immediate contact with reality. We shall best understand its general character and efficacy, as well as the relation in which it stands to the intellectual discipline that follows, if we consider for a little the Platonic simile of the line, to which it is desirable also on other grounds that I should now direct your attention.

At the end of the sixth book of the *Republic*, Plato offers a classification of what (for want of a better word) we may perhaps call "apprehensibles," meaning thereby the entire contents both of the phenomenal and of the ideal worlds, arranged in an ascending scale from lowest to highest, according to the degree of luminosity or truth which they possess. We are to take the line AB and divide it into two unequal parts at C; after which each of the two parts, AC and CB, is to be subdivided in the ratio of the original sections, so that AD is to DC and CE is to EB as AC is to CB. What may



have been the object of Plato in dwelling on these par-

¹ *The Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty*, Bk. 2.

ticular proportions, we need not now inquire ; it is enough for our purpose if we understand what the different segments of the line are intended to symbolise.

Of the two larger sections, AC represents the class of things which we apprehend by sense-perception and opinion, while CB stands for the objects of knowledge, which it is the province of Reason or the ratiocinative faculty to grasp. Here, as elsewhere, between the Kingdom of Sense and the Kingdom of Knowledge, Plato draws, you will observe, a clear and sharp demarcation. To the first of the two segments in the sphere of sense or opinion, namely, AD, belong *εἰκόνας* or "images," the category in which there is least of light and truth. The example which Plato gives, shadows, reflections in water and the like, are all of them taken from the visible world ; but inasmuch as he repeatedly speaks of AC as containing the objects, not only of sense, but also of opinion, and elsewhere uses the word "opinions" to denote canons or standards of morality, taste, and so forth, instilled by habituation or authority without scientific knowledge of the rational grounds on which they rest, we are justified in finding in the lowest section of the line shadows, reflections or imitations of opinables as well as sensibles. Now among the shadows of sensibles there should be no doubt that Plato included the products of so-called imitative art ; for, according to the Platonic theory, painting and sculpture copy directly from the life,—imitate the visible and tangible things which men ignorantly call real,—forgetting that these are themselves but imitations of the invisible and intangible Essence which is the sole and ultimate reality. Where then are we to look for the shadows or reflections of opinables ? Presumably these are nothing but the canons or opinions expressed or embodied in the writings and speeches of poets, rhetoricians, etc., in so far as these canons or opinions reflect and imitate the actual

beliefs of the multitude or any other beliefs and "appearances" whatsoever, be they right or be they wrong.¹ Poetry, not less than Art, is regarded by Plato as an imitation of that which is itself in turn an imitation of the truth; so that we are well within our rights, if, in agreement with Nettleship and other Platonic students, we include the creations of Poetry among the "images" appropriated to the lowest division of the line. The mental condition or state which is correlated with this class of apprehensibles is called by Plato *eikasia*, a word which ordinarily in Greek means "conjecture," but which in this particular passage receives a new and quasi-technical meaning, being used with a play on *eikōnes*, "images," to denote the condition of mind which acquiesces in images and accepts them as the only truth, the lowest of all the intellectual states, as its objects are the lowest of those to which the human mind can be directed.

The second section of the line, DC, consists of the originals which are copied or reflected in the first. Here again the instances cited by Plato belong to the sphere of sensibles: he speaks chiefly of living creatures and the other works of Nature, together with manufactured objects of every kind. But, as before, so now, we are justified in viewing this category also as embracing not only sensibles, but also opinables; and, thus regarded, it will of course embrace the originals of those reflected opinions which we have already found reason to assign to the lowest of the four grades; in other words, it will contain the canons or standards exemplified in the words and deeds of those who live not by the light of Reason, but in obedience to authority or unconscious habit, canons which are reflected, as we have seen, in Poetry and other forms of imitation, through the medium of language. Plato's name for the mental con-

¹ See my edition of the *Republic of Plato*, vol. ii. p. 158.

dition that takes the visible and opinable for true, refusing to penetrate into the region of the invisible, is the word which was destined to play so momentous a part in later religious thought—the word *πίστις*, “belief” or “faith.” With Plato, Knowledge and not Faith is “the assurance of things hoped for, the test of things not seen” —*πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων*.¹ The Platonic *πίστις* is still concerned with the visible and opinable, although it possesses a somewhat higher degree of clearness than *εἰκασία* or “Conjecture,” just as its objects contain more light and truth than the “images” of Poetry and Art.

If the above exposition is correct, it is manifest that the preliminary scheme of education in the *Republic* deals from beginning to end with the objects included in the two lower sections of the line. The aim of that discipline is to produce correct “opinion” or “belief,” not yet knowledge, although in the case of the guardians correct opinion will prove, of course, a stepping-stone to knowledge. Our pupils, Plato says, must first be moulded into *unconscious* harmony with the beauty of Reason, in order that, when Reason comes, they may welcome her with joy, in virtue of their affinity to her.² Under the guidance of a purified form of Art and Poetry, the student who has assimilated the earlier discipline becomes able at last, by a kind of instinctive and unreasoning sense, to discriminate between right and wrong, fair and foul, as they show themselves in the world of nature and of man; but he is still concerned with the visible and opinable region of “becoming,” not yet with the invisible realm of Being; and the virtue he has acquired is only (Plato says) an *ὑπογραφή* or “adumbration” of the true or philosophic virtue, inasmuch as it rests on a foundation of “correct opinion” and not knowledge.³ It follows that if education is to

¹ Heb. xi. 1.

² *Rep.* iii. 402 A.

³ *Rep.* vi. 504 D.

achieve its true and final purpose—if we are to raise our eyes from shadows to realities, from darkness to light—a further discipline is necessary; and this further discipline is represented by the remaining sections of the line (CE, EB). The soul does not desist from her journey until she has scaled the topmost summit of the intelligible land and beheld the Idea of Good. As Mr. Adamson has said, “Plato’s theory of education ends where it began, with a revelation of the divine being.”¹

We remark, in the first place, that the secondary course of training described in the *Republic* is confined to a small minority of those who received the earlier education. The others are excluded, not in any narrow spirit of intellectualism, but from the conviction that many persons are naturally incapable of rising from “correct opinion” to knowledge. Only the highest section of the Guardians, that is to say, the future rulers of the city, have access to the curriculum we are about to discuss. Plato begins by enumerating the more distinctively natural qualifications of his philosopher-king. The keynote of the philosophic temperament he declares to be the love of Wisdom or Truth, not of this or that portion of Truth, but of all Truth, everywhere and always. The philosopher is one who aspires to contemplate “all time and all existence”; unable to acquiesce in the partial or particular, his unwearied mind is ever soaring towards the universal, ever strives to grasp the totality of things, both human and divine—*τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός, θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου*.² From this consuming passion for truth and knowledge spring all the moral virtues which Plato ascribes to the truly philosophic nature—courage and high-mindedness, temperance, justice,

¹ *Education in Plato's Republic* p. 246. ² *Rep.* vi. 486 A.

kindness, and the rest.¹ Here, as elsewhere in his dialogues,² he draws a portrait of what, in his opinion, human character should be; and indeed the philosophizing of the *Republic* is expressly intended as a picture of the perfectly just and righteous man. The tendency to describe the intellectual and moral ideal under the form of an imaginary personality, afterwards known among the post-Aristotelian schools as the "wise man" or sage, would seem to have originated with Plato.

It is to characters thus endowed, continues Plato, that we shall entrust the government of our State, after we have made them perfect by means of education.³ How then is one to lead them upwards into the light, "even as some are said to have ascended out of Hades into Heaven"?⁴ The general character of Plato's intellectual discipline is determined partly by his conception of the goal toward which the mind must travel, and partly by his view of the nature of the mind itself. The goal, of course, is the Idea, and ultimately the Idea of Good. It is the Idea of Good which, to borrow the phrase of Nettleship, is "at once the keystone of knowledge and the polestar of conduct." Of the Platonic Ideas, the "colourless, formless, intangible Essence, visible only to *Nous*, the pilot of the soul,"⁵ I will speak in a subsequent lecture; meantime let me remind you of some cardinal points in connection with Plato's doctrine of *Nous*. We have seen that *Nous*, according to Plato, is the part of human nature which is related to God; nay more, it is this which makes us distinctively and truly human by making us essentially divine.⁶ And further, the faculty of *Nous*—so Plato affirms—is present in every human being from the first. It constitutes the eye of soul

¹ 485 A-486 E.

² Cf. *Theaet.* 173 C ff.

³ *Rep.* vi. 487 A.

⁴ *Rep.* vii. 521 C.

⁵ *Phaedr.* 247 C.

⁶ See p. 377 f.

(ὄμμα ψυχῆς), and the eye of soul can never wholly lose its power of seeing. Through its affinity with God, man's Reason, even when present in the body, retains an upward impulse, feels still a natural and spontaneous yearning toward the fountain of its being. But until education has come to the rescue, our spiritual insight is clouded by the darkness of the prison-house in which we live. The eye of the soul is turned unnaturally downwards, seeing only what is of the earth, earthy; at best, it gazes on what is no better than a shadow of the truth. And thus the soul, though "a heavenly and not an earthly plant," draws its sustenance from earth, and not, as it has a right to do, from heaven.

Let us now see how these considerations about the nature and condition of the soul determine Plato's view of the scope and method of education. It will follow (says Plato) that

"education is not at all what certain of its professors declare it to be. They tell us that they put Knowledge into an empty soul, as though one should put sight into blind eyes. Our theory is of quite another kind. This faculty of Reason, present in every human soul, this organ wherewith each man learns . . . must, along with the entire soul, be turned round from the sphere of Becoming until it can endure to gaze upon Being, and the brightest part of being, that is, the Good. Education is therefore the art of converting (τῆς περιγωγῆς) the Reason in the easiest and most effectual way. It is not the art of putting sight into the soul's eye: believing, on the other hand, that sight is already present in the soul, but turned in the wrong direction and looking at the wrong things, it endeavours to remedy this defect."¹

Thus, according to the Platonic view, education does not consist in filling the soul with a mass of uncorrelated fact and dogma; it has nothing to do with what is popularly known as "cram"—the travesty of educational method which Plato ascribes to some of the professional

¹ *Rep.* vii. 518 B-D.

sophists of his own day. On the contrary, as Mr. Adamson has well said, "That it is the business of education to mature and develop something given, the germ of a personality, rather than impress it from without, is the very keynote and spirit of Plato's teaching. 'There is a faculty residing in the soul of each person,' he tells us, 'an organ whose preservation is of more importance than a thousand eyes.' . . . The teacher must be content to efface himself, to stand aside. His business is to superintend the presentation of material and to guide his pupils to an orderly assimilation of it. But it is emphatically not his business to impress his 'modes of thought' so that they become a second nature in his pupils. Every bit of knowledge worth the name bears the private mark of the individual who has acquired it."¹ These are the words of a practical teacher who has tested by experience the value of Plato's principles in the earlier stages of mental and moral discipline. I have elsewhere attempted to explain the essential meaning of the Platonic conception by an illustration from the history of sculpture. Michael Angelo, himself, both in poetry and in statuary an exponent of the great Platonic thought which he expresses in the lines—

"Heaven-born, the soul a heav'n-ward course must hold,
Beyond the visible world she soars to seek
(For what delights the sense is false and weak)
Ideal form, the universal mould"²—

Michael Angelo "used to say that every block of marble contained a statue, and that the sculptor brings it to light by cutting away the encumbrances by which the 'human face divine' is concealed. In like manner, according to Plato, it is the business of the teacher to prune the soul of his pupil of those unnatural excrescences and

¹ *Education in Plato's Republic*
pp. 78-81.

² Wordsworth's translation.

incrustations which hide its true nature, until the human soul divine stands out in all its pristine grace and purity."¹

Some of the figurative expressions employed by Plato to emphasise the distinctive character of his educational theory are of considerable interest and importance in connection with later religious thought. At one time the process is pictured as an *ἐπάνοδος* or ascent of the soul into the realm of Being, a lifting of the eyes on high, a *θέα τῶν ἄνω*, "contemplation of that which is above."² The didactic art appears at other times as a kind of purification or purgation: its effect is to cleanse the soul from the defilement of the body and its senses, to lighten the soul of those leaden weights that drag it downwards to the earth.³ Or, again, it is a mode of deliverance (*λύσις*), a release from chains; or a quickening and rekindling (*ἀναζωπυρεῖσθαι*) of the spiritual vision. To several of these expressions interesting parallels occur in the New Testament; but the most striking analogy is furnished by Plato's description of the educational process as a *περιαιγωγή* or "conversion" of the soul. The eye of the soul, Plato implies, must be turned from darkness to light (*πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους*),⁴ must pass from a day which is but night into the true day" (*ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινοσ ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν*).⁵ Nor is it merely the intellect which participates in this revolution; the character is also involved: for Plato expressly says that the revolution extends to the whole soul (*ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ*).⁶ As with St. Paul, so also with Plato: conversion is the birth "of a new intellectual consciousness which transforms the will and is the source of a new moral life."⁷ The whole personality

¹ The *Republic of Plato*, vol. ii. p. 98.

² Cf. Col. iii. 1, 2 (see p. 359 f.).

³ Cf. Heb. xii. 1, *ὄγκον ἀποθέμενοι πάντα*, laying aside every weight.

⁴ *Rep.* vii. 518 C. Cf. Acts

xxvi. 18, *ἐπιστρέψαι ἀπὸ σκοτός εἰς φῶς*.

⁵ 521 C.

⁶ 518 C.

⁷ The quotation is from Sanday and Headlam, *Romans* p. 165.

of the pupil is to be transformed, to be reborn; ¹ as the light of truth shines ever clearer in his soul, "the inward man"—ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος, as Plato would say ²—is renewed unto knowledge after the idea of Good or God, until, so far as human nature admits, the assimilation is complete (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν).³

But it is time for us to consider the actual curriculum of studies by means of which Plato hoped to lead his guardians out of the darkness of the visible into the brightness of the intelligible world. Reverting to the simile of the line, we have to ask what are the contents of CE, the section that lies between the realm of sense and the realm of Ideas. Plato's answer to this question is introduced by a somewhat elaborate discussion explaining the principle of the curriculum described in this part of the *Republic*. The originating cause of reflection or thought is declared to be the self-contradictory character of certain sense-perceptions. Thus, for example, we perceive one and the same object as both heavy and light, that is, heavy in comparison with a lighter, light in comparison with a heavier object. The contradiction produces a feeling of perplexity (ἀπορία—the old Socratic term) which the senses are powerless to assuage; and the intellect is consequently summoned to their aid. Observe now the way in which the intellect sets to work, when thus invoked by the senses. After disintegrating the impression into its component parts, the "heavy" and the "light," it abstracts each of these two qualities from the material substance in which they inhere, and studies them as what we should call general notions or conceptions, apart from every element of sense-perception and corporeality. The question has ceased to be, "Is this particular object heavy or light?" and we have entered

¹ Cf. *Theaet.* 168 A, ἵν' ἄλλοι γινόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ἡσαν.

² *Rep.* ix. 589 A. Cf. *Rom.* vii. 22; *Eph.* iii. 16.

³ *Theaet.* 176 B.

on a purely intellectual inquiry as to the *οὐσία*, or essential nature of heaviness and lightness. Such an inquiry when once fairly started will lead us farther and farther from the visible world, and nearer to the invisible Ideas which in Plato's way of thinking furnish the solution of this and every other problem.¹

What then are the particular studies prescribed by Plato?

First in order comes *ἀριθμητική*, or the theory of numbers. Here, if anywhere,—so Plato holds,—the intellect is stimulated by the shock of self-contradictory perceptions; for number is an aggregate of units, and unity is never seen apart from multiplicity: we perceive one wood, for example, but many trees; one tree, but many branches, and so on. But the stimulus of perceptual contradictions can hardly count for much after the intellect is thoroughly aroused; and the important point, in view of the goal towards which the soul is travelling, is that we should realise the nature of the numbers with which the Platonic science of arithmetic professes to deal. The true arithmetician, according to Plato, although he may employ by way of illustration concrete numbers, such as one horse, two tables, three chairs and so on, is not really studying these material numbers at all: it is only with the abstract mathematical numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., that he is concerned. To these mathematical numbers, following the usual bias of his thought, Plato seems to have ascribed a substantial, and not merely a conceptual existence. When the arithmetician defines his units as "indivisible and equal each to each," he is not speaking of an "Unding," but of real existences, compared with which their visible counterparts are imperfect and illusory; no two material and concrete units being ever either indivisible or exactly equal to one another.

¹ vii. 523 A-524 C.

Mathematical numbers, as well as mathematical forms, appear to be included among those "imitations of the eternal existences, moulded from them in a mysterious and wondrous way," of which we read in the *Timæus*:¹ they form, apparently, a kind of intermediate link between the visible numbers in DC, and the ideas of numbers in EB. On the one hand, they resemble visibles inasmuch as they are many and not one—that is to say, there is, for example, a multiplicity of mathematical units, but only one Ideal unit. With the Ideas, on the other hand, they share the attributes of changelessness and eternity.²

The study of Number, according to Plato, if prosecuted on these lines, will insensibly lead the soul on high, away from the region of sense into the region of knowledge. Next in sequence follows Geometry. The geometrician, it is said, deals with τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, that which always is, eternal and necessary truth. In word, no doubt, he speaks of the visible and perishable triangle which he draws upon the board; but all the time he is thinking of the true mathematical triangle, and it is this whose properties he endeavours to explain.³ If I understand Plato rightly, he believes that mathematical triangles, circles, squares, etc., have a real or substantial existence, and occupy an intermediate position between the Ideas in whose likeness they are framed and the visible forms of which they are themselves the models. It is for this reason, among others, that the study of Geometry "compels the soul to turn towards the region where dwells the most blessed part of Being, which above all things she must behold."⁴ But Geometry will have no such result unless it be pursued on exclusively theoretical lines; and we are told that Plato strongly deprecated the use of

¹ 50 C.

³ *Rep.* vii. 526 C-527 C.

² *Rep.* vii. 524 C-526 C. See, however, p. 369 n.

⁴ *Rep.* vii. 526 E.

geometrical instruments and models. He is said to have reproved Eudoxus and others for this fault, maintaining that they "forfeited all the good of Geometry by allowing it to fall back upon sensibles rather than soar aloft and lay hold upon those eternal and incorporeal images upon which God by reason of his Godhead is evermore intent."¹

Plato's distrust of sense-perception is intelligible enough, so long as we are dealing with Plane Geometry; for we must remember that he is concerned with mathematics as an educative discipline, a means of forcing the pupil to use his reasoning faculties and think, instead of depending on the eye. Neither is it difficult to understand how the problems of Solid Geometry might be treated on similar lines, though here, perhaps, the student cannot so easily dispense with visible aids. At the time when Plato wrote the *Republic*, the study of Solid Geometry appears to have suddenly become popular in the Academy. He speaks of it as a singularly fascinating subject, and assigns to it the third place in his curriculum. But when we leave the region of pure mathematics and come to the concrete sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics, which form the last of the five preliminary studies, we must allow that Plato's attitude is more difficult to justify. Each of these two subjects is treated by him almost wholly from the standpoint of Geometry. As regards the first, he insinuates, perhaps with justice, that the astronomy of his own day was far too empirical. Plato himself flies to the opposite extreme. Refusing to allow that any study can lift the soul on high unless it deals with the invisible and real, he insists that the objects of true astronomy are not the celestial movements which we see, but the "movement wherewith essential speed and essential slowness, in true and genuine number and in all true forms, are moved

¹ Plutarch, *Quaest. Conv.* viii. 2. 718 F. The last clause has reference to the Platonic saying, θεός ἀεί γεωμετρῆς.

in relation to each other and therewithal make that which is essentially in them to move: the true adornments, which are apprehended by reason and the mathematical intelligence, but not by sight.”¹ The language of this sentence calls up in our minds the picture of a transcendental firmament analogous to the transcendental triangle in Geometry. It follows that just as the visible triangle is utilised by the geometrician for purposes of illustration and nothing more, so also the visible heavens should be employed as a moving diagram or orrery to facilitate our apprehension of the supra-celestial movements which they imitate. The true astronomer will “dispense with the starry heavens” (τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν), and cultivate astronomy by means of problems: only in this way, Plato adds—and the remark is highly significant of the aim and object of his whole curriculum—can he “make the natural intelligence of his soul useful, and not useless, as it was before.”² This is the only kind of “utility” which the *Republic* admits. Here, as elsewhere in Book VII., Plato’s aversion to the senses and their objects is profoundly real; nor could it well be otherwise, for in Platonism Truth lies yonder, in the realm of the Ideas.

Astronomy was looked upon by the Pythagoreans as the sister-science to Music or Harmonics. In this view Plato concurs; but his conception of Harmonics differs *toto caelo* from that of the Pythagoreans, and is in every respect analogous to his conception of Astronomy. There appear to have been two musical schools in the time of Plato, the so-called μουσικοί, who, as Mr. Monro remarks, “measured all intervals as multiples or fractions of the Tone,”³ selecting as their unit of measurement the quarter-tone or δέσσις; and the Pythagorean or

¹ *Rep.* vii. 529 C.

² *Rep.* vii. 580 C.

³ Smith’s *Dict. of Ant.* ii. p. 193.

mathematical school, who investigated the mathematical ratios determining consonance and dissonance. The first of these two classes Plato dismisses with contempt as mere empiricists who "persecute and torture the strings, racking them upon the pegs."¹ For the second or Pythagorean school of theorists he has more respect; but they too are guilty of a fundamental error, inasmuch as it is only audible consonances whose ratios they examine; whereas they ought to have recourse to problems, inquiring which members are really concordant or discordant, and what is the reason in each case. It is difficult to follow out Plato's conception in detail; but we can clearly see that he regards certain mathematical ratios as possessing *in themselves* the quality of consonance, audible consonances being only sensible and therefore inadequate embodiments of these transcendental ratios, and, like the visible movements of the stars, useful merely for illustrative purposes and nothing more. The true musician, according to Plato, is one who penetrates into "the world of harmony beyond."

So much, then, for the five preliminary studies forming the *ἐπάνοδος τοῦ ὄντος*, or ascent into the realm of Being. I have enumerated them in the order of their inception—theory of Number, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, and theory of Music; but we are not to suppose that each preceding study is relinquished as soon as a new one begins. It will be observed that the complexity increases as we advance, except at the last: for the science of Harmonics does not seem to be more complex than Astronomy; the truth is rather that they are two complementary sides of the same subject, namely, the intelligible counterpart of movement, in the one case of visible movement, and in the other of audible.² In the theory of Number, we are presumably dealing with one dimension, Number in antiquity being often

¹ *Rep.* vii. 531 B.

² *Rep.* vii. 530 D.

represented by a line: Geometry adds a second dimension, Stereometry a third; and in Astronomy there is the further element of motion. The demand upon the intellect becomes correspondingly greater at each stage, particularly as all these sciences are to be treated from a purely abstract, perhaps we should rather say a transcendental, point of view.

It is deserving of notice that Plato's *quadrivium* of studies—for Stereometry may be viewed as a department of Geometry—is the historical prototype of liberal education in Europe. There is some reason to believe that the Pythagoreans had already established a course of study embracing Arithmetic, Music, Geometry, and Astronomy, and we have already seen that, towards the end of the fifth century B.C., the sophist Hippias taught these four subjects under the name of "Arts," which is also the name applied by Plato to his propædeutic studies. An allusion in Isocrates to "the education established in our day"¹ has reference to the same curriculum. If Plato, as is not unlikely, owed something in this matter to his predecessors, he was probably the first to arrange the subjects according to a clearly conceived plan, and he certainly gave his own interpretation to them all. Nor can there be any doubt that when he installed the "Arts" along with Dialectic in his own Academy or University—for such it really was—he became the virtual founder of University education throughout the Middle Ages. The *quadrivium* of the Middle Ages consisted of these four subjects, which together with the *trivium*, Grammar, Dialectic, and Rhetoric, made up the seven *liberales artes*, proficiency in which was rewarded by the degree of *artium baccalaureus*.

To the student of language, the very name of "mathematics" speaks of Plato. It was in consequence of the position which he assigned to them in his Academy that

¹ *Panath.* 26.

mathematical pursuits came to be known in a special and peculiar sense as "studies" or *μαθήματα*: Plato himself, indeed, repeatedly so calls them. Thus in a passage of the *Laws*¹ he writes: *τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἔστι τρία μαθήματα*, "there are three studies suitable for freemen" —in other words, as we should say, three "liberal studies": one of them is Calculation and Arithmetic: the measurement (*μετρητική*) of length, superficies, and depth is the second"—he means, of course, Geometry (*γεωμετρία*), Plane and Solid: "and the third treats of the revolutions of the stars in their relations to one another." By the time of Aristotle the mathematical use of *μαθήματα* is fully established; and "mathematics" is only a literal translation of *τὰ μαθηματικά*, the subject-matter of "learning" in the narrower and more restricted meaning of the word. So close are the links that bind our education to the past.

In conclusion, I would ask you to remember that, in making his preparatory discipline consist of mathematics, Plato is true to the principles expounded in the *Timaus*. According to that dialogue, the Creator, who, in Plato's opinion, is always geometrising, constructs the soul and body alike of the Universe and man by means of mathematical ratios and forms. In a certain sense mathematical science, from Plato's point of view, is thus a revelation of the Deity. But the pupil must not be allowed to acquiesce in it as final. His teacher must never lose sight of the something beyond which alone gives meaning and value to the period of preparation. When, after years of patient effort, we finally attain an elevation from which we can take a synoptic view of the road by which we have travelled, apprehending the different studies in their mutual relationship and discerning the continuity of our progress from first to last,

¹ vii. 817 E.

we are in a position to enter on the study of the Ideas: but the ultimate goal, the Idea of the Good, is still far distant. All that we have hitherto learnt, says Plato, is only the prelude to the song of dialectic. It will be our duty in the remaining lectures to endeavour to interpret the music of that song.

LECTURES XXI AND XXII

PLATO—*concluded*

THE THEORY OF IDEAS

THE educational discipline which occupied our attention during the last lecture was intended by Plato to prepare the soul for the contemplation of "that which is best in the world of Being," in other words, the Idea of the Good. It is with this highest and final stage of the soul's initiation that we are concerned to-day.

We shall place ourselves in the best position for understanding what Plato meant by his Theory of Ideas, if we start from the passage in which Aristotle describes what he conceives to have been the strictly philosophical significance of the doctrine. According to Aristotle's account, the Theory of Ideas was generated out of the union of Socraticism with Heracliteanism.

From first to last Plato, according to Aristotle, agreed with Heraclitus in holding that all perceivable things are "ceaselessly flowing," and consequently incapable of being known: for the object of knowledge, he assumed, is necessarily constant and unchanging. At the same time, he believed that Socrates was right in the importance he attached to definition and the universals, with which definition is concerned. What then is this universal or constant element which the general term endeavours to express? It cannot be something perceivable, for perceivables are never constant, but always changing. Just because it is permanent and universal,

it must be something entirely disparate from sensibles. In this way Plato arrived at his doctrine of Ideas or Forms, which are simply the objective correlates of our general notions; and he further declared that every group of sensibles is separate from its Idea, while at the same time participating in it and called by its name.¹

The reasoning which Aristotle thus drily summarises was known in antiquity as the "argument from knowledge" (*οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν*). You will observe that, according to this argument, the Theory of Ideas is simply Plato's answer to the question which had occupied Greek thinkers from the time of Parmenides.

Heraclitus was the champion of multiplicity and change, Parmenides of permanence and unity; they stood at the opposite poles of thought, the one denying emphatically what the other no less emphatically affirmed. Their successors, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, recognising that each of these views contained a measure of truth, endeavoured to effect a reconciliation by identifying the principle of change with combination and dissolution, and the element of unity or permanence with certain changeless though corporeal substances, the four elementary bodies, or the homoeomeries, or, finally, in the case of Democritus, *individua corpora* or atoms. In the view of Aristotle, Plato unreservedly accepts the Heraclitean doctrine of flux so far as concerns the visible world, while at the same time he does justice to the opposite principle by elevating the Socratic universals into certain incorporeal and unchangeable realities which he calls Ideas. The "argument from knowledge" is, I think, the only formal argument in defence of the Ideal theory with which we meet in the writings of Plato himself.² Throughout the Platonic dialogues, those with whom Socrates converses are for the most part ready and even eager to accept without demur the existence of the

¹ *Met.* A 6. 987^a 29-^b10.

² *Rep.* v. 476 A ff. Cf. *Tim.* 51 D ff.

Ideas as an unquestionable truth, somewhat more eager, in fact, than Socrates himself appears to be.

For the present I will ask you to consider the evidence of Aristotle only in so far as it helps to explain, and not to justify, the Theory of Ideas. The first point which Aristotle makes clear is that Plato hypostasised the Socratic universals, giving to them not merely a conceptual, but a substantial existence on their own account; in the second place, we learn that the Ideas are at once transcendent and immanent, at once separate from, and yet present in particulars: for when Aristotle says that every group of sensibles partakes in its Idea, he only repeats what Plato expresses sometimes in this way, and sometimes by the formula of *παρουσία*, or presence: the Idea, Plato says, is present in the phenomena which bear its name. This union of transcendence and immanence constitutes the great intellectual paradox of the Ideal Theory. About the significance of the paradox I will speak presently; but in the meantime let us examine the Ideas first of all in their transcendental aspect.

That Plato should have attributed a separate existence to his Ideas, independently alike of sensible particulars and of the knowing mind—this at first sight extraordinary phenomenon has often proved a stumbling-block in the path of those who approach the study of Platonism from the side of philosophy pure and simple. The philosophical difficulty, involved in the apparent disruption of the Universe into two mutually exclusive hemispheres, has been so seriously felt that not a few interpreters have regarded the transcendence of the Ideas as no real part of Platonism at all, but only a misconception arising from a narrow and unsympathetic, not to say mechanical and pedantic, study of the dialogues.

For my own part, I think that Plato's actual statements leave us no alternative except to believe that he looked upon the Ideas as transcendent; nor does any-

one deny that Aristotle attributed this dogma, from which he himself profoundly disagreed, to his master.¹ The duty of a commentator in such a case would seem to be to take Plato at his word, and endeavour to understand the motives that impelled him to have recourse to such a hypothesis. Aristotle, for his part, represents the Ideal Theory as originating in an attempt to find a sure foundation for knowledge and knowledge only; but when we read the dialogues of Plato himself, we cannot but feel that there were other and hardly less powerful impulses at work; and we may perhaps conjecture what these impulses were if we examine some of the different attributes which he assigns to his Ideas.

It is in harmony with Plato's separation of the intelligible from the sensible world that his description of the former is generally conveyed in language which, by its implied antithesis, at once suggests the fundamental contrast between the two spheres. This is not, however, equivalent to saying that he describes the Ideas in terms of mere negation: on the contrary, since phenomena are in themselves less real than the Ideas, there is far more of what Plato would have called negation in his account of the phenomenal than of the Ideal World. In the first place, then, each Idea is one, and not many: there cannot, for example, be two Ideas of the Beautiful, otherwise we should have to postulate a still higher Idea to account for the common element in these two: and in such a case it would be the higher Idea and neither of the two lower that would constitute the really existent Beautiful.² By virtue of this attribute of unity, the Platonic Idea furnishes a kind of answer to the imperious demand of human nature for some haven of refuge from the sea of multiplicity on which we are tossed.

¹ Professor Gomperz pronounces it "a monstrous supposition" that Plato should have been "misunderstood by Aristotle in regard

to his principal doctrine" (*Greek Thinkers* iii. p. 328).

² *Rep.* x. 597 C.

In the second place, the Ideas are changeless and eternal. On these two characteristics of the Ideal World, Plato never wearies of insisting: they are involved in his description of the Idea as that which "always is" and "never becomes," as well as in the frequently recurring phrase *ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, "ever immutably the same." Applying to all the other Ideas what is predicated of the Idea of Beauty in the Symposium, we may say that each Idea is ever-existent, alike uncreated and imperishable; it is what it is always and everywhere and in all relations and respects: it is, in short, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν*, alone and by itself, simple and everlasting; and while the Idea is at the same time "present" in the particulars called by its name, yet this very "presence" is of such a kind that, although the particulars come into being and perish, the Idea nevertheless suffers no diminution nor increase nor change of any kind at all.¹ It is obvious that in this and similar pictures of the Ideal World, the dominating motive is not to provide a severely rational foundation for a theory of knowledge: it is rather to satisfy the instinctive longing of the mind for "an abiding city," a *βασίλεια ἀσάλευτος*, or "kingdom that cannot be shaken," in the contemplation of which we may find rest amid the change and decay of things terrestrial.

The third attribute of the Ideas, and that which seems to throw the greatest light on Plato's reasons for placing them in a world apart, is their perfection. Whereas the Socratic definition expresses only those qualities of the object defined which we have learned by means of an induction that at best is always incomplete, the Platonic Idea is the sum and substance of all the essential characteristics of the thing in question, whether we know them or not, and consequently represents the

¹ Cf. p. 433 ff.

perfect and complete reality of which our general notions may be only an imperfect copy. In this way the Idea becomes the absolute or standard for the particular group of phenomena over which it presides. It must be admitted, however, that the different examples by which Plato enforces his theory of Absolutes, or, as he sometimes names them, "models set up in nature,"¹ are not all equally persuasive. We find it difficult, for instance, to follow him when he speaks of the really existent Bed or Table at which the carpenter looks when manufacturing the beds or tables which we use;² and ancient as well as modern critics have sometimes doubted whether, in the case of artificial objects, Plato seriously intended to assert the existence of a transcendental Form. Yet even here we feel that the manufactured object is always imperfect—never fully and entirely is what it fain would be. We are conscious of a similar sentiment in connection with the creations of nature, both organic and inorganic: the ideal type, we feel, is never wholly realised.

"That type of Perfect in his mind
In Nature can he nowhere find."

The thought which Tennyson expresses in these lines³ was thoroughly congenial to Plato. When we look upon visible and material things he points out in the *Phaedo*, we are frequently sensible that they fall short of the ideal. "This thing, which I now see, would fain be like that other, but falls short, and cannot attain thereto, but is inferior." "All these equals which I see aspire to absolute equality, but do not reach it."⁴ But it is in the domain of art and morality that the Platonic conception of an absolute and unchanging standard appears

¹ *Parm.* 132 D.

² *Rep.* x. 596 A ff. Cf. *Crat.*

³ *The Two Voices.*

⁴ *Phaed.* 74 A ff.

389 A ff.

most powerfully to the idealistic impulses of mankind, and has exercised by far the greatest influence upon human thought.

“Who says that fictions onely and false hair
 Become a verse? Is there in truth no beautie?
 Is all good structure in a winding stair?
 May no lines passe, except they do their dutie
 Not to a true, but painted chair?”¹

It will be allowed that George Herbert, the author of these verses, gives expression in them to a feeling which, whether it be justifiable or not, is at all events deeply rooted in our nature. We are so constituted that we refuse to acquiesce in a purely subjective standard of the beautiful and ugly; on such a hypothesis, indeed, Art criticism becomes impossible, and those who hold the hypothesis in theory, are apt in practice to belie it, when others differ from them on a point of taste. It is also a historical fact that Plato's vision of a transcendent standard of Beauty, “everywhere and always and in all relations beautiful,” has fired the imagination of artists in more than one generation, and was in particular the inspiring motive of the art of Michael Angelo, in whose lifetime the famous Academy at Florence made Platonism live again. And if in questions of aesthetics we feel that there is and must be something more than a merely subjective or conventional standard of right and wrong, the feeling is even stronger in matters appertaining to morality. Inasmuch as Socrates concerned himself almost exclusively with ethical notions, it is not unlikely, as Mr. Waddell appears to suggest in his edition of the *Parmenides*,² that the Theory of Ideas itself began with the hypostasisation of Justice, Goodness, and so forth, and afterwards enlarged its scope so as to include the other inhabitants of the

¹ *Jordan*.

² P. xxix.

Ideal sphere. In any case, the need for asserting the objective reality of the moral standard may well have seemed to Plato all the greater on account of the teaching of the Sophists. We have already seen that one of the prevailing tendencies of the age of Illumination was to look upon Justice and other ethical concepts as determined, according to the usual formula, not by nature, but by convention—*θέσει*, not *φύσει*: they are merely matters of agreement between man and man, and correspond to no objective or so-called "natural" realities at all. Protagoras, if we adopt the ancient interpretation of his maxim, went even further, and maintained that the individual, alone and by himself, is for and to himself the only "measure" or standard of all things. Against this extreme development of subjectivity in morals, Plato's theory of Ideas is an emphatic counterblast. It is Protagoras whom he is trying to refute, when, in the *Cratylus*, he declares that the Ideas have a stable existence of their own, not relative to us, nor dragged to and fro by us according to our fancy, but independent, and relative only to their own essence with that relation which Nature, and not (as we may presume the antithesis to be) Convention, has ordained.¹

In view of the three attributes which we have now considered, unity, changelessness, and perfection, it ought to be easy for us to appreciate, at least in some degree, the motives which led Plato to "separate" his Ideas from the region of sense, and assign to them a transcendent existence of their own. In the world of space and time there is no unity without multiplicity, nothing that abides, nothing that is perfect in its kind, although everything speaks to us of a perfection not its own. Just as the inheritance for which the Christian looks, the "inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away," is not of this world, so the eternal and un-

¹ *Crat.* 386 E. Cf. p. 426.

changeable realities which, according to Plato, the Soul in her past history beheld, and which she hopes to behold again hereafter, are necessarily "yonder" (ἐκεῖ). If they were only immanent and not transcendent, they would cease to be what they are, that is, an Ideal; for an ideal must always be beyond—

"A world above man's head, to let him see
How boundless might his soul's horizons be,
How vast, yet of what clear transparency!"¹

Thus far, then, it would seem that the Ideas of Plato constitute a world of transcendental models or archetypes, the truly existent reality corresponding to all our dreams of perfection, in the spheres alike of nature, art, morality, and knowledge. Plato's religion consists in the passionate uplifting of the mind towards this realm of perfection, to which the Soul in her true nature is akin. It has often been pointed out that St. Paul and St. Peter laid the mysteries under contribution, for imagery in which to shadow forth the spiritual realities of the Christian faith. In exactly the same way the mysteries of Eleusis provide metaphors and phrases for Plato's description of the Ideal world. The account of the "region above the heavens,"² in the *Phaedrus*, is steeped in the atmosphere of the Eleusinian rites. The framework in which the narrative is set—a pilgrimage of Gods and souls as yet unfallen, ending in a sacrament—reveals the procession along the sacred way from Athens to the temple of Demeter at Eleusis: and in many details of the picture we can detect a reference to the actual celebrations of the festival. The conception of the Idea as the food or τροφή of the soul: the employment of expressions referring to the ceremony of initiation—τελετά, for example, μνεῖσθαι, ἀρτιτελής, ἀτελής, νεοτελής, ἐποπτεύειν, τέλειος,

¹ Matthew Arnold, *A Summer Night*.

² The ὑπερουράνιος τόπος, *Phaedr.* 247 C.

and perhaps *ὀλόκληρος*: the use of words like *μάκαρ*, *εὐδαίμων*, *εὐπαθεῖν*, to describe the rapture of the beatific vision: and the allusion to the *αὐγή καθαρὰ*, the blaze of light amid which the sacred *φάσματα* or emblems were exhibited—in each and all of these features we may easily recognise the source of Plato's inspiration.¹

No one who understands the part played by the mysteries in Greek life will deny that such a description of the Ideal World was intended to arouse religious as well as philosophical enthusiasm. It is consequently something more than a figure of speech when Plato calls the Idea divine—the divine model or *παράδειγμα* after which human institutions should be framed.² The eternal and invisible Forms are in very truth the Platonic equivalent of Gods; and from this point of view Mr. Pater is justified in describing the Ideal Theory as a sort of "recrudescence of polytheism in that abstract world."³ In the words of the same writer, the Ideas seem to become for Plato "not merely substantial things-in-themselves, but little short of living persons, to be known as persons are made known to each other, by a system of affinities, on the old Eleatic rule, *ὅμοιον ὀμοίῳ*, like to like—these persons constituting together that common, eternal, intellectual world, a sort of divine family or hierarchy, with which the mind of the individual, so far as it is reasonable, or really knows, is in communion or correspondence."⁴

Up to the present stage, we have considered only the transcendence of the Ideas. I have tried to suggest that the reason why Plato makes them "separate" from particulars is that the Ideal or Type must always be transcendent: neither by nature nor by man is it ever wholly realised. To this aspect of the Ideas we have found a religious parallel in the Christian conception of

¹ *Phaedr.* 246 A ff., esp. 250.

² *Rep.* vi. 500 E.

³ *Plato and Platonism* p. 153.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 138.

a heaven "that is above this world and beyond time, not only superterrestrial but supramundane,"¹ the ultimate goal of all our aspirations after spiritual beauty, goodness, and truth. We have next to examine the relation which Plato conceives to exist between the region of perfect Forms and the world in which we live. One of the objects of the Ideal Theory is to enable us to understand things as they are; and it is obvious that the creation of a second universe, a kind of archetypal "museum," as it has been called, so far from having any such result, only multiplies the phenomena to be explained, unless it is brought into some kind of causal and necessary connection with the world of space and time. The relation between the Idea and the particular is a topic on which Plato frequently dwells; but it is characteristic of his genius that he was far more anxious to insist on the reality of the Universal, than to develop a consistent theory of its union with individual things. At the same time we shall, I think, discover that for the student of religious, not of philosophical thought, no little interest attaches to Plato's general conception of the way in which the Infinite comes into contact with the finite, as well as to the terminology which he employs in treating of the subject.

It will be convenient to take as the basis of our discussion part of the famous passage of the *Phaedo* in which the Platonic Socrates tells the story of his intellectual development. After describing how he had found no rest or satisfaction for his mind in the study of mere secondary causes, he proceeds somewhat as follows:

"Let me now try to show you the sort of cause that interests me. I will return to the old and well-worn story, and begin with the Ideas, postulating a self-existent Beautiful, Good, Great, and so on. If you grant me these, I hope to make you understand what I mean

¹ S. D. F. Salmond in *Hastings' Dict. of the Bible*, ii. p. 323^b.

by causation. . . . I hold that if a thing is beautiful, it is so for no other reason than because it *partakes* in the Ideal Beauty (*μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ*). . . . If anyone tells me that such and such a thing is beautiful, because it has the bloom of colour or form or anything else of the sort, I neglect all that : it merely confuses me : and to this one point, simply and artlessly—perhaps you will think foolishly—I cleave fast in my own mind, that nothing makes an object beautiful except the presence (*παρουσία*) of Ideal Beauty, or their communion (*κοινωνία*) with each other, or the advent of the Idea in whatsoever way :¹ for upon the mode of the connection I do not insist ; but only that it is the Idea of Beauty by which beautifuls are made beautiful.”²

Communion (*κοινωνία*), participation (*μετέχειν, μέθεξις, μεταλαμβάνειν, μετάληψις*), presence (*παρουσία*)—these, then, are the usual terms employed by Plato to shadow forth the relation between the eternal self-existent Idea and the particulars of which, whatever may be the exact character of the relationship, Plato is profoundly convinced that the Idea and nothing else is the cause. Now, if the particular communicates with or partakes of the Idea, we are just as much entitled to say that the particular is in the Idea as that the Idea is in the particular. To each of these two ways of expressing the communion between the finite and the Infinite the language of religion offers many parallels ;³ but Plato confines himself exclusively, I think, to the second formula. The Idea is “present” in or “possesses” (*κατέχει*)⁴ the particular. It is worthy of notice, as indicating the religious affinities of the conception, that in common with the rest of the Greeks, Plato attributed also the phenomenon of inspiration to *παρουσία* or presence—the presence, namely, of the inspiring God. He who is inspired is *ἐνθεός* : there is a God within him : or he is possessed by a

¹ Reading (with the MSS.) *προς-γενομένη*.

² *Phaedo* 100 B ff

³ e.g. “Abide in Me, and I in you.”

⁴ e.g. *Phaed.* 104 D.

God (κατοκωχή). In the same way, as we have seen, the rational faculty is, according to Plato, the divine element *in* man; but I find no trace in the dialogues of the converse notion that the human soul can be "in God," although the phrase μετασχεῖν θεοῦ, "to partake in God," occurs in the *Phaedrus*.¹

It appears, therefore, that the Idea, which we have found to be transcendent, is at the same time immanent; and, as I have already stated, it is just this transcendent immanence of the Idea which constitutes the paradox of Plato's Idealism. No one knew better than Plato the difficulties inherent in such a conception, at least so long as it is interpreted in any narrow spirit of literalism. In the *Parmenides* he puts into the mouth of the veteran Eleatic philosopher the most trenchant criticism which the theory of Ideas has ever received, and a considerable part of that criticism is directed to this very point. Are we to suppose, asks Parmenides, that the whole of the Idea is present in each particular, or only part of it? One of the two alternatives must be true. In either case, we sacrifice the unity of the Idea: for if the whole Idea inheres in each several thing, the Idea is no longer one, but many; and if each particular has only part of the Idea, then the Idea is divisible; whereas Unity is indivisible.² And so on through a series of objections not less relevant and pointed—objections which (so far as I can see) Plato never succeeded in refuting, though to the last he seems to have upheld the transcendence as well as the immanence of the Ideas. In spite of the theoretical difficulty, Plato was apparently convinced that the Infinite must be at once above and beyond the finite and yet at the same time present in the finite; and here again we are struck by the resemblance between Platonism and Christian theology, which maintains

¹ 253 A.

² 130 E ff.

“with equal firmness a belief in the immanence of God in the world, and a belief in the transcendence of God above the world.”¹ Each of these two doctrines holds the field, although the difficulty of reconciling them has been felt by Christian thinkers not less than by Plato. Thus, for example, St. Augustine, speaking of the divine immanence, observes, in language that reminds us forcibly of the *Parmenides*: “But when Thou fillest all things, dost Thou fill them with all Thyself? Or because all things cannot contain the whole of Thee, do they receive a part of Thee, and do all receive the same part at the same time? Or does each receive its own part, greater things a greater part, lesser things a lesser? Then is one part of Thee greater, another less. Or art Thou wholly everywhere, though naught receives the whole of Thee?”²

What, then, it may be asked, does Plato wish to express, when he speaks of the transcendent idea as at the same time present in the particulars of which it is the cause? Perhaps we shall best understand his meaning if we take two examples, let us say the Beautiful and the Just, and consider what this notion of *παρουσία* or presence would signify in connexion with them. It is clear that the perfect Ideal of Beauty can be said to reside in a beautiful picture only in proportion as that picture *resembles* the Ideal which, on Platonic principles, is the cause why it is beautiful; and in like manner Ideal Justice or Righteousness is “present” in a human soul just to the extent to which that soul participates in the perfection at which it aims. In other words, the “presence” of the Idea in the particular means the resemblance of the particular to its Idea; and in point of fact, Plato constantly expresses the relationship in this way, not only in the later dialogues, when the

¹ Chase, *Credibility of the Acts*
p. 227.

² *Confessions*, tr. Bigg, i. c. iii.

paradeigmatic conception of the Idea predominates, but also in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, side by side with the theory of participation or immanence, on which, indeed, the theory of likeness is only a kind of explanatory gloss.¹ The view that the Ideas are *παραδείγματα* or types in which phenomena participate is condemned by Aristotle as a poetical metaphor and nothing more—*κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς*:² nor does Plato himself suppose that it provides a satisfactory philosophical account of the relation between the finite and the Infinite.

But if we would understand the religious potentialities of the doctrine, we must turn, as before, to the New Testament. In St. John's Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul, Ideal Righteousness, which Plato, we must remember, speaks of as divine,³ has become incarnate in Jesus Christ: "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us": hence we may fairly say that in these two writers the person of Christ occupies the same relative position as is occupied by the Idea of Righteousness in Plato. It is consequently more than a merely verbal or superficial analogy when the relationship between the believer's soul and Christ is described in the New Testament by the formula of participation or communion: "partakers of the divine nature" (*θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως*), "the fellowship (*κοινωνία*) of Jesus Christ our Lord," "our fellowship (*κοινωνία*) is with the Father and with His Son," "fellow-partakers (*συμμέτοχα*) of the promise in Christ Jesus," "partakers of the Holy Ghost," "partakers (*μέτοχοι*) of the heavenly calling."⁴ And if the idea of *κοινωνία* or fellowship is common, that of "immanence" is even more so. No doubt the word *παρουσία*, "presence," by which Plato generally expresses

¹ See *Parm.* 132 D.

² *Met.* A. 9. 991^a21 f.

³ *Theast.* 176 E *al.*

⁴ 2 Pet. i. 4; 1 Cor. i. 9; 1 John i. 3; Eph. iii. 6; Heb. vi. 4, iii. 1.

the relationship, has a different sense in the New Testament, where it refers with few exceptions to the second coming of our Lord and the fulfilment of the reign of righteousness already begun upon the earth. *Parousia*, in Plato, means partial, incomplete attainment; in Christianity, for the most part, it signifies the final consummation. That is the obvious difference, so far as language is concerned; but it is not a mere question of words: the point is rather that the doctrine of *Parousia* as the presence of the Infinite in the finite underlies the deepest religious teaching of St. Paul's Epistles, as well as the Gospel and Epistles of St. John, having attained, of course, to new vitality and power by the embodiment of the divine Idea in a divine yet human personality. Plato professes himself unable to conceive of any cause except the immanent Idea; it is the Idea of Righteousness, present in the soul, and nothing else whatever, that makes us righteous. In exactly the same way, according to the New Testament, the indwelling Christ, "Christ in you," produces the Christian or Christ-like character. Other cause there is and can be none. "I am the bread of life." . . . "He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood abideth in Me and *I in him*." "Ye shall know that I am in My Father, and ye in Me, and *I in you*." "Greater is He that is *in you* than he that is in the world." "Sanctify *in your hearts* Christ as Lord." "Christ *in you*, the hope of glory." "It is God which worketh *in you* both to will and to work, for His good pleasure." "No longer I, but Christ liveth *in me*." "My little children, of whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed *in you*."¹ Nor does the living and life-giving principle which the Apostles identify with Christ reside merely in the soul of the believer. As in Plato the universe of Ideas, afterwards summed up by

¹ St. John vi. 48, 56, xiv. 20; i. 27; Phil. ii. 13; Gal. ii. 20, 1 John iv. 4; 1 Pet. iii. 15; Col. iv. 19.

Philo in the single concept of *Logos*, constitutes the immanent reality of the world, so in the Fourth Gospel and in St. Paul, Christ is the inherent life and truth of all that is, a cosmic power as well as an influence that works in human lives. The author of St. John's Gospel intended to suggest this great idea when he wrote, "That which hath been made was life in him" (*ὃ γέγονεν, ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*):¹ the entire universe, organic and inorganic, lives in Christ. "The world is the poem of the Word to the glory of the Father: in it, and by means of it, He displays in time all the riches which God has eternally put within Him."² We meet with the same conception in the Epistle to the Colossians: "In him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible. . . . and in Him all things consist" (*τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν*).³

So much, then, for the religious significance of Plato's doctrine of *Parousia*. Reverting for a moment to the general question of the transcendent immanence of the Idea, we may sum the matter up by saying that just as by virtue of its transcendence the Idea is never wholly realised in the particular, but stands apart, an object of ceaseless aspiration and desire, so by virtue of its immanence, the Idea is at the same time always being realised, in proportion as the particular approximates to it.

We have next to inquire whether in the Ideal World itself there is any unifying principle. It has been pointed out that each individual Idea constitutes the essential unity of the group of phenomena in which it inheres; but if there is nothing to connect and co-ordinate the several Ideas among themselves, no still higher Being, Potency, or Power—call it by what name

¹ i. 3. So in one of the *Logia* published in 1897 Jesus saith:
² Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find Me; cleave the wood, and there am I.

³ Inge, *Christian Mysticism* p. 47.

³ Col. i. 16. Cf. Inge, *l.c.* p. 66.

you will—by which they in their turn are comprehended ; it is obvious that we do not really escape from multiplicity after all. Such a supreme and ultimate Unity Plato finds in the Idea of Good ; and this conception—the *θρυγκός* or coping-stone of his entire philosophy—a conception not less full of religious than of philosophical import—it is now our duty to examine.

By the time of Plato, owing chiefly to the influence of Socrates' life and teaching, the question, "What is the good?" had already become the central problem of Ethics ; and as such it appears again and again in the minor Socratic dialogues which are usually supposed to be earlier than the *Republic*. For an admirable account of the doctrine of these and other dialogues, regarded as a preparation for the more comprehensive treatment of the subject in the *Republic*, I may refer you to Mr. Nettleship's *Lectures and Remains* ;¹ but as the *Republic* gives by far the fullest description of the metaphysical and religious aspect of the Good, it is with the discussion in that dialogue that we are principally concerned.

The Idea of Good, says the Platonic Socrates, is King of the intelligible sphere, as the Sun is of the visible.² To describe the supreme Idea in itself he will not venture : the Father and Maker of all, we read in the *Timæus*,³ is hard to discover, and after he is discovered, impossible to declare unto all. We must be content to apprehend the Good by means of its *ἐκγονος*, or offspring, that is to say, the Sun ; for as the Sun in the visible world stands to sight and its objects, so the Good in the intelligible world stands to Reason and the objects Reason knows. In brief, the Good is, as it were, the Sun of the Ideal World : this is the leading thought running through the whole of Plato's exposition.⁴

¹ Vol. i. pp. 237-236.

² vi. 509 D.

³ 28 C.

⁴ vi. 506 D ff.

In the passage which I have just summarised, you will observe that something of the adoration with which Plato regards the supreme Idea is extended also to its offspring in the realm of visibles. There are traces of sun-worship in Plato, as in Greek religion generally; ¹ but here it is as the symbol and vicegerent of the Idea of Good that the "clear God and patron of all light" inspires religious feeling. "It is probable," says Mr. G. R. Benson, "that Plato felt it was no accident that made this imagery available for him. . . . He probably thought that, so to speak, it was part of the function of the sun thus to present a type of the good." ² A similar conception frequently occurs in the works of Dante. Thus in the *Banquet* we read: "There is no sensible thing in all the world more worthy to be an image of God than the sun, which with its sensible light illumines first itself, and then all celestial and elementary bodies; so God first illumines Himself with intellectual light, and then the celestial and other intelligences." ³

Let us see how Plato for his part develops the comparison. The Sun, he says, is the Lord of light, and by means of light enables our sight to see and the objects of sight to be seen. Where no light shines, we see nothing; but where there is light, we see. Similarly, the Good is the Lord of Truth,—the spiritual analogue of light,—and by means of Truth enables Reason, the eye of soul, to know. When the Reason is firmly stayed (*ἀπρεπισσηται*) on that whereon Truth shines, it is roused into activity and knows; but when it looks on the darkness of the phenomenal world, where things arise and pass away, it knows nothing, but merely opines, and is carried to and fro by every wind of doctrine. There is no rest for the soul till it is anchored in the Truth. ⁴

¹ e.g. *Tim.* 40 A; *Symp.* 220 D.

² Nettleship's *Lectures and Remarks* ii. p. 235 n. 2.

³ iii. c. 12, § 4, tr. K. Hillard:

cf. *Purg.* 7. 26 (l'alto Sol che tu disiri); *Par.* 9. 8, 15. 76 *al.*

⁴ *Rep.* vi. 508 A-D.

The Good is therefore, according to Plato, the ultimate cause of Knowledge; it is that which enables all the other Ideas to be known. Secondly, the Good is likewise the ultimate cause of Being: for just as the Sun provides the objects of sight not only with the capacity of being seen, but also with generation, increase, and nourishment, so also the Good furnishes the objects of Knowledge not merely with the power to be known, but also with *οὐσία* or Existence. It is that by reason of which every other Idea is.¹

In this way the Idea of Good becomes in Plato the source at once of Knowledge and of Existence. Plato is careful to point out that, although Knowledge resembles, it is not identical with, the Good, any more than sight should be identified with the Sun. The Good, he says, is something higher than Knowledge, and even more beautiful.² It is also higher than Existence—*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*,³ above and beyond all the other Ideas of which it is the cause, *ὑπερούσιον* or “super-substantial,” to use the name by which the transcendence of the Highest was sometimes described in later philosophical and religious thought. As the source of Knowledge, the Good, dwelling itself, as one might say, in light inaccessible (*φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον*),⁴ is “that which gives light to all” (*τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον*);⁵ so that from hence proceeds, not only Knowledge, but also whatever light or truth still lingers in those inferior grades of intellectual or quasi-intellectual apprehension enumerated in the simile of the line. Considered, again, as the source of Being, the Good is the author of all the subordinate Ideas, each of which is but a special determination of itself, and through them of the realities of mathematics, as well as of that reflection or semblance

¹ vi. 509 B.

² vi. 508 E.

³ vi. 509 B.

⁴ 1 Tim. vi. 16.

⁵ *Rep.* vii. 540 A.

of reality which belongs to the world of generation and decay, in each of its two categories, material things and shadows. In short, as Aristotle might have said, it is the principle on which the Universe and Nature hang—the ἀρχὴ ἀφ' ἧς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.¹

Throughout the foregoing discussion, I have occasionally used language which implies that the Idea of Good stands for Plato's philosophical conception of God. The identification has often been challenged; but the difficulties involved in any other hypothesis appear to be insuperable. If we deny the equation, while still believing that Plato did not exclude the concept of God from his philosophy, we must take up one of three positions. We must maintain that the Idea of Good is subordinate to God, or, conversely, that God is subordinate to the Idea of Good, or else that they are wholly independent of one another, the Idea being as it were a model or *παράδειγμα*, after whose likeness the Creator fashions the Universe, so far as Necessity permits. The first of these solutions is inconsistent with the sovereignty of the Good, on which Plato emphatically insists, and the second cannot be reconciled with the representation of the "Maker and Father of all" in the *Timaeus*, nor indeed with the suggestion in the *Republic* that God is the author of the secondary or derivative Ideas.² The third hypothesis, though held by some distinguished critics, and at first sight supported by the *Timaeus*, denies to the Idea of Good that creative function which is expressly assigned to it in the *Republic*. Or are we to adopt a fourth solution, and say that "religion and the Gods on the one hand, philosophy and the Ideas on the other, are two conceptions of the world, which, answering to two different needs of men, are

¹ See *Met.* A 7. 1072^b14. Cf. 28. 41 f.): da quel punto Dipende Dante's account of the Deity (*Par.* il cielo, e tutta la natura.

² x. 597 B.

elaborated by two distinct faculties of the mind," and that while Plato was "a religious person and believed in the Gods like the respectable people of his day, yet in his philosophy, as long as the Ideal Theory held the field, he might have said with Laplace, 'I have never felt the want of that hypothesis'?" This is the theory which M. Bovet has advanced in his treatise on "Le Dieu de Platon,"¹ but such a separation between religion and philosophy would assuredly have been repudiated by Plato, when he wrote the *Republic*, not less emphatically than when he wrote the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. The doctrine that reason, and not sentiment, is the divine element in man, as it were the link uniting him to God, belongs to the so-called middle as well as to the later Platonism; and no one holding this belief could have kept his religion and his philosophy in two watertight compartments. To impute anything of the sort to Plato involves, I cannot but think, an entire misconception of what Platonism really means.

Consider, in the second place, some of the positive reasons for the identification. To begin with, it establishes between the earlier and later books of the *Republic* precisely the kind of harmony we should expect. The first and most important of the canons which Plato, in the second book, prescribed for the religious instruction of the young was that God is good. Now we have already seen that the preliminary scheme of education was intended to pave the way for the later and more advanced, by inculcating in a categorical or dogmatic form, as it were, the reflection of philosophical truths which are afterwards to be apprehended in themselves by ratiocination and not by faith. It would accordingly seem that the Idea of Good is the philosophical fulfilment of the doctrine of the divine goodness already imparted at an earlier stage of intellectual development.

¹ P. 76.

A further reason for equating the two conceptions, God and the Idea of Good, is to be found in the analogy between the position of the Good in the *Republic*, and that of the Creator in the *Timaeus*. The same characteristics and activities are assigned by Plato to both. In the *Timaeus* the Godhead is "called the best":¹ in the *Republic* the Good is τὸ ἀριστον ἐν τοῖς οὐσίαις, "the best among things that are."² The Creator, according to the *Timaeus*, is hard to discover, and when discovered, difficult to reveal unto all men.³ In exactly the same spirit Socrates in the *Republic* professes himself unable to describe the Good otherwise than through an image:⁴ and it is worth remembering, by way of confirmatory evidence, that Greek writers not infrequently represent the Highest God as the inscrutable one, whose name is not lightly to be spoken.⁵ Of the Idea of Good we read that it is ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, "the beginning or source of the universe,"⁶ the creator or parent of the visible sun, and through it of the world in which we live." In like manner, God in the *Timaeus* is the "maker and Father of all";⁷ and Plato expressly attributes to him the creation of the sun and the other "heavenly Gods." In contradistinction with Necessity, the Creator, himself supremely good, is the sole cause of whatever is good in the world which he creates,⁸ making it, as far as may be, like unto himself. To the same purpose we are assured in the *Republic* that the Idea of Good is to everything the cause of all that is right and beautiful.⁹ These are some of the parallels which may be quoted; but, indeed, the whole of the *Timaeus* is only a kind of elucidation of one of the functions which the *Republic*

¹ 29 A, E, 37 A. Throughout this paragraph I have closely followed Biehl, *Die Idee des Guten* p. 65.

² vii. 532 C.

³ 28 C.

⁴ vi. 506 E.

⁵ Eur. *Troad.* 885. Cf. Plato, *Euthyphr.* 12 A.

⁶ vi. 511 B.

⁷ 28 C.

⁸ *Tim.* 68 E *al.*

⁹ vii. 517 C.

assigns to the supreme Idea, that of the efficient or creative cause.

Yet another argument may be derived from the exposition of the Ideal theory in Book X. of the *Republic*. Plato is attempting to explain the grounds of his belief that imitative art is twice removed from the Idea. We have here, let us say, the picture of a bed made by the painter. One degree higher in the scale of reality comes the so-called actual or concrete bed, which the carpenter makes, and the painter copies. Highest of all is the *αὐτὸ δ' ἔστι κλίνη*, that is, the "Idea of Bed," the "model set up in nature," and this in its turn is the original of which the carpenter produces a more or less imperfect likeness. Who then is the maker of the Idea? Socrates replies, "I suppose we shall say God."¹ On the strength of this passage, we are justified, I think, in holding that the Platonic Socrates would have ascribed the origin of any and all of the subordinate or derivative Ideas to the same cause; and if so, God is a synonym for the Supreme Idea, the Good, which in the sixth book of the *Republic* is held to be the author of all the rest.² It should be noticed, too, that just as the picture is third from reality, so also the painter is said by Plato "to be third from King and Truth."³ In this difficult phrase "Truth" refers, of course, to the Idea which the painter copies at two removes, and "King" must consequently stand for God, the author of the Idea. It will be remembered that in Book VI. the Idea of Good appears as "King" of the intelligible world.⁴ These are some of the reasons which appear to justify us in identifying Plato's Idea of the Good with his conception of the Godhead. The chief difficulty which a modern reader is likely to feel about the identification may perhaps be thus expressed. How can an apparently

¹ x. 597 B.

² 509 B.

³ x. 597 E.

⁴ 509 D.

abstract and impersonal principle like "Goodness" or "the Good" be equated with so personal a concept as the Deity? A brief consideration of this difficulty is desirable for its own sake, and will incidentally throw some further light on Plato's doctrine of the Good.

It is really correct to say that the Idea of Good, as portrayed in the *Republic*, is something purely impersonal and abstract. Taken by itself, no doubt, the expression τὸ ἀγαθόν carries no suggestion of personality. At the same time, the principle is frequently personified and becomes the object of religious emotion. Plato speaks of it as father and "king,"¹ parent in the visible sphere of light and the lord of light, and in the intelligible sphere, where it is itself the lord, author of truth and knowledge,² that which gives light to all,³ the brightest and most blessed part of Being,⁴ in the contemplation of which—the beatific vision, one might say—the soul at last finds rest!⁵ In all these expressions we are sensible of a certain admixture of religious feeling. But it is when we consider the functions of the sovereign Idea that we find ourselves compelled to suppose that Plato himself regarded the Good as something more than a mere inanimate abstraction. We have seen that the Good is the supreme creative principle alike in the world of sense and in the world of thought. As such, it cannot be separated from soul or life—that self-moving motion which communicates life and movement to all that lives.⁶ And soul, in its truest and most essential nature, was believed by Plato to be *Nous*⁷ so that the attribute of Reason must belong to the supreme Idea. The very perfection of the Good points to the same conclusion; for the rational, in Plato's way of thinking,

¹ vi. 506 E, 509 D.

² vii. 517 C.

³ vii. 540 A.

⁴ vii. 518 C, 526 E.

⁵ vii. Cf. 525 A, 532 B, C, E, 540 A.

⁶ See *Phaedr.* 245 C; *Lysis*, x. 895 E f.

⁷ See *Rep.* x. 611 B.

is always better than what is destitute of Reason. On this ground he declares in the *Sophist* that perfect Being (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν)—by which, of course, he means the Ideas—cannot be destitute of life and soul and intelligence.¹ And in at least one passage of his writings Plato definitely suggests the identity of the supreme Good with the “true and divine mind” (τὸν θεῖον καὶ ἀληθινὸν νοῦν).² If it be objected that we have no right to interpret the *Republic* by means of the later dialogues, we may reply that the same identification is implicitly involved in one of the dialogues almost universally allowed to belong to the same period as the *Republic*. Socrates in the *Phaedo* welcomes the Anaxagorean doctrine of a world-creating Reason as equivalent to the doctrine that there is no real cause except the Good; and it is just because Anaxagoras did not develop his epoch-making discovery to this conclusion, but contented himself instead with a host of secondary “causes,” falsely so called, that Plato pronounces him untrue to his own principles. Finally, it may be noted that we have an obvious literary parallel in Dante, to whom the Good is at once the object of universal desire, originating and maintaining all the life and movement of the world by means of the love which it awakens, and also the sovereign Intelligence or Mind who disposes all things for the best.³

We may take it, then, that this eternal and unchanging principle of Goodness, which Plato in the *Republic* calls the Idea of Good, and in the *Timaeus* the “maker and father of all,” supreme above all that is, the source alike of knowledge and of existence, the Alpha and Omega of every good⁴ represents the Platonic conception of the highest God—“one God and father of all,

¹ 249 A.

² *Phil.* 22 C.

³ See *Par.* 8. 97 ff., 24. 130 ff.

⁴ Dante, *Par.* 8. 87, la 've ogni ben si termina e s' inizia.

who is over all, and through all, and in all": εἰς θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν.¹

Let us now endeavour to understand the most important consequences, philosophical and religious, that would seem to follow from the doctrine we have been considering.

If the Good is the sole cause of Being, it will follow, in the first place, that the whole of Nature, so far as it really exists, is a revelation of God. This is the thought which Plato endeavours to work out in the *Timæus*, where he represents the world as a divine child, the "image of its maker, a perceivable God, most mighty and good, most beautiful and perfect."² The Creator, being altogether free from envy, desired that everything should be made as like as possible unto himself.³ The student of nature is consequently a seeker after God, provided he endeavours to trace, in the phenomena which he investigates, the operation of the Good. We have seen that Socrates tried to inculcate piety by dwelling on the adaptation of nature exclusively to the needs of man. The teleology of Plato is no longer anthropocentric. He believes that each particular organism has its appointed function to perform, and is good just in proportion as it fulfils the purpose and attains the end for which it was created by the divine mind. But at the same time all these different ends conspire together for the good of the whole, which is the ultimate or perfect end. The most emphatic assertion of this thoroughly Platonic doctrine occurs in a famous passage of the *Laws*. "The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion

¹ Eph. iv. 5.

² 92 C.

³ 29 E.

appropriate to it. . . . For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part.”¹

In the second place, if the Good is the only cause of existence, it would seem to be a necessary inference that nothing exists save in so far as it is good. That which we call evil or imperfection will therefore be pure and absolute negation. Such a view of evil is apparently involved in yet another passage of the *Republic*, where Plato describes the world of sensibles and opinables as intermediate between Being and not-Being.² The element of Being which it possesses comes from the immanent Idea; the rest, which we may call the evil, since it is that by which the world falls short of good, is the absolutely non-existent ($\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$). By means of this somewhat scholastic way of reasoning, a case might be made out for attributing to Plato a system, not of dualism, but of monism; and it may be allowed that in his treatment of the Good in the *Republic* he comes nearer to a monistic view of the universe than anywhere else throughout his dialogues. At the same time, unless there is still some hidden power that offers resistance to the Good, it is impossible to explain why the resemblance of the particular to the Idea should always be imperfect; for we cannot attribute this imperfection to the Good without sacrificing in that degree its essential quality of goodness. If we say, as is sometimes said, that the Idea can never fully realise itself in space and time, that “evil, whatever it may be, is more or less inherent in the very nature of matter and can never be totally abolished,” that it is “an inevitable accompaniment” of finite existence,³

¹ x. 903 B ff., tr. Jowett.

² v. 477 A ff.

³ See Archer-Hind's *Timaeus of Plato* p. 92.

and so on, we in reality set up a rival to the Good in this very principle of inevitability to which, so far, it has to yield. The truth would seem to be that Plato was too profoundly convinced of the effects of evil, both physical and moral, in the world as it now is, to acquiesce in a pantheistic denial of its existence. He tells us more than once that there is more evil than good in human life; and no one can read the extraordinarily powerful description in the *Republic* of the tyrannical man,¹ the living embodiment of active maleficence and vice, without feeling that moral evil at all events was something more to Plato than merely the absence or privation of good.

Hitherto I have spoken of the Supreme Idea as the efficient or creative cause; but in Plato it is represented also as the final cause—the cause δι' ὃ as well as δι' οὐ τὰ πάντα. It is with this conception of the Good that Plato begins his account of the subject; and I think he regarded it as more fundamental than any other. The Good, he says, is that “which every soul pursues, and with a view to it performs all actions, divining its existence (ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι), but perplexed and unable adequately to grasp its nature.”² Towards this highest end, indeed, not man alone, but the whole of Nature ceaselessly aspires—συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει, “groans and travails together in pain,” to borrow the strangely Platonic language of St. Paul;³ but in a special sense, it is the goal of human action and endeavour, the ideal to which man should aim at assimilating himself as well as the institutions he may be called upon to frame. The guardians of the perfect city, after they have fulfilled the necessary period of training, are to “lift up the radiant orb of their souls”—τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς

¹ ix. 571 A–580 A.

² vi. 505 E. Cf. Dante, *Purg.* 17. 127 ff. “Everyone confusedly apprehends a good in which the

mind may be at rest, and which it desires; wherefore every one strives to attain it” (tr. Norton).

³ Rom. viii. 22.

αὐγῆν — “and look upon that which giveth light to all, and having seen the Good itself, thereafter to order their country, their fellow-citizens, and themselves, in the likeness of that great exemplar.”¹ If, again, we consider the Idea of the Good, no longer in its transcendent, but in its immanent aspect, we may regard it as the power for ever working in the world against the forces that make for evil; so that man has the opportunity to become a co-worker with God in the attempt to establish a kingdom of heaven both within himself and upon the earth. To this idea Plato gives a characteristically religious expression in a striking passage of the *Laws*, thus translated by Jowett: “For as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies” — *ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες* — “and we are their property”² It is worthy of notice that Platonic dualism thus affords a solid foundation for morality. The guise under which morality is here presented is that of warfare; and it is just the existence of evil that makes the warfare possible.

We must recognise that the evil is there in order that it may be overcome. This is the true “Olympian victory” of which Plato sometimes speaks³ — “ever to cleave to the upward path and follow after righteousness and wisdom by every means in our power, that we may be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, both while remaining here, and when, like victors in the games collecting their rewards, we receive the prizes in store for virtue.”⁴ And so far at least as concerns

¹ vii. 540 A. Cf. p. 401 (*δουλοῦσι τῷ θεῷ*).

² x. 906 A.

³ *Rep.* v. 465 D.

⁴ *Rep.* x. 621 C. Cf. p. 412.

the individual, there is hope that the Good will ultimately prevail. The final triumph—the perfect “assimilation to God” which Plato makes the goal of human aspiration—we may suppose to be at last attained by those of whom he says that “having thoroughly cleansed themselves by philosophy, they live without bodies for all future time in mansions even more beautiful”¹ than the earthly paradise described in the *Phaedo*. I do not think, however, that Plato contemplates the ultimate victory of the principle of Goodness in the world as well as in the individual. It is true that in the *Laws* God is said to have disposed the several parts of the Universe in such a way as to secure as far as possible the defeat of evil and the triumph of Goodness in the whole.² But there is nothing here to suggest the ultimate elimination of evil altogether;³ the qualifying phrase “as far as possible” precludes such an idea; and in the *Theaetetus* we are told that evil can never perish, but necessarily haunts our mortal nature and this present world.⁴ Platonism furnishes no real analogy to that cosmic regeneration which is foretold in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans;⁵ nor is it easy to see how such a hope was possible for Plato, so long as he held that evil is inseparably bound up with the visible and material.

There remains the question, “By what means do we attain to knowledge, complete or partial, of the Good?” Plato’s answer is, “By means of dialectic.” When invited by Glauco to give an account of the character and content of the science, Socrates hesitates; and some have ventured to affirm that he had no answer ready. But the suggestions contained in the *Republic* do, in point of fact, enable us to form a tolerably clear conception of the

¹ *Phaed.* 114 C.

² x. 908 B. Cf. 897 C.

³ As Ackerman seems to sup-

pose (*Das Christliche in Plato* p. 320).

⁴ 176 A.

⁵ viii. 21.

general scope and character of the study, as it was understood by Plato when he wrote his greatest dialogue.

It will conduce to clearness if, before attempting to describe the nature of dialectic, we revert for a little to the subject of the hierarchy that prevails in the Ideal World. In the simile of the cave it is said that after the prisoner has emerged from the underworld and fulfilled a period of habituation which apparently symbolises the higher stages of the propaedeutic journey, he will begin by looking upon human creatures and other concrete things, after which he will lift his eyes to heaven by night, and see the moon and stars, till finally he is able to behold the sun: and then he will consider and understand that the sun is the steward (*ἐπιτροπεύων*) of all things visible, and in a certain sense the cause even of the shadows and images within the cave.¹ By the successive objects to which the now emancipated prisoner directs his gaze, first terrestrial things, and afterwards things celestial, Plato intends to suggest that there is a gradation of Ideas in the supra-celestial sphere. It may be noted by the way that the conception of a scale or ladder of Ideas leading upwards to the sovereign form of Good bears a general resemblance to patristic and mediaeval theories of those heavenly "dominions, principalities, and powers" to which St. Paul refers in the Colossians.² "In Origen," says Lightfoot,³ "we have five classes, which are given in an ascending scale in this order: (1) angels (*sancti angeli, τάξις ἀγγελικῆ*); (2) principdoms (*principatus, δύναμις ἀρχικῆ, ἀρχαί*); (3) powers (*potestates, ἐξουσίαι*); (4) thrones (*throni vel sedes, θρόνοι*); (5) dominations (*dominationes, κυριότητες*)."
The conception is greatly elaborated in later Christian speculation; thus, for example, in Dante⁴ we find three

¹ vii. 516 A, B.

² i. 16.

³ note *ad loc.*

⁴ *Convito* ii. c. 6 (p. 76 of K. Hillard's translation). See also *Paradiso* 28. 98 ff.

distinct hierarchies of spiritual beings, each with three orders, rising to the "supreme edifice of the Universe, in which all the world is included, and beyond which is nothing," the tenth or Empyrean heaven, "the abode of that Supreme Deity who alone doth perfectly behold Himself."¹ "These orders," says Dante, "are all upward gazing, and downward prevail, so that toward God they all are drawn, and they all draw."² Plato might have said the same of his Ideas; for every particular aspires to the Idea which it resembles, and each Idea in turn derives its being from the Good or God. With regard to the arrangement of Plato's hierarchy, we can readily understand the general principles by which it must have been determined. We may presume that each of the higher ideas has a wider scope than the next below it, and is also more excellent, since it is nearer to the Good; but Plato nowhere attempts a systematic treatment of the subject, perhaps for the reason that a complete classification of intelligibles in their varying degrees of interdependence and precedence would have been premature, in his day, as indeed it must always be premature, until there is nothing left for man to discover. The important point for us to observe is that Plato, though unable, of course, to justify his belief by the only method whereby it can be finally established, that is, by an induction which leaves no part of nature unexplored, did nevertheless emphatically hold that the universe of knowables constitutes a single organic whole, every part of which is related to every other in such a way that to know one thing perfectly is to know all. "Do you think it possible," he asks in one passage, "adequately to comprehend the nature of soul apart from universal nature?"³ "The whole of nature," we read in the *Meno*, "is to itself akin."⁴

¹ *Convito* ii. c. 4, pp. 65, 66 Eng. tr.

² *Par.* 28. 127 ff., tr. Norton.

³ *Phædr.* 270 C.

⁴ 81 C.

Let us now endeavour to understand the method by which Plato would have the rulers of his perfect city scale the successive heights of the Ideal World. They have learnt by this time to take a comprehensive and synoptic view of the different mathematical studies included in the propaedeutic curriculum; and this in itself forms a useful proposition for dialectic, since the dialectician is above all things *συνοπτικός*, one who is capable of "seeing things together" and reducing many scattered and apparently isolated phenomena under a single point of view.¹ But in other respects they have been satisfied with mathematical methods; and further progress is impossible until mathematical methods have been discarded. The mathematician begins with a series of hypotheses, comprising his so-called definitions of square, circle, triangle, etc.; and of these hypotheses he does not—*quid* mathematician, indeed, cannot—offer any proof: we must accept them, if at all, on trust. As soon as his hypotheses are granted, again, the mathematician proceeds by purely deductive ratiocination with the aid of sensible images or diagrams, downwards, as Plato would say, to a conclusion which in reality expresses nothing that was not implicitly involved in the hypotheses; nor does he, in the course of the argument, ever bring the subject-matter of his study into connection with any other department of thought. Now this is not what Plato calls "knowledge," in the proper meaning of the word. The mathematician "renders no account" of his principles; and "when a man's first principle is something which he does not know, while the conclusion and the intervening steps depend on what he does not know, how is it possible for such a harmony ever to become knowledge?"²

How then does the dialectician proceed? His object, we remember, is to apprehend the world of intelligibles,

¹ *Rep.* vii. 537 C; *Phaedr.* 265 D ff.

² *Rep.* vii. 533 C.

and the world of intelligibles is an organic system of mutually related Ideas, ascending by a perfectly graduated scale to the supreme Idea of Good, on which they all depend. Like the student of mathematics, the dialectician also starts from a hypothesis; but he does not treat his hypothesis as ultimate; on the contrary, to him it is something wholly provisional, only a stepping-stone (*ἐπιβάσις τε καὶ ὄρμη*) to something higher. Hence no sooner is the hypothesis propounded, than he proceeds at once to test it by the conclusions to which it leads. "If these conclusions are untenable, the original hypothesis is cancelled or annulled (*ἀναίρειται*), and a new suggestion takes its place, only to suffer the same fate. The process is repeated again and again, until at last we reach an *ἀρχή* or principle which will withstand every test."¹ The dialectician must not rest satisfied until, says Plato, "as it were in a battle, exhausting every weapon of refutation, striving to test his view not by that which seems, but by that which is, he comes safely to the end with reasoning that never stumbles."² "Thus each successive hypothesis serves as an additional step in the stair by which we ascend, and is useful to the dialectician just because he is willing to leave it and mount higher. In the completed dialectic which Plato adumbrates in Books VI. and VII., we are invited to suppose that the whole kingdom of knowables, in the spheres alike of Nature and of Man, has been surveyed and mapped out by this method. . . . The result is a number of true and irrefragable principles, apprehended not only in their mutual coherence and interdependence, but also in their relationship to the supreme Idea, which is itself, when we have climbed to the summit, no longer a hypothesis, but an 'unhypothetical first principle,'

¹ See my edition of the *Republic* of Plato, vol. ii. p. 176.

² *Rep.* vii. 534 C.

because the exhaustive scrutiny of all intelligibles has demonstrated that the Universe of thought and things derives all its reality from the Good.”¹

In this summary description of Plato’s dialectic there are one or two points that call for explanation and remark.

The first question which seems to suggest itself is this: What is the relation between the hypotheses of the dialectician and the Ideas? The answer would seem to be that, while the provisional, imperfect, or it may be wholly erroneous hypotheses which the dialectician has to discard, correspond only imperfectly or not at all to the Ideal Forms, those that finally survive, the “true and irrefragable principles” of which I have spoken, are perfect counterparts of the Ideas, provided, of course, that the dialectician has completed his ascent and finally adjusted them all in the light of the Good. They are subject to alteration and adjustment up to the last, like the changing figures of a landscape as we ascend a mountain.

In the second place, let us consider for a little the scientific value of this method of procedure by hypotheses. The essential condition of progress, according to Plato, is that we should be willing and eager to surrender our hypothesis as soon as it is proved inadequate. If we think of it, this is the principle on which any discussion or debate, having for its one and only object the discovery of truth, must necessarily be conducted. Just such a debate Plato intended the majority of his dialogues to represent; and throughout his writings we constantly meet with illustrations of the process which he calls τὸ ἀναρπείν τὰς ἰποθέσεις, “the cancelling of hypotheses.”² And if we take a wider survey, we shall see that the renunciation of hypotheses is a

¹ See my edition of the *Republic* of Plato, vol. ii. p. 176.

² *Ib.* vol. ii. p. 177.

principle essential to progress in every department of human inquiry. In all our investigations, we begin with a collection of isolated facts, and frame a provisional generalisation or hypothesis to account for them; in the light of new facts our generalisation is found to be imperfect or erroneous, and we discard it in favour of another, and so on, our hypothesis increasing in range and content as the horizon of facts expands; but there is no finality, until the phenomena have all been collated and arranged. The moment we acquiesce in any hypothesis as final, we become dogmatists, no longer philosophers or "seekers after truth," and progress is at an end. The history of investigation and discovery in whatever sphere of thought affords abundant evidence of this too frequently forgotten fact. On the one hand, the road by which science has always travelled is strewn with, nay rather is built out of, the wrecks of premature generalisations. And, on the other hand, the periods of greatest stagnation in discovery have been those in which powerful organisations and commanding thinkers have become, as it were, themselves ultimate hypotheses beyond which speculation is unwilling or afraid to travel. The paralysing influence exerted upon the scientific life of the Middle Ages by the union of ecclesiasticism and Aristotelianism is a case in point. Both these hypotheses had to be discarded, or at least revised, in order that the Renaissance might begin. And so it must always be in the intellectual as in the moral progress alike of the individual and of the race—we must always "rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things."

Plato speaks hopefully as though he believed it possible for his guardians to attain to a knowledge of the Good by the method which I have briefly indicated; but it is clear that his dialectic, like the objects which it seeks to comprehend, is in reality an Ideal. As such, it has a value of its own, because of its emphatic affirma-

tion of the essential unity of knowledge, and as foreshadowing the general lines on which knowledge has subsequently advanced.

But so far as the individual investigator is concerned, two further considerations deserve to be taken into account. Inasmuch as, according to Plato, the human mind is akin to the divine, we may suppose that intuition comes to the aid of the analytical or discursive intellect which the dialectician employs throughout his investigations. And, further, Plato's doctrine of immortality contains the suggestion of a continuous growth in knowledge throughout successive lives, until the goal is at last attained. We read in the *Phaedo* that "the soul takes nothing with her into Hades except her education."¹

In conclusion, it may be well to indicate in a few sentences what would seem to have been the sum and substance of Plato's theory of immortality. He believed, I think, that except in the case of some whose crimes are unpardonable—men who have done irremediable wrong to their fellows—the soul that came forth from God returns to him again, after her wanderings are fulfilled and her purification accomplished. One might, perhaps, argue that such a reunion with the universal mind involves the absorption or transmutation of the individual self into the kind of cosmic consciousness which Euripides describes in the lines—

"Albeit the mind
Of the dead live not, deathless consciousness
Still hath it, when in deathless aether merged."²

Our position on this matter will necessarily depend on the view we take of that which constitutes the "self" or "ego"; but it seems clear that Plato at least would have held that our essential personality is not extinguished

¹ 107 D.

² See p. 309.

by reunion with the divine; and it is noticeable that the conclusion which he draws from nearly all his attempted proofs of immortality in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere, has reference to the individual human soul, your soul and my soul. According to Plato, the true and essential "ego" is the rational and spiritual part of our nature, what he calls *Nous*; ¹ and he would consequently hold that we do not lose, but rather regain, our perfect individuality by union with the all-embracing, all-sustaining mind or spirit in which even now we live and move and have our being. Such, I conceive, is Plato's view of the ultimate destiny of the soul; and other philosophers have maintained a somewhat similar theory.² In this way immortality, according to Plato, becomes the crown and consummation of the religious life.

¹ Cf. *Phaed.* 64 A ff.

² See, e.g., Professor Royce's Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality.

INDEX

- Absolution from sin, 103.
 Absorption of soul, 107, 309.
 Aeschylus, 188-162; contrasted with Sophocles, 162 f.; teaching of, summarised, 161 f.
Agamemnon of Aeschylus, 144 f., 147, 150, 156 f.
 Age of Illumination or Enlightenment, 270-272, 286, 429.
 Ages of mankind, the five, 75-78.
 Agnosticism of Protagoras, 275; of Gorgias, 276; of Euripides, 295 f.
Aidos, 65.
Alceste of Euripides, 294.
 "All men have need of Gods," 21.
 "All things are full of Gods," 22.
 Allegorical interpretation as practised by the Greeks, 12-14; later history of the method, 14 f.
 Allegory, a Homeric, 47.
Amor intellectualis, 194, 396.
 Anaxagoras, 253-264; his theory of matter, 254 f.
 Anaximander, 184, 186-188.
 Anaximenes, 184, 188 f.
Andromache of Euripides, 292, 310.
 Anthropomorphism, 27-31, 112, 116; criticisms of, by Greek poetry and philosophy, 5 f., 116 f., 208-210.
Antigone of Sophocles, 166-170, 180 f.
 Antiphon, 278.
 Apocalypse, early Greek, 4, 104 f.
 Appetitive element in soul, 379 f.
 Apprehensibles, classification of, in Plato, 404-408.
 Archelaus, pupil of Anaxagoras, 279.
 Archilochus, 85, 89.
 Aristophanes, just and unjust arguments in, 16; attacks Euripides, 294; attacks Socrates, 353.
 Aristotle, as authority for Thales, 185 f.; for Anaximander, 186 f.; for Pythagoreans, 192, 194-197; for Xenophanes, 207, 209; for Empedocles, 250, 252; for Anaxagoras, 253, 260, 262; for Democritus, 268; for Protagoras, 273; for Socrates, 329, 346, 349; his criticisms on Plato, 369, 422-425.
 Arithmetic, 414 f.
 Art and Poetry, Plato's views on, 402-404.
 Asceticism in Greece, 102; in Plato, 378-386.
 Assimilation to God as ethical end, 18, 401, 413, 452.
 Astronomy, Plato's view of, 365, 416 f.
 Athens, condition of, in time of Socrates, 326 f.
 Atoms of Democritus, 268-270, 423.
 Atonement for sin, 53.
Bacchae of Euripides, 306, 312-318.
 Bacchylides, 84, 88.
 Beauty, Idea of. See *Idea*.
 Becoming, 244, 407, 410.
 Being, Parmenides' doctrine of, 243 f. See also *Idea*.
 Belief. See *Faith*.
 Bellerophon, 125.
Bellerophon of Euripides, 295.
 Body, as source of evil, 383; as tomb or prison-house of soul, 96-101, 182, 383, 385.
 Brotherhood, universal, 283.
 "Cannibal morality," 74, 281.
 Causation, Homer's conception of, 22 f. See also *Efficient cause* and *Teleology*.

- Cave, simile of the, 357-359; Orphic anticipation of, 100.
- Cerberus, 80.
- Children punished for sins of parents, 86 f.
- Choephoroi* of Aeschylus, 149, 152, 155, 159.
- Choice of lives in Orphic eschatology, 106.
- Christianity and Greek philosophy and poetry, 2, 14, 37, 51, 81, 176, 179, 240, 298, 331 f., 341, 352, 359 f., 373 f., 381-383, 385 f., 392, 395, 412, 429-432, 435, 436-438, 450 f.
- Circle of generation or Necessity, 100, 109, 111, 135.
- Cleanthes, 85, 210, 218, 223, 305, 341.
- Community of Gods and men, 45, 72, 116.
- Concupiscent element in soul. See *Appetitive do.*
- Conflagration, universal, 228-231.
- Conjecture, Platonic, 406.
- Conversion of soul, education as, 412.
- Creation out of nothing denied, by Empedocles, 244; by Anaxagoras, 254.
- Creator. See *God* and *Demiurgus*.
- Creon. See *Labdacidae*.
- Croton, a centre of early Orphism, 93.
- Daemon, the, leading men into sin, 87, 127, 147 f., 150; central, in Parmenides, 242, soul as guardian, in Plato, 377. See also *Gods*.
- Daemonium* of Socrates, 321-324.
- Daemons, doctrine of, in Greek thought, 71 f., 76, 99; identified by Zeller with images of Democritus, 270.
- Dante, Platonic elements in, 440, 447, 458 f.
- Daughters of Troy*, of Euripides, 297, 299, 310.
- Death, nature of, according to Homer, 56; as separation of body and soul, 384.
- Deceitfulness of the Gods, 39 f., 89. See also *Gods*.
- Definition, Socratic, 338 f., 422.
- Deianeira, 170 f.
- Demiurgus, the, 374, 376.
- Democritus, 268-270.
- Destiny. See *Fate*.
- Diagoras of Melos, 295.
- Dialectic, of Socrates, 332-340; of Plato, 396, 421, 452-459.
- Diogenes of Apollonia, 264-268.
- Dionysus, concept of, in Euripides, 314-318.
- Dionysus Zagreus, 113.
- Divination, ancient views of, 55.
- Divinity of the soul, 98 f., 107, 112 f., 116, 130, 132, 377.
- Drama, religious character of the Greek, 138.
- Dualism, of Pythagoreans, 194-196; of Empedocles, 252; of Anaxagoras, 262; of Plato, 361 f., 400, 449-452; of Plato and St. Paul compared, 381 f.
- Dynasties of Gods, 69 f., 139 f.
- Education, demand for, produces Sophists, 272; Socrates' view of, 339 f.; Plato's theory of, 398-421; preliminary or "musical," 399-404; intellectual, 404-460; scope and method of, 410-412.
- Efficient cause, in Empedocles, 245, 251; in Anaxagoras, 256; in Plato, 446-450.
- Electra*, of Sophocles, 181; of Euripides, 292 f.
- Elegiac poetry. See *Lyric and elegiac poetry*.
- Elements, the four, 244, 423.
- Elenchus, negative arm of the, 332-335.
- Eleusinian rites. See *Mysteries*.
- Empedocles, 244-253; connexion of, with Orphism, 99, 106, 253.
- Enthusiasm, spirit of, 315-318.
- Environment, effect of, upon morality, 51, 89, 402.
- Envy, the divine, 37, 89, 123-125, 156 f.
- Erebus, 57.
- Erinna, 90.
- Eros. See *Love*.
- Eschatology: Homer, 56-61; Hesiod, 80; Hymn to Demeter, 82 f.; Lyric and elegiac poetry, 90 f.; Orphism, 104-110; Empedocles, 106; Pindar, 131-137; Aeschylus, 159-161; Sophocles, 180-183; Heraclitus, 237-239; Anaxagoras,


- 264; Diogenes of Apollonia, 267 f.; Euripides, 306-310; Socrates, 344-347; Plato, 459 f.
- Eternal punishment, 60, 106, 135.
- Eternity. See *Idea* and *God*.
- Eumenides* of Aeschylus, 15 f., 142, 152.
- Euripides, 286-319; fusion of philosophy and poetry in, 19, 299-304, 308-310; contrasted with Sophocles, 298 f., 319; looked on as disbeliever by Athenians, 294; his connexion with Heraclitus, 303; his teaching summarised, 318 f.
- Evil, attributed to the Gods, 86, 64 f., 118; origin of, according to Hesiod, 78; derived from body, 383. See also *Dualism*.
- Faith, 407.
- Fasting from sin, 111.
- Fatalism and religion, 110.
- Fate, position of, in Homer, 25; in other Greek poets, 70 (Hesiod), 84 (lyric and elegiac poets), 118 f. (Pindar), 141 f. (Aeschylus).
- Final cause. See *Teleology*.
- Fire as cosmological principle, 223-235, 239 f.
- Flesh, St. Paul's use of word, 332.
- Flux, universal, 231 f., 423.
- Fortune, the Goddess, 119.
- Friar, the Orphic, 104.
- Friendship in Empedocles. See *Love*.
- Geometry, plane and solid, 415 f. See also *Mathematical law of universe*.
- Gnomic poets, 83-91.
- God, in Xenophanes, 200-209; uncreated, 207; in Heraclitus, 225-234; in Empedocles, 248-251; in Anaxagoras, 263 f.; in Plato, 361-374, 400-402; transcendence of, 372. See also *Idea*.
- Gods, example of the, used to enforce a particular line of conduct, 15-18; their nature and attributes, 27-42, 64 f., 71-73, 83-89, 116-129, 139-159, 176-178; mislead men, 38-41, dynasties of, 69 f., 139; existence of, denied by Democritus, 269; attitude of Protagoras towards, 275; rationalisation of, by Prodicus, 277; attitude of Euripides towards, 288, 304; must possess moral goodness, 297; no hegemony among, 298; self-sufficiency of, in Euripides, 298; attitude of Socrates towards, 346-352; the created, in Anaximander, 188; in Plato, 375 f., 378.
- Golden Age, the, 76.
- Good, the Gods as givers of, 41, 118; Idea of, see *Idea of Good*.
- Gorgias, 276 f.
- Hades. See *Erebus* and *Eschatology*.
- Harmonics, 417 f.
- Harmony, universal, 173-175, 236, 304; of opposites, 232 f.
- Hatred, in Empedocles, 245-247, 250 f.
- Heaven, the Orphic conception of, 107-109.
- Hecuba* of Euripides, 303, 310.
- Helena* of Euripides, 295, 309.
- Heraclitus, 212-240; views of, on suffering, 174 f., misanthropy of, 212-214; style of, 214 f.; obscurity of, 215 f.; connexion of, with Orphism, 237-239.
- Heroes, the age of, 77.
- Hesiod, the religion of, 68-81.
- Hippias, 279.
- Hippolytus* of Euripides, 16 f., 236-239, 293, 304 f.
- Homer and the Homeric religion, 21-67.
- Homeric legends, denounced by Euripides and Plato, 17 f., 291 f., 401 f.
- Homeric poems as sacred volume of the Greeks, 9-11.
- Homeridae, the, 11.
- Homo Mensura*, 274.
- Homocomerics of Anaxagoras, 254, 423.
- Hope often conceived of as an evil by the Greeks, 79 f.
- Humanism of Euripides, 304-306.
- Hylozoism, 184-190, 222, 251.
- Hymns, the Homeric, 81-83.
- Hypotheses, Platonic, 455-458.
- Idea, Platonic, transcendence of, 424; immanence of, 424; unity of, 425; immutability and changelessness of, 426; perfection of, 426; relation of particular to,

- 432-438; as type, 431, 436; relation of hypothesis to, 457.
- Idea of Beauty, 391-395.
- Idea of Good, 408 f., 439-452; as source of knowledge and existence, 441 f.; as Sun of Ideal World, 439-441; identified with God, 442-452; with Nous, 446.
- Idealism, element of, in the poetical theology of Greece, 6, 29-42, 117 f.
- Ideas, hierarchy of, 438 f., 453 f.; theory of, 422-459; origin of theory of, 422-424; criticisms of, 434.
- Ignorance identified with vice, 326-332.
- Images, in Democritus, 269; in Plato, 405.
- Imitative art, Views of Plato on, 402, 445.
- Immortality. See *Eschatology*.
- Incarnation, Orphic doctrine of, 99-101.
- Inconsistency of the poetical theology, 29-41, 42 f.
- Individualism, Heraclitus' protest against, 287.
- Induction, Socratic, 338 f.
- Infatuation, 50, 87 f., 126 f.
- Inferno, Pindar's, 134 f.
- Innocent, the, suffer with the guilty, 73, 128.
- Insolence. See *Pride*.
- Inspiration, nature of, 14, 33 f., 433.
- Intellectual character of Greek morality, 50, 89, 327-332, 407-409.
- Intelligibles, as last two sections of Plato's line, 413-421, classification of, 453 f.
- Intermediate state, the, 104-106.
- Ion* of Euripides, 292.
- Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides, 297.
- Iron, the age of, 77.
- Irony of Socrates, 334.
- Irrational element in man, 380 f.
- Islands of the blest, 60 f., 77, 80, 135 f.
- Ixion, 126, 135.
- Jus talionis*. See *Lex talionis*.
- Justice, the divine, shown in punishment of sin, 41 f., 52, 71-75, 85 f., 120, 127 f., 145; in the reward of virtue, 65, 73, 86, 127 f., 145; the duty of, 74; concept of, in Sophocles, 172; as interest of stronger, 281 f.; concept of, in Euripides, 302-304; Socrates' view of, 343 f.
- Knowledge opposed to opinion, 205 f.; way of, 242; identified with virtue, 327-332; Socrates' conception of, 329 f.; Plato's conception of, 441, 455-459.
- Labdacidae, legend of the, 148-150, 166-173.
- Labour, the duty of, preached by Hesiod, 80.
- Law, conflict between divine and human, 165-169.
- Law and nature, antithesis between, 279-284, 303.
- Lex talionis*, 42, 52, 154.
- Life, the brevity of, a reason for strenuous endeavour, 67, 130.
- Life according to nature, 281.
- Limit of Pythagoreans, 194-196.
- Line, simile of the, 404-408.
- Logos, in Heraclitus, 216-225, 233-235, 239 f., 371; in Stoics, Philo, and N.T., 239 f., 371, 438; Socratic, 338 f., 423 f.
- Love, in Empedoclea, 245-247, 250 f.; Plato's doctrine of, 387-397.
- "Love your friends and hate your enemies," 37, 75, 89, 343 f.
- Lyric and elegiac poetry, religious ideas of, 83-91.
- Macrocosm and Microcosm, 366, 375.
- Madness of Heracles* of Euripides, 239-291, 297, 304 f., 310.
- Maieutic art of Socrates, 339 f.
- Man, his duty to the Gods, 43-54, 73; nobility of the Homeric, 66 f.
- "Man is the measure of all things," 274.
- Mathematical law of universe, 364, 367, 420.
- Mathematical study, objects of, according to Plato, 369; in educational curriculum, 414-420.
- Meditatio mortis*, 384 f.
- Melancholy, Greek, 53, 62-66, 78, 89 f., 110, 128 f., 179 f., 310 f.
- Memory and Forgetfulness, the fountains of, 105.
- Metempsychosis, 101 f., 106, 133 f.
- "Might is right," 281-283.
- Mind, in Anaxagoras. See *Nous*.

- Miracles and the miraculous in Homer, 24.
 Misogynism, 76, 79 f.
 Monism, Plato's approach to, 449.
 Monotheism, traces of, real or alleged, in Greek poetry, 25-27, 122, 143 f., 176-178; of Xenophanes, 200-211. See also *God*.
 Motion, as physical change, 368.
 Movent cause. See *Efficient cause*.
 Music. See *Harmonics* and *Education*.
 Mysteries, the Eleusinian, 82 f., 137, 138; influence of, on Plato, 395 f., 430; Orphic mysteries, 102-104.
- Natural and supernatural, not yet distinguished in Homer, 24.
 Natural theology, a development of Greek metaphysics, 2.
 Naturalism and Idealism in the religion of Homer, 29-42.
 Nature and law, antithesis between, 279-284, 303.
Ne quid nimis, 124, 126, 131.
 Necessity, doctrine of, in the *Timaeus*, 361 f., 364 f., 444.
 Necrosis, St. Paul's doctrine of, 386.
 New Testament, analogies to. See *Christianity and Greek philosophy and poetry*.
Niobe of Aeschylus, 147.
 Noocracy, as substance of Socrates' teaching, 342.
 Nous, in Anaxagoras, 254-264; in Democritus, 268 f.; as fragment of aether, 309; in Plato, 361 f.; as eye of soul, 377; links man to God, 380 f.; unites with Being or Beauty, 395; apprehends third and fourth sections of Line, 405, 413-421.
- Oedipus, legend of house of. See *Labdacidae*.
Oedipus at Colonus of Sophocles, 171-173, 178 f.
Oedipus the King of Sophocles, 165 f., 171.
 Old Testament, analogies to, 24 f., 28, 37, 40, 75, 86 f., 155 f., 203.
 Olympian theology, Homer and Hesiod as founders of, 7.
 Olympus, 31 f.
 Omnipotence of the Gods, 31, 89, 117.
 Omnipresence, the divine, 24.
 Omniscience, the divine, 33, 89, 120.
 Omophagia, 102, 114.
 Opinables, 406-408, 449.
 Opinion, opposed to knowledge, 205 f.; apprehends the first two sections of the Line, 405; correct, 407.
 Opposites, harmony of. See *Harmony*.
Orestea, the, 148-156, 160 f.
Orestes of Euripides, 292.
 Orphoetelestae, 104.
 Orphic communities, 93 f.
 "Orphic life," the, 102.
 Orphic religious ideas, 92-114; absence of, in Sophocles, 132.
 Orphism, literature of, 93-95, 103.
 Orthodoxy, ancient Greek, 7.
 Otherness and Sameness, 367-370.
- Pandora, 78 f.
 Panspermism, 99.
 Pantheism, 98 f., 118, 144, 210, 233 f., 252, 300.
 Parmenides, 241-244.
 Parousia. See *Idea, immanence of*.
 Participation. See *Idea*.
 Particulars. See *Idea*.
 Pelops, 117.
Persas of Aeschylus, 145-148, 156.
 Personality, Homer's conception of, 29, 54-56; Plato's view of, 56; of God, 210, 446-448.
 Pessimism. See *Melancholy*.
Phaedo of Plato discussed, 383-386.
 Phanes, 96.
Philoctetes of Aeschylus, 159.
Philoctetes of Sophocles, 174.
 Philosopher, the true, 396 f., 408.
 Philosophy, aim of, 383; as "rehearsal of death," 384; as the highest music, 387.
 Pindar, 115-137.
 Pittacus of Mitylene, 75.
 Plato, his relationship to Socrates, 356 f.; and St. Paul, 359 f., 381-383, 385 f., 395, 412, 436-438, 450, 453; and St. John, 486-438; cosmology of, 361-374; his conception of God, 361-374, 442-446; called "the atticising" Moses, 15, 374; psychology of, 377-381; his theory of education, 398-421; his views on Poetry and Art, 402-404;

- his theory of Ideas, 422-459; teleology of, 448-451.
- Poet, the, conceived of as a teacher by the Greeks, 9-11.
- Poetical theology of Greece, protests against the, 4-6; purification of, after Homer, 19.
- Poetry, influence of, in Greek life and thought, 7-18; true function of, 403 f.
- Poetry and Philosophy, place of, in Greek religious development, 1-20; their mutual antagonism, and its cause, 2-6, 401 f.; fusion of, in Euripides, 19, 299-303, 308-310.
- Politicus*, myth of the, 78.
- Polytheism, Greek, 25, 122; attacks of Xenophanes on, 201 f.; do. of Euripides, 293 f.
- Prayer, 45-48, 89, 352.
- Pride, 126 f., 145, 150.
- Prodicus, 277 f.
- Prometheus, the legend of, 79, 189-141.
- Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus, 139-142, 157 f.
- Protagoras, 278-276.
- Providence, 120 f., 349 f.
- Psychology. See *Soul*.
- Purgatory, 105, 134.
- Purity, notion of, in Orphism, 101, 106; religious, in Sophocles, 178.
- Punishment, the law of, 52, 135; retributory and remedial, 154-156; remedial, 330 f. See also *Suffering*.
- Pythagoreanism, 190-197; connexion of, with Orphism, 190-193; scientific doctrine of, 194-197.
- Quadrivium*, 419.
- Quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat*, 38 f., 87 f.
- Rationalism of Euripides, 318.
- Rationalistic movement in Athens, 271 f.
- Reason. See *Logos* and *Nous*.
- Recording angel, the, in Greek literature, 72.
- Remonstrances, examples of, addressed to the Gods, 48, 87.
- Republic* of Plato, the, theory of education in, 399-421, (dialectic) 452-459; theory of Ideas in, 439-452; views on poetry and art in, 401-404, 407.
- Restoration of all things, the, 78, 109, 248.
- Retribution and reward hereafter, 59 f., 104-111, 134-136.
- Return to nature, desire for, 231.
- Rites and ceremonies of Orphism, 102 f.
- Rivers of the underworld, 57.
- Sacrifice, 43-45, 73 f., 89, 351.
- St. John and Plato, 436-438.
- St. Paul and Plato, 359 f., 381-383, 385 f., 395, 412, 436-438, 450, 453.
- Sameness and Otherness, 367-370.
- Sense perception, Plato's distrust of, 365, 413-431. See also *Opinion*.
- Sensibles as lowest stage of truth, 370, 405-408, 449.
- Seven against Thebes. See *Labdacidae*.
- Seven against Thebes* of Aeschylus, 149 f., 152 f.
- Simonides, 90, 275 f.
- Sin, origin and nature of, as depicted in Greek poetry, 48-52, 87 f., 125-127, 145-154; possibility of atonement for, 53; ante-natal sin, in Orphism, 97 f.; Orphic conception of sin in general, 111 f.
- Sin-offering, nature of, in Homer, 53.
- Sisyphus, 135.
- Slavery, attacks on, 283 f.
- Socrates, 320-355; introduces new intellectual and spiritual era, 320; his character, 321-327, 342 f., 352 f.; *daemonium* of, 321-324; his mission to Athenians, 324-328; servant of Apollo, 325; identifies virtue with knowledge and vice with ignorance, 327-332; his conception of knowledge, 329; his optimism, 332; method of teaching, 332-340; his irony, 334; produces perplexity, 334; studies man exclusively, 336 f.; method of induction and definition (*logos*), 338 f.; uses plebeian illustrations, 338 f.; relationship to disciples, 339 f.; substance of his teaching, 340-355; effect of his teaching, 334 f.; his doctrine of self-knowledge, 342; forbids requital of evil with evil, 348; his views on immortality, 344-347; his teleology, 347-350; his views on worship and

- sacrifice, 350 f.; on prayer, 352; his trial and condemnation, 353-355.
- Solon, 84-88.
- Sophists, 272-285; as professional teachers, 272 f.
- Sophocles, 163-183; piety of 164; contrasted with Aeschylus, 162 f.; with Euripides, 293 f., 319.
- Soul, Homer's view of the, 56; Orphic doctrine of its origin and history, 96-114; the Pindaric do., 131-137; Empedocles' do., 252; immortality of, denied by Democritus, 268; divine origin of, in Plato, 377; parts of, in Plato, 379, 381. See also *Eschatology* and *Nous and World-soul*.
- Sphere-god of Empedocles, 246 f.
- Spirit, St. Paul's use of the, 381 f.
- Spirited part of soul, 379 f.
- Spirits of the departed affect fortunes of the living, 160 f., 182.
- Spiritualisation of the Godhead, 32 f. See also *God and Gods*.
- , universal, 281; in Empedocles, *Hatred*.
 ing, the problem of, 73, 86 f., -175; due to sin, 154, 169 f.; road to knowledge, 155 f., 172-400.
 as offspring of Idea of Good, -441.
- ants of Aeschylus, 142 f., f.; of Euripides, 294, 308.
- osium, of Plato discussed, -397.
- otic view of studies, 420, 455.
- s, 102.
- lus, 117, 135.
- rus, 60, 70, 106, 139.
- ogy of Diogenes of Apollonia,
 ; of Anaxagoras, 262 f.; of Soc-
 s, 347-350; of Plato, 448-451.
- s, 184-186.
- nis, 85-88, 295.
- ony, the, of Hesiod, 68-71.
- ymachus, 278.
- Timaeus* of Plato, cosmology of, 360-374; dualism in, 361 f.; doctrine of Necessity and Reason in, 361 f., 364 f.; account of human soul in 376-379; as "hymn of the Universe," 378; influence of, among Hellenising Jews, 373 f.
- Time as moving image of eternity, 375.
- Timon the satirist, 5.
- Tityos, 185.
- Trachiniae* of Sophocles, 170, 173 f.
- Trinity, resemblance in Plato to the doctrine of the, 371 f.
- Trivium*, 419.
- Truth, the foundation of virtue, 121; way of, 242; offspring of *Nous* and Beauty, 396.
- Truthfulness, the divine, 121, 157 f., 207 f.
- "Two evils to one good," 86 f., 64, 129; denied by Euripides, 311.
- Tyrannical man, the, 450.
- Tyrtaeus, 85.
- Unity of God. See *Monothism*.
- Universals. See *Logos* and *Ideas*, *Theory of*.
- Unlimited, the, in Pythagoreanism, 194-196.
- Upward and downward road, in Heraclitus, 281.
- Vice identified with ignorance, 326-332.
- Virtue, rewarded by prosperity, 51, 73, 128; attained by toil, 81; identified with knowledge, 327-332.
- Wheel of generation. See *Circle of do*.
- Wisdom, divine. See *Nous*.
- "Wise men" or "sages," 97.
- Women, creation of, 76, 79.
- Word, the. See *Logos*.
- Works and Days*, the, of Hesiod, 71-81.
- World as incarnate God, 209, 363-374.
- World-soul, theory of, in Plato, 366-378.
- Xenophanes, 198-211; his connexion with Orphism, 199 f.
- Xenophon, religious disposition of, 321, 337; and Aristotle concerning Socrates, 346.
- Zagreus, 113.
- Zeus, the Homeric, 26 f., 32, 38-40, 48; the Hesiodic, 71-73; in lyric and elegiac poetry, 83 f.; in Orphism, 95; in Pindar, 119, 122 f.; the Aeschylean Zeus, 141, 142-145.



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